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This thesis is a systematic legal study on “Dirty Industry Migration” (“DIM”). The 
hypothesis of DIM postulates that free trade and investment without an adequate 
consideration on environmental factors would drive pollution-intensive industries to 
migrate to countries with laxer environmental regulations or to the “pollution havens”. 
Developed countries generally tend to deny the existence of DIM while developing 
countries exhibit a vigilant attitude towards its trueness. In this thesis, the author first 
poses an important empirical question—“have dirty industries migrated to China”. 
Based on the theoretical analytical model established by the author and empirical 
evidence collected through the author’s fieldwork, this thesis concludes that in specified 
industries there is solid evidence for DIM from developed countries to China. Based on 
this finding, the thesis explores the causes of DIM and the problems it creates. It 
examines the available international / domestic legal frameworks which formally 
regulate DIM, as well as voluntary codes relating to corporate environmental citizenship 
and social responsibility which bear implications on the regulation of DIM.  
 
This thesis selects the Chinese regulatory framework of DIM as a major case for study. 
It aims at providing law and policy suggestions on a national development strategy that 
moderates the adverse environmental effects of dirty industry migration, without 
sacrificing the country’s continued economic growth and international competitiveness. 
The experience of China provides useful guidance to other developing countries seeking 
to emulate or draw lessons from China’s management of DIM.   
 ix 
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Prelude: The Origin of “Dirty Industry Migration” Debate 
 
On February 8, 1992, an article titled “Let Them Eat Pollution” was published in The 
Economist, which leaked an internal memo by Lawrence Summers, the World Bank’s 
chief economist at the time. He suggested, on the basis of his economic analysis, that 
the World Bank should consider encouraging the migration of pollution intensive 
industries to developing countries. 1  This, of course, aroused significant unrest and 
controversy among economic theorists, environmentalists and the general public.  
 
The term “Dirty Industry Migration” (hereinafter DIM), in a narrow sense, refers to the 
hypothesis that free trade and investment without an adequate consideration on 
environmental factors drives pollution-intensive industries to migrate to countries with 
laxer environmental regulations or to the “pollution havens”.  
 
According to the classical trade theories based on comparative advantage, countries will 
generally produce and export goods manufactured with factors that are abundant within 
the country and will import those for which factors of production are scarce. On this 
basis, economic theorists, policymakers from both industrialized and industrializing 
                                                 
1
 In urging the World Bank to encourage the migration of dirty industries to Less Developed Countries (“LDC”), 
Summers argued that worldwide welfare will be maximized by locating dirty industries in LDCs because: (1) the 
income lost through health-impairing pollution will be lower in countries with lower wage levels; (2) many under-
populated LDCs are under-polluted (as compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City); and (3) the demand for a clean 
environment for aesthetic and health reasons will be greater in wealthy countries than in poor countries. The 
Economist, (Feb. 8, 1992). at 66. 
 2 
nations, spokesmen for international agencies and private corporations all tend to 
assume that highly polluting industries would gradually move from industrialized 
countries with scarce environmental factor endowments to countries where such factors 
are abundant.2  
 
China is the largest developing country in the world with a population over 1.3 billion. 
Like other developing economies, China has taken an open attitude towards 
international trade and investment. In 2002, China has surpassed the U.S. and became 
the world’s largest foreign direct investment (“FDI”) recipient. 3  Since 2004 it has 
become the world’s 3rd largest trading country in both import and export. 4  In the 
meantime, China had a notorious record for mass industrialization at the cost of 
environmental protection.5 In a sense, China has the potential of becoming a “pollution 
haven” as Summers suggested. Furthermore, as China’s international influence 
increases with its expanding economic power, many other developing countries tend to 
emulate China in their economic and social policies. Hence a clear understanding on 
China’s attitude towards DIM not only has policy implications for the country itself, but 
                                                 
2
  See Low, P. & A. Yeats, “Do ‘Dirty’ Industries Migrate?”, in P. Low, International Trade and the Environment, 
World Bank Discussion Paper No. 159 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992), at 2. 
3
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), World Investment Report 2003, “FDI 
Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives” (New York and Geneva, 2003) 
4
 World Trade Organization (“WTO”) statistics, <http://stat.wto.org> Accessed June 10, 2006.  
5
 It was suggested that the mass industrialization of the 1950s led to increased environmental deterioration. The worst 
period occurred during the “Great Leap Forward” (1958-60) when factories were built without giving proper 
consideration to environmental protection measures. During the “Cultural Revolution” (1966-76), urban construction 
defied all existing planning and regulations. The polluting factories were built right in the middle of residential areas, 
causing serious damage to their surroundings. More recently, with the adoption of the open-door policy since the 
early 1980s, the implementation of the government initiative for opening up the Western Region and China’s 
accession to the WTO, industrial expansion, municipal growth, highway construction, energy development and 
mineral extraction were promoted both as ends in themselves and as the means by which the lives of the 1.3 billion 
population would improve. See Zhao Yuhong, “Environmental Dispute Resolution in China” (2000) Journal of 
Environmental Law Vol 16 No. 2, at 157  and Wang Canfa et al (Eds), Studies on Environmental Pollution Disputes 
in East Asia: Cases from Mainland China and Taiwan (Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, 2001). 
 3 
also for other developing countries which are seeking similar development strategies to 
that of China.  
 
The author’s selection of this topic for his Ph. D research is based on the above 
background. The basic questions this thesis is going to address are: Have dirty 
industries migrated to China? If yes, how is that achieved? To what extent is DIM a 
result of China’s environmental laxity? What international and domestic regulations on 
dirty industry migration are available? Are they adequate, fair, and effective? Other than 
the international and domestic regulation of DIM, what other factors contribute to the 
regulation of DIM? Carrying these questions, the main objective of this thesis is to 
examine the DIM hypothesis in the context of China. Based on theoretical analysis and 
empirical findings, the author will evaluate the role of law and other institutions in 
China’s regulation of DIM.  
   
1.2 DIM under Globalization—Some Basic Understandings 
 
The dichotomy between “clean” and “dirty” industries is made here in definitional 
terms to test out certain hypotheses common to the debate on globalization. Those who 
favor globalization argue that increased globalization through liberalization of the flow 
of assets will lead to greater prosperity for all and a resultant reduction of poverty in the 
developing world. On this basis, all foreign investment must initially at least be 
regarded as clean and beneficial to the developing world, including China, the largest 
developing economy.  
 4 
  
In this thesis, clean industry is contrasted to dirty industry. In Summers’ definition, a 
dirty industry was confined to highly pollutive industries and Summers exhorted such 
industries to go to developing countries. Here, although our research will focus on the 
environmental aspect of DIM, it must be understood that the definition of dirty 
industries is wider than that the environmental aspect of industries. A dirty industry is 
the opposite of the clean industry in the neo-liberal scheme.6 It is the type of industry 
which does not produce the economic development that the neo-liberal model demands 
of all foreign investment. While the neo-liberal model is averse to the idea of the 
existence of dirty industries in this sense, there is no doubt that dirty industries exist and 
a large number of such industries go into the developing countries.7 These industries are 
clearly detrimental to economic development and their entry obviously should not be 
encouraged by the developing countries. Quite apart from this, the usefulness of these 
flows has to be assessed not only from the value of the flow to the host state but also in 
the context of the newly articulated values of the international community. These new 
values stress economic development, the absence of pollution, the non-abuse of human 
rights, the eradication of corruption and similar aims. Globalization may promote 
economic liberalization but it also brings about situations in which the values of the 
international community interact with local values, giving strength to the latter so that 
                                                 
6
 The “Neo-liberal Scheme” or “Neo-liberalism” is a set of economic policies that have become widespread during 
the last 30 years or so. Neo-liberalism as a strategy for economic development can be summarized to include several 
aspects: (1) the flow of capital, goods, and services free from state or government interference; (2) deregulation, 
allowing the market forces to self-regulate; (3) privatization of public enterprise and state owned economic assets; 
and (4) a greater move to individualism and individual responsibility. The removal of trade barriers such as tariffs, 
regulations, certain standards, legislation and regulatory measures, as well as removal of restrictions on capital flows 
and investments play a crucial role in accomplishing the economic and political goals of neo-liberalism. See 
generally Stigliz, Joseph E. Globalization and its discontents (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2002). 
7
 For a review of literatures recording evidences of industry-specific migration from developed to developing 
countries, see infra Chapter 2.6.2.   
 5 
local solutions enhancing global values may be advanced. In view of such reality, we 
consider the construction of international and domestic laws on dealing with the 
migration of dirty industries to be necessary.  
 
This thesis is a contribution to the study on the construction of laws to deal with DIM. It 
takes into account the fact that there is an emergence of values of the international 
community in certain areas which have been articulated and that these are in opposition 
to the values of neo-liberalism which seems to call for unrestricted flows of foreign 
investment on the belief that such flows are beneficial to development. These values 
which indicate support for the control of dirty industry migration are counterpoised with 
neo-liberalism. A balanced and nuanced approach finds their expressions in domestic 
and international trade, investment, and environmental legal instruments. 
 
1.3 Current Research Status 
 
Attentions on DIM started as early as 1970s when the United States suddenly tightened 
its environmental laws. As a result, some Multinational Corporations (“MNCs”) have 
threatened to relocate to other countries with laxer environmental standards.8 During the 
1980s and 1990s there were heated debates on “whether or not dirty industries are 
                                                 
8
  There is empirical proof confirms that at least some American industries’ international location patterns have been 
significantly affected by environmental regulations in the U.S. See Barry I. Castleman, “The Export of Hazardous 
Factories to Developing Nations” (1979) 9 Int'l J. Health Serv. 569; Leonard, H. Jeffrey, Pollution and the struggle 
for the world product (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988), at 111-112. In particular, “manufacturers of 
asbestos, arsenic trioxide, benzidine-based dyes, certain pesticides and a few other carcinogenic chemicals, some 
basic mineral processing industries, including those involved in copper, lead and zinc processing, and some 
producers of intermediate organic chemicals have exported their "dirty industry" to the developing world.” See Alan 
Neff, “Not in Their Backyards, Either: A Proposal for a Foreign Environmental Practices Act” (1990) 17 Ecology 
L.Q. 477, at 484.  
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migrating from developed to developing countries”. 9  Applying different empirical 
research methods, different scholars came up with opposing conclusions. While most 
researchers agreed upon the evidence that some industries do migrate, they nevertheless 
deny that gaps in environmental standards between countries played a significant role in 
such “migration”.10 So far the prevailing academic view seems to be that there was not 
much empirical evidence to support DIM hypothesis, mainly because environment 
compliance cost covers only a very small part of the total cost in the production.11 In 
other words, compared to endowments of the traditional factors considered to 
characterize comparative advantage in neo-classical trade theory, differences in 
environmental standards might be negligible, and dirty industries do not have much 
incentive to migrate.”12  
 
                                                 
9
  For a literature review on the debates and different arguments on this topic, see OECD “Environmental Issues in 
Policy-based Competition for Investment: A Literature Review” (2002) 
ENV/EPOC/GSP(2001)11/FINAL,<http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2001doc.nsf/LinkTo/env-epoc-gsp(2001)11-final> 
Accessed Dec, 27, 2006. 
10
 Literatures that hold this view include: For example, Tobey, James A., “The Effects of Domestic Environmental 
Policies On Pattern Of World Trade: An Empirical Test”, (1990) 43 (2) Kyklos, World Bank Series Studies 191; Low 
& Yeats, supra note 2; Lucas, Robert E.B., David Wheelr and Hemamala Hettige, “Economic Development, 
Environmental Regulation and the International Migration of Toxic Industrial Pollution, 1960-1988,” in Patrick Low, 
ed., International Trade and the Environment (Washington, DC:  World Bank 1992); Repetto, R. “Jobs, 
Competitiveness, and Environmental Regulation: What Are the Real Issues?” (1995) WRI Research Report, 
Washington, DC; Xing, Y, and C. Kolstad, “Do Lax Environmental Regulations Attract Foreign Investments?” (1995) 
Working Papers in Economics, 06/95, May 1995, University of California, Santa Barbara; Levinson, A., 
“Environmental Regulations and Manufacturer’s Location Choices: Evidence from the Census of Manufacturing”, 
(1996) Journal of Public Economics (61), no. 1 (October), pp. 5-29. 
11
 There has been some controversy over the true environmental cost among industries and in different states. It is 
mainly because the global costs of compliance with environmental regulations are hampered by a lack of available 
data, Studies by the WTO indicate that complying with environmental regulations in the United States (since U.S. 
published such data) accounts for 0.6% of production costs for most industries, rising to between 1.5% and 2% of the 
costs of production for the most pollution-intensive industries (petroleum and coal products, chemicals and allied 
products, metal industries, and paper and allied products). See WTO, Trade and Environment 35 (1999). By contrast 
to this, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") in Europe did a study of the costs of 
compliance in the iron and steel industries and found a larger range of compliance costs, concluding that “direct 
environmental costs are believed to account for 1-5 percent of production costs.” See OECD, The Effects of 
Government Environmental Policy on Costs and Competitiveness: Iron and Steel Sector, DSTI/SI/SC(97) 46 (1997), 
At country level, studies indicate that environmental protection expenditures account for one to two percent of Gross 
National Product in developed countries. See Sanford E. Gaines, “The Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic 
Equity to Environmental Ethos”, (1991) 26 Tex. Int'l  L.J. 463, at 465. 
12
 Tobey, supra note 10, at 205. 
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The prevailing academic view seems to be a reassuring finding both for industrialized 
countries concerned with a loss of competitiveness from strict environmental standards, 
and for developing countries as they contemplate stronger environmental protection. 
However, despite the plausibility of this argument, there is not much conclusive 
empirical evidence. Furthermore, as there is previously little empirical research on DIM 
which focuses on China,13  the applicability of this argument in a China context is 
questionable. Up till now the DIM remains a debatable issue in economics and other 
areas of social science.  
 
1.4 Originality of this Research 
 
Compared with the previous research in this area, this research has the following 
strengths:  
 
(1) It challenges the previous conclusions by re-defining DIM under globalization 
The author holds the opinion that previous conclusions on DIM require re-examination 
because the term “dirty industry migration” requires further clarification under 
globalization. In particular, what criteria are used to determine whether an industry is 
“dirty”? “Dirty industries”, if interpreted from a broader perspective, may apply to most 
                                                 
13
 To the author’s knowledge this thesis is the first comprehensive study on the dirty industry migration on China, 
although there are a few previous research papers which partially touched upon this problem from different 
perspective; see e.g. Dean, Lovely, and Wang, “Are Foreign Investors Attracted to Weak Environmental Regulations? 
Evaluating the Evidence from China”, (2005) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3505 (Estimating the 
strength of pollution-haven-seeking behavior by foreign firms in investing in China in the presence of inter-
provincial differences in stringency of environmental regulation). Ma Li et al, “The Impact of Foreign Direct 
Investment and International Trade on the Environment of Coastal China” (外商投资与国际贸易对中国沿海地区
资源环境的影响), (2003) 18 Journal of Natural Resources 5, 603 to 609; Yang Tao, “Empirical Study on the Impact 
of China’s Environmental Regulation on FDI” (环境规制对中国 FDI 影响的实证分析), (2003) 5 World Economy 
Studies, pp 65-68.. 
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natural-resource-depleting, pollution intensive and hazardous industries. While certain 
heavy industries have a high pollution potential such as steel, pulp and paper, 
petrochemicals, some labour-intensive manufactures and processes can be also highly 
polluting, such as leather tanning and the dyeing and processing of textiles. “Dirty 
industries” can also be analyzed from a human rights perspective. From this perspective 
it implies that any industry that forces people to work and live in an unhealthy or 
degrading environment qualifies as a dirty industry. Such values and ideas might not be 
anticipated in the earlier works on DIM.  
 
An equally important issue is whether the migration of dirty industry refers only to the 
plant relocation by individual firms or includes other forms of “migration”? Under 
globalization the dirty industries from one country may take various forms to enter 
another country such as international trade, merger and acquisition, etc. The extent to 
which these forms of “migration” have been taken into consideration in previous 
research is inadequate. To summarize, by re-examining the term “dirty industry 
migration” under globalization, this thesis brings new issues into analysis and broadens 
the perspectives of scholarly studies on DIM.  
 
(2) An inter-disciplinary approach with emphasis on legal analysis 
Dirty industry migration is a complex economic and social phenomenon driven by a 
variety of factors. To understand it we need to take interdisciplinary approaches. In this 
thesis, the author has made original distinction between “active DIM” by way of foreign 
direct investment and “passive DIM” by way of international trade. Based on this 
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distinction, the author applies economic and statistical methodology to examine the 
extent of active and passive DIM respectively. Among the research methodologies of 
social science, the author emphasizes the law as a major driving factor as well as 
regulatory method. Previous research on DIM has focused more on how trade and the 
environment interact with each other. The issue has been discussed in the context of the 
relationship between economic incentives in trade and in the determination of 
environmental quality.14 However, only a few scholars have ever extended economic 
analysis to the legal aspect and examined its implication on the national economic and 
environmental regulations. The law and policy study of this thesis is going to fill this 
gap. In this thesis, the author examines both international and domestic trade, 
investment, environment, and human rights laws that bear implications for the dirty 
industry migration. Special attention is given to the construction of an international and 
domestic regulatory framework on DIM.  
 
(3) First hand materials collected from China based on the author’s fieldwork 
Previous research on DIM was funded mainly by the World Bank, OECD, and 
institutions from developed countries. A common shortfall is that they relied too much 
on the developed world sources and statistics, but often failed to seriously evaluate the 
data and materials produced by the developing countries. 15  Similarly, a general 
                                                 
14 See the World bank series studies Tobey, supra note 10; Low, P. & A. Yeats, supra note 10; Grossman, G.M. & 
A.B. Krueger, “Environmental Impacts of A North American Free Trade Agreement”, (1991) Princeton University 
and NBER Working Paper; Xu, X., International Trade and Environmental Regulation—A Dynamic Perspective 
Huntington (New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc, 1999) and Wilson, “Dirty Exports and Environmental 
Regulation—Do Standards Matter to Trade?” (2002) Development Research Group, World Bank, 
http://www.sice.oas.org/geograph/environment/otsuki.pdf Accessed Nov 10, 2006. These studies analyze the link 
between trade and environmental regulations by treating environment as a production factor which creates a 
comparative advantage in producing “pollution-intensive goods.”  
15
 It must be recognized that developed country sources of data are more systematically prepared and readily for use 
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overview of previous literatures reveals that a great majority of them are written by 
developed country-authors, and a great many of them are economists. There is a general 
lack of literatures on dirty industry migration from the perspective of law, management 
and public policy.16  
 
It was suggested that the basic difficulty for social and policy researchers operating in 
China is to establish an appropriate “point of entry” into the system under study. As an 
indispensable part of this research, during the period April to August 2004, the author 
has conducted a five-month fieldwork in mainland China. The fieldwork covers 9 
provinces and 18 cities. Throughout the research, a total number of 98 face-to-face 
interviews and telephone interviews, as well as 14 on-site visit of corporations were 
successfully conducted.17  
 
The fieldwork is designed to achieve three primary objectives: first to collect China 
sourced industrial and environmental data for the testing of the author’s hypothesis on 
DIM to China; second to obtain a true and fair picture of problems arising from DIM in 
                                                                                                                                               
by researchers than data from developing country sources. However, this thesis stresses the importance of certain 
developing country data that provides valuable insight to our study. For example, to test whether or not dirty 
industries have an incentive to migrate, previous research focuses more on the pollution abatement cost rather than 
the cost of nature conservation. In fact, even if the dirty industries have to meet the same pollution abatement cost in 
developing countries as in developed ones, so long as the nature conservation cost is not adequately internalized into 
the production cost in developing countries, the dirty industries still have an incentive to migrate. In addition, for job 
and competitiveness considerations, many developing countries are reluctant to disclose the information on dirty 
industries that migrated to their states. As a result, such sources of information can only come from developing 
countries. See Repetto, supra note 10, at 13. 
16
 There are numerous literatures on globalization and multinational corporations and many of them discussed the 
environmental aspect of globalization and corporate behavior, including the problems arising from dirty industry 
migration. For example, see Stigliz, supra note 6; Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law 
(Oxford, Cambridge MA: Blackwell Publishers 1995), and Leonard, supra note 8. However, to the author’s 
knowledge there is no monograph which specifically addresses the dirty industry migration problem. Existing 
academic articles on this topic mostly applied economic methodologies to testify this hypothesis, but few went 
forward to examine the law and policy implications if this hypothesis is confirmed. 
17
 For a detailed description on the author’s fieldwork methodologies, results and analysis see infra chapter 6.4 
(“About the Fieldwork”). 
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China and its regulation by interview experts in related areas and conduct factory site 
visits; finally to examine the level of the corporate environmental citizenship and social 
responsibilities in China by interview selected corporations and their stakeholders. 
 
Throughout the fieldwork a combination of literature search, face-to-face interviews 
and factory site visits was used to collect data. Snowball sampling method was used 
when necessary to access a larger sample. The information has been collected from a 
variety of sources including enterprises, academic institutions, government bodies, 
NGOs, media, as well as international organizations that have a presence in China. A 
special feature of the author’s fieldwork is the author’s extensive communication with 
Chinese government officials.18 The in-depth interviews with officials have helped the 
author to understand the work of various Chinese governmental agencies and how 
China’s huge bureaucracy functions to regulate the dirty industry migration in China.  
 
(4) In-depth research on China as a major case for study 
Making China the country for study has its value. China is among the few developing 
countries that have maintained a rapid economic progress in the last nearly 30 years. 
Due to its large territory, special political arrangements and imbalanced development 
                                                 
18 It was suggested that a traditional difficulty in carrying out China related law and policy research is that the 
Chinese officials and agencies tend, not surprisingly, to be suspicious of the motives of researchers, whether they be 
from China itself, or from abroad. Chinese governmental officials, though rather more open than in the past, are 
extremely sensitive to critical research findings. This is not simply a matter of language or culture. It also reflects the 
deeply entrenched mentality of secrecy that pervades large and powerful state bureaucracies. Furthermore, given the 
tensions that can, and does, exist between agencies at different levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy, which are further 
compounded by the sensitivities of central–local government relations. Successful research initiatives must inevitably 
involve a long and careful process of building trust between the researcher and the target agency.  Once  trust  has  
been  established, then the flow of information is likely to increase steadily, and a more relaxed working relationship 
will  develop  between  the  researcher  and  agency staff. See Peter Hills and C.S. Chan, “Environmental Regulation 
and the Industrial Sector in China: the Role of Informal Relationships in Policy Implementation” (1998) Business 
Strategy and the Environment 7 53-70, at 59.  
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stage of each part, many developing countries can mirror their development dilemmas 
with ones experienced by China. At the same time it is a country in drastic transition 
from a semi-market economy to a market one, and from the rule of man to the rule of 
law. Having learned from its historical lessons of reckless economic growth at the cost 
of environment, China is now officially promoting a “balanced and scientific 
development perspective” (“he xie fa zhan” and “ke xue fa zhan”) policy and propose to 
legislate on it. On December 11, 2001 China joined the WTO and became one of the 
largest FDI recipients in the world in 2002. It is a location where MNCs feel that they 
ought to be present, despite numerous obstacles.  
 
While the whole world is looking at the economic miracles in China, the social impact 
of foreign trade and investment on China is an aspect that is often overlooked. A series 
of problems created by DIM require disclosure and intensive study. This thesis is a 
contribution to this study. It analyzes in detail the economic and social impacts of DIM 
on China and their regulation. Besides the regulations of law, the alternative regulatory 
methods such as market and self-regulation of DIM are also discussed in the context of 
corporate environmental citizenship and social responsibility. The conclusion and 
suggestions of this study not only bear law and policy implications to the Chinese 
government, but also to other developing countries seeking to manage the DIM.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. Chapter two 
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starts to identify the issues and construct the author’s theoretical framework for the 
studying of the DIM hypothesis in China. Chapter three starts with an empirical 
literature review and goes on to construct the author’s empirical models in testing a 
series of DIM hypotheses in China. Chapter four presents a legal analysis on the 
international regulatory framework of DIM. Chapter five shifts the discussion from the 
international to the domestic context, it presents the author’s examination on China’s 
comprehensive laws which bear implications on the regulation of DIM. Chapter six 
shifts the focus from the public to private sector. It analyzes private initiatives in China 
and globally on the regulation of DIM, in particular the corporate environmental 
citizenship (“CEC”) and corporate social responsibility (“CSR”). Chapter Seven is the 
conclusion of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER II DIRTY INDUSTRY MIGRATION AND 
ENVIRONMENT: THEORIES AND APPLICATION 
 
2.1 A Summary of Existing Theories on DIM 
 
 The existing theories on DIM come mainly from three sources. The primary source is 
the research on trade and environment. It mainly deals with the conflicts between the 
values of free trade and environmental protection.19 Another source is the research on 
the environment and competitiveness, which focuses on the gap among inter-state 
environmental standards and studies how environment stringency will affect the 
international competitiveness of a specific industry or country.20 The third source is the 
study on the interactive mechanism between stringency in environmental standards and 
technological innovation.21  
 
                                                 
19
 For an excellent survey of this literature, see Tisdell CA. Free Trade, “Globalization, and  Environment  and  
Sustainability:  Major  Positions  and  the Position  of  WTO” (2000) Economics, Ecology  and  the  Environment 
Working Paper 39, the University of Queensland: Brisbane; Beghin J, Potier M., “Effects of Trade Liberalization on 
the Environment in the manufacturing sector” (1997) World Economy 20(4): 435–456; Ferrantino MJ, “International 
Trade, Environmental Quality and Public Policy” (1997) World   Economy 20(1): 43 – 72; Dean JM. “Trade and 
Environment: A Survey of Literature. In International Trade and the Environment” in Low P (ed.) International 
Trade and the Environment (World Bank: Washington, DC. 1992) at 15 – 28.  
20
 For a review of this source of studies, see Adams J. “Environmental Policy and Competitiveness in A Globalized 
Economy: Conceptual Issues and A Review of Empirical Evidences” in OECD, Globalization and Environment: 
Preliminary Perspectives (Paris: OECD 1997), pp53-100, also see infra Chapter 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 on a literature review 
in relation to “Race to the Bottom” and “Pollution Haven”. 
21
 See infra Chapter 2.6.3 on research in relation to “Pollution Halo”. Also see Warhurst, A., and G. Bridge, 
“Economic Liberalization, Innovation, and Technology Transfer: opportunities for cleaner production in the minerals 
industry” (1997) Natural Resources Forum 21(1):1-12. 
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2.1.1 “Pollution Haven” Hypothesis  
 
This hypothesis derives from classical theories of comparative advantage. It regards the 
environmental standard of a country as an important factor which shapes the country’s 
comparative advantage in international trade and investment. On this basis, it postulates 
that there exists “pollution havens” whose lax environmental regulation has become the 
primary incentive for foreign dirty industries.22  For example, it was suggested that 
certain developing countries with laxer environmental standards tend to become the 
pollution havens of dirty industries from developed countries, especially those in 
neighboring countries.23  
 
2.1.2 “Race to the Bottom” Theory 
 
Based on theories of comparative advantage but from a different angle, the “race to the 
bottom” theory postulates that governments of countries would be involved in a 
“prisoner’s dilemma” where they collectively would be better off by not offering lower 
environmental standard but each feels compelled to offer the incentive to maintain a 
competitive business environment. A reasonably expected outcome is that governments 
would engage in the race of lowering environmental standards in order to attract FDI or 
                                                 
22
 See Walter, I. & Judith Ugelow, J.L., Environmental Policies in Developing Countries (Ambio, 1979), pp. 102-109. 
Also see Walter I, “Environmentally Induced Industrial Relocation in Developing Countries”, in J.S. Rubin & R. 
Tomas Graham (eds). Environment and Trade (Totowa NJ: Allanheld, Osmum and Co., 1982), pp67-101. 
23 An example could be the case between Mexico and the United States. See Cropper, M. & W. Oates, 
“Environmental Economics: A Survey”, (1992) 30 Journal of Economic Literature 675. 
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to avoid domestic industries being lost to others.24 Under this theory, the likely result 
would be that every country adopts the environmental standard lower than the standards 
that would exist in the absence of competition.  
 
2.1.3 “Porter” Hypothesis  
 
Porter’s theory focuses on the interactive mechanism between stringency of 
environmental regulation and international competitiveness.25 He found that in the short 
term, strict environment policy will increase a company’s costs and further affect its 
competitiveness. However in the long run, stringency of environmental regulation will 
trigger a series of technological innovation, management innovation, etc. These 
innovations will enhance productivity and thereby offset the increase in environmental 
cost. 26  Furthermore, the government plays an active role in safeguarding the 
international competitiveness of its products against domestic stringency of 
environmental regulation, for example by subsidizing its pollution intensive industries 
or setting restrictions on those imported goods with lower environmental standards, etc. 
 
                                                 
24 See generally David Wheeler, “Racing to the Bottom? Foreign investment and Air Quality in Developing 
Countries” (2000) Development Research Group World Bank, <http://econ.worldbank.org/files/1340_wps2524.pdf> 
Accessed Feb 13, 2007. 
25
 See generally Porter, M, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, (New York: Free Press 1990). Also see Porter, 
M.E. & C. van der Linde, “Towards A New Conception of The Environment–Competitiveness Relationship”, (1995) 
9(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 97, pp. 97–118. 
26Anthony Barbera & Virginia McConnell, “The Impact of Environmental Regulations on Industry Productivity: 
Direct and Indirect Effects” (1990) 18 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 50, pp. 50-65. 
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2.1.4 “Pollution Halo” Hypothesis 
 
The “pollution halo” hypothesis argues that foreign firms, which are subject to more 
stringent regulations at home, tend to diffuse cleaner technologies, environmental 
management systems and standards when they operate in the host country.27 Hence the 
environmental standards of the host state are improved as a result of FDI imports of 
newer and cleaner technologies and environmental management systems. 28  It also 
asserts that multinational firms are more exposed to the environmental demands of 
governments, Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGO”), shareholders and customers. 
Considering the resources that foreign firms bring in improving efficiency, transferring 
technology and addressing existing pollution, their investment might pull-up industry 
standards of host countries.29 
 
All these four theories are supported by empirical evidence.30 The “pollution haven” 
and “race to the bottom” hypotheses were based primarily on the rationale of economics. 
Their views are pessimistic from the environmentalist’s perspective. The “porter 
hypothesis” stands in the position of competitiveness, its findings serve to reassure 
those industrial countries who took the lead in setting up high environmental standards 
                                                 
27
 For studies which support the arguments that MNCs are upgrading the environmental standards for the plants 
regardless of location, see Weiss, E. B., “Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Comment” (1993) 102  
Yale Law Journal 2123; Vogel, D., “Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and 
Environmental Protection” (1997) 4:4 Journal of European Public Policy 556-571; Vogel, D., “Environmental 
Regulation and Economic Integration, (2000) 3:2 Journal of International Economic Law 265-280. 
28
 For example, Blackman & Wu has found such trend in the Chinese energy sector. See Blackman, A. & Wu, X, 
“Foreign Direct Investment in China’s Power Sector: Trends, Benefits and Barriers” (1998) Discussion Paper 98-50 
(Resources for the Future: Washington, D.C.). 
29
 Zarsky, L, “Havens, Halos and Spaghetti: Untangling the Evidence about Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Environment”, (1999) Paper presented at OECD Conference on Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment, 
28th and 29th January, The Hague, Netherlands. 
30
 For a discussion on the empirical evidences supporting each of the four theories see infra chapters 2.6.1-2.6.4. 
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yet remained concerned with a loss of competitiveness. “Pollution Halo” hypothesis 
was in line with the neo-liberal views of foreign trade and investment. It was often used 
to justify the investment of MNCs in certain environmentally sensitive industries in the 
host countries.  
 
2.2 DIM and Related Hypotheses 
 
The author’s research on DIM starts with an exploration of its definition. Very often, 
the term “Dirty Industry Migration” is used generically and sometimes confused to 
researchers as to its specific meaning. Therefore, in order to clarify the issues under the 
study of this thesis, the author’s approach is to first compare it with other common but 
differentiated terms. Then the author shall study its three components: i.e. “Dirty”, 
“Industry” and “Migration” respectively. Based on the elaboration the author attempts 
to give the DIM a concrete definition. 
 
“Pollution Haven”  vs. “Dirty Industry Migration” 
The two hypotheses are inter-related but they are of different research focus. The 
“Pollution Haven” hypothesis focuses on the jurisdiction of “pollution haven” whose 
lax environmental regulation has become its primary comparative advantage to attract 
foreign dirty industries. By contrast, “Dirty Industry Migration” hypothesis focuses on 
the migration of dirty industries. In other words, it studies the destination, mechanism 
and driving forces of such migration. In this sense, the primary incentive for these dirty 
industries to migrate may or may not be the environment considerations.  
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“Industrial Flight” vs. “Dirty Industry Migration” 
“Dirty Industry Migration” can be regarded as a branch of the framework research on 
“industrial flight”. The industrial flight is a well studied phenomenon after the Second 
World War. Research on “industrial flight” focuses on the lifecycle of a particular 
industry and studies its shifting mechanism. By contrast, the research on DIM studies 
the shifting mechanism of industries that are pollution intensive. Specifically, it focuses 
on the “push” and “pull” factors for dirty industry migration, such as their motive, 
condition, barrier, and locational choice, etc. 
 
Some economic theories of “industrial flight” can be useful references to the research 
on DIM, especially:  
 
(1) Classical Theories of comparative advantage. 31  These theories assume that 
countries will generally produce and export goods manufactured with factors 
that are abundant within the country and will import those for which factors of 
production are scarce. On this basis, highly polluting industries would gradually 
move from countries with scarce environmental factor endowments (presumably 
industrialized states) to countries where such factors would be abundant 
(presumably industrializing states).  
                                                 
31
 For the old literature on theories of comparative advantage, see Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) (New York: Kelley, 1966); Ricardo, David, On the Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation (1817) (edited with an introduction by R. M. Hartwell, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971); Mill, 
James, Elements of Political Economy, (London: Baldwin, Cradock & Joy, 1821); Mill, John Stuart, Principles of 
Political Economy (1848). 
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(2)  Theories of Central and Peripheral Economies.32 Developed by Argentinean 
economist Raul Prebisch, this group of theories claimed that the “industrial 
flight” is inevitable as the Third World countries were defenseless to the 
distortive development brought by trade-induced interaction with heavily-
financed First World monopolistic capitalism. As a result, the Third World has 
been coerced into a state of “dependency” upon the First World, and becomes 
the producer of raw material for the First World manufacturing development—a 
“Center-Periphery” relationship.  
(3)  Theory of Product Cycle.33 Developed by Vernon, this theory put less emphasis 
on the factor-proportion theory of comparative advantage. It is in essence a 
production oriented trade cycle explanation of some international trade patterns. 
According to Vernon’s research, the industrial flight is a result of enterprises 
voluntarily following the product’s lifecycle and adjusts its production and 
market strategies.  
(4) The “flying geese” theory. 34  Developed first by Japanese scholar Kaname 
Akamatsu in the 1930s based on his study on the development history of 
Japanese cotton textile industry, this theory was utilized more frequently to 
explain the pattern of regional industrialization, particularly in East Asia. Its 
basic idea is that: A group of economies advance together because of mutual 
interactions between countries through demonstration effects, leaning and 
                                                 
32
 See generally Raul Prebisch, Towards A Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America (New York: United 
Nations, 1963). 
33
 Vernon Raymond, “International Investment and International Trade in Product Cycle” (1966) Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 80. 
34
 Akamatsu, Kaname, “Historical pattern of economic growth in developing countries” (1962) 1 The Developing 
Economies 3. 
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emulation, with the transmission mechanism being flows of people, trade in 
goods and services, flows of FDI, technology and other MNC-related assets. 
According to Akamatsu, the industrial flight is a interactive and spontaneous 
process.   
 
The above theories interpret the nature of industrial flight from different perspectives. 
To sum it up, the following factors drive the industries to migrate from one country to 
another: (a) Difference in the comparative advantages among countries (e.g. theories of 
comparative advantage and “flying geese” theory); (b) A product’s life cycle and 
market change (e.g. theories of product lifecycle); and (c) Impact of trade & investment 
liberalism (e.g. theories of central and peripheral economies). It is to be emphasized that 
often the migration of industries is not driven by a single factor. Which factors are 
dominant will depend on factors such as the nature of that industry, its development 
stage, and the overall environment of that industry in the specific country, etc. 
 
As mentioned above, certain theories regarding “industrial flight” can be helpful to the 
understanding on DIM, especially when differences in the production cost are largely 
caused by the gaps in the environmental regulation between countries. Despite this, 
theories on “Industrial Flight” cannot cover certain factors that are unique to DIM. For 
example, in the case that environmental legislation of the home state directly prohibit 
certain materials or production processes, then industries are left with only two choices: 
to close or migrate. Consequently, it can be inferred that the government regulations are 
also an important factor in driving dirty industries to migrate..  
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“Pollution Migration” vs. “Dirty Industry Migration” 
People sometimes equal dirty industry migration with pollution migration. In fact, DIM 
does transfer pollution, as dirty productions which generate pollution relocate from one 
country to the other. However, pollution migration is not necessarily caused by dirty 
industry migration. For example, when a country’s industries have environmental effect 
that flows across national boundaries and cause environmental harm in other states, or 
when the emission or leakage from the dirty production in a specific country causes 
harm to the global commons, such as air, ozone layer, or high seas. In such cases, it is 
the pollution effect rather than pollution source that is migrated. The former case is 
mainly regulated by international environmental law. DIM, in contrast, focuses on the 
shifting mechanism of the pollution source from home to the host states. Often these 
cases are governed by international trade and investment laws, in addition to domestic 
regulations. 
 
2.3 Dirty Industry Migration, Sustainable Development and Environmental 
Justice—Constructing the Conceptual Framework 
 
2.3.1 Principle of Sustainable Development and Dirty Industry Migration 
 
The normative content of sustainable development was provided by the Brundtland 
Commission (the “Commission”) in its 1987 document “Our Common Future”. 
According to the Commission, it means the kind of “…development that meets the 
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needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their needs.”35  The principle of sustainable development seeks to reconcile the different 
goals of development and environmental protection—two goals which are often 
considered as incompatible. According to Sands (1999), “Customary principles of 
international law such as sustainable development, insofar as they are used to interpret 
treaties to be consistent with them, seek to reconcile seemingly contradictory principles 
(e.g. the neo-liberal views of international trade and investment and the principle of 
environmental protection) in order to make the two regional areas of regulation 
consistent with the overarching principles of international law.” 36  Proponents of 
sustainable development characterize the object of sustainability as “the ongoing need 
to better align economic, social and environmental goals, and, similarly, to develop 
policies and practices that consider how these three pillars are interdependent.”37  
 
It has been suggested that there are two temporal dimensions to this principle: the 
responsibility to present generations, or what is often called “intra-generational” 
responsibility, and the responsibility to future generations, often called “inter-
generational” responsibility. 38  Both dimensions have been utilized by developing 
countries to rectify the serious socio-economic asymmetry in resource access, 
                                                 
35
 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1987). Also see Vaughan Lowe, “Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments” in Alan Boyle & David 
Freestone (eds.) International Law and Sustainable Development (1999) at 26 (recognizing sustainable development 
as an “umbrella concept” encompassing a number of congruent norms). 
36
 Philippe Sands, “Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom, and the Cross-fertilization of International Law” in 
Alan Boyle & David Freestone (eds.) International Law and Sustainable Development (1999) at 39. 
37
 David Monsma & John Buckley, “Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The Material Edges of Social and 
Environmental Disclosure” (2004) 11 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 151, at 171. 
38
 G. F. Maggio, “Inter/intra-generational Equity: Current Applications under International Law for Promoting the 
Sustainable Development of Natural Resources” (1996) 4 Buff. Envt’l. L. J. 161, 163.  
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distribution, and consumption between nations. 39 This asymmetry, at present, has led to 
severe environmental degradation and the inability of a large part of humanity to meet 
its basic needs in an adequate manner.40  
 
The dirty industry migration is against the principles of sustainable development in that, 
on one hand, it exacerbates the intra-generational inequity by meeting the consumptive 
demands of the developed countries by transferring pollution to the developing 
countries. On the other hand, the large exploitation of natural resources and enhanced 
environmental pollution in the developing countries as a result of foreign DIM imposes 
threats on the principle of inter-generational equity by leaving insufficient resources for 
future generations in these countries to meet their needs.  
 
2.3.2 Principle of Environmental Justice and Dirty Industry Migration 
 
Born in the United States in early 1980s as a vehement reaction to the disproportionate 
imposition of environmental hazards on racial and ethnic minorities and the poor,41 the 
                                                 
39
 It was argued that natural resources are now exploited in unprecedented quantities and rates of consumption are 
continuing to increase. In relation to their population sizes, the “Northern” industrialized countries are responsible for 
a vastly disproportionate amount of the natural resources being consumed or adversely impacted. Issues concerning 
the access to and consumption of global resources, and responsibility for the resulting environmental degradation and 
depletion, have become focal points for much current thinking on intergenerational equity and have taken on a 
distinctly “North” v. “South” dimension. See Lynch, Human Rights, Environment, and Economic Development: 
Existing and Emerging Standards in International Law and Global Society, Chapter IV, 
<http://www.ciel.org/Publications/olp3iv.html> Accessed Feb 13, 2007. 
40
 This goal has been a major feature of the international legal and politico-economic agenda of developing countries 
since at least the early 1970s, as evidenced by the adoption of resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly calling for 
the creation of a "New International Economic Order", as well as efforts to obtain greater control over natural 
resources. Id. 
41
 As a grassroots social justice movement combining the principles of civil rights and environmental protection, 
environmental justice emerged in the 1980s within the anti-toxics movement and was soon adopted by social justice 
leaders and environmental activists in the struggle against the sitting of hazardous waste facilities in their 
communities. See E. Andrew Long, “Protection of Minority Environmental Interests in the Administrative Process: A 
Critical Analysis of the EPA's Guidance for Complaints Under Title VI”, (2003) 39 Willamette L. Rev. 1163, 1168-69  
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environmental justice movement provides a relevant and effective construct for 
addressing institutional and doctrinal imbalances inherent in the multilateral trade and 
investment system. 42  As a community-led grassroots movement, the environmental 
justice was originally based on the idea “that the burdens of environmental pollution 
should not fall disproportionately on poor and minority communities”.43 In its brief 
history, the environmental justice movement has focused primarily on perceived 
domestic abuses.44 However, over the time the definition of environmental justice has 
evolved considerably.45 Many of the environmental justice concerns have gone beyond 
the legal domain of equal protection or civil rights law involving state and federal 
regulatory actions such as hazardous waste sitting permits, but involve the 
disproportionate impacts from lawful pollution attributable to private sector decisions or 
practices at facilities and in communities where companies operate.46 
 
                                                 
42
 See Giovanna Di Chiro, “Nature as Community: The Convergence of Environment and Social Justice” in William 
Cronen & W.W. Norton (eds.) Uncommon Ground (1996) 298, at 300-301,. 
43
 It was recalled that the direct result of the environmental justice movement in the U.S. was the Executive Order 
12898 issued by U.S. President William J. Clinton on 11 February 1994. The Order has the force of law and it 
requires that “...each Federal Agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying 
and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its 
programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations in the United States and its 
territories...” See Jason Pinney, “The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Environmental Justice: Do the 
National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act Offer a Better Way?” (2003) 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
353, at 354. 
44
 See generally Olga L. Moya, “Adopting an Environmental Justice Ethics” (1996) 5 Dick. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 215, 
217 (surveying “the environmental justice movement and actions taken by communities, government, the courts, and 
industry”). 
45
 See Hillary Gross et al., “Environmental Justice: A Review of State Responses” (2001) 8 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. 
L. & Pol'y 41, 42 (discussing emerging themes in state and federal responses to environmental justice); Alice Kaswan, 
“Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and "Justice"”, (1997) 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 
221, 223 (examined the gap between environmental laws and equal justice under law, and analyze how 
environmental justice contributes to social and political debates about fair treatment). 
46
 On the whole, the “principles of the environmental justice movement include not only equal protection from 
environmental risks, or life and health issues, but also the right for people to live in communities that are 
environmentally safe, regardless of their race or income.” See R. Gregory Roberts, “Environmental Justice and 
Community Empowerment: Learning From the Civil Rights Movement”, (1998) 48 Am. U.L. Rev. 229, at 265 
(quoting Deeohn Ferris & David Hahn-Baker, Environmentalists and Environmental Justice Policy, in Environmental 
Justice: Issues, Policies, and Solutions 66 (Bunyan Bryant ed. 1995)). 
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In 1991, the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit was held 
in Washington, D.C. Minority leaders at the Summit articulated “a seventeen-point 
statement entitled Principles of Environmental Justice, and pledged to build a national 
environmental justice movement to address the ecological threats facing minority and 
disadvantaged communities.” Some of these principles, according to some scholars, 
“still provide the best definition of what environmental justice means”.47 For example, 
Principle 3 stated that environmental justice, among other things, “mandates the right to 
ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land and renewable resources in the interest of 
a sustainable planet for humans and other living things.”48 Furthermore, it was stated 
that environmental justice “opposes the destructive operations of multinational 
corporations" (Principle 14) and “demands the cessation of the production of all toxins, 
hazardous wastes, and radioactive materials and demands that all past and current 
producers be held strictly accountable to the people for detoxification and the 
containment at the point of production”(Principle 6). 49  Although these asserted 
principles sounds expansive and potentially unmanageable from a business management 
perspective, they nevertheless have provided us with useful insights on the inter-linkage 
between principle of environmental justice and the rationale for the regulation of dirty 
industry migration in an international context. 
 
                                                 
47
 See David Hahn-Baker, “The 20th Anniversary of Love Canal: Lessons Learned” (2001) 8 Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 225, at 
236 Also see generally Robert D. Bullard, “Essays on Environmental Justice: Environmental Racism and Invisible 
Communities” (1994) 96 W. Va. L. Rev. 1037, 1046. 
48
 See Julian Agyeman and Tom Evans, “Rethinking Sustainable Development: Toward Just Sustainability in Urban 
Communities--Building Equity Rights with Sustainable Solutions” (2003) 590 Annals 35, at 49 (listing principles of 




The principles of environmental justice provide important conceptual justification for 
the regulation of dirty industry migration on a global basis. Environmental justice seeks 
to address the disproportionate impact of environmental pollution caused by the 
corporations operating around the world and the lack of equal environmental protection 
experienced by the disadvantaged people. As Suttles suggested, “operating beyond the 
traditional limits of both the civil rights movement and the environmental movement 
per se, and owing especially to its nonhierarchical formulation, the environmental 
justice movement provides an immensely adaptable vehicle for addressing the disparate 
imposition of environmental risks globally, in a wide variety of applications.”50  Indeed, 
to an extent, the movement’s ability to elude an easy definition derives precisely from 
the fact that it constantly evolves to address imbalances that lead to disproportionate 
burden sharing rather than merely responding to particular actors in specific contexts.  
 
2.3.3 Synthesizing Principles of Environmental Justice and Sustainable 
Development 
 
Despite the historically different origins and their attendant movements of 
environmental justice and sustainable development, the theoretical compatibility 
between the two concepts has gained wide recognition among researchers. Tracing the 
“strikingly similar pathways” and “co-evolution of sustainable development and 
environmental justice,” J.B. Ruhl (1999) theorizes that “environmental justice benefited 
from the increasingly broad policy acceptance that sustainable development enjoyed 
                                                 
50
 John T. Suttles, “Transmigration of Hazardous Industry: the Global Race to the Bottom, Environmental Justice, 
and the Asbestos Industry” (2002) 16 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 1,  at 5-7. 
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across international and national lines which legitimized the more narrow message of 
environmental justice”. 51  One group of commentators agreed that the “concept of 
sustainable development and environmental justice share many critical and defining 
characteristics” and that “each requires taking into account and integrating policies 
relating to social justice, environmental protection, and economic development”.52 At a 
less pivotal but more practical level, Fisher (2003) points out that “there exists a nexus 
of theoretical compatibility between sustainability and environmental justice, including 
an emphasis on community-based decision making; on economic policies that account 
fiscally for social and environmental externalities; on reductions in all forms of 
pollution; on building clean, livable communities for all people; and on an overall 
regard for the ecological integrity of the planet.”53 Thus, if the “race to the bottom” 
theory is to be adopted, then the resulting downward trend of environmental, health and 
safety standards (“EHS standards”) exacerbates the imbalance between developed and 
developing nations, thereby not only violates the intra-generational equity as advocated 
by the principle of sustainable development, but also “qualifies as precisely the type of 
disparity against which the principle of environmental justice movement contends”.54 
 
                                                 
51 J. B. Ruhl, “The Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: Cooperation, Then 
Competition, Then Conflict” (1999) 9 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 161, 162 (discussing the co-evolutionary patterns 
and relations between sustainable development and environmental justice that can be explained by using concepts 
being developed through complex systems research). 
52
 Barry E. Hill, Steven Wolfson, & Nicholas Targ, “Human Rights and the Environment: A Synopsis and Some 
Predictions” (2004) 16 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 359, 373 (noting that in “a recent article entitled, 'One Species, One 
Planet: Environmental Justice and Sustainable Development,' the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) 
concluded that environmental justice and sustainable development are virtually synonymous”). 
53
 Emily Fisher, “Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: Same Planet, Different Worlds?” (2003) 26 
Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 201, 207-08  (“If sustainable development fails to prioritize issues of distributive justice, 
it will be little more than an accomplice to the ongoing exploitations of the market. Similarly, environmental justice 
cannot achieve its goal of distributive justice as long as there are burdens to distribute.”) 
54
 Debora L. Spar & David B. Yoffie, “Multinational Enterprises and the Prospects for Justice” (1999) 52 J. Int'l Aff. 
557, at 560. 
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The international law principles of sustainable development and environmental justice 
have not only demonstrated the necessity to regulate DIM, but also offered a conceptual 
framework for the author’s subsequent discussion on the international laws on DIM. 
The following sections intend to define the research scope of this thesis through a re-
examination on the concrete meaning of the term DIM under globalization.  
 




To narrow down the research scope, “dirty” industry as referred to in this thesis 
generally means “pollution intensive” industry. In defining “pollution intensive”, a 
conventional approach in the literature has been to identify pollution-intensive sectors 
as those which have incurred a certain high level of pollution abatement cost per unit of 
output. 55  According to the Economic Committee of Asian and Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (“APEC”), dirty industries, or what they call “environmentally sensitive 
industries” are those industries that incurred pollution abatement and control 
expenditures of approximately 1% or more of the value of their total sales.56 Tobey 
                                                 
55
 Pollution abatement costs, according to US Census Bureau, refers to costs arising from “the reduction or 
elimination of pollution that is created by the production process and has the potential to produce undesirable 
environmental and/or human health effects or the removal of pollution created by prior years’ production. 
Pollution abatement activities include pollution treatment, pollution prevention, recycling, and/or disposal in 
an environmentally sound manner.” See US Census Bureau (1999) Surveys of Pollution Abatements Costs 
and Expenditures, available at: <http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/ma200-99.pdf> Accessed Feb 10, 
2007. 
56
 By these definition, their list of dirty industries include all four-digit products in iron and steel (SITC 67); 
nonferrous metals (68); metal manufactures N.E.S. (69); pulp and waste paper (251); organic chemicals (512); 
inorganic chemicals (513, 514); radioactive etc. materials (515); coal, petroleum etc. chemicals (521); manufactured 
fertilizers (561); paper and paperboards (641); articles of paper etc. (642); veneers, plywood, etc. (631); wood 
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(1990) defines pollution intensive industry as one where pollution abatement costs in 
the United States were 1.85% or more of the total costs.57 Levinson (1996) defines 
“high pollution intensity” as those pollution abatement capital expenditures as a 
percentage of total new capital expenditures exceeding 5%.58 By these criteria, five 
sectors emerge as leading candidates for “dirty industry” status: Iron and Steel, Non-
Ferrous Metals, Industrial Chemicals, Pulp and Paper, and Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products.  
 
Another, more direct, approach is to select sectors which rank high on emissions 
intensity (i.e. emissions per unit of output). To determine high-ranking sectors by this 
criterion, Hettige, et. al (1995) use detailed emissions intensities by medium (i.e. air, 
water, and metals) for U.S. manufacturing at the 3-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (“SIC”) level.59 By this approach, the result of average sectoral rankings 
for air pollutants, water pollutants, and heavy metals are displayed in  
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Candidature for “Dirty Industries” Ranked by Medium Emission Intensities  
Rank Air Water Metals Overall 
                                                                                                                                               
manufactures N.E.S. (632); petroleum products (332); agricultural chemicals (599) and cement (661) See APEC, 
Survey on Trade-Related Environmental Measures and Environmental-Related Trade Measures in APEC (1998) 
Wellington, New Zealand.  
57
 Tobey, supra note 10, at 194. 
58
 Pollution abatement capital expenditures include installation and retrofit that occurred for separately 
identifiable methods, techniques, or process technologies installed exclusively for the purpose of removing 
pollutants after their creation, from air emissions, water discharges, and/or solid waste or expenditures for 
technologies that reduce or eliminate the creation of pollutants. It includes the total expenditures for pollution 
abatement. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 5-29. 
59
 Hettige, Mala, Paul Martin, Manjula Singh and David Wheeler, “IPPS: The Industrial Pollution Projection 
System,” (1995) World Bank, Policy Research Department Working Paper. 
 31 
Rank Air Water Metals Overall 
1 371 Iron and Steel 371 Iron and Steel 372 Non-Ferrous Metals 371 Iron and Steel 




371 Iron and Steel 372 Non-Ferrous 
Metals 
3 369 Non-Metallic Min. 
Product. 








323 Leather Products 353 Petroleum 
Refineries 
5 341 Pulp and Paper 351 Industrial 
Chemicals 
361 Pottery 369 Non-Metallic Min 
Product 
6 353 Petroleum 
Refineries 
352 Other Chemicals 381 Metal Products 341 Pulp and Paper 
7 351 Industrial 
Chemicals 
313 Beverages 355 Rubber Products 352 Other Chemicals 
8 352 Other Chemicals 311 Food Products 383 Electrical Products 355 Rubber Products 
9 331 Wood Products 355 Rubber Products 382 Machinery 323 Leather Products 
10 362 Glass Products 353 Petroleum 
Refineries 
369 Non-Metallic Min. 
Product 
381 Metal Products 
Computed by the World Bank in Collaboration with the U.S. Environment Protection Agency and the U.S. 
Census Bureau   in Hettige, Mala, Paul Martin, Manjula Singh and David Wheeler, "IPPS: The Industrial 
Pollution Projection System," World Bank, Policy Research Department Working Paper, February 1995. 
 
Other than being intensive by the above criteria, “dirty” industries can also apply to 
industries which are intensive in other inputs, particularly bulk raw materials, energy 
and land.60 Mani and Wheeler (1997) did an interesting research on the standards of 
dirty industries in the context of Japan. Using the abatement expenditure and emission 
                                                 
60
 It was suggested that dirty industries often deal with bulk raw materials because pollutants are waste residuals—
harmful byproducts of industrial processes which are not profitable to recycle or resell at existing prices (including 
the price of pollution). The volume of such residuals is, almost tautologically, largest in weight-reducing industries 
which transform bulk raw materials into primary inputs for industrial production. Dirty industries should be land 
intensive, because some bulk material inventories must be stored on-site. Besides, dirty industries should also be 
energy-intensive, because transformation processes generally involve the application of high temperature, pressure, 
and /or mechanical force to raw material inputs. See Mani, M. & Wheeler, D., “In Search of Pollution Havens? Dirty 
Industry in the World Economy, 1960-1995” (1998) 7;3 Journal of Environment and Development 215-247. 
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intensity approaches, they first identified the five cleanest (Group 1) and five dirtiest 
sectors (Group 2); then computed the energy, land and labour intensities for each 
industry and compared the results of the two groups. Their results have shown that: The 
five dirtiest sectors are about three times more energy intensive than the five cleanest 
sectors, and there is striking uniformity within the two groups. Despite a within-group 
variation, such result is basically the same for land intensity (three times higher in dirty 
sectors)..Capital intensity is also substantially higher in the dirty sectors than clean 
sectors, with an average ratio around 2:1 for capital / output and investment / output.61  
 
Apart from indicators based on technical measurements, from a human rights 
perspective the author would suggest the dirty industries to include any industries that 
force people to live and work in a hazardous or unhealthy environment. Despite the fact 
that there is no instrument that sets out the minimum environmental standards for 
human beings that industries are obliged to sustain, nobody would deny that an industry 
is dirty if it threatens people’s life and health (in short or long term), or causes serious 
impact to the surrounding environments.62 An example would be the migration of ship-
breaking industry from developed countries to India, Bangladesh and other countries in 
South Asia which causes serious health and ecological problems.63  Such industries are 
included in our definition of “dirty” industries for the purpose of this thesis. 
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 Id, at 215-220. 
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 For an analysis on people’s rights to a healthy environment under international law, see Hill et al, supra note 52. 
Also see Clarence J. Dias, “Human Rights, Environment and Development in South Asia: The Importance of 
International Human Rights Law” (2000) 6 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 415; For a brief summary of the history of the 
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Environment as a Human Right” (1991) 19 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 301, 303-305. 
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 Anjana Pasricha, “Ship-Breaking Industry Brings Environmental Problems Along with Money”, May 11, 2004, 





The traditional rough categorization of industry includes the primary sectors of industry, 
which involve the conversion of natural resources into primary products, such as 
agriculture, agribusiness, fishing, forestry, mining and quarrying industries; the 
secondary sectors of industry which generally take the output of the primary sector and 
manufacture to a point where they are suitable for use by other businesses, or sale to 
consumers; and the tertiary sectors of industry which are also known as the service 
industry. Considering the fact that most energy is consumed and most pollutants are 
created in natural resource exploitation as well as manufacturing, the research scope of 
industries in this thesis shall mainly cover the pollution intensive sectors in the 
manufacturing industry. In addition, some admittedly pollution intensive industries in 
the primary sectors such as mining and quarrying industries will also be studied.. 
 
The present commonly applied methods for industrial categorization are the 
International Standard Industry Classification (“ISIC”)64 and North American Industrial 
Classification System (“NAICS”).65 Both methods use hierarchical codes (2- to 6-digit) 
to classify specific industries. Consequently, most pollution intensive industries studied 
by this thesis are 3- to 4-digit level industries described under the ISIC category “D” 
                                                 
64
 International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) is defined by the United Nations Statistics Division and is a 
standard classification of economic activities. For a list of ISIC codes (Rev. 3.1), see 
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=17&Lg=1> Accessed Jan 6, 2007. 
65
 The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the product of a cooperative effort on the part of 
the statistical agencies of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. It.has replaced the U.S. Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system in 1997. For a list of 2002 NAICS codes, see US Census Bureau at  
<http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/naicod02.htm> Accessed Jan 6, 2007. 
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This section studies the vehicles of DIM. Normally the migration involves a flow of 
assets from one country to the other. Under globalization the transnational flow of 
assets is mainly achieved through international trade and foreign investment.  
 
2.4.3.1 Distinction between “Active” and “Passive” Dirty Industry Migration 
 
The distinction between “active” DIM and “passive” DIM is made here to untangle 
some confusion in the understanding of “migration” (see Chart 1). Traditionally people 
tend to understand the DIM as referring only to the plant relocation of dirty production 
plants from one country to the other. However, in the author’s opinion, the migration of 
dirty industries can be achieved actively, i.e. MNCs actively invest abroad to flee from 
the high environmental regulations in their home country. Such active DIM can take the 
form of greenfield investment66 in pollution intensive industries (“PII”) in the host state, 
or financing on the expansion of existing production facilities, or acquiring the 
corporations in PII in the host state, etc. Alternatively, the migration of dirty industries 
can be achieved passively. Namely, through the closure of dirty production or other 
forms of exit from the dirty industry in their home countries, PIIs in the home state tend 
                                                 
66
 A Greenfield Investment is the investment in a manufacturing plant, office, or other physical company-related 
structure or group of structures in an area where no previous facilities exist. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenfield_investment (Accessed on Feb 28, 2007). 
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to import such products from producers in other countries. In other words, the total 
demand for Pollution Intensive Industrial Products (“PIIP”) did not decrease but only 
the market share being filled by other countries. In both “active” and “passive” DIM, 
pollutions arising out of dirty production relocate from the home to the host countries. 
 
The significance of making the distinction between active and passive DIM is to rectify 
a common deficiency with past literature on DIM. Previous researchers tend to focus on 
either DIM through FDI or DIM through international trade, yet very few researchers 
have attempted to combine the two for the assessment of DIM. In the author’s opinion it 
is the aggregate environmental impact of both foreign trade and investment that gives a 
comprehensive picture of DIM in a particular country. Following this logic, in Chapter 
III the author conducts two empirical studies, one on the active and the other on passive 
DIM in China. Based on the aggregate empirical results of the two studies, the author 
draws his conclusion on whether there is evidence of DIM in China.  
 











“Active” DIM through Foreign Direct Investment in 
Pollution Intensive Industry in the Host Country 
 
“Passive” DIM through International Trade for Pollution 
Intensive Industrial Products from the Host Country 
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2.5 Motives of Dirty Industry Migration 
 
In regard to why dirty industries decide to migrate, the author identifies three factors, 
namely cost advantage, production restrictions and investment restrictions. Cost 
advantage in DIM refers to cost advantages arising from the difference in environmental 
standards among states. Previous research tends to suggest that there was not much 
empirical evidence for DIM mainly because environment compliance cost covers only a 
very small part of the total cost of production. 67  In other words, compared to 
endowments of the traditional factors considered to characterize comparative advantage 
in neo-classical trade theory, differences in environmental standards might be negligible, 
and dirty industries do not have much incentive to migrate.68  
 
In response to this argument the author must first stress that whether there is evidence 
of DIM and whether the environment cost advantage is the primary cause of DIM are 
two different questions. The former is a matter of fact while the latter is another 
hypothesis subject to empirical testing. Thus even if environmental cost advantage is 
proved to be a negligible factor for DIM, since DIM is driven by a variety of factors, 
denying on one factor does not necessarily render the DIM hypothesis invalid. 
 
Despite the above argument, the author considers the environmental cost advantage as 
an important motive for DIM, mainly because such factor has previously been 
                                                 
67 Studies indicate that environmental protection expenditures account for only one to two percent of Gross National 
Product in developed countries. See Gaines, supra note 11, at 465. 
68
 See Tobey, supra note 10, at 194. 
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underestimated. For example, a popular approach of previous researchers is to use the 
survey method to test the motives behind trade and investment decisions. Usually a pre-
set series of motives are available for the candidates to choose from, in which the 
intention to seek lower environmental regulation is often overlooked. Even if they are 
included, they are sensitive and candidates tend to avoid directly answering the question, 
with or without intention. Furthermore, the question “to what extent the environmental 
factor plays a role in driving the migration of dirty industries” is a difficult one because 
an investment decision is often a comprehensive one based on a variety of 
considerations. The environmental cost advantage is often intertwined with other 
motives which jointly drive the migration of dirty industries. Very often the low 
environmental standard in the host state is associated with low labour costs and other 
factors. It is impractical to single out the environmental factor and tell to what extent it 
affects the decision on migration. 
 
In addition to the imperfection in previous research methodology, another common 
shortfall of previous DIM studies is that they only considered part of the environmental 
costs of industries, i.e. the pollution abatement cost, but failed to take into account 
environmental costs and expenditures of, for example, planning and monitoring 
activities, productivity loss, and research and development.69 Other costs that are often 
excluded are occupational health and safety expenses.70  For certain industries the total 
environmental cost can be substantial and may become the primary incentive of these 
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 See Mabey, N. & McNally, R. Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment: From Pollution Haven to 
Sustainable Development, (WWF, UK: Surrey, UK 1999). (Analyzing other environmental cost of corporation other 
than pollution abatement costs) Also see Zarsky, supra note 29. 
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 Chapman, D., “Environmental Standards and International Trade in Automobiles and Copper: The Case for a 
Social Tariff” (1991) 31:3 Natural Resources Journal 449-461. 
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industries to migrate, actively or passively. Based on these considerations, Mabey and 
McNally (1999) suggest that a country’s inability to internalize environmental costs into 
its economy might indirectly act as an incentive to woo FDI in pollution intensive 
industries.71  
 
Besides cost advantage, a country’s laws and regulations which impose restrictions on 
the production or investment in dirty industries have direct impact on DIM. In such 
circumstance producers are left with only two choices: To cease production in 
compliance with law or to relocate the production thereby evades the restriction. Small 
producers that are unable to relocate their production tend to exit such industry, and 
such decline in capacity is replaced by the increasing import from countries where there 
is no such restriction. The remaining producers are generally those being able to reform. 
Such reform may take the form of “green innovation” on their existing production 
process to meet the increased standards, or a change of strategy to access global 
production outside their own country.   
 
2.6 Barriers to Dirty Industry Migration 
 
2.6.1 Dirty Industries’ Barriers to Exit 
 
Usually the migration of dirty industries involves two processes: the dirty industries 
have to first exit their home state and then enter the host state. It is by no means a free 
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flow of assets. Each process has its own barriers which constitute the cost of DIM.  
 
The barriers to exit refer to the barriers that enterprise must encounter when it seeks to 
exit certain market or industry. According to Bain (1956), the barriers to exit generally 
fall into three categories: sunk cost, government dissuasion, and damage to the 
reputation.72  
 
Sunk cost is generally determined by the capital intensity of that industry. The high 
capital intensity implies that such industry requires more workshops and production 
facilities. Industries with high sunk cost are often pollution intensive industries. 
Examples are petroleum, chemical, machinery, metal, smelt and paper. For these 
industries, to exit the home country and enter another country requires the often 
burdensome dismantlement and re-establishment. Therefore, from the perspective of 
sunk cost, “dirty” industries have both a higher exit and entry barrier for migration. 
 
Capital-intensive industries are usually the pillar industry of a country. Its migration 
will affect the macro-economy of the home country and bring about a series of 
problems such as the loss of state revenue and domestic jobs. For example in the steel 
and iron industry, the steel producing nations usually have one dominant “flag bearing” 
firm, and such a firm has traditionally been protected for strategic reasons. The size of 
these firms allows them to enjoy increasing returns to scale in production, marketing, 
distribution, advertising and research and development. Given these competitive 
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advantages, they are able to offset extra environmental costs and have few incentives to 
migrate. Even if they have enough reasons to relocate, the home state governments tend 
to dissuade them against such migration. The government dissuasion can take the form 
of incentives, such as government subsidy, technical support and tax deduction, etc. 
Alternatively, it can take the form of disincentives, such as direct governmental 
interference. All these measures have, to a certain extent, increased the dirty industries’ 
barriers to exit.  
 
Reputation is another important factor. For established MNCs, the environmental 
performance is an integral part of their public image, and this applies to their overseas 
operations and investments. If an MNC is reported to have migrated to other countries 
with the effect of transfer pollution, its reputation may be damaged, its stock price may 
drop, and it may lose its existing and potential customers worldwide. The cautions on 
reputation constitute the third barrier whenever established companies decide to migrate. 
 
2.6.2 Dirty Industries’ Barriers to Entry 
 
The barrier to entry refers to the barriers that foreign corporations must encounter when 
they seek to enter a certain market or industry. From a broad sense, it not only refers to 
the pre-entry costs and requirements, but also includes all post-entry conditions and 
disadvantages that foreign corporations must encounter as against the domestic 
corporations in the host country. According to Bain (1956), barriers of this kind include 
barriers of cost advantage, barriers of scale-economy, barriers of required capital, 
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barriers of law and policies, etc.73  
 
Interestingly, using pollution abatement cost as an indicator of pollution intensity, it is 
found that most pollution intensive industries considered to have high barriers of exit 
are also those found to have high barriers of entry. Although the entry requirements for 
dirty industries which constitute barriers of entry are country-specific, due to the 
capital-intensive nature, strategic role in the national economy and potentially large 
polluting effect on environment of these industries, host states generally keep a vigilant 
eye over their entry.  
 
Generally, large MNCs have certain advantages over small and medium foreign 
industries in overcoming barriers to entry. For instance, large MNCs have the 
advantages in scale-economy so that the capital requirement of the host state doesn’t 
create extra burden for them. Large MNCs also have extraordinary purchasing power 
over their small and medium counterparts in obtaining required inputs at competitive 
price. However, for reputation considerations large MNCs generally have to spend more 
on maintaining a socially responsible public image. But, this disadvantage can be 
mitigated by the factor that given the large economic contributions that MNCs bring to 
the host state, the host state government is always willing to make concessions in order 
to facilitate their entry.  
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The government policy of the host state often plays a key role in determining the entry 
barriers for foreign dirty industries. For example, China has had its Catalogue for the 
Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries since 1995. The Catalogue serves to guide 
the sectoral flow of FDI according to China’s national objectives. The criteria for the 
“encouraged”, “restricted” and “prohibited” investment are provided in the 2002 
Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment (the “Provisions”), a 
governmental regulation that has the force of law. For example, Art.6 of the Provisions 
provides that “A project being of technology lagged behind or being adverse to saving 
resources and improving environment shall be a restricted foreign-funded project”, and 
Art.7 provides that “a project that pollutes the environment, damages natural resources 
or harms human health shall be a prohibited foreign-funded project.” A foreign industry 
that falls under the “restricted” or “prohibited” list simply means they are either denied 
entry to China or has to incur substantially higher cost of entry compared with those 
under the “encouraged” list. This reflects the general attitudes of Chinese government 
towards foreign pollution intensive industries.  
 
To summarize, our conclusion is that in general the pollution intensive industries are 
also industries with a comparatively high exit and entry barrier. However, to what 
extent such barriers affect a firm’s decision to migrate shall depend on a variety of 
factors and needs to be studied on a case by case basis.  
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2.7 Evaluation on the Existing Theories of DIM 
 
Subject to the re-examination of the term “dirty industry migration” under globalization, 
this section will analyze the value of existing theories of DIM. Namely, the “race to the 
bottom” hypothesis, the “pollution haven” hypothesis, the “pollution halo” hypothesis 
and “porter” hypothesis.  
 
2.7.1 “Race to the bottom” 
 
Advocates for the race to bottom hypothesis are generally seeking evidence that the host 
governments have explicitly changed their environmental laws, and therefore lowered 
the standards, in order to attract investment. For example, the UNCTAD in its 1999 
World Investment Report pointed out that developing countries are seen to be under 
pressure to gain high rates of economic growth and to secure FDI but that this, in some 
instances, can tempt them to accept environmentally risky activities.74  In India, Mabey 
and McNally (1999) find that a British company pressured regional authorities in India 
to de-notify one of India’s three designated eco-fragile areas so that they could go ahead 
with a port development.  The state government initially offered six potential sites but 
since they did not receive many bidders, they allowed the company to use another site 
that was previously excluded under certain environmental protections.75   They also 
report two cases where the host government was pressured to provide post-
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establishment concessions, such as lowering regulations or preventing its enforcement: 
oil exploitation and drilling in Nigeria and mining in Southeast Asia.76  Zarsky (1999) 
also points out that an investor may act as an “environmental renegade” after entering 
the country while environmental regulators may be lax in their enforcement of 
regulations.77 
 
Despite anecdotal evidence, the author is of the opinion that the race to the bottom 
hypothesis might not be true. An irrefutable fact is that under the economic growth and 
intensifying competition, most countries and industries are better off than their original 
environmental standards. 78  Some scholars examined other factors to provide 
confirmation that there is no race to the bottom. For example, it was suggested that the 
local input in decision making, premised on the “Not in My Backyard” attitudes, can act 
as a countervailing force against the race to the bottom. 79  On the empirical side, 
conclusive evidence on host countries actively engage in altering environmental 
regulatory system to attract FDI is not forthcoming, partially due to the unavailability of 
evidence from the host countries themselves.80  Instead, the prevailing empirical view is 
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that the most significant impact of country differentia in environmental laws might not 
be a “race to the bottom”, but a “chilling effect” on the harmonization process towards 
global minimum environmental standards.81 This implies that competition and the fear 
of losing potential investors may keep new initiatives to enhance environmental 
standards “chilled”, not allowing them to reach their socially optimal levels.  
 
2.7.1.1 “Regulatory chill” 
 
Some authors suggested that unlike the hypothesis of “race to the bottom”, it is 
potentially easier to assert that a regulatory chill or political drag on regulation occurs 
since it is based on undocumented non-action by governments.82  It is also for this 
reason that definitive empirical proof of government inactivity does not exist and only 
anecdotal evidence can be relied upon.  
 
In industrialized countries, Neumayer (2001) suggests that many of the examples of 
regulatory chill are seen in the regulation of energy and taxation.83 Esty and Geradin 
(1997) cite various country examples, such as Australia, the United States and the EU, 
where governments failed to enact energy tax regimes or other greenhouse gas 
reduction measures, to be motivated, at least in part, by competitive concerns. 84 
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Erlandson (1994) cites that the U.S. federal government’s introduction of a British 
thermal unit energy tax was ultimately terminated partly in response to complaints by 
several energy and oil lobbies, who claimed that such a tax would reduce their 
competitiveness, cause massive job losses and encourage a flight of capital.85 Moreover, 
there are specific examples where energy companies threatened to leave jurisdictions 
due to proposed higher environmental costs and taxes, as was seen in the energy sector 
of Netherlands.86   
 
Some evidence is brought forward on regulatory chill in developing countries. Mabey 
and McNally (1999) assert that Brazilian tanneries, specializing in low quality products, 
are trapped between being unable to compete with better quality competitors in Europe 
and the lower-cost producers in Asia. As a result, local authorities are unwilling to 
enforce more stringent regulations due to a concern for loss of employment and lower 
tax revenues.87  Another case they raise occurs with the phosphate industry in Morocco 
and Tunisia, where the governments have been reluctant to increase the level of 
regulation partly out of fear that other destinations will become more attractive.88  
 
To summarize, the theory of “regulatory chill” probably has more potential in 
explaining the host state’s response to the migration of dirty industry, although solid 
empirical evidence to support this hypothesis is still lacking. Despite this, the author is 
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of the opinion that the chilling effect may hamper the initiatives of the host state to 
promote higher environmental standards or the zeal of the regulator to enforce existing 
regulations, but it generally would not result in the downgrade of existing 
environmental standards.  
 
2.7.2 “Pollution haven” 
 
The general difficulty in evaluating the pollution haven hypothesis is that often the 
environmental incentive is “stuck in the mud” with other factors and they collectively 
drive the trade or investment decision. Some countries are alleged as “pollution havens” 
because dirty industries are less regulated there, but the primary incentive for industries 
to migrate to these alleged pollution havens varies from sector to sector. While 
aggregate studies do not tend to support the pollution havens hypothesis, the pollution 
havens debate must not be conveniently aggregated away, as there is clear empirical 
evidence that not only certain country’s low environmental standards serve as an 
incentive for foreign industries, but also companies have a locational preference over 
areas with low environmental standards.  
 
The mining industry represents a natural resource sector that is highly polluting and 
where there is a great disparity between environmental regulations in developed and 
developing countries.89  In most cases, mining legislation was practically non-existent 
in the latter, with the exception of a few basic standards for water quality and air 
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quality.90 Investors can select among a number of different sites within a region and 
therefore are in a position of strength to obtain the most attractive set of incentives that 
may include lowering environmental standards. 91  Jha et. al. (1999) report that in 
Zimbabwe, a country with a high percentage of foreign ownership in the mining sector, 
the Mines and Minerals Act supersedes all other legislation including acts for the 
protection of the environment. There are few restrictions on mining rights once an 
initial permit is issued, which is attributed to the need to secure foreign exchange 
earnings from mining.92  In Papua New Guinea as well as Indonesia, mining operations 
are minimally or completely unregulated. Mining in Indonesia operated pursuant to a 
Contract of Work, which generally exempted mining corporations from environmental 
laws. 93  Moreover, in both of these countries, there were exemptions given to 
accommodate major mining disasters.94  
 
Many authors cite the example of the Maquiladora region in Mexico as offering 
evidence of pollution haven. 95  It has been concluded by some that environmental 
abatement costs acted as a determinant for the movement of FDI to the region,96 which 
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has been confirmed by industry polls. 97  In the Maquiladora region, evidence of 
industrial flight was seen in the chemical industry where investment increased by over 
twenty fold from 1982 to 1990, following a tightening of environmental regulations in 
the United States.98  Production of some hazardous chemical products banned or strictly 
regulated in the U.S., such as pesticides, has expanded in Mexico.99  It was suggested 
that the serious environmental degradation in the area has been linked to the inadequate 
environmental regulation to control the rapid development and industrialization 
processes.100 In particular, one major reason engendering the movement of industry to 
Mexico was that there were no air pollution standards for the application of solvents.101 
Severe pollution problems in areas such as Tijuana are partly attributed to the lack of 
recycling and refuse disposal facilities.102 In addition, workers in this region are subject 
to occupational hazards such as working with asbestos fibres that they would not be 
exposed to in the United States.103  
 
In the author’s opinion, even if environmental regulations may not have the primary 
influence on a firm’s investment decision, they are nevertheless important factors for 
pollution- or resource- intensive firms when selecting among different countries in the 
same trading region, or among different locations in the same country. In practice, for 
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industries that wish to relocate it is more common that environmental regulations are 
only considered once the so-called “fundamentals” have been met. These fundamentals 
generally relate to the size of the prospective market, natural endowments, and lower 
wages. They may also relate to the availability of human and physical capital or existing 
infrastructure. It is common practice, particularly for long term projects, for the investor 
to pinpoint a number of different potential sites which meet their principal requirements. 
These investors then play each location off against the others; force the host states to 
offer significant incentives before they decide where to locate their investments. 
Amongst these incentives can be a tacit or expressed lowering of environmental 
standards. Klavens and Zamparutti (1995) survey 1,000 MNCs and draw the conclusion 
that large corporations tend to look systematically at environmental questions when 
they decide where to invest.104  However, such finding is challenged by other authors, 
Eskeland and Harrison (1997) in their comparative study of Mexico, Morocco, Ivory 
Coast and Venezuela ascertain that different pollution abatements costs were significant 
in determining FDI flows.105  Other studies also indicate that investors can be lured to 
certain countries because of lower environmental regulatory standards.106  
 
 In summary, the evidence for pollution haven hypothesis holds some potential in 
explaining the possible causes for DIM. In the author’s opinion, the term “pollution 
haven” is a dynamic and comparative concept. There is no “pollution haven” in the 
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general sense; there are only “alleged pollution havens” of specific industries and for a 
specific period of time. With countries’ comparative advantage constantly changes, in 
practice, “pollution havens” have apparently been as transient as “low-wage havens.”107  
 
2.7.3 “Pollution Halo” 
 
With regard to the “Pollution Halo” hypothesis, there are clear examples where foreign 
investors do bring improvements in environmental performance to the host countries.108 
Evidence suggests that in some sectors, particularly the energy sector, where 
considerable economic savings can be acquired through superior technology, “pollution 
halos” may exist.109 However, there is also considerable evidence which does not lend 
support to the “halos” hypothesis. Case studies by the California Global Corporate 
Accountability Project finds that the U.S. oil companies tend to employ “double 
standards,” that is, lower—sometimes far lower—environmental standards in 
developing country operations than at home. For example, U.S. semiconductor and 
chip-making companies are characterized by “leaders” and “laggards”. Leading 
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companies tend to use global standards and new technologies in developing country 
operations, while laggards follow local practice and use older, dirtier technologies.110  
 
Evidence also shows that MNCs sometimes play a negative role in promoting higher 
environmental standards. For example, industry has been and continues to have a role in 
negotiations for international environmental agreements. Its lobbying proved to be 
successful at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(“UNCED”) when the final text of Agenda 21 failed to include any mention of the need 
to control the activities of multi-national corporations. More recently its involvement 
has consisted of encouraging governments to oppose controls over methyl bromide. 
Understanding that methyl bromide will soon be phased out of industrialized nations, 
corporations are lobbying hard for the Montreal Protocol to institute a later phase-out 
date for the Third World countries while simultaneously circumnavigating the globe to 
create thriving methyl bromide markets throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America, in 
particular, Mexico, Kenya, Morocco, Jordan and China.111 Jha et. al. (1999) note that 
there has been an influx of foreign companies coming to Thailand to take advantage of 
its Article 5 status under the Montreal Protocol, available for developing countries with 
low consumption of ozone depleting substances. A rise in ozone depleting substance 
(ODS) imports between 1986 and 1991 is used as evidence of this trend.112  In addition, 
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the chemical industry continues to dodge issues relating to health concerns of human 
and wildlife populations. When statements such as “[s]o far, the scientific evidence 
linking chemicals to health problems is murky” are made by the Executive Vice 
President of Exxon Chemical Company, 113  given that the methyl bromide-free 
technology is widely used in their home countries, it can only be interpreted as a means 
to justify continued expansionism. Arguably it is also a way to try and maintain 
credibility in the face of an increasingly skeptical public. 
 
In regard to the question whether the host state’s environmental standards is positively 
affected by the state’s foreign exposure, literature has exhibited mixed results. World 
Bank studies by Dasgupta et al (1998) find that greater environmental performance is 
more attributable to the transfer of new technology and facilities rather than stricter 
environmental regulation in the host state.114 Despite this, two other World Bank studies 
by Wheeler et al (1997) and Pargal and Wheeler (1995) found that firm-level 
environmental performance is unaffected by foreign links. Factors such as age, size and 
community pressure have been more important in raising environmental standards than 
foreign investor involvement.115  
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It is to be recognized that to define an investment’s true environmental impact can be 
difficult. In some cases although some MNCs hold environmentally advanced 
technologies but they tend not to diffuse the technology in the host state, in other cases 
although MNCs discontinue the dirty production themselves, they may simply pass the 
environmental problem onto their local suppliers. In the chemicals industry for example, 
there has been a practice of MNCs buying certain intermediate chemicals locally rather 
than paying the high clean up costs of production.  These problems have previously been 
under researched in the literature on pollution halos.  
 
To summarize, the evidence collected to investigate the pollution halo hypothesis does 
not identify a consistent trend of foreign investors having higher environmental 
standards than domestic companies in developing countries. Rather the characteristics 
of these firms – size, sector, global supplier chains, and responsiveness to stakeholders 
– determine their better performance. Nor is there conclusive evidence that the host 
state’s environmental performance has been positively affected by the importation of 
MNCs. The pollution halo hypothesis thus provides an ideal practice for MNCs 
operating in the host state and it casts some light on the environmental self-regulation of 
MNCs in the trend of global DIM. 
 
2.7.4 “Porter” Hypothesis 
 
The “Porter” Hypothesis appropriately recognized that in the short term, strict 
environment policy will increase a company’s cost and further affect its 
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competitiveness. However in the long run, the impact of environmental regulation on 
“green” innovation as well as corporate environmental cost remains unclear. Therefore 
the principal issue can be summarized as to what extent the government environmental 
policies can influence the behavior of enterprises, and to what extent they may trigger 
the actual “green” innovation. Here the “green” innovation should be understood 
broadly to incorporate product innovation, process innovation and management 
innovation, etc. To illustrate the mechanisms of which environment policies affect the 
corporation’s “green” innovation, the author summarizes two effects, namely, time 
effect and stringency effect.  
 
2.7.4.1 Time Effect 
 
The time effect refers to that with the lapse of time accompanying the implementation 
of environment policies, the stimulation on the innovation will gradually increase. Such 
effect may come from, for example: (1) the government’s improved regulation. Namely, 
with relevant authorities gradually become familiarized with new environmental 
policies, their management skills improve which in turn strengthens green innovations.  
(2) The chain effect. Namely, the implementation of environmental policy facilitates the 
adjustment and adaptation of a chain of related government policies. The latter will, in 
reverse, strengthen the policy objectives for innovation. (3) Pressures from the public. 
Namely, the implementation of environmental policies will enhance public awareness, 
participation, and further alter their environmental preferences. Such rising public 
demands conversely push corporations to green their production process. (4) Pressures 
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from international community on the harmonization of production process. Namely, 
pressures from international community promote and integrate environmental 
considerations into industrial restructuring and strengthen the environmental 
management systems of exporting firms. When a significant number of companies 
adopt the higher standards, the innovation becomes the mainstream environmental 
practice in the industry.  In summary, as time lapses, the stimulating effects of the above 
four factors on the “green” innovation are gradually increasing.  
 
2.7.4.2 Stringency Effect 
 
The stringency effect indicates that generally the higher stringency of environmental 
regulation imposed on the firms, the higher stimulating effect that it will have on the 
firms’ “green” innovation. However, the relationship between policy stringency and its 
effect on the actual innovation is not a simple linear one, but there exists a threshold. In 
other words, below this threshold the innovation does not take place because at this 
point the cost of polluting and paying fines is still less than that of innovation.116 This 
implies that, although the company has already felt the pressure of increasing 
environmental cost as a result of stringent regulation, the extent of stringency may still 
not suffice to trigger green innovations. However, once the stringency of environmental 
                                                 
116
 It was suggested that it is a common problem among developing countries that the cost of obeying the 
environmental regulations is more than paying the fines for breaking the law. As a result, many corporations prefer 
not to fulfil their legal duties. Therefore, being stricter in the control process and a considerable increase in the 
fines to be paid may cause corporations to take the environmental activities more seriously in underdeveloped 
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Perspectives” (2000) 18(1) European  Management Journal: 23, at 32. 
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regulation reaches this threshold, its stimulating effect to innovation will proliferate 
among firms.  
 
To summarize, the porter hypothesis provides thoughts on the mechanism that national 
laws and policies influence the corporate environmental behavior. It has policy 
implications on the national response to DIM. In practice, special attention shall be paid 
to the design and implementation of trade, investment, and environmental policies so as 
to allow corporations to offset the short term environmental pressure while gradually 
take up “green innovation”.  
 58 
CHAPTER III DIRTY INDUSTRY MIGRATION 
GLOBALLY AND IN CHINA— AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
The empirical research on DIM draws much lesson from the approaches that were 
applied in testing the related hypothesis, such as the pollution haven or race to the 
bottom. Despite the broad diversity in the approaches of literature, these approaches 
generally aim at identifying the correlation between the industrial migratory behavior 
and the stringency in environmental standards in the host or home country.117 This 
chapter is designed to first overview and evaluates the existing approaches in the 
empirical study of DIM. Based on the literature review, the author develops his own 
empirical model to test the DIM in the context of China. The results of the author’s 
empirical test will be analyzed to draw a tentative conclusion on DIM in China.  
 
3.1 An Overview on Previous Empirical Studies 
 
3.1.1 Firm Level Empirical Studies 
 
Empirical studies at firm’s level generally fall into two major approaches. One approach 
is to compare the major indicators of a company’s economic activity level with those of 
its environmental cost. The result varies from industry to industry. For example, in the 
U.S. paper and pulp, refined petroleum and steeling industry, lower productivity and 
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growth rate were found as a result of the stringency of environmental regulation.118 But 
for most other industries, such trend is not remarkable.119 The result also varies from 
country to country. For example, a study based on Japanese companies discovered 
higher economic performance as a result of the environmental pressures.120 But for 
companies of other countries the trends are not consistent.  
 
In contrast, the other approach more directly studies the migrating activity by individual 
firms and evaluates the environmental motives behind their locational choice. The 
general presupposition of this approach is that industrial firms seek investment where 
they can exploit a comparative advantage. Environmental costs, due to tightened 
pollution controls, can affect this advantage negatively.121 Using primarily case study, 
this approach proves to be successful in finding cases that support the DIM hypothesis. 
Examples of both governments failing to enforce environmental legislations and firms 
acknowledging that environmentals were a factor—were found in Costa Rica, Mexico, 
India, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines.122  Jha et. al (1999) find that 
in China, many foreign firms have located their plants for highly polluting industries 
such as pesticides and asbestos. 123  Other instances of industrial flight of heavily 
polluting sectors have been found, for example, in the case of asbestos tile and 
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benzidine dye manufacturing facilities relocating to Mexico and Romania from U.S. 
and Canada,124 wood finishing firms to Mexico from California,125 wet processing in the 
tanning industry from Europe to Brazil, 126 and iron and steel industry from EU to China, 
Brazil and the Republic of Korea.127   
 
Despite these important findings, this approach was challenged to have suffered from 
selection bias—primarily because firms that have actually shifted are documented.128 
Some authors have characterized this as being marginal and not showing up in 
aggregate trade and investment statistics.129 Other studies tend to believe that given the 
proportionately low business costs for environmental compliance, corporations would 
be reluctant to resettle due to the high costs involved in relocating.130 By comparison, 
there are other determinants for location that mark a higher priority for corporations. 
These may include the availability of cheap labour;131 natural resource endowments of 
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the host country, 132  presence of industrial base, 133  market size, availability to raw 
materials,134 and concerns about liability or consumer pressures in home countries.135 
 
3.1.2 Industry Level Empirical Studies 
 
At industry’s level, there are generally two approaches for empirical research on DIM: 
international trade approach and international investment approach. Each approach has 
yielded mixed results.  
 
3.1.2.1 International Trade Approach  
 
The international trade approach mainly examines the export performance of Pollution 
Intensive Industries (“PII”) of different countries at the international market. The 
underlying hypothesis is that if a country’s environmental standard is higher than others, 
then its market share of PII export in the global market will decrease.  
 
Based on this hypothesis, Tobey (1990) uses a UNCTAD survey to rank 23 countries on 
a scale of 1 (most tolerant) to 7 (most strict) for stringency of environmental regulation. 
He then regresses net exports of each country’s PII on their factor inputs (land, labour, 
capital, and natural resources) and on stringency of environmental regulation. In no case 
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does he find that stringency of environmental regulation was a statistically significant 
determinant of net exports.136 
 
World Bank researchers Low and Yeats test whether developing countries have gained 
a comparative advantage in producing pollution intensive industrial products (“PIIP”) 
during the period 1965-1988. 137  Their model relies on the calculation of Revealed 
Comparative Advantage (“RCA”), defined as the share of an industry in a country’s 
total exports, relative to that industry’s share of total world exports of manufactures. 
They look at the RCAs of 109 countries for PIIPs. They observe the decreases in PIIPs’ 
RCAs in the developed world and increases in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and 
West Asia. Sorsa (1994) also finds similar trends that over the last 20 years, the export 
of PIIPs from developing countries are increasing in while those from developed 
countries are decreasing.138 
 
At regional level, the research of Grossman and Krueger (1993) is widely cited during 
debates around the passage of North America Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”). 
Grossman and Krueger test whether pollution abatement costs in U.S. industries 
affected imports from Mexico. That is, they ask whether dirtier U.S. industries relied 
more heavily on imports from Mexico, as would be expected if Mexico was functioning 
as a pollution haven relative to the U.S. They find traditional economic determinants of 
trade and investment, such as factor prices and tariffs, to be very important. In contrast, 
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they find the impact of cross-industry differences in pollution abatement costs on U.S. 
imports from Mexico to be small and statistically insignificant.139 
 
Another study by Abimanyu (1996) focuses on the trade between the U.S, Japan, 
Australia, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”). It also uses an 
RCA model to find that dirty industry expansion was faster in developing countries than 
developed ones. However, it concludes that differences in environmental standards 
between developing and developed countries were not a significant cause of the 
movement of dirty industries.140 
 
Results along the same line are found by Hettige, Mani and Wheeler (1998). They find 
that from 1960 to 1995, pollution-intensive output as a percentage of total 
manufacturing has fallen consistently in the OECD countries and risen steadily in the 
developing world. Moreover, the periods of rapid increase in net exports of pollution-
intensive products from developing countries coincided with periods of rapid increase 
in the cost of pollution abatement in the OECD economies—a typical “pollution haven” 
effect.141  
 
Using different variables, Lucas, Wheeler, and Hettige (1992) look at the trade 
liberalization and the toxic intensity of manufacturing in 80 countries between 1960 and 
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1988.142 Analyzing aggregate toxic releases per unit of output, they identify metals, 
cement, pulp and paper, and chemicals as the dirtiest industries. They find that the dirty 
(toxic-intensive) industries grew faster in the developing countries as a whole, but this 
growth was concentrated in relatively closed, fast growing economies, rather than in the 
countries that were most open to trade. Regional work by Birdsall and Wheeler (1993) 
on Latin America generates similar results.143  
 
However, the work of Lucas et al. is criticized by Rock (1996) for their classification of 
dirty industries and their narrow definition of openness. Rock finds that a measure of 
the toxic intensity of GDP (toxic pollution loads per dollar of GDP) for a country as a 
whole is positively correlated with measures of openness to trade during 1973-1985.144 
That is, the more open is a country’s trade policy, the greater is the pollution intensity of 
GDP. 
 
Despite these findings, these authors also suggest several countervailing factors which 
serve to undermine the “pollution haven” hypothesis: first, the consumption / 
production ratios for dirty-sector products in the developing world have remained close 
to unity throughout the period. It implies that most of the dirty-sector development story 
is strictly domestic. Second, a significant part of the increase in dirty-sector production 
share in the developing regions seems due to a highly income-elastic demand for basic 
industrial products. With continued income growth, this elasticity has declined. Third, 
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some portion of the international adjustment has probably been due to the energy price 
shock and the persistence of energy subsidies in many developing countries. These 
subsidies have been on the wane for a decade. Finally and ultimately, it seems clear that 
environmental regulation increases continuously with income. According to them, any 
tendency towards formation of a “pollution haven” seemed to be self-limiting, because 
economic growth brings countervailing pressure to bear on polluters through increased 
regulation.145 
 
3.1.2.2 International Investment Approach  
 
The international investment approach mainly examines the pollution haven hypothesis 
by tracing the FDI flow and the stringency of environmental standards. The underlying 
hypothesis is that lower environmental standards are more attractive to pollution-
intensive FDI. The findings of this approach vary, and they are sensitive to the measures 
chosen to proxy stringency of environmental regulation and pollution intensity.  
 
For example, Smarzynska and Wei (2001) measure the stringency of environmental 
regulation and pollution-intensity by participation in international treaties and an 
emissions index. They find dirty projects are more likely to locate in areas with low 
stringency. However, this result is not robust to alternative measures such as actual 
standards and an abatement index.146 
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Other scholars (Adam 1997, Repetto 1995, Lucas et al 1992, Eskeland and Harrison 
1997, Warhurst and Bridge 1997) correlate U.S. outward FDI with environmental 
standards. Most of them find no support for pollution haven hypothesis.147 One study by 
Xing and Kolstad (1997) does find the predicted effect that there is a rise in the flows of 
FDI in dirty industries to developing countries.148 However its robustness has been 
questioned because the authors use Sulphur Dioxide emissions alone as a proxy for 
environmental regulation in a large model of locational choice and fail to separate the 
effects of environmental regulation from other variables.149 
 
Focused on the home country environmental standards, Eskeland and Harrison (1998) 
look at the patterns of U.S. foreign investment in Mexico, Venezuela, Morocco, and 
Cote d’Ivoire between 1982 and 1994, and examine whether they are influenced by U.S. 
pollution abatement costs. This study also finds traditional economic variables to be 
important, but rejects the hypothesis that the pattern of U.S. foreign investment in any 
of the recipient countries is skewed toward industries with high costs of pollution 
abatement.150 
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3.2 Evaluation on the Existing Empirical Studies  
 
To summarize the mixed empirical findings, it seems clear that the migration of dirty 
industries globally is a fact, but whether the environmental factor being their primary 
incentive to migrate is a debatable issue. While much can be learned from previous 
studies, the author identifies at least three important limitations to the body of work 
reviewed in the previous section. These are the limitations that the author tries to 
overcome in his empirical model in the context of China.  
 
The most obvious limitation is the extent to which previous conclusions depend on the 
methodology and scope of the research. There appears to be a pollution haven effect in 
analyses of global patterns of comparative advantage, but not clear in studies of bilateral 
trade or of business location within a specific country. Even the extent of the global 
pattern is uncertain, when the analysis of RCA is coupled with controls for other 
economic factors that influence trade, the relationship between trade liberalization and 
the location of dirty industry becomes weaker. In any case, it is not clear how to apply 
the results of an analysis of many countries over long time periods to the effects of a 
specific nation’s scenario, such as China. 
 
The second limitation stems from the first. When studying DIM in a specific country’s 
context, quantitative international comparisons require that complex information about 
national policy, such as the degree of stringency of environmental regulation or 
openness to trade, must be represented by numerical variables. However, it is difficult 
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to quantify the optimum or most efficient level of environmental protection for each 
country.151  Comparing environmental laws is also problematic due to the high number 
of variables involved. This gives rise to inevitable problems of subjectivism and 
arbitrariness. This problem is especially critical in the case of China, a former non-
market economy with defective national environmental and accounting system. 
 
The third limitation is on the research scope. No previous research has explicitly made 
the distinction between active and passive DIM. Consequently, their research focuses 
on either trade and environment, or investment and environment. No research has ever 
evaluated their aggregated effect on a specific country in their research on DIM. Even 
for the studies that focus on the DIM through FDI, they tend to focus narrowly on the 
number of plant relocation and green field investments in the host country. In fact, it is 
the total amount of migrated dirty production in a country that should be measured, not 
the number of new plants. Expansion of old plants and opening of new ones both have 
the effect of increasing production. They should be calculated in the research on China. 
 
3.3 Empirical Study on Dirty Industry Migration in China 
 
Bearing in mind the limitations of previous empirical studies, the author designs and 
applies his own empirical model to test out two important questions in China: 
 
(1) Whether there is empirical evidence of DIM in China. If yes, in what industries? 
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(2) Based on the empirical result of (1), to what extent does the stringency of China’s 
environmental regulation affect the migration of foreign dirty industries? 
 
3.3.1 Methodology for Testing the Existence of DIM in China 
 
As discussed before, there exists both active DIM through foreign investment and 
passive DIM through international trade. For this reason, the author’s empirical model 
consists of two parallel studies. One model is based on the proportion of foreign funded 
dirty production in the total foreign funded industrial production in China. The purpose 
of this study is to examine whether foreign investors have a general preference towards 
pollution intensive industries in China. The other model is based on the change in the 
composition of the bilateral commodities trade between China and U.S. The purpose of 
this study is to examine whether there is evidence of passive DIM from the U.S. to 
China. The results of both researches will be studied together in order to draw a 
conclusion on the DIM in China.  
 
3.3.2 Identify “Dirty” Industries 
 
Various definitions have been used for pollution intensive industries in the empirical 
literature.152 As there appears to be no definitive criteria yet adopted to define pollution 
intensive industries, the author follows the “Pollution Abatement Costs and 
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Expenditures: 1999” issued by the U.S. Census Bureau in November 2002.153  The 
report is produced based on a most recent U.S. national industrial pollution abatement 
costs and expenditures survey in 1999. The Pollution abatement Capital Expenditures 
(“PACE”) in the report is defined to include “installation and retrofit that occurred 
during 1999 for separately identifiable methods, techniques, or process technologies 
installed exclusively for the purpose of removing pollutants after their creation, from air 
emissions, water discharges, and/or solid waste or expenditures for technologies that 
reduce or eliminate the creation of pollutants. Include the total expenditures for 
pollution abatement.” The Pollution abatement operating costs (“PAOC”) is defined as 
“annual costs for operating and maintaining all pollution abatement technology. Include 
all costs of materials and fuels, salaries and wages, leasing and contract work and 
services for pollution abatement.” 154 
 
The report surveyed the PACE and PAOC of industries up to 6-digit NAICS. It 
therefore it provides a good reference on the pollution intensity of various industries in 
the U.S. and world wide. For the purpose of this study, the author selects all the twenty 
3-digit NAICS manufacturing industries (NAICS 311 to 337, excluding 339 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing) and calculates their individual pollution intensity. The 
pollution intensity is calculated by adding the PACE and PAOC of a specific industry 
and divided by the Total Value of Shipments (“TVS”) of that industry. (See Table 2 on 
“Pollution Intensity of NAICS-3 Manufacturing Industries”) The TVS is chosen as the 
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coverage variable since it is available for all manufacturing industries and is correlated 
well enough with operating costs. Based on the author’s calculation, a ranking on the 
pollution intensity of major manufacturing industries is shown in Table 2:  
 
Table 2 Ranking of the Pollution Intensity of NAICS-3 Manufacturing Industries 
[Unit: Million US$] 
Classification NAICS Code Subsector 
Value of 
shipments PACE PAOC 
Polution 
Intensity* 
331 Primary metal mfg 158,101.80  605.7 1,543.90  1.360% 
324 Petroleum & coal products mfg   168,096.20  488.1 1,697.90  1.300% 
322 Paper mfg 157,491.00  611.9 945.60  0.989% 
325 Chemical mfg 419,673.90  990.9 2,808.00  0.905% 
327 Nonmetallic mineral product mfg  97,498.40  232.6 281.50  0.527% 
311 Food mfg   429,053.50 369.9 924.30  0.302% 
316 Leather & allied product mfg  9,673.20  7.3 19.60  0.278% 
332 Fabricated metal product mfg  256,899.50  283.3 405.30  0.268% 
313 Textile mills   54,854.20 37.1 105.00  0.259% 
HPII 
321 Wood product mfg   97,583.40  82.1 134.90  0.222% 
326 Plastics & rubber products mfg 172,396.90  102.6 164.70  0.155% 
323 Printing & related 




component mfg   
119,792.20  33.7 97.00  0.109% 






463,651.60  138 325.40  0.100% 
333 Machinery mfg  277,117.40  163.3 97.70  0.094% 
336 Transportation 
equipment mfg  675,121.90  134.7 454.40  0.087% 
312 Beverage & tobacco product mfg  107,437.00 17.1 66.10  0.077% 
339 Miscellaneous mfg  108,238.10  11.5 42.80  0.050% 
Clean 
Industry 
314 Textile product mills  32,641.60 7.2 4.90  0.037% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, “Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures: 1999” (2002) 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/ma200-99.pdf>  
*Pollution intensity (calculated by the author in %) = (PACE + PAOC) / Value of Shipments  
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In this thesis, the author defines industries which have pollution intensity over 0.2% as 
high pollution intensive industry (“HPII”), those between 0.1% and 0.2% as pollution 
intensive industry (“PIIs”), and those below 0.1% as “clean” manufacturing industry. 
The migration of HPIIs and PIIs are the focus of study. 
 
3.3.3 Empirical Study on Active DIM in China 
 
3.3.3.1 Methodology and Findings 
 
To test the foreign investor’s industrial preference in China, the author selects a set of 
time series data from National Statistics Yearbooks published by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (“NBS”) of China.155  This set of data covers the economic indicators of 
foreign invested enterprises (“FIEs”) in China for a 9 year’s period from 1996 to 
2004.156  In China, the definition of FIEs refers to the enterprises in which foreign 
investors contribute at least 25% of the registered capital of the enterprise. 157 Among 
the economic indicators of FIEs the author selects the “Total Assets of FIEs” as the 
variable because it best reflects the overall scale of foreign funded dirty production in 
China.  
 
The author’s approach is to first identify the annual increase in the total asset of the 
FIEs in each PII, and divide them by the total increased FIE’s asset of that year. The 
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result (shown in Table 3) indicates the trend, from 1996 to 2004, whether a specific 
foreign invested PII has increased or decreased its share in the total assets of FIEs of 
that year.  
 
Table 3 has shown that for the 9 years from 1996 to 2004, 5 out of 10 HPIIs (primary 
metal manufacturing, leather & allied product manufacturing, fabricated metal product 
manufacturing, textile mills, wood product manufacturing) and all 5 PIIs (plastics & 
rubber products manufacturing, printing & related support activities, electrical 
equipment, appliance, & component manufacturing, furniture & related product 
manufacturing, computer & electronic product manufacturing) have increased their 
respective shares in the total assets of FIEs. These 10 industries altogether account for 
47.94% of the total assets of FIEs in 2004.  
 
Despite this finding, the above trend is still insufficient to proof that foreign investors 
have a general preference over China’s PIIs. Some scholars argue that an increase in the 
presence of dirty industry in developing countries could simply be an indication of 
growth and industrialization in developing countries, 158  a rise in demand for such 
products in those countries,159 or the countries’ possession of higher natural resource 
endowments.160 In response to these challenges, the author further studies the industrial 
distribution trend of the asset of domestic (non-foreign owned) enterprises. The 
industrial distribution trend of FIE assets represents the direction of foreign investments, 
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and the industrial distribution trend of domestic enterprise assets represents that of 
domestic investors, which is a good reflection on China’s normal industrialization 
process, the demand for such products, and the country’s possession of various 
endowments. Therefore, by comparing the shares of an industry’s FIE assets and 
domestic enterprise assets in their respective total assets, the author’s presumption is 
that if the share of an industry’s FIE asset in all FIE asset is higher than the share of that 
industry’s domestic enterprise asset in all the assets of domestic enterprise, then it 
indicates that foreign investors have a preference in that industry. 
 
The industrial distribution trend of domestic enterprise assets for the same period as 
well as the foreign / domestic comparison are shown in Table 4. In the percentage 
column if the percentage is higher than 100%, it implies that in that industry foreign 
investors have a preference over domestic investors. Based the comparison, 4 out of 10 
HPIIs (paper manufacturing, leather & allied product manufacturing, fabricated metal 
product manufacturing, textile mills) and 4 out of 5 PIIs (plastics & rubber products 
manufacturing, printing & related support activities, furniture & related product 
manufacturing, computer & electronic product manufacturing) have demonstrate FIE’s 
preference over domestic enterprises. Notably in computer & electronic product 
manufacturing, paper manufacturing and plastics & rubber products manufacturing, the 
FIE’s preference over domestic enterprises is very significant. In other words, in these 
industries, there is clear evidence of active DIM. 
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Table 3 Share of Yearly Increased FIE’s Asset in HPII / PII in the Total Yearly Increased FIE’s Assets (1996-2004) 































2004 8690.87 517.43 5.95% 111.99 1.29% 244.01 2.81% 421.8 4.85% 253.18 2.91% 
2003 7746.5 419.22 5.41% 36.05 0.47% 138.64 1.79% 414.46 5.35% 94.79 1.22% 
2002 3159.3 123.15 3.90% 49.82 1.58% 59.4 1.88% 140.06 4.43% 91.17 2.89% 
2001 2640.4 28.39 1.08% 235.8 8.93% 51.45 1.95% 152.94 5.79% 22.35 0.85% 
2000 2695.14 85.28 3.16% 3.9 0.14% 281.39 10.44% 121.65 4.51% 76.76 2.85% 
1997 3173.17 38.92 1.23% 44.01 1.39% 104.93 3.31% 165.02 5.20% 131.65 4.15% 





























2004 8690.87 88.32 1.02% 129.79 1.49% 299.82 3.45% 302.86 3.48% 38.71 0.45% 
2003 7746.5 81.22 1.05% 94.04 1.21% 5.14 0.07% 388.03 5.01% 15.74 0.20% 
2002 3159.3 83.19 2.63% 102 3.23% 75.55 2.39% 153.07 4.85% -0.82 -0.03% 
2001 2640.4 57.53 2.18% 30.28 1.15% 117.23 4.44% 114.72 4.34% 17.41 0.66% 
2000 2695.14 13.94 0.52% 10.34 0.38% 107.33 3.98% 52.4 1.94% 24.49 0.91% 
1997 3173.17 127.35 4.01% 32.99 1.04% 154.07 4.86% 102.46 3.23% 71.77 2.26% 
1996 1612.25 81.98 5.08% 3.94 0.24% 24.75 1.54% -18.59 -1.15% 1.78 0.11% 
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2004 8690.87 344.15 3.96% 67.46 0.78% 461.84 5.31% 87.29 1.00% 2508.39 28.86% 
2003 7746.5 345.85 4.46% 87.3 1.13% 530.81 6.85% 95.23 1.23% 2026.22 26.16% 
2002 3159.3 169.65 5.37% -17.5 -0.55% 71.96 2.28% 26.7 0.85% 818.5 25.91% 
2001 2640.4 148.91 5.64% 101.43 3.84% 161.13 6.10% 24.68 0.93% 598.17 22.65% 
2000 2695.14 134.8 5.00% 36.92 1.37% 195.12 7.24% 25.86 0.96% 763.79 28.34% 
1997 3173.17 155.07 4.89% 29.23 0.92% 214.85 6.77% 22.95 0.72% 480.95 15.16% 
1996 1612.25 27.74 1.72% 6.41 0.40% 197.07 12.22% -0.49 -0.03% 331.11 20.54% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Statistics Yearbook (1997-2005) (electronic version) <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/>. * Note: Due to the fact that 
relevant data for the year 1998 and 1999 is incomplete, for the consistency of study the author omits these two years. (% of total calculated by the author)
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Table 4 Share of Yearly Increased Domestic Asset in HPII / PII in the Total Yearly Increased Domestic Assets (1996-2004) 






























2004 18.16% 32.78% 3.85% 33.48% 1.07% 261.73% 5.59% 86.84% 5.18% 56.27% 
2003 17.94% 30.16% 0.46% 101.52% 1.45% 123.77% 3.82% 140.23% 5.45% 22.45% 
2002 -1.42% -273.97% -1.52% -103.94% 2.23% 84.17% 7.10% 62.41% 3.78% 76.28% 
2001 12.87% 8.35% -1.23% -726.82% 2.23% 87.24% 3.03% 191.26% 2.49% 33.95% 
2000 11.25% 28.13% 3.04% 4.76% 1.86% 560.35% 5.96% 75.72% 0.26% 1111.27% 
1997 7.55% 16.25% 6.87% 20.20% 1.34% 247.25% 10.59% 49.12% 3.47% 119.66% 
1996 10.59% -23.03% 2.68% 173.89% 1.94% 210.60% 8.40% 86.48% 6.50% 65.17% 
 
 




























2004 1.37% 74.26% 1.16% 128.93% 2.57% 134.05% 3.23% 107.81% 0.61% 73.19% 
2003 0.97% 107.76% 0.70% 173.16% 1.75% 3.79% 4.94% 101.46% 0.55% 36.77% 
2002 2.61% 101.03% 0.37% 877.14% 2.22% 107.58% 4.33% 112.02% 0.68% -3.82% 
2001 0.87% 250.63% 0.56% 205.26% 1.27% 350.76% 2.51% 172.99% 0.70% 94.62% 
2000 0.91% 57.04% 0.13% 291.06% 0.24% 1683.23% -0.12% -1613.35% 0.34% 269.81% 
1997 0.71% 567.02% 0.11% 956.61% 0.79% 616.17% 2.08% 155.33% 0.67% 340.03% 
1996 1.15% 443.55% 0.49% 49.65% 1.78% 86.36% 3.24% -35.64% 0.76% 14.50% 
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2004 1.91% 207.79% 0.55% 141.53% 5.66% 93.93% 0.37% 270.52% 2.83% 1021.37% 
2003 1.68% 265.39% 0.82% 137.99% 4.07% 168.32% 0.49% 252.18% 1.89% 1382.82% 
2002 2.50% 214.76% 0.85% -64.84% 5.26% 43.31% 0.32% 267.92% 6.42% 403.30% 
2001 1.63% 345.37% 0.60% 640.49% 5.23% 116.74% 0.15% 639.16% 5.38% 420.76% 
2000 0.68% 732.26% 0.40% 343.24% 2.19% 330.01% 0.26% 371.72% 8.85% 320.19% 
1997 1.34% 363.77% 0.54% 171.99% 3.22% 210.31% 0.22% 324.58% 4.53% 334.95% 
1996 3.70% 46.46% 0.87% 45.65% 3.82% 319.60% 0.25% -12.06% 2.88% 713.76% 
Source: China National Statistics Yearbook, Ibid. (Share of yearly increased domestic asset in HPII / PII in the total yearly increased domestic assets & Comparison (%) 
between foreign and domestic investor’s industrial preference calculated by the author.)
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3.3.3.2 A Further Discussion on the FDI-based Research Results 
 
So far the author applies the set of data from the NBS to evaluate the scale and 
distribution of foreign funded dirty production in China. A critical question then arises: 
To what extent are such statistics reliable and reflecting the actual situation? If there are 
factors which undermine the data accuracy, what are they and how will they affect the 
author’s conclusion based on data analysis? This question has to be dealt with as there 
is a common perception that a Communist government like that in China’s is prone to 
make use of official data for propaganda purposes, therefore its statistics are processed 
rather than original. For this argument the author feels necessary to make some 
comments.  
 
Previous researches tend to use western-based statistics for international research. Very 
few researches on DIM based their arguments on data produced by developing countries. 
There are compelling reasons why the author needs to apply the statistics of China NBS. 
The most obvious reason is that no other country or international organization is 
capable of conducting such a comprehensive sector specific foreign funded project 
survey on China, especially the author applies the total assets of FIE in PII rather than 
the actual FDI inflows as the proxy for the scale of foreign funded dirty production in 
China. The uniqueness of this set of data determines that there are little comparable data 
that the author can apply for cross-references. Considering that China’s industrial and 
foreign investment policies have been relatively coherent since 1995, the 
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comprehensiveness and specificity of this set of data determine that it is a true reflection 
of the foreign presence in China’s PII.  
 
Previous suspicions from overseas scholars on the reliability of China’s foreign 
investment data generally fall under two categories: the alleged “fabrication of official 
statistics” and the FDI “round-tripping”. In response to these suspicions the author 
analyzes their robustness and possible impacts on the conclusion of DIM in China. 
 
The alleged “fabrication of official statistics” is a general argument raised by scholars. 
They suspect the proliferation of official data and the astonishing speed with which the 
NBS releases its statistical data to the public.161 In many cases, public confidence on its 
official statistics has been dented by official revelations of exaggerated reports or false 
figures.162  
 
The author admits the existence of such phenomenon. The central planning sets 
production targets for lower governments to fulfill, and this creates pressures for 
provincial authorities / enterprises to make false reports. In relation to foreign 
investment data, another incentive for the fabrication of data is that, in China the ability 
                                                 
161
 It was alleged that in China, the national yearbook containing the last-year data, for instance, is normally 
published in the third quarter of this year. Even more remarkable, such key economic performance indicators as 
industrial output, imports and exports and (“CPI”) Consumer Price Index of the current month are normally released 
in the middle of the following month. It is perhaps quicker than anywhere in the world. 
162
 For instance, in early 1998 Premier Zhu Rongji declared his intention to see 8% growth for China. At the end of 
1998, most provinces returned with more than 8% GDP growth figures for the year. NBS eventually had to readjust 
some provincial figures downward to arrive at a 7.8% growth for China for 1998. See Anonymous, “Numbers Lie: 
Premier Uncovers Lies”, Asia Weekly (27 March 2000). The same problem has repeated itself. In 1999 China’s GDP 
growth was 7.1%, with 10 provinces reporting more than 10% growth. Hence there is the need for NBS to readjust 
the numbers. See Anonymous, “Beijing has HK$546 b chasm in key data”, South China Morning Post  (29 February 
2000). 
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to attract FDI is taken as one of the governors’ “Official Record” (Zheng Ji) that may 
boost his political fortunes. Consequently, higher officials tend to distribute and impose 
such tasks on lower officials and the latter, in case not being able to attract enough 
foreign investments, tends to declare inflated statistics to the upper level authorities.  
 
However, for any responsible scholar, if seriously looking at China’s statistics, it may 
be found that it is not possible for the central statistical authorities to deliberately and 
systematically fabricate statistical information for the following reasons: 
 
First, it is technically and politically difficult for any government to systematically 
manufacture false economic and social statistics on a large scale. The deliberate 
falsification of official statistics would entail the mammoth administrative 
complications of keeping two separate set of books (one for the public and one for 
restricted use) all the way from the central down to local levels. 
 
Second, in relation to the author’s research on DIM, data like foreign trade and foreign 
investment cannot be easily falsified as they involve foreign countries and such data can 
be cross-referenced with that of other countries. It is also dangerous to tamper with 
growth figures. To inflate a higher percentage increase for this year would make it more 
difficult to do it again in the following year, as growth is a cumulative process based on 
the powerful compound interest rate principle.  
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Finally, some statistics such as wages, prices, household incomes, and inflation rates, if 
falsified, can be easily checked out by the people based on their own personal 
experience. Faking such data then serves no purpose except to discredit all the other 
official materials. 
 
In short, the official mendacity is simply impossible because of the abovementioned 
reasons. An authoritarian government, instead of falsifying numbers, could have easily 
withheld unfavorable information, or just published selective items in a misleading 
context. In fact, as the Chinese government is getting more technocratic, it demands 
more accurate statistics for better macroeconomic management. The remarkable 
evidence is the revision of China’s Statistics Law in June 2000 in order to punish those 
who make use of their position to distort statistics for political or financial gains. 
 
Despite that the reliability is no longer a central issue for Chinese official statistics 
today. It does not imply that the statistics are automatically accurate. In fact, in China 
the problem is more of “people cheating the government” rather than “government 
cheating the people”.163 In other words, fabrication of data tends to come from below: 
i.e. enterprises and local governments, who manipulate statistics for ulterior motives. To 
cope with these abuses, the China NBS has to from time to time run additional surveys 
or dispatch officials to check on the suspected data sources. This is for the purpose of, 
                                                 
163
 John Wong & Ren Caifang, “Understanding China’s Statistical System” (2000) No. 75 East Asian Institute 
Working Paper. 
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to the largest extent, “squeezing the water”164 and restoring the data to their original 
face.  
 
Acknowledging the distortive effect of statistics manipulation from below, it deserves 
discussion how it will affect the author’s FDI-based empirical result on DIM. On one 
hand, if local officials have overstated the FIE assets and the central government failed 
to deflate these figures, then the DIM problem in scale may be not as serious as 
anticipated but the change of each PII’s share in the total scale of foreign funded dirty 
production is unclear. On the other hand, as discussed in previous chapter, dirty 
industries are often large investments with high sunk cost (i.e. capital intensive). As a 
result, local governors often regard the settle down of these industries as a quick way to 
build their official record. For these reasons they tend to strive for such projects 
regardless their negative impact on environment. To balance these factors, we cannot 
preclude the possibility that after properly deflate the inflated data collected from local 
authorities, the central government finally come out with a by and large accurate set of 
statistics, as the NBS claimed. In that case, the empirical result based on the foreign 
investment data is not much affected.   
 
The other strong argument which challenged China’s foreign investment data is the 
“round-tripping”—funds originated from the China disguised as foreign capital and 
repatriated to China. If this argument is true, it will certainly affect our conclusion in 
                                                 
164
 See Anonymous, “Are China’s statistical figures on economy reliable?”, People’s Daily (22 July 2002). 
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that, to the extent that a portion of foreign investment in PIIs is artificial, they really 
should not be counted as DIM but rather as domestic investment in PII.  
The author acknowledges the distortion effect of “round-tripping” on China’s foreign 
investment. First of all, the favorable tax treatment that foreign investors enjoy used to 
be a primary incentive for round-tripping. Foreign-funded manufacturing enterprises in 
the Mainland enjoy a tax-free holiday for two years after their first profitable year, then 
a 50% discount on taxes for a further three years. Profit consideration will therefore 
make round-tripping a tempting practice. Secondly, although China has been imposing 
foreign exchange control, capital flight could not be completely curbed. Thus it is quite 
possible that some of the funds flowing back to China would be disguised as foreign 
capital. 165  A large proportion of China’s FDI inflows come from Hong Kong or 
overseas tax havens and this reinforces the notion of round-tripping. The following 
table shows that Hong Kong’s changing share in China’s FDI inflows from 1985 to 
2001.  
Table 5 Hong Kong’s Share in China’s FDI Inflows 
 
Source: Bank of China Statistics 2003 
                                                 
165
 China’s capital flight is a rather complex issue. No accurate estimate could possibly be made. Economists usually 
use the Net Error and Omission under China's Balance of Payments account as a reference to the size of the flight. 
From 1997 to 2000, the amounts were US$17bn, US$16.5bn, US$14.8bn and US$11.9bn respectively (in a 
downtrend). Although not all of it is capital flight, the consensus remains that a large proportion is and part of it 
should find its way back into China. Source: China State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
<http://www.safe.gov.cn> Accessed May 5, 2004. 
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It is noticed that the share has been declining since 1992 and the decline continued after 
1997 when it was handed over to China. Meanwhile, inflows from overseas tax havens 
such as the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”), Bermuda and Cayman Islands have been on 
the rise and make up for Hong Kong’s decline. A rational explanation is that after the 
hand-over, some capital was concerned enough to abandon Hong Kong for these 
overseas tax havens. By the end of 2005, it was reported that Hong Kong, BVI and 
Cayman Islands ranked 1st, 2nd and 8th in China’s ten largest sources of FDI inflows, 
totaling US$289.19 billion or 47.89% of the total utilized foreign capital of that year, 
adding further evidence of round tripping. 
Having confirmed the existence of “round-tripping”, the question is then, to what 
percentage round tripping accounts for China’s FDI inflows? In other words, how 
serious is the problem of exaggeration? Unfortunately, there is neither official statistics 
nor consensus. Hong Kong and overseas tax havens encourage free flows of capital and 
it is impossible to trace the capital’s real origins. A 2002 report by International Finance 
Corporation (“IFC”) of the World Bank put the estimates that the round-tripped capital 
accounts for between 30-50% of the total China’s inward FDI in the year 2000. And the 
market’s general assessment is that the ratio has declined from 30% to around 10-20% 
in recent years. Considering the fact that Hong Kong’s share has been on a steady 
decline, China’s capital flight has also been on a steady decline due to improved 
supervision, and the progressive development of national treatment of foreign and 
domestic enterprises under China’s WTO commitments, the author is inclined to the 
latter estimate. 
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To what extent the round-tripping affects the empirical result on DIM really depends on 
how much of the round-tripped capital was actually invested in pollution intensive 
industries. In examining this issue, the author holds the opinion that the round-tripping 
problem does not affect much on our estimated scale of foreign funded dirty industries 
in China. Even more, it increases the share of foreign funded PII relative to the total 
foreign invested industries in China. There are two primary reasons for that: 
 
First, the nature of dirty industries has determined that “round-tripping” activities are 
unlikely to occur in this field. This is mainly because the capital intensive character of 
“dirty” industries determines that such investment often involves huge capital. China’s 
stringent control over foreign exchange transaction makes the “round-tripping” process 
not only risky but also costly.166  In other words, it is very difficult to transfer overseas a 
large amount of capital required for PII investment. If one’s objective is to take the 
advantage of China’s tax holidays in PII, then the “round-tripping” is the last resort one 
may consider as the cost of round-tripping may easily outweigh the proposed tax 
benefits. For this reason the “round tripping” is not a common practice in pollution 
intensive industries, unless for special purposes.  
 
Second, even if huge amount of Chinese capital is transferred overseas, it may not 
consider investing in China’s dirty industries because Chinese laws provided that 
certain capital and pollution intensive industries are prohibited or restricted from 
                                                 
166
 The major forms that round tripping can take include under-invoicing exports, over-invoicing imports, and 
overseas affiliates of Chinese companies borrowing funds or raising capital in the stock market and reinvesting them 
in China, etc. 
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foreign investment, either because of their strategic importance to China’s economy or 
of their potential impact on China’s natural resources, people’s health and the 
environment. This further undermines the necessity of using “round-tripped” capital to 
invest in PIIs.  
 
To summarize, for the abovementioned reasons, pollution intensive industries in China 
is a field with few round-tripped capital involvement. As a result, the existence of 
round-tripping phenomenon in China’s FDI data does not affect much on our empirical 
result. Furthermore, since the scale of foreign invested dirty industries is not much  
affected by round-tripping, the author may even boldly postulate that the more round-
tripped capital involved in China’s inward foreign investment, after deduction of round-
tripping capitals the higher the share of foreign capital in PII relative to the total true 
FDI in China. 
 
3.3.4 Empirical Study on the Passive DIM between China and U.S. 
 
The author selects the Sino-U.S. trade as a case for the passive DIM study for several 
reasons. First, U.S. is the largest developed country and China is the largest developing 
country. The Sino-U.S. trade makes an excellent case to study the characters of 
international trade between developed and developing countries, which is the primary 
vehicle of passive DIM. Second, U.S. is both China’s most important trading partner 
and the largest export market for China’s industrial products. According to the latest 
U.S. statistics, China’s trade surplus with U.S. has reached US$230 billion in 2006 
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(increased from US$28 billion in 2001).167  Washington is seriously concerned over 
China’s enormous trade surplus with U.S. and the surplus has fueled accusations in 
Washington over unfair trade practices by China, including efforts to hold the RMB 
artificially low to boost exports. For these reasons, it would be particularly useful to 
study whether there is the trend of passive DIM from U.S. to China. In other words, 
whether there is evidence that U.S. producers in “dirty” industries have gradually 
lowered their production and at the same time bought more pollution intensive 
industrial products (“PIIPs”) from China.  
 
The author selects a set of Sino-U.S. international trade data which covers an 11-year 
period from 1995 to 2006 (same period with the foreign investment based empirical 
study) from the U.S. Census Bureau.168 Based on the previous classification of HPII and 
PII, the author calculated the share of the industrial products of each HPII / PII in the 
annual total export from China to U.S. and in the annual total export from U.S. to China. 
The matching of the HPII / PII and their respective industrial products under U.S. SITC 
is shown in Table 6. The trend of industrial-specific U.S. export to China is shown in 
Table 7. The trend of industrial specific U.S. import from China is shown in Table 8. 
Table 6 The Matching of HPII / PII under NAICS and PIIP under SITC 
 
NAICS Code SITC Code for Commodity Grouping 
Primary metal mfg (331) Nonferrous Metal (Iron and Steel) (SITC 67 and 68) 
Petroleum & coal products mfg (324) Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (SITC 3) 
Paper mfg  (322) Paper, paperboard, and articles of paper pulp, paper or paper board  (SITC 64) 
                                                 
167 U.S. Census Bureau International Trade Statistics, <http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/country/index.html> Accessed Mar 1, 2007. 
168
 U.S. Census Bureau, International Trade Statistics, <http://censtats.census.gov/sitc/sitc.shtml> Accessed Mar 8, 
2007. 
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NAICS Code SITC Code for Commodity Grouping 
Chemical mfg (325) Chemicals and related products (SITC 5) 
Nonmetallic mineral product mfg 
(327) 
Nonmetallic mineral manufactures (SITC 66) 
Food mfg (311) Food and live animals (SITC 0) 
Leather & allied product mfg (316) Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s., and dressed furskins (SITC 61) 
Fabricated metal product mfg (332) Manufactures of metals (SITC 69) 
Textile mills (313) Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., and related products (SITC 65) 
Wood product mfg (321) Cork and wood manufactures other than furniture (SITC 63) 
Plastics & rubber products mfg (326) Rubber manufactures (SITC 62) 
Printing & related support activities 
(323) 
Office machines and automatic data processing machines 
(SITC 75) 
Electrical equipment, appliance, & 
component mfg, Computer & 
electronic product mfg (335 & 334) 
 
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) 
Furniture & related product mfg (337) 
Furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, mattress 
supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings (SITC 
82) 
Source: NAICS codes from U.S. Census Bureau, <http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/naicod02.htm>, SITC codes 
from U.S. Census Bureau, International Trade Statistics, <http://censtats.census.gov/sitc/sitc.shtml> (PII-PIIP 
matched by the author) 
 
 
From Table 8 it can be seen that during the year 1995 to 2006, most PIIPs of China 
have increased their respective share in China’s export to U.S. (except mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related materials; nonmetallic mineral manufactures). As for U.S. export 
to China, the trend is not consistent. 4 out of 10 HPIIs increased their shares in the U.S. 
export to China, 169  while 6 have decreased. 170  Thus, if the author’s hypothesis of 
passive DIM from U.S. to China is to be supported, then special attention shall be
                                                 
169
 The 4 HPII that increase their shares in U.S. export to China are Iron and Steel; Mineral fuels, lubricants and 
related materials; Leather and leather manufactures; Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., and related 
products. 
170
 The 6 HPII that decrease their shares in U.S. export to China are Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials; 
Paper manufacturing; Chemicals and related products; Food and live animals; Manufactures of metals; Wood product 
manufacturing. 
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Table 7 Percentage Change of PIIPs in the U.S.’s Export to China (1996-2006) 



























n.e.s., and dressed 
furskins 
2006 55,224,163 3.02% 0.37% 0.80% 11.31% 0.60% 2.59% 0.24% 
2005 41,836,534 3.16% 0.32% 1.12% 12.91% 0.62% 2.69% 0.22% 
2004 34,721,008 1.73% 0.64% 1.35% 13.63% 0.75% 3.81% 0.29% 
2003 28,418,493 2.70% 0.47% 1.47% 12.75% 0.64% 2.85% 0.26% 
2002 22,052,679 1.03% 0.43% 1.77% 13.42% 0.60% 2.51% 0.25% 
2001 19,234,827 1.09% 0.49% 1.68% 11.50% 0.89% 2.66% 0.22% 
2000 16,253,029 2.22% 0.37% 2.39% 14.31% 0.98% 2.91% 0.26% 
1999 13,117,677 1.63% 0.93% 2.59% 15.93% 0.59% 2.49% 0.25% 
1998 14,257,953 1.28% 0.89% 2.33% 13.84% 0.60% 3.42% 0.27% 
1997 12,805,416 1.77% 1.81% 2.02% 15.11% 0.66% 3.12% 0.21% 
1996 11,977,921 1.86% 0.56% 2.08% 14.42% 0.54% 6.46% 0.12% 
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Table 7 (Continued)  
Year 
Total U.S. 
Export to China 





































2006 55,224,163 1.02% 0.86% 0.10% 0.24% 4.13% 98,177 45.99% 
2005 41,836,534 1.02% 0.87% 0.14% 0.26% 4.39% 78,681 44.63% 
2004 34,721,008 1.01% 0.84% 0.23% 0.15% 4.02% 60,582 43.27% 
2003 28,418,493 0.79% 0.89% 0.19% 0.11% 4.48% 58,824 44.15% 
2002 22,052,679 1.12% 0.85% 0.23% 0.09% 5.41% 56,465 53.41% 
2001 19,234,827 1.07% 0.60% 0.13% 0.08% 8.33% 50,781 53.47% 
2000 16,253,029 1.07% 0.73% 0.11% 0.07% 9.22% 55,826 49.64% 
1999 13,117,677 0.94% 0.65% 0.13% 0.08% 6.42% 44,855 54.50% 
1998 14,257,953 0.84% 0.54% 0.11% 0.05% 6.16% 29,349 57.78% 
1997 12,805,416 0.99% 0.51% 0.11% 0.07% 2.69% 16,932 50.93% 
1996 11,977,921 1.42% 0.42% 0.10% 0.05% 2.22% 20,224 46.50% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Trade Statistics, <http://censtats.census.gov/sitc/sitc.shtml> (percentage calculated by the author) 
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Table 8 Percentage Change of PIIPs in the U.S.’s Import from China (1996-2006) 



























n.e.s., and dressed 
furskins 
2006 287,772,786 2.05% 0.41% 0.63% 2.17% 1.51% 1.24% 0.10% 
2005 243,462,327 1.37% 0.41% 0.63% 2.14% 1.44% 1.13% 0.10% 
2004 196,698,977 1.10% 0.52% 0.64% 1.91% 1.50% 1.19% 0.12% 
2003 152,379,236 0.50% 0.30% 0.67% 1.99% 1.73% 1.31% 0.11% 
2002 125,167,886 0.56% 0.33% 0.63% 1.94% 1.95% 1.20% 0.08% 
2001 102,280,484 0.73% 0.38% 0.61% 2.02% 2.12% 1.12% 0.08% 
2000 100,062,958 0.93% 0.73% 0.61% 1.81% 2.06% 1.02% 0.06% 
1999 81,785,930 0.89% 0.30% 0.58% 2.05% 2.06% 1.06% 0.05% 
1998 71,155,860 0.99% 0.55% 0.56% 2.03% 2.02% 1.03% 0.05% 
1997 62,551,934 0.80% 0.90% 0.50% 2.02% 1.95% 1.17% 0.05% 
1996 51,495,276 0.85% 1.00% 0.52% 2.01% 1.88% 1.27% 0.06% 
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2006 55,224,163 4.31% 2.25% 0.92% 0.82% 16.86% 5.27% 45.70% 
2005 41,836,534 4.15% 2.30% 0.82% 0.73% 17.35% 5.42% 44.91% 
2004 34,721,008 4.20% 2.16% 0.82% 0.59% 18.11% 5.55% 44.05% 
2003 28,418,493 4.14% 2.21% 0.76% 0.52% 15.52% 5.74% 39.93% 
2002 22,052,679 4.18% 2.01% 0.79% 0.49% 12.19% 5.56% 36.92% 
2001 19,234,827 4.03% 1.81% 0.77% 0.42% 10.52% 4.91% 34.16% 
2000 16,253,029 3.66% 1.82% 0.71% 0.42% 10.99% 4.47% 34.92% 
1999 13,117,677 3.53% 1.94% 0.69% 0.42% 10.10% 3.99% 32.28% 
1998 14,257,953 3.15% 2.02% 0.63% 0.37% 8.94% 3.07% 30.35% 
1997 12,805,416 2.91% 2.20% 0.53% 0.30% 8.06% 2.47% 28.04% 
1996 11,977,921 2.75% 2.03% 0.50% 0.27% 6.95% 2.15% 27.16% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Trade Statistics, <http://censtats.census.gov/sitc/sitc.shtml> (percentage calculated by the author) 
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focused upon those industries that have increased their shares in China’s export to U.S. 
AND at the same time decreased their shares in U.S. export to China.  
 
Based on the above logic, the author has identified three industries that conform to such 
trend. They are paper manufacturing, chemical and related products, as well as 
manufactures of metals. All of which fall in the category of HPII. In other words, in 
these three industries, there is prima facie evidence of passive DIM. 
 
3.3.5 Combined Assessment on Active and Passive DIM 
 
Comparing the empirical results of active DIM and passive DIM, it is discovered that 
for some industries, the trend of active DIM is significant, for other industries, the trend 
of passive DIM is significant. Notably in two industries, i.e. the paper Manufacturing 
and fabricated metal manufacturing (both are HPII by the author’s definition of “dirty” 
industries), there is strong evidence for both active and passive DIM. (see Chart 2 below) 
 95 
Chart 2  Empirical Findings on the Active and Passive DIM in China 
 
 
In the paper manufacturing industry, the foreign investment has an annual average of 
225% preference over domestic investment and such preference is on a steady growth in 
recent years. In respect of the Sino-U.S. international trade of paper and paper board 
products, the share has steadily increased from 0.52% in 1995 to 0.63% in 2006 in 
China’s export to U.S. and decreased from 2.08% to 0.8% in U.S. export to China. 
 
In the fabricated metal manufacturing industry, the foreign investment has an annual 
average of 426% preference over domestic investment and such preference is also on a 
steady growth in recent years. With regard to the Sino-U.S. international trade of the 
manufactures of metal, the share has steadily increased from 2.75% to 4.31% in China’s 
export to U.S. and decreased from 1.42% to 1.02% in U.S. export to China. 
 
Active DIM  Passive DIM 
Leather & Allied mfg (316) 
Textile Mills (313) 
Plastics & rubber mfg (326) 
Printing & related mfg (323) 
Furniture & related mfg (337) 









Chemical & related 
products mfg (325) 
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The identification of these industries, especially the paper and metal manufacturing 
industries in which evidence for both active and passive DIM are apparent, has policy 
implications. If China is to legislate or use policy tools to regulate the DIM, then these 
industries would be the priority of the regulator’s attention. It would be helpful to have 
a thorough examination on the existing trade and investment policies that apply to these 
industries and see whether they have taken an adequate consideration of environmental 
issues. At the same time, the environmental laws, regulations and sectoral standards in 
these industries are also required a general survey to see whether they are understood, 
fair, and adequate. 
 
3.3.6 The Calculation of Aggregate Impact of DIM in China 
 
Based on the author’s analysis, the extent of DIM situation in China shall be the 
aggregate impact of both active DIM through foreign investment in PII and passive 
DIM through international trade in PIIP. However, their aggregate impact on China is 
not simply the sum of the two. It is because many FIE in PII in China are at the same 
time involved in the international trade of PIIPs. In that case since pollution is generated 
in the same production process, there is an overlap between active DIM and passive 
DIM. Therefore, the author predicts that the environmental impact of DIM on China is 
higher than that of active or passive DIM whichever is higher, but less than the 
aggregation of the two. It is in fact the aggregated impact of “FDI in PII that supply 
domestically” plus “FIEs in PII that export to other countries” plus “domestic supplier 
in PIIP to foreign buyers”. (See Chart 3 below) 
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Chart 3  Aggregate Environmental Impact of Active and Passive DIM in China 
 
 
3.4 Empirical Test on the Relationship between DIM and Stringency of 
Environmental Regulation in China 
 
To empirically test the relationship between DIM and host state environmental 
regulation it is essential to choose a reliable measure of environmental stringency. 
Tobey (1990) measures environmental stringency by using data from a 1976 UNCTAD 
survey. The degree of environmental stringency is measured from one to seven. Higher 
values imply more stringent regulations. 171  List and Co (1999) use four different 
measures of the stringency of environmental regulation of the U.S. The first two 
measures estimate money spent by different agencies with a state to control air and 
water pollution and solid waste disposal. The third measure they use is firm-level 
                                                 
171
 Tobey, supra note 10.  
FDI in PII 
that supply 
domestically 









Active DIM through FDI in 
Pollution Intensive Industries  
(“PII”) in China 
Passive DIM through Purchasing 
Pollution Intensive Industrial Products 
(“PIIP”) from China 
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pollution abatement operating expenditures relative to abating air and water pollution 
and solid waste disposal. The fourth measure is an index that combines local, state and 
federal government pollution abatement efforts with firm-level abatement expenditures 
to assign a dollar value ranking to each state. A higher value in the index implies more 
stringent environmental regulations. 172  Smarzynska and Wei (2001) measure 
environmental standards by a country’s participation in international treaties (e.g. 
Convention on Long-range Trans-boundary Air Pollution), the quality of ambient air, 
water and emission standards, and finally observed actual reduction in various 
pollutants.173 
 
Considering the situation of China and the availability of data, the author selects a set of 
data that is published by the State Environmental Protection Administration (“SEPA”). 
This set of data contains China’s total industrial pollution control investment each year 
from 1995 to 2005. In addition, the yearly pollution control investment by media (i.e. 
water, air, and solid waste) as well as the number of industrial pollution control projects 
is disclosed (see Table 9). These data are good measurement of the government’s effort 
each year in regulating the industrial pollution in China. They are therefore used as the 




                                                 
172
 List, J.A. and C.Y. Co., “The Effects of Environmental Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment” (1999) Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management. 40: 1-20.  
173
 Smarzynska and Wei, supra note 146. 
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Table 9 China’s Yearly Industrial Pollution Control Investment (1995-2005) 
[Unit: RMB 100 million] 
 
Source: China State Environmental Protection Administration, Environmental Statistics Yearbook (1995-2005) 
<http://www.sepa.gov.cn/plan/hjtj/qghjtjgb/> 
 
Based on the author’s previous empirical study on the existence of both active DIM and 
passive DIM, the author first calculates the correlation coefficient between the change 
in the share of each PII in the total FIE assets from 1996 to 2004 (trend in active DIM) 
and the change in each proxy of environmental stringency for the same period (see 
Table 10). The result, which ranges from -1 to 1, indicates both the direction and 
strength of a linear relationship between two variables. 174 Therefore, if an industry is 
                                                 
174
 The correlation coefficient measures the direction and extent of linear association between two variables. A 
correlation coefficient can have maximum value of 1 and a minimum value of -1. A correlation coefficient greater 



























2005 458.2 133.7 213 27.4 13330 
2004 308.1 105.6 142.8 22.6 12944 
2003 221.8 87.4 92.1 16.2 11292 
2002 188.4 71.5 69.8 16.1 11580 
2001 174.5 72.9 6508 18.7 11640 
2000 239.4 109.6 90.9 11.5 27243 
1999 152.5 68.8 51 8.3 19866 
1998 123.8 73.3 32.5 8.7 14374 
1997 116.4 72.8 28.7 6.3 8985 
1996 95.6 47.4 28.1 9.1 6990 
1995 98.7 45.6 33.2 14.1 21644 
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sensitive to the stringency of the environmental regulation in China, correlation 
coefficient between its share in total FIE assets and total pollution control investment of 
that year would most likely to be negative. Furthermore, it can be predicted that the 
closer the coefficient is to -1, the more sensitive that industry is towards the stringency 
of environmental regulations. 
 
As shown in Table 10, five industries have demonstrated medium to large negative 
correlation with the total national industrial pollution control investment, 175  i.e., 
petroleum and coal products manufacturing (-0.398); chemical manufacturing (-0.647); 
nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing (-0.419); food manufacturing (-0.901); and 
electrical equipment, appliance, & component manufacturing (-0.495). Notably, the 
food manufacturing and nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing have shown 
significant negative correlation not only to the total pollution control investment, but 
also to other environmental stringency proxies like pollution control investment in 
water, air, solid waste as well as total number of pollution control projects each year. 
Within these two industries, the coefficient reveals that the food manufacturing industry 
is very sensitive to water control (-0.911) and solid waste control (-0.627), but not so 
sensitive to air emission control (-0.06). Such a result is consistent with the actuality of 
food manufacturing industry which generates large volumes of mostly biodegradable 
                                                                                                                                               
the other also tends to increase (or decrease). A correlation coefficient less than 0 indicates a negative lenear 
association between the two variables: When one increases (or decreases), the other tends to decrease (or increase). A 
correlation coefficient of 0 indicates no linear relation between the two variables. 
175
 In interpreting a correlation coefficient, according to Cohen (1988), the correlation coefficient ranging from ± 
(0.1-0.29) is “small”, from ± (0.3-0.49) is “medium”, and from ± (0.5-1) is large. See Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical 
power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.) (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ISBN 0-8058-
0283-5). 
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liquid and solid waste but less pollutants through air.176 Similarly, the non-matallic 
mineral product manufacturing industry is less sensitive to water control (-0.298) than 
to emission control (-0.644) and solid waste control (-0.650). Industrial environmental 
report shows that the major environmental problems of non-metallic mineral product 
manufactue are the emission to air and solid waste management.177 
 
Next, the author calculates the correlation coefficient between the percentage change in 
the share of each PII in China’s export to U.S. from 1996 to 2005 (trend in passive DIM) 
and the change in each proxy of environmental stringency for the same period (see 
Table 11). The result has shown that two industries: petroleum & coal products 
manufacturing (-0.381) and nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing (-0.78) have 
medium to large negative correlation with the total industrial pollution control 
investment. Both of which also have significant negative correlation with other 
environmental stringency proxies. 
 
The findings of correlation coefficient of active / passive DIM as opposed to stringency 
in the environmental regulation also have important policy implications. First, it implies 
that for those industries that have demonstrated a significant negative correlation with 
stringency in environmental regulation, China’s comparatively low environmental 
standard in these sectors might be their primary incentive to migrate. The migration of 
these industries deserves intensive study.  
                                                 
176  See Colic Miroslav, “Special Treatment: The Food Manufacturing Wastewater Challenge” (2007) 
<http://www.foodmanufacturing.com/scripts/ShowPR.asp?RID=8837&CommonCount=0> Accessed Mar 12, 2007. 
177 See Environment Australia, “Emission Estimation Techniques for Non-mettalic Mineral Product Manufacture” 
(1999), < http://www.npi.gov.au/handbooks/approved_handbooks/pubs/fnonmepr.pdf> Accessed Mar 12, 2007) 
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Table 10 Correlation Coefficient between Active DIM and Stringency in Environmental Regulation 
 
























Total Industrial Polution 
Control Investment 0.443 -0.268 0.303 0.026 -0.495 0.725 0.868 
Industrial Pollution Control 
Investment on Water 0.370 0.108 0.428 0.106 -0.408 0.753 0.693 
Industrial Pollution Control 
Investment on Air 0.261 -0.001 0.407 0.888 -0.094 0.145 -0.103 
Industrial Pollution Control 
Investment on Solid Waste 0.540 -0.544 0.266 0.235 -0.521 0.559 0.712 
Number of Industrial Pollution 
Control Projects 0.012 0.072 0.374 0.138 -0.161 0.415 0.586 
 























Total Industrial Polution 
Control Investment 0.873 -0.398 0.140 -0.647 -0.419 -0.901 0.217 -0.015 
Industrial Pollution Control 
Investment on Water 0.786 -0.533 0.452 -0.745 -0.298 -0.911 -0.012 0.216 
Industrial Pollution Control 
Investment on Air -0.219 0.879 -0.258 0.193 -0.644 -0.060 -0.041 0.378 
Industrial Pollution Control 
Investment on Solid Waste 0.649 0.158 -0.380 -0.310 -0.650 -0.627 0.429 -0.113 
Number of Industrial Pollution 
Control Projects 0.338 -0.370 0.851 -0.574 -0.158 -0.702 -0.208 0.281 
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Table 11  Correlation Coefficient between Passive DIM and Stringency in Environmental Regulation 
 





































Total Industrial Polution 
Control Investment 0.695 0.458 0.741 0.946 0.870 0.905 0.692 
Industrial Pollution Control 
Investment on Water 0.599 0.364 0.661 0.834 0.785 0.813 0.609 
Industrial Pollution Control 
Investment on Air 0.246 -0.495 0.229 -0.058 -0.097 -0.037 0.170 
Industrial Pollution Control 
Investment on Solid Waste 0.820 0.361 0.831 0.907 0.871 0.910 0.791 
Number of Industrial Pollution 
Control Projects 0.166 -0.503 0.258 0.121 0.063 0.121 0.195 
 


























Total Industrial Polution 
Control Investment 0.617 -0.381 0.647 0.140 -0.780 -0.032 0.697 
Industrial Pollution Control 
Investment on Water 0.617 -0.275 0.581 -0.050 -0.640 -0.235 0.555 
Industrial Pollution Control 
Investment on Air -0.180 -0.236 0.116 0.115 0.345 -0.108 0.075 
Industrial Pollution Control 
Investment on Solid Waste 0.397 -0.495 0.736 0.165 -0.735 0.185 0.856 
Number of Industrial Pollution 
Control Projects 0.223 -0.171 0.248 -0.488 0.280 -0.736 -0.222 
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Second, the strong sensitivity of some industries to environmental regulation (such as 
petroleum & coal products manufacturing, nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing, 
food manufacturing) may imply that DIM in these industries can be more effectively 
controlled through the increase in environmental standards. For other PIIs which are not 
so sensitive to environmental stringency, to effectively regulate their DIM the 
government might wish to adopt alternative measures.  
 
Finally, the correlation between the DIM in specific industry and pollution control 
investment in specific media (water, air, solid waste, etc.) may provide policy 
implication to the government on the allocation of resources within the overall pollution 
control investment. For example, our test has shown that the food manufacturing 
industry and chemical industry are particularly prone to the stringency in waste water 
control (-0.911 and -0.745 respectively), the non-metallic mineral industry is 
particularly prone to both the stringency in emission control (-0.644) and solid waste 
control (-0.65). Therefore, to allocate more resources on these controls may achieve 




This chapter empirically tests the existence of DIM in China and examines the 
correlation between DIM and China’s stringency in environmental standards. Based on 
the two primary vehicles of DIM, namely active DIM through foreign investment and 
passive DIM through international trade, the author conducts two parallel empirical 
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studies and evaluates the aggregate environmental impact of both active and passive 
DIM. 
 
To summarize the findings, the author is of the opinion that a large scale of DIM may 
not occur in China. In other words, evidence neither show that foreign investors have a 
general preference over China’s PIIs nor that China specialized solely on PIIPs in its 
exports. Despite this, the author does find apparent and consistent evidence of both 
active and passive DIM in specific industries, examples such as paper manufacturing 
industry and fabricated metal product manufacturing industry. Such a trend should 
attract sufficient attention and appropriate regulation.  
 
Besides, the author examines the correlation coefficient between DIM and stringency in 
environmental regulation in China. The results indicate that some foreign migrated 
industries are particularly prone to the change in the environmental stringency in China, 
examples such as food manufacturing industry and non-metallic mineral industry. These 
findings provide not only directions for future China DIM research but also important 
policy implications for effective regulation of DIM. 
 
The empirical testing model designed by the author is original. It can be applied to any 
country for the examination on the trend of active DIM, and be applied between any 
two countries to examine the extent of passive DIM from one to the other (if relevant 




First, using different definition of PII and other economic indicators, the results will 
differ to a certain extent. Second, in the author’s correlation coefficient study it would 
be better to use sector specific pollution control data as proxy rather than the data on the 
overall pollution control investment. However since such detailed data are not available 
in China the result of correlation testing may not be as accurate as it should be. Finally, 
although the author identifies the trend of DIM in certain industries, the characters and 
driving forces of migration in these industries differ and they deserve more intensive 
study. At the same time, in order to feed China’s huge demand for industrial products, 
statistics show that many of China’s import of PIIP increases together with export. 178  
Moreover, there is evidence that as China’s domestic enterprises are becoming 
increasingly active in outward FDI in PIIs. Following the rationale of this thesis, it 
would be an interesting new topic to study whether there is also DIM from China to 
other even less developed countries.  
                                                 
178
 For example, based on the idea of embodied effluent trade (EET) introduced by Lee and Roland-Holst (1997), 
Chai (2002) compares the pollution content of exports (Ex) and imports (Em) of China during the period 1980-82 and 
1996-98, and find that despite China’s import is becoming cleaner in 1996-98 than in 1980-82, it is still more than 
60% more pollution intensive than its export counterpart. This implies that “in a long-term situation of relatively 
balanced bilateral trade, import trade has had a beneficial effect on China’s environment, as it enabled China to 
transfer a significant amount of environmental cost to other countries.” See Joseph C. H. Chai, “Trade and 
Environment: Evidence from China’s Manufacturing Sector” (2002) Sustainable Development, 10, 25-35, at 33.  
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CHAPTER IV DIRTY INDUSTRY MIGRATION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Generally speaking, to identify an international regulatory framework on DIM is 
difficult. There are several reasons for this. First, currently many developed countries 
still refuse to accept the existence of DIM. This implies that international instruments 
toward its regulation are still at infant stage. Second, the migration of dirty industry is 
essentially a result of free international trade and investment. Since the neo-liberal ideas 
towards broader trade and investment liberalization are hardly going to be shaken by the 
international community, the regulation of DIM will remain weak. Finally, from a law 
perspective, as a general principle international law mainly governs the rights and 
obligations of states. By contrast, DIM is a voluntary, market oriented activity by 
corporations which is private in nature. Such activities, unless under special 
circumstances, rarely give rise to cognizable claims under international law. 
 
Despite the above obstacles, there is no doubt that the DIM has become a global 
problem and its regulation requires a comprehensive international approach. Such 
relevant regulations are reflected in various sources of international law, including 
treaties and conventions, customary international law, judicial decisions and legal 
literatures, etc.  It is from these scattered international legal sources that the author is 
able to draw a framework on the international law of dirty industry migration.  
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It must be stressed that often the negative impact of DIM is multi-facet and implicates 
several areas of law, no matter how the problem is characterized (e.g. as violations of 
international environmental law, human rights law, or trade and investment law, etc.) 
None of the potentially applicable areas of international law is able to fully capture the 
situation. Besides, as the regulation of DIM often seeks to reconcile certain seemingly 
conflicting values such as trade and environment, investment and environment. The 
regulatory framework on DIM needs to fairly balance these values.  
 
In a typical scenario of dirty industry migration, the dirty productions relocate, directly 
and indirectly, from the home to the host state where environmental standards are less 
stringent. Such relocation involves two or more states and it is mainly achieved through 
international trade and investment. Therefore, based on the cognizable international 
claims under international law, the author’s framework of legal study on DIM is 
categorized into four subjects: Trade Related Environmental Claims (“TREC”), 
Investment Related Environmental Claims (“IREC”), Environment Related Trade 
Claims (“ERTC”), and Environment Related Investment Claims (“ERIC”).  
 
4.1 Trade Related Environmental Claims under International Law  
 
Trade Related Environmental Claims refers to the claims based on environmental 
damages relating to international trade. Grossman and Krueger (1993) summarize three 
effects which trade liberalization may have on the pollution level and environment. 
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Namely, the scale effect,179  composition effect,180  and technique effect.181  Under the 
international law a state’s right to prevent the environmental harm originated from the 
other state is well established.  Principle 21, which holds a state responsible for harm 
originating in that state which harms another state, is the most famous of the Stockholm 
Declaration principles and has been deemed customary international law. 182  As 
established by the Trail Smelter 183 and other related cases,184 every state has a legitimate 
interest in restricting the flow of environmental harm from entering its territory. This 
includes a legitimate interest in restricting the flow of imports the processing and usage 




                                                 
179 The scale effect is based on the fact that more open trade creates greater economic activity, which raises the 
demand for all inputs such as raw materials, trucking transportation services and energy. If output is produced and 
delivered by the prevailing methods, an increase in emissions must follow and this has been labeled as scale effect. 
See Grossman and Krueger, supra note 139. 
180
 The composition effect stems from the changes in the relative size of an economy’s sectors that follow a reduction 
in trade barriers. Countries tend to specialize in sectors in which they have a competitive/comparative advantage. If 
environmental regulations are important in determining competitive advantage, a country with lax regulations in all 
sectors will end up specializing to a greater degree in the more polluting industries. If, however, the bases for 
international competitive advantage are differences in labour and capital abundance or technology differences, then 
the result of the changing sector composition due to trade liberalization on environmental quality is ambiguous. Since 
more open trade makes a country shifting into sectors using heavily its relatively abundant factors. The final effect 
depends on whether the new sector composition is more or less polluting than the original one. Id. 
181 The technique effect refers to changes in the production method that follow trade liberalization. More exposure to 
foreign trade and investment will bring modern technologies and it may have a positive impact on the local pollution 
level and environment. Id. 
182
  Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration (1972), adopted by U.N. G.A. Res. 2998 of December 15, 1972, UN Doc 
A/CONF.48/14. 
183
 Trail Smelter Arbitration USA v Canada (1938 and 1941) 3 RIAA 1905 Arbitral Tribunal. It involved a privately 
owned Canadian smelting plant that discharged airborne sulphur particles. These particles were carried by the winds 
to Washington State where they caused damage to crops, pastures, trees and livestock. The dispute was settled 
through arbitration.  The tribunal found Canada responsible for the conduct of the Trail Smelter under international 
law, awarded reparation in the amount of $78,000 to the United States, and imposed a duty on Canada to limit future 
emissions of sulphur transmissions to prescribed maximum levels.  
184 In Gut Dam Case (1969) 8 I.L.M. 118 also between the United States and Canada, Canada agreed to pay 
compensation in respect of the damage caused to the property of US citizens as a result for its Gut Dam on the 
international boundary. In the Corfu Channel Case (1949) I.C.J. Rep. 4 between U.K. and Northern Ireland-Albania, 
it was maintained that incumbent on every state is the duty “not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other states.” 
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4.1.1 Transfer of Hazardous Wastes  
 
The most obvious claim of this kind is claims on the transfer of hazardous wastes. It 
falls into the author’s definition of DIM for the reason that international trade on 
hazardous wastes seriously threatens the human health and environment of the host 
states. Developed countries, by way of dumping hazardous industrial waste to the 
developing countries for processing or disposal, directly transfer pollution to developing 
countries.   
 
In response to this problem, international law imposes state responsibility for the import 
/ export of hazardous wastes through multilateral environmental treaties. The violation 
of treaty obligation thus gives rise to cognizable international claims. The most direct 
international law in this area is the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. 185 The Convention 
requires its contracting parties not only to take appropriate measures to ensure 
compliance but also to punish illegal traffic of hazardous wastes through domestic 
legislation (Art. 9.5). According to the Convention, responsibilities to prevent illegal 
traffic are borne shared by both the waste exporting and importing country. It implies 
that each relevant party can invoke the claim if it finds the other party is acting against 
the provisions of the treaty. In case of dispute, the Convention provides for recourse to 
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) or arbitration as forums for settlement.  
 
                                                 
185
 The Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 
(adopted in 1989, in force in May 1992) 28 I.L.M. 657.  
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Given the dangerous nature of international waste trade on human health and 
environment, several international agreements called for contracting parties to impose 
criminal liability on those who dump hazardous substances and who import such 
substances. The 1991 Bamako Convention on Hazardous Wastes within Africa went 
further in requiring that the penalties be sufficiently high both to punish and deter illegal 
traffic.186  On November 4, 1998, the Council of Europe adopted the first treaty to 
criminalize acts causing or likely to cause environmental damage, The Convention on 
the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law 187 calls for administrative 
sanctions for less serious offenses, while serious, intentional offenses such as waste 
dumping should result in imprisonment or fines and may call for “reinstatement of the 
environment” (Art. 6) or “confiscation of profits” (Art. 7).188  
 
So far the international law principles on the transfer of hazardous waste have been well 
established. For conventions that have gained near universal acceptance like Basel, their 
principles may take on the character of customary international of law, which may 
become binding among non-contracting parties as well (unless the non-contracting 
parties are persistent objectors).  
 
Clear as it is in principle, the critical issue is the enforcement. It is arguable whether a 
state would file such claims against another state, and to what extent the state can justify 
it has conducted its due diligence in preventing the traffic of hazardous wastes. After all, 
                                                 
186
 See Art. 4, Bamako Convention on Hazardous Wastes within Africa (1991) 30 I.L.M. 773. 
187




the successful control of this form of DIM requires the joint effort of both the exporting 
and importing states of the hazardous wastes. In this regard the European Union has 
taken the lead in adopting the Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(WEEE Directive) in 2003,189 which makes producers (domestic or foreign) responsible 
for taking back and recycling their WEEE products safely and at no cost to consumers, 
regardless of the location of the last resting place. 190  Therefore, WEEE Directive 
provides an incentive for producers to design their products taking into consideration 
the life cycle of their products. In addition, it has been suggested that the EU WEEE 
Directive is designed to address the “race to the bottom” by requiring that exported 
waste be treated as specified by the WEEE Directive.191 China serves as a good example 
to discuss in this context. As is widely known, China is a popular destination for WEEE 
because of the significantly lower costs due to cheap labour and lower environmental 
standards.192 Under the new Directive in order to receive WEEE from EU, China will 
have to meet the EU standards for treatment.193 According to Kibert (2003), government 
run extend producer responsibility programs, such as the WEEE Directive, will have a 
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positive outcome on the economic, environmental and social elements of international 
trade, and have the potential to make sustainable development a reality.194 
 
4.1.2 Product Liability 
 
The migration of dirty industries through international trade is by no means limited to 
waste dumping, it also incorporates the migration of certain industries or industrial 
products whose production or consumption may have a hazardous impact on people’s 
health and the environment. Industries of this kind generally include chemicals, chlorine 
and pesticides, resource extracting and heavy manufacturing. 195 All of these industries 
are now facing additional costs in their home countries due to public relations, 
establishment of environment divisions in firms, liability and insurance, legal fees, 
occupational health and safety costs, and delays incurred during Environmental Impact 
Assessment (“EIA”).196  
 
Xing & Kolstad (1998) find that U.S. chemical companies migrated to developing 
countries basing their decision on the laxity of environmental regulations governing 
SO2 emissions.197  There has also been an exodus of firms in the chlorine industry partly 
as a result of the U.S. government banning the land disposal of chlorine wastes and 
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moratorium on its incineration.198 Similar situations are found for German chemical 
companies where increasingly stringent environmental regulations in the EU have 
contributed to movement of production facilities in Asia.199  
 
Other than relocating the highly polluting production facilities to developing countries, 
large quantity of hazardous industrial products are sold to developing countries without 
restriction. In Canada, for instance, when domestic sales of asbestos declined due to 
public health concerns, the industry collaborated with the government to promote sales 
abroad. Canada is currently the leading exporter and second-largest producer of white 
asbestos, and ninety-six percent of the asbestos Canada produces is exported and the 
majority of it to the Third World.200  
 
The international trade on pesticides serves another case for study. Developing 
countries are particularly vulnerable to health and environmental damage from 
pesticides. Many of them lack the regulatory mechanisms needed to evaluate risks 
thoroughly or to ensure that chemicals are used in accordance with instructions. Despite 
this, certain pesticides which are banned in most developed nations are widely sold and 
used in the Third World without regulation. For instance, the insecticides chlordane and 
heptachlor were banned for agricultural uses in the United States in the 1970s. Yet, it 
was reported that between 1987 and 1989, the U.S. manufacturers produced and 
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exported nearly 5 million pounds of the insecticides to some 25 countries. A partial 
result of widespread misuse of pesticides in the Third World is a reported 3 million 
poisonings and 200,000 deaths in Southeast Asia alone, many of which local 
governments often attribute to suicide. 201 The World Health Organization (“WHO”) 
estimates that these deficiencies cause approximately 25 million agricultural workers in 
the developing world to suffer at least one incident of pesticide poisoning per year, 
resulting in as many as 20,000 deaths annually.202  
 
4.1.2.1 Domestic Claims & Remedies 
 
At the national level, the defense available for consumers who suffer from hazardous or 
defective products is the consumer protection / product liability laws. Product liability is 
defined as the liability of the seller or manufacturer for injuries and damages caused by 
its allegedly defective product. It implies that manufacturers who sell globally have a 
plethora of technical standards and product liability rules to consider. Some countries 
impose fault-based liability while more and more others impose strict liability for 
manufacturers who sell in their country.203 To make it easy for consumers to claim their 
rights, the definition of “manufacturer” can be extended to incorporate foreign 
manufacturers, domestic sellers or distributors, and importers, subject to certain 
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prove that the defendant was actually negligent in the manufacture or selling of a potentially hazardous product. 
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defenses.204 Victims can seek remedies based on the consumer protection / product 
liability laws in their country or under the common laws of tort, if applicable. 
 
Despite the existence of national laws to protect the consumers, the strength that these 
laws are to be enforced is questionable, especially in developing countries. A further 
problem is whether it is possible for victims of the host country to rely on the home 
country laws and sue the foreign manufacturer in the court of its home country. 
Generally speaking, this possibility depends, to a large extent, on the attitudes of the 
foreign court. In one of the few reported cases, in 1994 a group of farm workers from 
12 countries fled a class action suit in U.S. courts seeking damages from the American 
companies that produced and used 1, 2-Dibromo-3-chloropropane (“DBCP”) after it 
was already known to have caused sterility among U.S. farm workers. (The chemical 
was banned for use in the U.S. in 1979) The action finally led to several out of court 
settlements, with defendant companies agreeing to pay altogether $52 million in 
damages, while admitting no liability.205 
 
In practice, there exist substantial procedural barriers for victims to seek redress in a 
foreign court. These barriers, as summarized by the authors, include the notions of 
national sovereignty, international comity, and forum non convenience, etc. 206 
Ultimately, the regulation on this form of DIM shall depend on the cooperation between 
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the home and host states. Without home country imposing restrictions on the export of 
hazardous products, and host country establishing mechanism to control such import, 
this form of DIM will continue to cause environmental, health and safety problems in 
the developing world. 
 
4.1.2.2 International Claims & Remedies  
 
In an effort to crack down on the export of hazardous materials, more than 160 nations 
gathered in Rotterdam, the Netherlands in 1998, to finalize an international treaty that 
puts in place a system of prior informed consent for trade in 22 pesticides and five 
industrial chemicals when these substances are banned or restricted in the exporting 
country. The Rotterdam Convention, which became effective in February 2004, 
promotes a shared responsibility between exporting and importing countries in 
protecting human health and the environment from the harmful effects of certain 
hazardous chemicals that are being traded internationally. It allows countries to make 
informed decisions about what chemicals they allow to enter and contribute to processes 
of managing chemical risk.  
 
In recent years, espoused by increased media attention and proliferation of advocacy 
groups, there has been considerable discussion on the unrestricted international trade for 
human health and the environment. The long-lasting Beef Hormone’s dispute between 
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EC and the U.S. evidences this increasing public unrest.207  In the Asbestos dispute 
between Canada and EC, worrying that a growing number of bans on asbestos 
production in Europe will devastate Canada’s asbestos industry, Canada tried to protect 
its market by lodging a complaint at the WTO, arguing that France’s 1996 ban on the 
importation of white asbestos from Canada broke international trade rules because it 
was imposed with insufficient scientific evidence of adverse health effects. The 
Appellate Body of the WTO finally ruled in favor of France, suggesting that the French 
decree is “necessary to protect human life or health” and is justified based on the 
exceptions under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994.208  
 
At the regional level, particularly in the European Union, active legal measures have 
been taken to restrict the import of certain products whose production process does not 
meet the environmental, health or safety (“EHS”) standards of the importing country. 
The best known mandatory requirement is the Second Amendments to the Consumer 
Protection Act issued by the German government in 1994 prohibiting the use of azo 
dyes in the production of textiles and garments.209  Following Germany’s initiative, 
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Netherlands, Sweden, France and Denmark passed similar regulations soon after and it 
is believed that EU will adopt legislation on azo dyes by amending its Derivative 
83/189/EEC.210  These measures have imposed great challenge for textile export of 
China and other developing countries.211 
 
4.1.2.3 EHS Standards as Non-tariff Trade Barrier 
 
A common argument is whether these laws and standards are justified on the basis that 
they actually set “non-tariff barriers” to trade, which violate the Most-Favored-Nation 
(“MFN”) principle under the GATT. The issue becomes particularly controversial when 
the exporting state does not consider its product to be defective by its own environment 
/ safety standards, but the importing states restrict such import based on their own but 
higher standards. Under the WTO, there are two agreements that regulate EHS related 
government measures. The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS 
Agreement”) addresses measures taken to protect humans, animals, and plants from 
certain risks to life and health, including risks arising from additives, contaminants or 
toxins in foods. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”) 
addresses all voluntary and mandatory standards for products, other than any that 
qualify as sanitary or phytosanitary measures under the SPS Agreement, which 
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indirectly impact free trade (i.e., create “technical barriers to trade” without directly 
regulating trade as such).  
 
Unlike the transfer of hazardous waste which is clearly detrimental to the environment, 
the chronic environmental harm of the imported unsafe products is not immediately 
detectable. Thus, as far as the WTO rules are concerned, one state cannot simply 
impose restrictions on the importation of suspect products. It has to base its measures on 
scientific health or environmental grounds and act in a non-discriminative manner. Thus, 
under the WTO, the potential state responsibility herein involved is not imposed on the 
exporting state of unsafe products but rather on the importing state who fails to meet a 
WTO justified measure of restriction. Put it another way, the “imputability rule”212 
under international law determines that the export of unsafe products is private conduct 
which cannot be attributed to the exporting state.213  But the import ban which the 
importing state imposes is a state action against the interest of other states. Regardless 
of the health and environmental justifications behind the ban, it might breach the 
importing state’s international commitments under the WTO thus incur international 
liability.  
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As is generally understood, the institutional goal of the WTO is to promote freer 
international trade among states. Thus whenever differences in environmental standards 
among states create barriers to trade, the WTO will seek ways to settle the dispute. 
Although there are general suspicions among interested groups over the WTO’s 
jurisdiction over global environmental issues,214 it must be admitted that over time the 
WTO has proved to be a successful forum for the settlement of trade and environment 
related disputes. The jurisprudence of the WTO over a series of trade and environment 
cases has put forward the substance of “general exceptions to trade” based on 
environment.215 It is generally recognized that restrictive trade practices may sometimes 
be justified based on environment, health and safety considerations, provided that they 
are imposed and implemented in a “non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner”.216  
 
4.2 Investment Related Environmental Claims 
 
On December 3, 1984, a poisonous gas—methyl isocyanides (“MIC”)—used in the 
production of the pesticide Sevin, leaked from a U.S.-based Union Carbide plant, 
located in the Indian city of Bhopal. The leakage of MIC gas killed almost 20,000 
peoples. Such accidents are not rare in developing countries. In recent years, as more 
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and more foreign industries relocated for low costs as well as lax regulation in these 
countries, the conduct of MNCs outside their home country has become a public 
concern. For example, the claims brought against the Texaco company for alleged 
environmental degradation in Ecuador,217 claims brought against Royal Dutch Shell for 
its alleged entanglement with repressive securities forces in Nigeria,218 claims brought 
against the UNOCAL company for its alleged involvement with a repressive military 
regime and associated human rights violations in Burma,219  and claims brought by 
garment workers in Saipan against contractors, manufacturers, and U.S. retailers for the 
alleged sweatshop conditions under which they work in Saipan220 have all resulted in 
international tort claims in the courts of the United States. In these cases, the alleged 
tort was caused by the local subsidiary of the MNC. The main reason why such cases 
involve international law is that the parent corporation of the subsidiary in the host state 
is a national of the home state.  Here the author identifies two areas of international law 
which may tackle the human rights and environmental related accidents in the host 
country. The civil liability imposed by international law for environment or related 
damages, and the host state’s responsibility to protect its own people and environment 
under international human rights law.  
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4.2.1 Environmental Civil Liability under International Law 
 
Environmental civil liability is one of the liabilities imposed by international law for 
environmental damage caused by an identifiable national of a contracting party to the 
national of the other. It refers to the liability of any legal or natural person under rules of 
national law adopted pursuant to international treaty obligations which establish 
harmonized minimum standards. These harmonized standards usually have developed 
in the areas which require special supervision, such as nuclear installations and oil-
related transportation, though recent regional treaties in Europe tended to apply this 
more generally to industrial operations. 221  Unlike the traditional inter-state dispute 
settlement, the approach of international environmental civil liability is to bring the 
polluter and victim together directly before a competent domestic court.  
 
The main principles of civil liability for environmental damage are those laid down in 
the 1960 OECD Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy.222  Subsequent international laws that deal with environmental civil liability 
include International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 223 and 
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 224. A regional model for 
environmental civil liability is the 1993 Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for 
Damages Resulting from the Exercise of Activities Dangerous for the Environment. 225 
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To generalize, there are several common traits found in the international civil liability 
regime: 
 
(1) The identification of the polluter is assured through a presumption that channels 
responsibility. For example, in case of nuclear energy the responsibility 
automatically is imputed to the exploiter, in oil pollution damage, the 
responsibility is imputed automatically to the ship owner.226 
(2) The system of liability is settled by imposing strict liability for damage, but 
subject to a certain number of defences.227 
(3) Jurisdictional competence is determined by designating the proper forum, in 
some cases that of the plaintiff,228 in other cases that of the polluter,229 or in 
permitting the victim the free choice of tribunal.230 
(4) Time limits are imposed for the raise of environmental civil liability. For 
example, the 1993 Lugano Convention makes it three years from the date of 
knowledge or the time when the plaintiff reasonably should have known of the 
damage and the identity of the operator. An absolute bar to suit is imposed after 
thirty years. 
(5) Liability limits are coupled with mandatory insurance requirements. 
(6) The execution of judgments is assured. 
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Despite the clarity in the area of international law on environmental civil liability, its 
actual effectiveness in regulating DIM is limited because it regulates only those 
industrial operations where special international supervision is needed. For 
environmental damage that arises from ordinary industrial operations of migrated dirty 
industries it is still largely regulated under the law of the host state, rather than 
international law.  
 
4.2.2 Host State Responsibility to Protect Its Own People and 
Environment 
 
Traditionally, international law was not concerned with the way in which a sovereign 
state treated its own nationals in its own territory.231 A human right is a right held vis á 
vis the state, by virtue of being a human being. The state’s responsibility to protect its 
own people seems to be self-evident. However in the case of Bhopal where the 
environmental harm are attributed to wholly private entities, it is a question whether the 
host state is under an international obligation for the failure to protect its own people 
and environment. This argument is justified on the basis that without the state’s 
approval of entry, foreign dirty industries would not be allowed to operate in the host 
state; had the host state exercised its due diligence in supervising the operation of 
foreign dirty industries, the human health and environmental damage should not have 
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occurred. When suffered from the environmental harm caused by multinationals, it is to 
the state that the individual will look to his most basic needs, and it is from the state that 
an individual often most seeks protection. If the host state does not stand as advocate for 
its people, the individual is left with no direct access to a forum, no legal right that he 
can call his own, and no redress against his own state. Thus failure to protect its people 
against misconduct by private parties may give rise to international liability under 
human rights law. 
 
Despite these arguments, as a long-standing rule of customary international law, a state 
has jurisdiction to prescribe law for entities and individuals residing within its border, 
and has exclusive control over the legitimacy of the complaints made against it by the 
victims. States should, in principle, refrain from challenging other state’s behavior when 
the matter is solely subject to the latter’s jurisdiction. Although international law does 
give states the right to challenge another state’s behavior in relation to the latter’s 
domestic environmental policies, either in the context of general rules on state 
responsibility or specific provisions under environmental treaties,232 in reality treaty 
member states have never invoked the formal dispute settlement procedures contained 
in most international environmental agreements. Even if such procedures are invoked, 
the ability to impose actual sanctions is extremely limited. 233 . Moreover, because 
international environmental law mainly address the actions of the state and offers little 
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possibility of recourse for individual victims of domestic environmental problems, the 
alternative mechanisms and institutions under international law becomes essential.  
 
International human rights law, in this regard, provides a basis for intervention into 
another state’s jurisdiction when harm occurs solely within another state’s border while 
international environmental law generally does not. It is when serious human rights 
violation is involved.234 Such universal jurisdiction is based on the theory that some 
behaviors are so unacceptable that they are every nation’s concern regardless of where 
they occur or who they involve. Thus whenever environmental harm involves serious 
human rights violation, the victims can rely upon the international human rights law to 
seek protection from their state. The human rights mechanism is virtually unique in 
offering avenues of redress for individuals or groups wishing to appeal beyond their 
own state in cases of environmental harm that constitute a violation of their rights. 
 
4.2.2.1 Human Rights Approach to the Environment 
 
The evolution of a “human rights approach to the environment” began essentially with 
the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, which declared that 
“man’s environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and 
to the enjoyment of basic human rights.” 235  There is much literature on the 
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jurisprudence of “environmental rights” or “human rights to a healthy and clean 
environment”. This is focused on, within the human rights regime, whether such right 
is sufficiently specific to be justifiable, whether it is a substantive or procedural 
right,236 separate or derivative right, individual or collective right, and whether such 
right has been recognized as an established principle of international law etc. 237 
Despite the arguments favoring a human right to a clean and healthy environment 
which generally involves a balancing of social, economic, health, and environmental 
factors, international bodies and states have yet to articulate a sufficiently clear legal 
test or framework so as to ensure consistent, protective application and enforcement of 
such a right.238  
 
In practice, human rights abuses and environmental degradation are often closely 
linked. For example, governments often authorize logging, gas or oil exploitation on 
lands on which indigenous people are reliant for survival. Under such circumstances, it 
can be argued that the international human rights law imposes a positive duty of state 
to consider the right of indigenous people (including their right to life, family, and 
environment) and make necessary arrangement to prevent massive human rights 
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violation. Failure to do this may lead to state responsibility at international level. Even 
if state did not authorize such exploitation (as occurred often in illegal logging and 
forest fire), it was argued that the state may also become responsible for violations by 
private actors if it fails to exercise due diligence to prevent the violations or to respond 
to them.239  If a government does not seriously investigate human rights violations 
committed by private parties, “those parties are aided in a sense by the government, 
thereby making the state responsible on the international plane.” 240  
 
If the host state fails to protect its people and environment, the international human 
rights law does provide measures for individuals or groups to seek redress from their 
government. There are several functioning treaty bodies pursuant to international 
human rights treaties which hear individual petitions in the human rights and 
environmental area, for example the Committee on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”), 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee (“UNHRC”), and the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”). 241  Among these international bodies, the 
UNHRC created pursuant to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
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Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) is the most established and authoritative organ to 
hear the environment-related human rights cases.242  
 
4.2.2.2 Environment Related Cases under the UNHRC 
 
A review on the environment-related cases under the UNHRC indicates that they fell 
neatly into two categories: (1) practices that affect the environment in which 
indigenous groups inhabit and rely for survival, and (2) cases relating to nuclear 
weapons and radioactive materials. In both categories, it is found that the common 
strategy of applicants is to allege the violation of some basic human rights that applied 
to the environmental problem, rather than the violation of specific right to environment. 
The reason for this, as suggested by authors, is that the right to a healthy environment 
has not yet developed into an independent human right which is capable of standing on 
its own in a human rights claim. 243  
 
In the case of Bernard Ominayak & the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada,244 the applicants 
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alleged that the government of the province of Alberta had deprived the Lake Lubicon 
Indians of their means of subsistence and their right to self-determination by selling oil 
and gas concessions on their lands. The UNHRC found that historical inequities and 
certain more recent developments, including oil and gas exploration, were threatening 
the way of life and culture of the Lake Lubicon Band and were thus violating minority 
rights, contrary to Article 27 of the ICCPR.245  
 
In EHP v Canada,246 residents of Port Hope, Ontario, brought an action before the 
Committee against the Canadian government for its failure to clean up 200,000 tons of 
radioactive waste remaining in a nearby dump which had been closed. Although the 
case was dismissed for failure to exhaust local remedies, the Committee observed that 
it raised “serious issues, with regard to the obligation of States parties to protect human 
life”.247  
 
Another case which interests environmentalists and arguably could have been decided 
under Article 27 was brought in 1993 by two ethnic Polynesians resident in Tahiti.248 
The applicants claimed that, by granting a lease for land—formerly a burial ground—
to a hotel group wishing to build a luxury hotel complex, France had failed to protect 
an important part of the heritage of Tahiti’s indigenous peoples. The applicants also 
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claimed that building the hotel would ruinously affect their fishing activities. The 
UNHRC concluded that since France’s “declaration” on Article 27 operated as a 
reservation, thus complaints against France under Article 27 could not be considered. 
Instead, the Committee found that the construction of the hotel complex on ancestral 
burial grounds interfered with the applicants’ rights to family and to privacy, in 
violation of Articles 17 and 23 of the ICCPR.249 Interestingly, it has been suggested 
that the UNHRC seems to be amenable to particular substantive environmental claims 
based on, for example, minority rights under Art. 27 of ICCPR.250 Probably because 
most of the environment related human rights claims brought under UNHRC involve 
indigenous people as minority. It is therefore suggested that future petitioners should 
take this into account in order to maximize their opportunities for achieving redress.  
 
If  the  Committee  finds  a  violation  in  a  particular  case,  the  State  party  is  
requested  to remedy that violation.251 The  recommended  remedy  may take specific  
form,  such  as  the  payment  of  compensation,  the  repeal  or  amendment  of 
legislation, or others. Thereupon, the case is taken up by the UNHRC’s Special 
Rapporteur to follow up, who communicates with the parties with a view to achieving  
a  satisfactory  resolution  to  the  case  in  the  light  of  the UNHRC’s views.252 
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Furthermore, Rule 86 of the UNHRC’s Rules of Procedure allow the UNHRC to ask 
the state in question to take interim measures before it has even considered the 
admissibility of the communication, without prejudice to the admissibility or the merits 
of the application. 253  This injunction-like power of UNHRC will be of particular 
interest to environmentalists, as environmental damage is often impossible to repair 
once it has occurred.  
 
4.2.2.3 Environment Related Cases under Regional Human Rights Tribunals 
 
Compared with judicial responses to claims brought pursuant to international human 
rights treaties, the efforts to derive an environmental right vis á vis the state have also 
yielded mixed results under regional human rights tribunals, in particular the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(“IACHR”).  
 
Similar to the claims brought under the UNHRC, the substantive claims brought under 
the ECHR consist of derived environmental rights—generally basic human rights 
applied to the environmental problem—rather than specific rights to environment. In 
Lopez Ostra v Spain, the tribunal ruled in favor of a claim that the failure by the public 
authorities to take measures to control noxious fumes and effluents from a treatment 
plant near an apartment building infringed upon the right to privacy and family life.254 
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In Guerra and Others v Italy, the claim was brought against Italian government based 
on emissions and an explosion from a chemical factory in Italy which alleged to have 
caused infringement upon the petitioners’ right to life as well as rights to privacy and 
family life. The ECHR ruled in favor of the violation to the privacy and family life but 
concluded that it did not reach the right to life claim.255  In Zander v Sweden, the claim 
was brought against Swedish government for the water pollution from a waste 
treatment plant in Sweden that was licensed without adequate judicial review. The 
ECHR found that the process by which a waste treatment plant’s license was renewed 
violated petitioners’ right to a fair and public hearing.256  
 
Despite the above successful environmental related human rights claims, there is a 
danger to regard the government’s positive duty to protect its people against 
environmental harm by the polluter to be expansive. In Powell & Rayner v U.K., the 
ECHR rejected a claim based on adverse effects of airport noise under a balancing test 
that considered the positive impact of the airport to justify infringement on the right to 
privacy.257 In LCB v United Kingdom, the petitioner claimed that her father had been 
intentionally exposed to radiation and that her parents had not been warned of the 
possible risks of that exposure to his offspring. 258  The ECHR ruled against the 
petitioner by concluding that “given the information available to the State at the 
relevant time concerning the likelihood of the applicant’s father having been exposed to 
dangerous levels of radiation and of this having created a risk to her health,” the State 
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did not have a duty to warn the petitioner’s parents or take special action with respect to 
her.259  
 
To summarize, by interpreting people’s environmental interest as “human rights to 
environment” under international human rights law, it becomes clear that host state has 
a positive duty to protect its people against environmental harm by the polluter. If the 
environmental damage constitutes a human rights violation, grounds exist for a claim 
against the host state under international law, even when the harm occurs solely within 
that state’s territorial jurisdiction. 260 Despite this, it must be noted that although the 
existing international and regional human rights tribunals might be able to hold the 
states responsible for inadequately constraining the behavior of the polluters, these 
tribunals have no power to reach the polluters directly. The direct claim against 
polluters still relies on the effectiveness of the national rather than international courts. 
This structural limitation not only prevents petitions against states that are not treaty 
members, but also effectively prevents any direct accountability for non-state actors at 
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4.3 Environment Related Investment Claims 
 
4.3.1 Host State Responsibility of Alien Property Protection Related to the 
Protection of Environment 
 
Under international investment law, host state responsibility is mainly studied in the 
context of alien property protection. The rules of customary international law protecting 
the property rights of aliens are well established.262 Although the state is granted a 
broad measure of discretion in relation to the treatment accorded to the property of 
aliens on their territory, the state’s discretion is not unlimited, and customary law 
requires a state to observe certain minimum international standards in respect of alien 
property. These minimum standards are supplemented by more specific rules 
established by treaties. More than 2500 Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BIT”) have been 
adopted by the end of 2005.263 Furthermore, there are a growing number of multilateral 
agreements aiming at setting standards within a region or to a particular economic 
activity. Example of such treaties are the 1994 North America Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”)264 and the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty 265. Following the failure of efforts 
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to establish a multilateral investment agreement in the mid-1990s under the auspices of 
the OECD, such initiatives have also failed under the auspices of the WTO.  
 
The state’s protection of alien property mainly falls into two categories. The first 
comprises investment treaties, bilateral and multilateral, which seeks to protect foreign 
investments against certain governmental acts, in particular expropriation and unfair 
treatment. The second comprises unilateral guarantees made by the host state 
government to foreign corporations, which seek to provide guarantees against the acts 
prohibited by international investment treaties. Both mechanisms are becoming 
increasingly connected to international environmental rules, in the sense that they may 
impact upon states’ abilities to adopt certain environmental measures at the national 
level or through multilateral environmental agreements, or encourage states to reduce 
their environmental standards in order to attract foreign investment. The focus of the 
literature has been largely on whether controls instituted by the host state on 
environmental grounds can be regarded as takings which are compensable.266  
 
In the situation where guarantee is made by the host government to foreign corporations 
in the absence of bilateral or multilateral investment treaties between the home and host 
states, it can be difficult to argue that state responsibility is involved when the host state 
acts in accordance with its laws, whether on environmental grounds or not, that interfere 
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with alien property. Such guarantee shall obviously operate in the context of national 
law and not in the context of international law.267  
 
However in the situation where there exist bilateral or multilateral treaties which protect 
foreign investments against certain governmental acts, the issue is then, whether the 
government’s action on the environmental objectives in accordance with law constitutes 
a violation of its treaty obligations which incur state responsibility. Few investment 
treaties have responded to this concern, except NAFTA. One area where the 
investment-environment interface is mired in a considerable degree of controversy is 
found in NAFTA Chapter 11:  
 
Art. 1114  paragraph 1 “Nothing in [Chapter Eleven on investment] shall be construed to prevent a 
Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter 
that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a 
manner sensitive to environmental concerns”. 
  
“The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, 
safety or environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate 
from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a 
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Party considers that another Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request consultations 
with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such 
encouragement”.268 
 
As general principle of law, a country’s legislative sovereignty to increase its 
environmental standards and ensure that the latest domestic health, safety or 
environmental standards are applied to the investment should not be fettered by any 
investment treaties. However from the above text one might surmise that national or 
even sub-national regulators may be concerned about enacting environmental 
legislation that might be challenged under the Chapter 11 by other treaty members.269 
Furthermore, some authors have provided evidence that threats of Chapter 11 litigation 
have been used to prevent the passage of new environmental regulations.270  
 
4.3.1.1 Environment Related Investment Claims under the NAFTA and ICSID 
 
A series of case law, especially under the NAFTA, tends to give a wide interpretation 
on compensable “expropriation” or “taking” based on environment, and there seems to 
be a trend to place investment interests over public interest considerations of the host 
state.  
                                                 
268
 Art. 1114, NAFTA, supra note 264. 
269
 Mann, H. & von Moltke, K, “NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment; Addressing the Impacts of the Investor-
State Process on the Environment” (1999) International Institute for Sustainable Development: Winnipeg, Canada. 
270
 See Rugman, A (1999), Environmental Regulation and Corporate Strategy: A NAFTA Perspective, (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, UK). Also see Horlick, G & Marti, A.L. “NAFTA Chapter 11B: A Private Right of Action 
to Enforce Market Access through Investments” (1997) 14 Journal of International Arbitration 43-54. However, 
some authors find no evidence that NAFTA or other bilateral investment treaties are used to lobby against the 
enactment of environmental legislation or effectively establish a regulatory chill on new environmental regulation, 
see Mann, H. & Araya, M., “An Investment Regime for the Americas: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Sustainability” (2001) Yale Centre for Environmental Law and Policy; New Haven, CT. 
 140 
 
In Metalclad v Mexico, 271 a project to construct an underwater waste-disposal system in 
a Mexican province had been given clearance by the federal government. But, agitation 
commenced at the site because of fears that the construction would interfere with the 
subterranean streams which supplied water to the people in the vicinity. For public 
health concerns and also because of popular protests against the construction, the 
provincial authorities refused permission for the construction. The tribunal, constituted 
under NAFTA, held that there was a taking on the facts and that compensation had to be 
paid.  
 
In Ethyl Case,272 the claimant company, an American investor in Canada, was the sole 
manufacturer of a petroleum additive in Canada. A Canadian minister announced in 
Parliament that he was contemplating a ban on the substance as it was a pollutant. The 
litigation was brought on the basis of the claim that the announcement led to the 
depreciation in the value of the shares of the Claimant Company and thereby amounted 
to a taking. The dispute was settled as a result of Canada agreeing to pay damages.  
 
In Santa Elena v Costa Rica,273 a case under the ICSID, the tribunal stated: 
  
"Expropriatory environmental measures-no matter how laudable and how beneficial to 
society as a whole-are in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that 
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a state may take in order to implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even 
for environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the states obligation to 
pay compensation remains." 
 
If the above statement is to be adopted, then state responsibility may incur and the state 
is under a duty to pay the foreign investors “full compensation”.274 However, such 
statement that compensation is due for any environmental measure amounting to 
expropriation taken is extreme. In most states, domestic law would not accept such an 
absolute statement.  
 
Most recently in Methanex Case, the claimant, Methanex Corp., submitted its claim to 
arbitration in 1999 alleging that California’s ban of the use of MTBE in gasoline was a 
violation of the NAFTA’s investment protections. In August 2005 the arbitrators 
unanimously dismissed Methanex’s claim on jurisdictional grounds and determined 
further that, even if they had jurisdiction, the claim also failed on the merits. In an 
unprecedented step, the Tribunal also ordered Methanex to pay the United States more 
than $4 million in legal costs and arbitral expenses. 275  The Tribunal’s decision 
demonstrates that U.S. trade agreements and investment treaties do not encroach on 
governments’ legitimate right to regulate in the public interest. It should reassure those 
who are concerned that investor-State dispute provisions in U.S. free trade agreements 
                                                 
274
 For a review of what constitutes “full compensation”, see Chorzow Factory Case (1931) 27 A.J.I.L. 153, 
supporting a full compensation for illegal taking, which equals market value plus future profit. Also in see BP v 
Libya (1977) 53 I.L.R. 296 for full compensation on illegal takings; On compensation for lawful takings, see ELSI 
Case (1989) ICJ Rpts 15 and Lithgow Case (1986) 8 E.H.H.R.. 
275
 See U.S Bureau of Public Affairs’ Press Release, “NAFTA Tribunal Dismisses Methanex Claim” 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/50964.htm> Accessed Feb 20, 2007. 
 142 
and investment treaties threaten state or federal prerogatives in regulating to protect 
public health and the environment. Moreover, the Tribunal’s award of costs to the 
United States has the effect to discourage similarly baseless claims from being brought 
in the future. It is interesting to see the development of international case law in this 
issue. 
 
4.3.2 Home State Responsibility to Regulate MNCs 
 
The home state responsibility for DIM is studied in the context of the responsibility of 
the home state in regulating the MNCs that act to the detriment of host state while 
abroad. The jurisprudence of the existence of such home state responsibility is that the 
parent company of the faulted subsidiary in the host state is a national of the home state. 
One may argue whether such a responsibility under international law is recognized in 
the first place, as such a duty is clearly beyond the prescribed duties of states under the 
International Law Commission Drafted Articles of State Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.276 Indeed, while much of the laws on investment related 
state responsibility were established in the context of the host state’s duty to protect 
aliens, the home state’s duty to regulate its corporate nationals for their overseas 
misconduct has long been a debatable issue under international law.  
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There is apparent need to establish a home state responsibility regime for MNCs. 
Globalization has facilitated the changes that states are no longer the exclusive 
participants in the international legal process even though they remain the principal 
actors in law making. Meanwhile, MNCs have exerted increasing power and influence 
over the course of international relations as well as law making. While international law 
has recognized that the assets of MNCs could be protected through investment treaties 
and through customary international law,277 there has been little movement towards the 
recognition of the obligations of MNCs towards the host states and the communities in 
which they operate. The argument that these corporations do not have personalities 
under international law has often been used as a reason for the non-development of such 
international law.278  Given that host developing countries are often incapable of or 
reluctant to harness MNCs in the fear of losing foreign investment, the development of 
home state responsibility on MNCs is thus important for the regulation of MNCs whose 
conduct otherwise remains unregulated under modern international law.  
 
4.3.2.1 The Development of Home State Responsibility on MNCs 
 
From a moral perspective, there is a general duty on all states, home or host, to ensure 
compliance with standards that are prescribed either in international treaties or in 
customary international law. Such duty should not be premised upon territorial limits. 
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existing few that did come about contain soft prescriptions. Notably the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (2001) I.L.M. 40, 236.  
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The home state, being the place of MNCs’ headquarters and financial centre, and 
receiving tax from the repatriation of MNCs’ profits, undoubtedly has the capacity to 
control these corporations.279  On practical levels there were also attempts by home 
states to control the behaviour of multinationals abroad in areas as diverse as trading 
with the enemy, antitrust, corruption and others, with varying success.280 However the 
issue is whether the home state’s capacity to control its MNCs must be exercised by the 
state when it has knowledge that harm could eventuate to the people and environment of 
another state by its MNCs. In other words, whether there is a positive duty of home 
states to ensure that their MNCs behave in accordance with the standards of, for 
example, those prescribed under international human rights and the environmental law. 
If such positive duty of states under international law is established, then failure to do so 
would probably incur the international liability of the home state.  
 
From an implementation perspective, the practical difficulties need to be considered if a 
home state responsibility is established, for example, by requiring MNCs to adopt their 
home country environmental standards wherever they operate in the world. First, to 
monitor and investigate the environmental activities of MNCs around the globe would 
pose serious logistical, technical and financial problems for home country regulatory 
agencies. Second, many home countries, concerned about the financial welfare of their 
MNCs, would choose not to subject them to stricter environmental standards than those 
to which the domestic companies of the host countries are subject. Third, host countries 
                                                 
279
 Beth Stephens, “The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights” (2002) 20 Berkeley J.I.L. 
45. 
280
 See Muchlinski, supra note 16, at 126-56; Also see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “National Regulation of Multinational 
Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization” (2003) 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 5, 17-31.  
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would likely raise vehement objections to such a proposal, arguing that the intrusions 
into their internal affairs necessary for the enforcement of home country environmental 
regulations would infringe on their sovereignty. Finally, if such a proposal is adopted, 
different MNCs operating in one country would be subject to a variety of environmental 
standards, depending on their respective home countries. It will not only give some 
MNCs competitive advantages over others, but also violates the national treatment 
principle under the WTO.281  
 
Sornarajah (2005) has done substantial work in constructing a framework of home state 
responsibility for the act of its corporate nationals. 282 The home state’s obligation to 
control its overseas nationals can be traced to the old notion of the state diplomatic 
protection of citizens abroad, in which the right with regard to the protection of 
nationals abroad was conditioned on the good conduct of the nationals, and there was a 
forfeiture of protection where a national engages in censurable conduct abroad. 283 
Generally, states recognized this by not interfering in support of a citizen who had done 
wrong whilst abroad.284 According to Sornarajah, it was a significant acknowledgement 
of a link between state responsibility and the conduct of the foreign national.285 Despite 
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 For more discussion on non-treaty environmental regulation on the conduct of MNC and the most appropriate 
environmental standards for MNCs to apply see Harris Gleckman, “Proposed Requirement for Transnational 
Corporations to Disclose Information on Product and Process Hazardous” (1988) 7 B.U. Int'l L.J. 89. 
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 Sornarajah M, International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd Ed Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
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 The older cases are discussed in EM Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (original edition 
1915 Kraus Reprint Co, 1970), pp. 718-720.  
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jurisdiction as is torture. The refusal of diplomatic protection and the trial of the national for the offence may be 
mandated in these circumstances by modern law. Where there was taking of property of an alien in execution of a 
criminal fine, this was considered a non-compensable taking. Again, the idea is that the alien loses protection in these 
situations. 
285
 Sornarajah, supra note 282, at 258-264. 
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the jurisprudence of old cases,286 the international law underwent a change as power-
based and state-centered positivism gained sway over international legal thought. It 
came to be understood that the state could only be held responsible for the acts of its 
own organs and not for those of its nationals. In the process, “positive duties on the 
home state of these foreigners dropped out of the legal picture – at least in power-based, 
mainstream international legal thought.”287 
 
Under modern international law, the principles that potentially apply to the control of 
nationals’ conduct abroad are those responsibilities in relation to the acts of private 
parties that the state was under a duty to control. This category has grown up largely in 
the context of cases involving mob violence against a foreigner within the territory of 
the host state. It is clear that responsibility will arise if there are specific instructions 
given to nationals to engage in the harmful behavior abroad.288 Such instructions in 
effect create an agency relationship as stipulated in Article 8 of the ILC Drafted Articles 
of State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts resulting in the nationals 
acting on behalf of their state.289 Even if such instructions are absent, Sornarajah (2005) 
suggests that in certain areas, the assumption of positive duty by states for the conduct 
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 Moore, International Arbitrations, vol. 2, (1898) at 2082; Poggioli Case before the Italian-Venezuelan 
Commission of 1903, Ralston, Report p. 847, 869; Borchard, supra note 283, at 217. There are also cases which 
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  Sornarajah, supra note 282, at 263. 
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  The Nicaragua Case (1986) ICJ Rep 14 provides obvious authority. There need not even be the link of nationals; 
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 Art. 8 of the ILC Drafted Articles of State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts reads: “The conduct 
of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of 
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct.”, supra note 276. 
 147 
of their nationals abroad may be accepted. Sornarajah generalized two situations where 
home state responsibility may be derived. Namely, where a state knowingly permits its 
nationals to engage in violations of ius cogens principles (like torture) whilst abroad, 
and where a state gives active assistance to those who are known to violate or are seen 
as capable of violating such ius cogens principles.290 
 
Despite the fact that there may be some grounds to support a home state responsibility 
to regulate their MNCs, researchers should be very careful in extending such state 
responsibility broadly to the situation of DIM. As has been discussed above, in specific 
areas such as waste dumping or nuclear testing, established international laws in the 
form of treaties already exist.291 States which ratified such treaties undoubtedly owe 
duties for the misconduct of their nationals (including corporations). However normal 
industrial operations of DIM, their human health and environmental damage to the host 
country are often chronic and not easily identified. In other words, unless very serious 
human and environmental damage had been caused by the DIM, the DIM itself is not a 
                                                 
290
 This area of the law was recognized in modern times in the Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (1990) 82 I.L.R. 499 
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the Rainbow Warrior. The damage was to an alien life and property by aliens sent into New Zealand as agents by 
France. The New Zealand Minister of Justice said: “What New Zealand was saying to France on this matter was, in 
effect, that it was a political imperative that decent arrangements be made for compensation for damage suffered in 
New Zealand but not by New Zealand”. France paid compensation. G Palmer, “Settlement of International Disputes: 
The Rainbow Warrior Affair” (1989) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 585. In Letelier v Chile (1980) 488 F Supp 665, 
state responsibility (of Chile) for act of its agent in setting off a car bomb which killed a former Chilean ambassador 
was recognized. The Pincochet Case also recognized the liability of a head of state (Chile) for acts of torture 
committed in Spain. The issue of liability of Chile was not raised. But, in Al Asdani v Kuwait, (29 March 1996) the 
English court recognized that Kuwait could be liable for acts of its agents in Britain if they had caused personal 
injury to any resident in Britain. 
291 
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crime which has violated obligations ius cogens, at most it is a violation of obligations 
erga omnes.292  
 
The most promising approach to hold a home state liable seems to be proving that there 
is a de facto agency relationship between the multinationals and their home state. In 
order to do this, there must be proof that the home state has or ought to have knowledge 
that its MNCs are taking out hazardous technology or with intention to transfer 
pollution when invest abroad, but fails to take necessary steps to regulate. However, 
such an argument could be hard to establish, especially in the absence of specific 
instructions given by the home state to its multinationals.   
 
4.3.2.2 Parent Corporation Liabilities for Foreign Subsidiaries—the 
Emergence of   Transnational Law Litigation 
 
Having established that holding the home countries liable for the misconduct of their 
MNCs is always difficult, this section turns to consider the possibilities for victims of 
MNC’s misconduct to seek remedies in a competent national court other than the court 
of the host state. Given the situation of Bhopal,293 state level action between the India 
and United States is impossible because the accident was caused not by the state but by 
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  Common interests shared by the international community may be protected as obligations erga mones. The court 
in Barcelona Traction case included in the category of obligations erma omnes the international laws prohibiting 
aggression, genocide, slavery and racial discrimination. More recently, the ICJ has cited with approval the view of 
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 For a chorological brief on the Bhopal tragedy and its settlement, see Bhopal Information Center: 
<www.bhopal.com> Accessed Nov 10, 2006. 
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a subsidiary of a U.S.-based MNC.294 The mere parental and subsidiary link between 
the home state and the MNC in the host state may not be strong enough to justify state 
responsibility. Unfortunately, as is common in most developing countries, the domestic 
court of the host state often lacks the needed resources to protect their citizens against 
large-scale industrial accidents.295 Such deficiency stems in part from the developing 
states’ lack of regulations for dealing with industrial production, and in part from their 
inability to enforce the regulations they do have.296 
 
By contrast to such deficiency, most developed nations (often the home countries of 
MNCs) have created extensive environmental regulations to protect their citizens and 
natural resources from the harms that can come from unrestricted industrial activities, as 
well as allowing recovery in tort for any negligent industrial activities.297 In view of 
such reality, to seek compensation in a competent national court seems to be the ideal 
method for remedying the victims of environmental and personal injury damages such 
as in the Bhopal disaster.298 
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The idea of transnational law litigation, as propounded by international human rights 
advocates, is consonant with the liberal international law theories that there are certain 
international values that must be protected regardless of jurisdictions, and that home 
countries have an implied duty (if not positive duty) to regulate their corporate nationals 
operating abroad.299 Although the home states themselves are unlikely to be held liable 
for the misconduct of their MNCs, they are well in a position (and arguably has a 
responsibility) to protect the victims (domestic or overseas) through their established 
judicial system. In other words, by confining transnational law litigation to countries 
with established and independent judiciaries for the enforcement of international legal 
norms, transnational law litigation provides “decentralized fora for the vindication of 
individual rights and interests against governments, institutions, and other corporate and 
individual entities”.300  
 
Under the current national law of different countries, some courts have shown 
willingness to hear domestic tort cases involving foreign plaintiffs, although this 
practice has yet to be well accepted in any jurisdiction and the allowance of such claims 
appears to be extremely narrow.301 The primary hurdles faced by victims who attempt to 
bring claims against MNCs in their home country include the consideration of forum 
                                                                                                                                               
809 F 2d 195 (2nd Dist, 1987). 
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 As suggested by Acevas (1997), the transnational law litigations focus on the role of individuals and domestic 
institutions in the international discourse of human rights conflicts. It seeks to “generate ex ante respect for rights to 
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 Suttles, supra note 50, at 38. 
301See Mary Elliott Rollé, “Unraveling Accountability: Contesting Legal and Procedural Barriers in International 
Toxic Tort Cases” (2003) 15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 135 , at 153-154. 
 151 
non conveniens,302  comity303  and the “corporate veil”.304  The following section will 
discuss these hurdles in the context of a series of environment related cases brought 
under the U.S. law and the laws of other home countries of MNCs. 
  
4.3.2.3 Environment Related Cases under the U.S. Alien Torts Claim Act 
 
The Alien Torts Claim Act (“ATCA”) was enacted as early as 1789.305 It allows foreign 
plaintiffs to seek justice for internationally recognized crimes committed abroad by 
defendants who are subject to the U.S courts’ jurisdiction.306 The stakes in ATCA suits 
are obvious: due to the lack of law and enforcement in regulating the abuses of 
multinationals, the ATCA action “might represent the only means even theoretically 
available to prevent or receive some compensation for the loss of [the victims’] 
livelihoods, cultures, health and even lives”. 307  Depending on how the claims are 
crafted, the ATCA may be effectively applied by victims in the host state to seek 
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remedy from the parent company of MNCs in their home country court. Consequently, 
there has been an explosive burst of litigation against MNCs on the basis of ATCA in 
recent years. These cases not only cover human rights violations, but also involve large 
scale environmental abuses.308 
 
The ATCA not only contains a jurisdictional grant, but also provides a substantive 
cause of action for violations of U.S. treaties and the law of nations. 309 In order to sue 
MNCs under the ATCA, applicants must assert that (1) they are aliens, (2) they are 
suing for a tort claim, and (3) the tort violates the “law of nations”. The third element is 
the most difficult to establish in most cases. In ascertaining whether a tort violates the 
law of nations under the ATCA, despite the claim of the courts that they would look to 
all the traditional sources of international law, it was suggested that in practice, the U.S 
courts tend to apply a definition of the law of nations to ATCA cases that is narrower 
than what international lawyers consider as customary international law. 310  
 
Based on the previous both successful and unsuccessful claims brought under the 
ATCA, the author identifies eight crimes which the ATCA regarded as violations of the 
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“law of nations” thus litigable under the ATCA. Namely torture, 311 summary 
execution,312 genocide,313 war crimes,314 disappearance,315 arbitrary detention,316 slave 
trading,317 and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment.318 However, to the extent that 
environmental damages are concerned, the U.S courts’ attitude seemed not 
consistent.319  
 
In a contentious and hotly contested case Beanal v Freeport-McMoRan, Inc.,320  an 
Indonesian tribal leader filed an ATCA suit in United States district court against a 
Louisiana-based gold and copper mining corporation, Freeport-McMoRan (“Freeport”). 
Beanal alleged that Freeport’s environmental practices at its mine in Irian Jaya, 
Indonesia amounted to genocide because the practices were bringing about the physical 
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destruction of the Amungme tribe. Beanal asserted three international environmental 
law principles to support his cause of action including the Polluter Pays Principle, the 
Precautionary Principle, and the Proximity Principle.321  The court, however, rejected 
these principles by suggesting that these standards had not garnered universal consensus 
in the international community, and they applied only to state actors. In addition, the 
court explained its dismissal of the case by suggesting that: firstly, the existing 
international environmental principles merely provide that nations shall take care to 
ensure internal state practices do not harm the environment beyond their borders. 
Secondly, genocide encompasses deliberate violence aimed at eradicating a race of 
people, not reckless efforts to make a profit by engaging in poor environmental 
practices.322 As long as Freeport did not intend to destroy the people of the Amungme 
Tribe, the law of nations did not proscribe its detrimental environmental conduct, 
regardless of the consequences. Consequently, neither the court nor the plaintiff was 
able to identify, absent state action, any germane universal norm in customary 
international law that could establish private corporate ATCA liability for 
environmental practices harmful to an indigenous tribe.323 Last but not least important, 
the Freeport-McMoRan court observed that: the existing international consensus on 
environmental damage gives states “the sovereign right to exploit their own 
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resources”324 and follow their own environmental and developmental policies. Thus, as 
long as host-government business partners, like Indonesia, refrain from regulating these 
practices to encourage foreign investment, it seems unlikely that the requisite state 
practice or universal consensus against environmental torts will emerge.325  
 
In a more recent case Flores v Southern Peru Copper Corporation, 326 the plaintiffs 
brought personal injury claims under the ATCA against copper mining corporations 
doing business in Peru. Plaintiffs alleged that pollution from Southern Peru Copper 
Corporation’s mining, refining, and smelting operations emitted large quantities of sulfur 
dioxide and heavy metals into the local air and water, resulting in adverse health impacts. 
Plaintiffs claimed that this violated customary international law by infringing upon their 
rights to life and health. The lower court rejected their claim, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the decision. The Court of Appeals noted, “As a practical matter, it is 
impossible for courts to discern or apply in any rigorous, systematic, or legal manner 
international pronouncements that promote amorphous, general principles.” 327 The Court 
of Appeals also noted that the rights to life and health as expressed in various 
international instruments cited by plaintiffs are “boundless and indeterminate….They 
express virtuous goals understandably expressed at a level of abstraction needed to 
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secure the adherence of states that disagree on many of the particulars regarding how 
actually to achieve them.” 328 
 
Despite the shortage of successful investment related environmental claims under the 
ATCA, there is no doubt that the existence of such a forum serves as a potential for 
individuals to claim compensation against MNCs, especially when gross environmental 
and human rights violations are involved. In fact, the long-standing Doe I v Unocal 
case329 under the ATCA has finally resulted in the out-of-court settlement of the case in 
2005, with an unspecified amount of compensation being paid to the plaintiff.330 
 
4.3.2.4 “Pierce the Corporate Veil” 
 
Another legal barrier which prevents victims to seek remedies in the home country of 
MNCs is the existence of corporate veil between the MNC’s parent company in the 
home country and its subsidiary in the host country. As a general principle of corporate 
law in the world, parent and subsidiary companies are separate legal entities. Thus if the 
environmental harm is attributed to the subsidiary, the liabilities lie with the subsidiary 
and not the parent company. However, there are exceptions to this rule under which the 
court will deem it just and equitable to “pierce the corporate veil” and hold parent 
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329Doe I v Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880 (Cent. Dist. Cal., 1997); Doe I v Unocal, 27 F. Supp 2d 1174 (Cent. Dist. Cal., 
1998) In Doe I v Unocal the allegation in a class action was that Unocal, an American multinational corporation, had 
participated actively or passively in the torture, forced labour and killings of aboriginal people by Burmese military 
agents in the land through which the gas pipeline it was constructing for the Burmese government passed. 
330See Earth Rights International, “Final Settlement Reached in Doe v Unocal” 
 <http://earthrights.org/news/unocalsettlefinal.shtml> (May 10, 2005) Accessed Feb 20, 2007; Also see Unocal News 
Release Archive, “Settlement Reached in Yadana Pipeline Lawsuit,” 
 <http://www.unocal.com/uclnews/2005news/032105.htm> Accessed April 10, 2006. 
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company liable for the act of its subsidiary.331 The willingness of home country court to 
apply these rules on the parent company of MNC is therefore essential for victims to 
seek any effective remedies.332 
 
In recent years as cross-border environmental liability of MNCs is becoming an 
international concern,333 several precedent-setting judicial decisions in Canada, U.S., 
and Europe have shown that the courts in these countries have demonstrated a 
willingness to hold parent corporations liable for environmental damages caused by 
their foreign subsidiaries.334  
 
In the Amoco Cadiz case, 335 the District Court of Illinois held an American parent 
company (“Standard Oil”) liable in tort for its negligent supervision of its Liberian 
subsidiary (“Amoco Transport”) which caused the spill of crude oil damaging the 
                                                 
331
 For common law on some grounds for lifting the corporate veil, see Gilford Motor Co. v Horne (1933) All ER 
Rep 109. (where ccorporate veil used to evade legal obligations); HKSAR v Leung Yat Ming (1999) 2 HKLRD 402 
(where corporate veil used to commit fraud); Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v Birmingham Corp. (1939) 4 All ER 116 
(where subsidiary is the agent of the parent company), and DHN v Tower Hamlets (1976) 1 W.L.R. 852 (where group 
of companies can be treated as a single economic entity). 
332This thesis focuses on home country courts’ attitude towards parent corporations’ liability for environmental 
damages caused by their foreign subsidiaries, because even the host country courts are willing to pierce the corporate 
veil and hold foreign parent corporations liable, enforcement is difficult as the assets of Parent Corporation is not 
accessible in the host country. 
333
 See for example, claims brought against the Texaco Company for alleged environmental degradation in Ecuador, 
claims brought against Royal Dutch Shell for its alleged entanglement with environmental degradation and repressive 
securities forces in Nigeria, etc, claims brought against the US Union Carbide Corporation for the gas leak disarster 
in Bhopal, etc. Supra note 217 to 219 and 293 to 295. 
334
 See Joseph M Lookofsky, Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration: A Comparative Analysis of 
American, European, and International Law (2nd ed. Juris 2003) at 268-88 (providing a comparative analysis of 
approaches to corporate veil piercing); Carsten Alting, “Piercing the Corporate Veil in American and German Law—
Liability of Individuals and Entities: A Comparative View” (1995) 2 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 187, 191 (same); 
Sandra K. Miller, “Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the European Community and in the 
U.S.: A Comparative Analysis of U.S., German, and U.K. Veil Piercing Approaches” (1998) 36 Am. Bus. L.J. 73 
(same). 
335
 See Re Oil Spill By The Amo co Cadiz Off The Coast of France On March 16, 1978, MDL Docket No. 376 ND 
Ill. 1984, American Maritime Cases, 2123 -2199. 
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marine environment. In the Canadian United Canadian Malt case, 336  the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice allowed a tort claim to proceed against an American parent 
corporation based on that the American parent company exercised too much control 
over its Canadian subsidiary which caused the leachate contamination on the site, and it 
is justified to “pierce the corporate veil”. In the English Cape Asbestos case which 
involved tort damages arising in the South African asbestos mines owned by a 
subsidiary of an English parent corporation, 337 the English House of Lords unanimously 
decided that all the claimants could sue the parent company (Cape PLC) in England. 
The court held Cape liable under negligence for it knew or ought to have known that the 
activities of the subsidiaries would cause damage but failed to ensure the observance of 
proper standards of health and safety by its overseas subsidiaries. According to Braul 
and Wilson (2004), MNCs need to pay particular attention to the growing case law in 
which courts in their home countries may apply corporate and tort law principles in 
sometimes flexible ways to give remedies to foreign victims of environmental 
damage.338 These initiatives, to the author, although not common practices in developed 
countries, are nevertheless commendable initiatives of the home country court to 
address the disparate distribution of environmental harms as a result of MNC’s global 
operation. The growing case law on “piercing of corporate veil” in cross-border 
                                                 
336
 See United Canadian Malt Ltd. v Outboard Marine Corp. of Canada (2000), 34 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 116. 
337 The Court noted that the trial would require particular attention to the parent’s role in the operations of the 
subsidiaries, whether directors and employees of the parent had knowledge, what actions were taken or not taken by 
the parent and whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the employees of the subsidiary companies.  See Lubbe v 
Cape plc [2000] 4 All ER 268. 
338
 See generally Waldemar Braul and paul Wilson, “Parent Corporation Liability for Foreign 
Subsidiaries”(2004)COMM/ENV100000/608549.13,<http://www.fasken.com/Web/fmdwebsite.nsf/AllDoc/CCEFC
D83EF8C66B287256B040074D5B7?OpenDocument> Accessed Jan 3, 2007. 
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environmental harm indicates that home country does have a role to play in regulating 
MNCs and contributing to the global environmental justice.
 
 
In conclusion, the author favors the strategy of promoting home state responsibility for 
MNCs to prevent their misconduct in the host developing countries. In fact, there are 
already proofs that home countries are regulating their multinationals through 
international law. For example, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention says corporations 
cannot bribe foreign governmental officials or they will be held criminally responsible 
under the jurisdiction of either the home or the host state.339 This is a research area that is 
increasingly drawing international scholar’s attention and the author is expecting more 
home country initiatives in the regulation of MNCs and their DIM. 
 
4.4 Environment Related Trade Claims  
 
Environment Related Trade Claims (“ERTC”) refer to those claims based on 
international trade disputes that are related to environment. DIM may have a distortive 
effect on international trade. According to the pollution haven hypothesis, given the 
differences from country to country in the levels of substantive environmental standards, 
both the domestic producers in the alleged pollution haven and foreign producers who 
relocate their dirty industries there enjoy a considerable cost advantage over their home 
                                                 
339
  Art. 4 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions  (1997) 37 I.L.M. 1 (entered into force February 15, 1999). 
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competitors.340 From the perspective of environmental economics, 341 as long as the 
prices of products do not fully internalize production and consumption externalities, the 
international trade is distorted, and the gains from trade are reduced. The reality, 
however, indicates that developed countries are generally more successful than 
developing countries in seeing to it that export product prices reflect the costs of 
environmental damage and that of controlling that damage. Thus in the case of exports 
from industrial states, the environmental costs are ultimately transferred to consumers in 
importing states, includes the Third World states. However, in the case of Third World 
exports, their comparative advantage lies in the sale of high quantity, low value-added 
primary products, whose production often involves huge pollution. Thereby for them, in 
order to maintain price competitive, they do not often calculate the environmental cost 
into final products. Consequently, no matter import or export, it is always developing 
countries that “eat” the cost of pollution.  
 
Such distortive effect has not only caused trade-based environmental claims which have 
been discussed above, but also given rise to environment related trade claims which is 
antitrust in nature. In the case of passive DIM, both the producers in the alleged 
pollution haven and foreign producers who relocate their dirty industries there enjoy 
                                                 
340
  Specifically, producers in pollution havens made less effort than their home state counterparts to change materials 
used, to change production processes, or to install end-of-pipe treatment equipment. They had significantly fewer 
programs to train their general workers in environmental responsibilities. They lagged behind in environmental 
training, waste management, and transportation training. They received less technical training, especially about the 
environment, environmental policy and administration, and clean technology and audits.  
341
 
 From the environmental economics perspective, it is necessary to distinguish national “revenue” and “income” for 
the purpose of taking environmental depletion into account. The fundamental meaning of income is synonymous with 
“value added”. When an individual, a corporation or a country, sells assets, it is an elementary mistake to view the 
proceeds of sale as income. The fiscal authorities of developed countries have in many cases endorsed the necessary 
distinction between revenue and income by allowing the deduction from revenue of an estimated “depletion 
allowance”. By contrast many, if not most, developing country economies depend to an appreciable extent on 
primary production: fishing, forestry, mining, etc., where revenues derive not from value added, but in large measure 
from asset sales. 
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environmental cost advantage over their home competitors. It implied that domestic 
industries / producers who produce similar products will be damaged by the strong 
imports. Therefore, in order to balance the vigor of the import with the interest of the 
domestic industries, governments have vowed to “level the environmental playing 
field”.342  
 
Generally, a government could satisfy the demand for a level-playing-field by removing 
the perceived cost disadvantage in one of three ways. First, the government could lower 
its own environmental standards. Second, the government could give domestic 
producers a subsidy to offset their environmental compliance costs. Finally, the 
government could tax away the foreign producers’ cost advantage by imposing customs 
duties (“eco-duties”) on imports from countries with low environmental standards. 
 
For the first two options, they are impractical as environmentalists quite naturally 
oppose relaxing domestic environmental standards, and budget problems usually limit 
the extent to which subsidies can be granted. Consequently, commercial and 
environmental interests tend to support eco-duties. This is through regulating 
environmental considerations that influence the application of rules prohibiting or 
limiting the grant by governments and other public authorities of subsidies. At the same 
time, the failure to integrate environmental costs into production costs could lead to 
charges of “environmental dumping” in international trade.  
 
                                                 
342
 See European Chemical Industry Council, CEFIC’s Trade and Environment Position Paper, (1995), 
<http://www.cefic.be/Position/Tea/pp_tm013.htm> Accessed Aug 18, 2006. 
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4.4.1 Anti-Dumping and Subsidy  
 
4.4.1.1 Environmental Dumping 
 
Current antidumping laws define dumping to include sustained sales at prices below the 
average cost of production. When dumped imports materially injure a domestic industry, 
governments may levy an antidumping duty equal to the “margin of dumping” –the 
amount by which the import price falls below the true cost of production plus profit.343 
If goods produced under low environmental standards (or in alleged pollution havens) 
can be viewed as goods being sold for less than their true cost of production, 
antidumping laws may provide a mechanism to impose eco-duties. 
 
To the author’s knowledge, so far both national antidumping laws and the rules of the 
WTO seem to preclude using antidumping laws to remedy the level-playing-field 
complaint against low environmental standards. It is mainly because the environmental 
compliance cost is often too small to cause “material” commercial injury to the 
importing country. Even if an environmental dumping case is justified, potential state 
liability will be held against the importing country which raises anti-dumping measures. 
There is no state responsibility of the exporting state, only the responsibilities attributed 
to the alleged manufacturers and exporters within the exporting state. 
 
                                                 
343
 See generally Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(“Anti-dumping Agreement”) Final Texts of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreements Including the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization 168 (1994). 
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4.4.1.2 Environmental Subsidy 
 
The most common level-playing-field claims against low environmental standards is the 
assertion that such low standards should be treated as a form of subsidy to producers. 
The subsidy is the cost saved due to the difference between the producer’s actual costs 
and the higher costs it would have incurred if required to comply with more rigorous 
environmental standards. As early as 1972, the OECD Council has recommended that 
environmental protection measures should not be accompanied by subsidies that would 
create significant distortions in international trade and investment, although exceptions 
or special arrangements may occur. 344  The GATT permits governments to impose 
Countervailing Duties (“CVD”) on subsidized imports that cause material injury to a 
domestic industry. The amount of the countervailing duty should be equal to the amount 
of the subsidy. An article related to environment is found in the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, in which “assistance to promote adaptation of existing 
facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law”345 is defined as “non-
actionable subsidies” subject to prescribed conditions.346 
 
                                                 
344 OECD Council Recommendation on Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of 
Environmental Policies. (1972) C(72) 128  Annex Para. 4 and 5. 
345 Art. 8.2 (c) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 343. 
346
 Id, Non-actionable subsidies include: assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental 
requirements imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burdens on firms 
provided that the assistance: (i) is a one-time nonrecurring measure; (ii) is limited to 20% of the cost of adaptation; 
(iii) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must be full borne by firms; (iv) 
is directly linked and proportionate to a firm's planned reduction of nuisance and pollution, and does not cover any 
manufacturing cost saving which may be achieved; and (v) is available to all firms which can adopt the new 
equipment and/or production processes. 
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Despite the law and policy initiatives in treating environmental laxity as “subsidy”,347 
the author holds the opinion that current countervailing duty laws do not seem to 
provide a remedy against goods produced in countries with low environmental 
standards. Such a legal claim would fail on several grounds. First, the current definition 
of “subsidy” does not appear to include the cost advantage obtained from lower 
environmental standards. An easy question which justifies this argument is: if lax 
environmental standards or enforcement could be characterized as a subsidy, what about 
other differences in regulatory standards among states? Often the lax environmental 
standards and enforcement (i.e. the financial benefit to producers) involves government 
inaction rather than action. A definition that treated the absence of regulation as a 
subsidy would be a radical change in the concept of “subsidy”. It, at least in the near 
future, is unlikely to be accepted by most states. Second, technically in most cases the 
benefits of environmental laxity are generally available to all or most producers, thus 
not meeting the “specificity” requirement 348 for the determination of subsidy. Finally, it 
is very difficult to demonstrate, much less measure, the financial benefit conferred by 
low environmental standards. It was argued that even if the above-described barriers, 
such as the definition of an actionable subsidy, the specificity requirement, and the 
material injury requirement, to the use of CVD law against lax environmental regulation 
were changed to allow such use, other characteristics of its application, such as the 
                                                 
347 For a discussion of countervailing duties based on environment under US Law and NAFTA, see George William 
Mugwanya, “Global Free Trade Vis-à-vis Environmental Regulation and Sustainable Development: Reinvigorating 
Efforts Towards a More Integrated Approach” (1999) 14 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 401 Also see Robert E. Hudec, 
“Difference in National Environmental Standards-the Level Playing Field Dimension” (1997) 5 Minn. J. Global 
Trade 1; Laura J. Van Pelt, “Countervailing Environmental Subsidies: A Solution to the Environmental Inequalities 
of the North American Free Trade Agreements” (1994) 29 Tex. Int'l L.J. 123. 
348
 “Specificity” test provides that countervailing duty law was held inapplicable to any governmental benefits 
“generally available to all or most producers. This limitation effectively excluded most government contributions to 
infrastructure, as well as most economy-wide social or economic programs. 
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valuation of subsidies, procedural inflexibility, and the increased controversy associated 
with the use of CVDs, would hamper the effectiveness of CVD law in responding to lax 




This chapter intends to outline an international legal framework in relation to DIM. The 
international regulation on DIM intertwines with international environment, human 
right, trade, and investment laws. The inherent conflicting values among these fields of 
laws are clearly reflected in the international law of DIM.  
 
Generally speaking, the difficulty of constructing a state responsibility / international 
liability on DIM is primarily due to the fact that the DIM is an act of private parties 
rather than states. Public international law consists of mainly treaties among states. 
Failure to comply with treaty obligations triggers state liability. However, it must be 
understood that the general level of compliance with international agreements cannot be 
empirically verified, and that “non-compliance” of treaties often do not reflect a 
deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking. 349  For example, an 
international environmental treaty calls on states to reduce sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
emissions by thirty percent against a certain baseline. However, the real object of the 
treaty is not to affect state behavior but to regulate the behavior of non-state actors 
carrying out activities that produces SO2—generating power, driving automobiles, and 
                                                 
349
 See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance” (1993) International Organization     Vol. 47, 
No. 2, at 176. 
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the like. The ultimate impact on the relevant private behavior depends on a complex 
series of intermediate steps, which normally requires an implementing decree or 
legislation followed by detailed administrative regulations designed to secure the 
necessary reduction in emissions. Quite apart from political will of the member states, 
the construction of an effective domestic regulatory apparatus is not a simple or 
mechanical task. It entails choices and requires scientific and technical judgment, 
bureaucratic capability, and fiscal resources. It was argued that even developed Western 
states have not been able to construct such systems with confidence that they will 
achieve the desired objective.350 Hence, a state may be considered “in compliance” with 
the treaty when it has taken the formal legislative and administrative steps, but at the 
same time, despite the vagaries of legislative and domestic politics, it is perhaps 
appropriate to hold it accountable for failure to do so. Furthermore, the problem of 
“non-compliance” may come from the treaty itself. As Chayes and Chayes (1993) 
recognize, if agreements are well-designed—sensible, comprehensible, and with a 
practical eye to probable patterns of conduct and interaction—compliance problem and 
enforcement issues are likely to be manageable. However if issues of noncompliance 
and enforcement are endemic, the real problem is likely to be that the original bargain 
did not adequately reflect the interests of those that would be living under it, rather than 
mere disobedience.351 
 
                                                 
350
 Kenneth Hanf, “Domesticating International Commitments: Linking National and International Decision-
making,” (1992) prepared for a meeting entitled Managing Foreign Policy Issues Under Conditions of Change, 
Helsinki, July 1992.  
351
 Chayes and Chayes, supra note 349, at 183. 
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Even if a state is held accountable for the violation of treaty obligations (which rarely 
occurs), as has been shown, the state responsibility regime generally fails to provide any 
meaningful redress for human, environmental, and economic loss as a result of DIM. 
For victims who wish to raise private actions against the wrongdoer but are 
inadequately protected by their domestic legal system, there exist substantial procedural 
barriers for them to seek justice in a competent court other than the court of the host 
country. 
 
In regulating the migration of dirty industries, the author’s review of international law 
shows a consistent trend of the relocation of state sovereign into international 
institutions and private powers. However, such a process seems to be more complicated 
than a mere “replacement of power” at global level;352 instead, what is presented here is 
a framework where multiple sources of power and institutions with regulatory authority 
compete with each other. Under this framework, the traditional sharp lines between 
public and private international law have blurred. The traditional analytic divide 
between international and domestic law is fading, and the preference for binding 
instruments over voluntary or legally nonbinding norms is receding. For example, 
international law now aspires to directly regulate property rights through 
internationalization of investment interests, as reflected in investment laws on DIM. 
The internationalization of property rights has been accompanied by the 
internationalization of the discourse of human rights, and there has been a proliferation 
                                                 
352
 For commentary suggesting the replacement of international law systems for the nation-state at the head of the 
hierarchy of “law” see, for example, Richard Falk, Law in an Emerging Global Village: A Post-Westphalian 
Perspective (Transnational Publishers, 1998); Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, “On the Creation of a Global Peoples 
Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty” (2000) 36 Stan. J. Int'l L. 191.  
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of foreign and international tribunals that subordinate the role of national legal systems 
in resolving a variety of DIM related disputes.  
 
Based on these general feelings, the author’s first conclusion is that the current 
international law is ineffective in regulating DIM. The formal institutional arrangements 
often lack the scope, speed and informational capacity to keep up with the rapidly 
changing global issues implied by DIM. Existing general customary international law 
provides some useful elementary concepts, but they are inadequately developed or 
elaborated to cope with present problems. As J.F. Rischard, the World Bank’s Vice-
President for Europe describes, “hierarchical international treaties and arrangements 
cannot keep pace with current global problems. A shift towards flatter, more network-
like organizations is necessary to further sustainable development”. 353  
 
The author’s second observation indicates that the major actors of DIM, the MNCs, are 
left largely unregulated under current power-based and state-centered international legal 
system. MNCs operate in foreign states are not generally subject to strict EHS 
regulations and they do not always stick to their home country standards outside the 
territory. Home state regulation of MNCs’ misconduct abroad is largely non-existent. 
The host states, which are frequently developing states, often lack the legal resources 
needed to protect their citizens against environmental harm or large-scale industrial 
                                                 
353
 J.F. Rischard, 20 Global Problems 20 Years to Solve Them (Basic Books, 2002), at 157-164. (Rischard claims that 
“[h]ierarchies are just too slow, too rigid, too self-obsessed, too mired in a sort of perpetual bad mood. And most of 
the time, their leaders are in over their heads.”). A Stockholm Environmental Institute and Global Scenario Group 
report reached similar conclusions. It argues that human civilization is moving into a "planetary" phase and that the 
current international structures are inadequate to address the challenges we face. See Paul Raskin et al. Stockholm 
Environmental Institution & Global Scenario Group , “Great Transition: The Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead” 
(2002), <http:// www.tellus.org/seib/publications/Great_Transitions.pdf> Accessed Nov. 20, 2006. 
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accidents. Such deficiency stems in part from the developing states’ legislative gap, and 
in part from their inability to enforce the regulations they do have. In view of this reality, 
the pursuit of alternative sources of regulation on MNCs other than those offered by 
international and host state law thus becomes essential. Example of such sources of 
regulation may come from the home state, the market, and MNCs themselves, etc. 
Probably more time is needed for a cognizable framework of international law on DIM 
to be shaped, and probably the more effective means to regulate DIM lies in a national 
rather than international law context, and in private rather than public sector.  
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In previous chapter the author has discussed the international regulatory framework 
based on cognizable international claims arising from the migration of dirty industries. 
In practice, international law is rarely employed and DIM is largely regulated under the 
domestic law of the host country. This chapter is an examination on the regulation of 
DIM under domestic law of China. In particular, using the case of China, this chapter 
attempts to evaluate two common hypotheses relating to the host state regulation of 
DIM. These two hypotheses reflect the common dilemma of developing countries in the 
regulation of DIM.  
 
Hypothesis 1:  
China’s lax environmental laws have created incentive for foreign pollution intensive 
corporations to migrate to China and this trend will exacerbate China’s already severe 
environmental problems.  
 
Hypothesis 2:  
The increase in the stringency of Chinese environmental regulation would deter foreign 
corporations and thus decrease China’s FDI inflow.  
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To test the validity of these two hypotheses, the author starts by examining relevant 
provisions under Chinese law. As previously analyzed, the migration of dirty industry 
migration can be roughly divided as active DIM through FDI and passive DIM through 
international trade. Therefore, the effective legal control of DIM depends largely on 
whether a country’s foreign trade and investment laws have taken adequate 
consideration of environment. There are much literature describing China’s 
international trade and investment regimes; however, no scholar has ever conducted a 
“green” review of Chinese trade and investment laws. The author’s assumption is that if 
both areas of law adequately take into account environment concerns, then theoretically 
DIM shall be effectively controlled.  
 
Other than examining the laws “on paper”, this thesis will pay special attention to the 
deeper institutional and government organization issues surrounding the integration of 
environmental concerns such as monitoring, enforcement and prosecution. As some 
authors suggest, although countries may be willing to respond to environmental 
questions, and may even have enacted strong environmental legislation, they often lack 
the resources and technical expertise for inspection, monitoring, enforcement and 
prosecution needed to implement appropriate environmental legislation and to work in 
collaboration with the investors. 354  When evaluating the effectiveness of domestic 
regulation of DIM, the author concerns primarily three aspects, namely: (1) Whether 
such laws and regulations are in place; (2) Whether the available regulations are 
                                                 
354
 See generally UNCTAD, supra note 89 also see Lall, S., “FDI and Development: Research Issues in the Emerging 
Context” (2000) Policy Discussion Paper No. 0020, Centre for International Economic Studies, University of 
Adelaide.  
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enforced with adequate strength; and (3) How easy is it to litigate environmental and 
other claims as a result of DIM in domestic court?  
 
5.1 Regulation of Dirty Industry Migration through Investment Law 
 
Foreign investment laws are domestic laws that provide the framework of the 
relationship between the host country and foreign investors. Not all countries have 
foreign investment laws (or codes). For example, the U.S. has a reputation of being a 
state which has openly welcomed foreign investments yet so far the U.S. does not have 
an integrated foreign investment code. Foreign investments may enter and exit the U.S. 
at will and they are regulated by national standards. However, even in a country like the 
U.S. which embraces the idea that there should be no restriction on the flow of foreign 
investment, the inflow of foreign investment is not absolutely free. For example, the 
U.S.’ 1976 International Investment Survey Act, 1988 Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act and many bilateral investment treaties all serve to either make 
reservations on particular sectors or restrict the specific rights of foreign investors in 
certain ways. 355 
 
There is a great deal of similarity in the legislation on foreign investment among 
developing states. On one hand, the laws have been enacted to provide guarantees 
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 For example, the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, 1988 SEC. 5164. 
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investment companies, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7, a-8; domestic air transportation, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1378(a) (4); and 




relating to the treatment and protection of the property of the foreign investor; on the 
other hand, these legislations also contain devices to screen the influx of foreign 
investment and permit entry only to investment that is considered desirable.  
 
Under customary international law, a state has an absolute right to exclude an alien 
(including foreign investment) from entry into its territory. This is a right that derives 
from state sovereignty.356 To what extent a state maintains an open door policy is totally 
the option of that state. It is well accepted that a state may institute laws and regulations 
to exclude foreign investments considered harmful to its interests. This includes foreign 
investment on dirty industries. However, under international law such legislative right 
of the host state may be surrendered when the state has executed bilateral or multilateral 
investment treaties to grant the entry and treatment to foreign investors.357  
 
5.1.1 Investment Law of China at a Glance 
 
There is no uniform foreign investment law in China that governs all types of FDI. On 
the contrary, each form of FDI is regulated by a specific series of laws and regulations. 
It is reported that there are approximately 200 major laws and regulations effective 
today in governing FDI.358 One distinct feature of China’s complex foreign investment 
laws is the corporate law oriented legislative approach, which means that the core of 
Chinese foreign investment laws is, actually, the foreign-invested enterprise laws, 
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 See Cao Jianming (the vice Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of China), “WTO and Construction of Rule of 
Law in China”, preface to WTO and the Judicial Judgment in China (Law Press, 2001), at 10. 
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comprising the Sino-foreign Equity Joint Venture Law (2001) (the “EJV Law”), the 
Sino-foreign Contractual Joint Venture Law (2000) (the “CJV Law”), and the Wholly 
Foreign Owned Enterprise Law (2000) (the “WFOE Law”)  The EJV Law, CJV Law 
and WFOE Law are collectively referred to as the Foreign Invested Enterprises (“FIE”) 
laws..  
 
5.1.1.1 Sources of China’s Investment Law  
 
Although the legal sources of China’s investment laws are complex, they can be 
generally classified into two categories, the domestic sources of investment law and 
international sources of investment law. 
 
Generally speaking, Chinese domestic investment laws (or regulations that have the 
force of law) emanate officially from no fewer than eleven sources. These are, in an 
hierarchy from top to bottom: (1) the Constitution; (2) international agreements to 
which China has subscribed; (3) so-called basic laws (jiben fa) enacted by China’s 
National People’s Congress (the “NPC”), the supreme legislative body; (4) other laws 
(fa lv) issued by the NPC’s Standing Committee; (5) interpretations of the Constitution 
and basic law (lifa jieshi) issued by the Standing Committee of the NPC; (6) regulations 
and other documents having the force of law (collectively, xingzheng fagui) issued by 
the State Council, China’s highest administrative body; (7) ministerial regulations, and 
rules (collectively, bumen guizhang) issued by national ministries and commissions; (8) 
interpretations issued by the Supreme People’s Court (sifa jieshi) and the Supreme 
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People’s Procuracy to carry out their respective judicial and prosecutorial work; (9) 
regulations (difang fagui) issued by people’s congresses (and their standing committees) 
at the sub-national level, consistent with national legal enactments; (10) regulations and 
other legal orders known as “difang zhengfu guizhang” issued by the executive branch 
of people's governments at the sub-national level; and debatably (11) individual cases 
decided by the Supreme People's Court and lower level courts.359 
  
Apart from the domestic legislative sources, the international legal sources relating to 
Chinese investment law largely consists of three aspects:  
 
(1) Multilateral investment-related agreements to which China is a contracting party 
 
The multilateral investment-related conventions to which China is a party mainly 
consists of: (i) China’s commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(“GATS”).360 In addition to general commitments inscribed in the main text of GATS, 
China made specific commitments on “market access” and “national treatment” over 
the sectors inscribed in its Schedule. (ii) The Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Dispute between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID 
Convention”). 361  This Convention is mainly responsible for arbitration of disputes 
                                                 
359
 For a fuller discussion, see Albert H. Y. Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People's Republic of 
China (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 1992), pp. 77-127, and Perry Keller, “Sources of Order in Chinese Law”, 
(1994) 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 711.  
360
 General Agreement on Trade in Services (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1167. In GATS which China subscribed, trade in 
services is defined as four modes of service supply, among which the third mode refers to the supply of services “by 
a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member”; this includes 
foreign direct investment. 
361
 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dispute between States and Nationals of Other States (1965) 4 I.L.M. 
524. China ratified the ICSID Convention on 1 July 1992. 
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between the host country and foreign investors. China ratified the ICSID Convention in 
1993 but made reservation that only for disputes arising out of nationalization and 
expropriation does it agree to submit to the Convention. (iii) The Convention on 
Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA Convention”).362 
The major purpose of the MIGA Convention is to facilitate investment for productive 
purpose to developing countries under conditions consistent with the developmental 
needs, policies and objectives of those countries. In addition to the abovementioned 
multilateral investment-related conventions, China is also a party to Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property 363  and the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards364. These conventions are 
closely related to foreign investment and thus also a source of Chinese investment laws. 
 
(2) Bilateral investment-related treaties to which China is a contracting party 
 
The main purpose of bilateral investment treaties (“BIT”) is to promote and protect 
mutual investment, particularly investment in China. BITs that China has entered into 
have the force of domestic law. They largely fall into two categories: one is investment 
protection treaties; the other is avoidance of double taxation treaties. As of June 2006 
China has entered into more than 100 BITs. 365  All of them contain fundamental 
provisions relating to definitions, admission, treatment standards, expropriation and 
                                                 
362
 Convention on Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (1985) 24 I.L.M. 1598. China ratified 
MIGA Convention on 28 April 1988. 
363
 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (March 20, 1883, enter into force May 19, 1970), 21 U. 
S. T.1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.  
364
  New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) 330 UNTS 3. 
365
 For status of China’s BIT with other countries see UNCTAD,  
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/china.pdf> Accessed Jan 14, 2007. 
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consequent compensation, war losses compensation, monetary transfers, subrogation, 
dispute settlement and so forth.  
 
(3) International practice 
 
In a civil law country like China, the role of customary international law may have 
limited effect on its domestic laws. China’s General Principle of Civil Law (1986) does 
provide that: “International practice may be applied on matters for which neither the 
law of the People’s Republic of China nor any international treaty concluded or acceded 
to by the People’s Republic of China has any provisions”.366  It implies that certain 
international legal sources in the investment area such as customary international law or 
general principles of law may, on exceptional cases, be applied in China in judicial 
decisions. 
 
The legal status of bilateral treaties, multilateral investment treaties and international 
practice is expressly recognized in the General Principles of Civil Law, Art.142 
stipulates that: “[I]n the event of any inconsistencies between the international treaties 
or conventions to which China is a signatory countries and the civil law of China, the 
provisions of the international treaties and conventions should prevail.”367 Thus it has 
made clear that international treaties and conventions should prevail over domestic civil 
law provisions, and domestic civil law provisions should prevail over international 
practice. International practice should apply only if international treaties / conventions 
                                                 
366
 Art. 142  Para. 3 民法通则 [General Principles of Civil Law] (effective Jan 1, 1987) (PRC). 
367
 Id., Art.142. 
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and domestic civil law contain no express provisions. In practice, many international 
treaties / conventions require contracting parties to enact domestic law pursuant to their 
treaty obligations. As a result, many such international laws have already been 
incorporated into Chinese domestic laws. They are largely in the form of ministerial 
regulations, national standards and rules issued by national ministries and commissions.  
 
5.1.2 Pre-entry Examination and Approval of Foreign Investment 
 
Like many other developing countries, in order to obtain necessary capital and 
technology from foreign investors without losing its tight control of the national 
economy, the Chinese government adopted a strict examination and approval system for 
receiving foreign investment. There is no specific law that regulates the entry of foreign 
pollution intensive industries; general environmental requirements are imposed on all 
inward FDIs.  
 
5.1.2.1 Foreign Investment Industrial Orientation 
 
The current framework law on foreign investment industrial guide is the Provisions on 
Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment of 2002 (“the Provisions”). It provides 
guidance to Chinese governments at all levels on the principles of screening and 
approving the inward FDI. On entry screening, the law has generally classified foreign 
funded projects into four categories: “prohibited”; “restricted”; “allowed” and 
“encouraged”. Projects belonging to the “encouraged” industries enjoy the most 
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preferential treatments and least scrutiny in the examination and approval procedures. 
“Restricted” projects require certain conditions to be met before the entry can be 
approved.368 “Prohibited” projects are excluded from entry. Some general principles are 
listed in determining the category of industries, for example, Article 6 and Article 7 of 
the Provisions provide that: 
 
Art.6 “A project in any of the following situations shall be a restricted foreign-funded project:  
1) Using technology lagged behind; 2) being adverse to saving resources and improving 
environment;”  
 
Art. 7 “A project in any of the following situations shall be a prohibited foreign-funded 
project: …2) polluting the environment, damaging natural resources or harming human 
health;”  
 
Despite the general language, it is apparent that the environmental impact of foreign 
investment is an indispensable factor for the initial examination and approval of FDI. 
To better facilitate implementation, China further promulgated its Catalogue for the 
Guidance of Foreign Investment Industry (2004). This periodically updating catalogue 
was designed to provide up-to-date guidance for the screening and approval of foreign 
invested projects. 369  A detailed list of encouraged projects, restricted projects and 
                                                 
368
 For example, in certain restricted industries foreign investors are required to hold special qualifications; in certain 
industries the business scope of the FIE is limited or there is a ceiling on foreign ownership in the FIE. 
369
 In fact, China has its 外商投资产业指导目录 [Provisional Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment 
Industry] since 1995. Prior to which China admitted foreign investment in accordance with very vague policy 
declarations provided in various foreign investment legislative instruments. The current & latest version is the 2004 
Catalogue. Compared with previous versions (1995,1998, and 2002), the 2004 Catalogue not only reflected China’s 
changing demand for foreign investment, but also integrated China’s WTO commitments especially under GATS.  
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prohibited projects were provided and all the unspecified industries are deemed as 
permitted projects.   
 
5.1.2.2 Requirement for Environmental Impact Assessment  
 
An Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”) report is required before the entry of 
foreign investment. EIA must be carried out by accredited professional consultant 
institutes, and must be accepted by the relevant environmental protection bureau 
(“EPB”) before the project is approved. The grant of foreign investment will be denied 
if the EIA report proves that the environmental impact on the host state would be 
harsh.370  In particular the EIA requirements are applicable to not only new projects, but 
also the rebuilding and expanding of existing projects. Thus, in the case that foreign 
investment results in the expansion of an existing plant, such activity is treated as new 
foreign investment for the purpose of EIA.371 
 
5.1.2.3 Requirement on Technology 
 
Apart from the environmental impacts, another determinative factor for the entry 
approval is technology. Jha et. al. (1999) in a study on a series of developing countries 
                                                 
370 The submission and approval of EIA report is a requirement that applies not only to foreign invested projects but 
also to all new domestic enterprises / projects. Art. 13 of the 环境保护法 [Environmental Protection Law] (1989) 
reads: “The environmental impact statement on a construction project must assess… [and] the statement shall…be 
submitted by specified procedure to the competent department of environmental protection administration for 
approval. The department of planning shall not ratify the design plan descriptions of the construction project until 
after the environmental impact statement on the construction project is approved.” 
371
 Art.18 of 清洁生产促进法 [Law on Promoting Clean Production] (2002) provides that:” For the projects of new 
building, rebuilding and expanded building, appraisals shall be made with regard to the effects upon the environment, 
analytical argumentations shall be made about the use of raw materials, consumption of resources, comprehensive 
utilization of resources, and the generation and disposal of pollutants, etc., and priority shall be placed on the 
adoption of clean production technologies, techniques and equipments that have high use rate of resources and 
generating few pollutants.” 
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find that  in China some foreign firms use obsolete (sometimes banned by the parent 
company) rather than modern technology, leading to high energy consumption and 
pollution problems.372 To import advanced technology is a major goal employed in the 
Chinese FDI policy. In the environment sphere, whether the technology is “clean” or 
“dirty” determines to a large extent which category the proposed investment falls in.  
Investment of a kind using outdated technologies will generally fall under restricted or 
prohibited foreign investment. 373  In fact, China’s ratification of most international 
environmental treaties is also conditional upon developed country members’ promise to 
transfer environmentally sound technology to China.   
 
In addition to this, China has an established national policy called “The elimination of 
lagged product and production process”.374 In implementing such policy, the Ministry 
of Commerce periodically promulgates the Catalogue on the elimination of Lagged 
Production Capacity, Production Process and Product and sets deadlines before which 
the lagged production capacity and processes should be abadoned. 375 For example, in 
1997 enforcement action has been directed at 15 categories of polluting enterprises, 
including paper mills producing less than 5000 tonnes of pulp per year, and tanneries 
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 Jha, supra note 92. 
373
 Goldenmann (1999) cited China as an example, where the government’s schedule for foreign investment prefers 
industries that include coal-fired power plants adopting clean combustion technology. See Goldenman, G., “The 
Environmental Implication of Foreign Direct Investment: Policy and Institutional Issues” (1999) in OECD 
Proceedings, Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment at 75 (OECD: Paris). 
374
  Article 12 of the Law of the PRC on Promoting Clean Production provides that: “The production technologies, 
techniques, equipments and products that are lagged behind, wasting resources or seriously polluting the environment 
shall be eliminated during prescribed time periods. The administrative departments of economy and trade of the State 
Council…formulates and publishes catalogues of the production technologies, techniques, equipments and products 




processing less than 3000 hides per year,376 the rationale being that the economic output 
of such enterprises does not justify the environmental damage they do in rural areas. 
 
5.1.2.4 Public Consultation on Certain Foreign Funded Projects 
 
Besides substantive environmental requirement, the environmental consideration is also 
integrated into the examination procedure for the approval of investment projects. In the 
latest Interim Measures for Examining and Approving Enterprises’ Investment Projects 
promulgated in 2004, Article 14 provides that: “in the case of a project that may have a 
serious impact on the public interests, when making its examination, the approving 
organ shall seek opinions from the public in an appropriate manner. For especially 
important projects, the specialist appraisal system shall be adopted.”  
 
To summarize, a distinct feature of Chinese investment law is a strict examination and 
approval system for receiving foreign investment. In the environmental sphere, China’s 
regulation of the entry of foreign industries includes both substantive and procedural 
assessment, i.e. admitted foreign investment shall first meet the substantive 
environmental conditions imposed by China, the fulfillment of these substantive 
conditions are embodied in the EIA report foreign investors submit to the approval 
authorities. In evaluating the environmental impact of an investment on the local 
community, the nature of industry and the technology it employs are two key issues 
assessed by the approval organs. The control of the admission of foreign investment is 
                                                 
376 Anonymous,  “Authorities  get  tough  on  polluting factories” China Daily, 31 May 1, 1997. 
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carried out by screening procedural rules. All foreign investment projects must pass two 
phased examinations and fulfill registration before the formal establishment. 377 
Although the procedures for the examination seem to be complex and they vary from 
sector to sector, they have become more transparent. In some environmentally sensitive 
projects, public consultation and participation has become a common practice. The 
existence of such laws reduces the ambiguity and uncertainty for the admission of 
foreign investment. It serves to provide the Chinese government with a tool to monitor 
foreign investment to ensure conformity to the state plan and the goal of social 
development.  
 
5.1.3 Post-entry Regulation of Dirty Industry Migration 
 
Theoretically, after the initial examination and approval stage, industries that are 
allowed entry are considered beneficial to China’s economy. The FIEs, upon 
establishment, become Chinese corporate nationals. The post-entry regulation of DIM 
thus transforms from the regulation of investment projects to the regulation of FIEs.  
 
5.1.3.1 Treatment Standard and “Dual Track System” 
 
There are two broad categories of treatment standards in foreign investment law: 
relative treatment and absolute treatment. The relative standard generally requires the 
host country to treat foreign investment no less favorably than domestic investment 
                                                 
377
 To establish an EJV, the potential Chinese partner must first submit project proposal and feasibility study to its 
administrative “department-in-charge.”, which is generally a local, provincial, or national government department 
with responsibility for the relevant industry. Upon that department's approval, those documents must be submitted to 
the “examination-and-approval authority” of the proposed joint venture. 
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(“National Treatment”) or of nationals of any third country (Most-Favored-Nation or 
“MFN treatment”). The absolute standard requires the host country to provide foreign 
investment with fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and, at the 
very least, no less than that required by international law.  
 
China generally adopts the relative standard including the MFN treatment but has been 
reluctant to promise national treatment standard to foreign investment. Such reluctance 
was reflected both in China’s domestic laws and its BITs with other countries. As a 
result, many developed countries, including the U.S., have yet to conclude BIT with 
China. Essentially China is concerned that the core of the socialist economy, the state-
owned enterprise (“SOE”), is not ready for the competitive challenges that come with 
foreign investment. Consequently, it is not surprising that unlike other states where 
foreign and domestic companies apply the unified laws of the host country, China has 
adopted a dual track legal system for governing foreign invested enterprises and 
domestic enterprises.   
 
Despite the unification trend, the “dual-track system” currently adopted in China 
determines that in prescribed areas, FIEs and domestic corporations are regulated by 
separate sets of laws, foreign investment legislation and domestic legislation. Foreign 
investment law forms an independent system that co-exists with the laws solely or 
mainly applicable to the domestic-invested enterprises. Table 12 is a brief illustration on 
the “dual-track system” 
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Table 12  A Brief Illustration of the “Dual-Track System” 
 Domestic Legislation 
 







 Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China  
 Partnership Law of the People’s 
Republic of China  
 Sole Proprietorship Enterprise 
Law of the People’s Republic of 
China  
 Law on Industrial Enterprise of 
Public Ownership of the People’s 
Republic of China 
  
 EJV Law 
 CJV Law 
 WFOE Law 
 The Notice of the General Office 
of the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation 
Concerning Issues Related to 









 Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China on the 
Administration of Company 
Registration 
 Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China on the 





 Regulations on the Registration 
and Approval Procedures for 







 Labour Law of the People’s 
Republic of China; 
 Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China on the 
Settlement of Labour Disputes in 
Enterprises 
 
 Provisions on Labour 
Management of Sino-Foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures 
 Provisions on Labour 






 Provisional Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China on 
Enterprises Income Tax 
 
 
 Income Tax Law of the People’s 
Republic of China for Enterprises 






 Regulation on the Foreign 
Exchange System of the People’s 
Republic of China 
 
 Rules for the Implementation of 
Foreign Exchange Regulations 
Relating to Enterprises with 
Overseas Chinese Capital, 
Enterprises with Foreign Capital 




Laws and Regulations compiled by the author  
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The co-existence of two parallel sets of laws in China raises question on the relationship 
between the two sets of laws. In this regard, the Company Law of 2005 makes it clear 
that where the domestic and FIE laws both have relevant provisions, regardless of the 
consistency or conflict between the two, the provisions in FIE laws shall apply to FIEs; 
on any other subject where the FIE laws are silent, the domestic legislation shall apply 
to FIEs.378 This implies that except for the above-listed areas of laws, other Chinese 
domestic legislations apply uniformly to both FIEs and domestic companies. Therefore 
it is safe to say that in the environmental regulatory sphere, FIEs in China are treated 
the same as domestic enterprises. 
 
In the long run, with China furthers its WTO commitments, the dual-track system in 
economic areas is destined to be eliminated and foreign investors will enjoy a more 
comprehensive national treatment. In fact, even before China’s entry into the WTO, 
there was already a trend that China’s BITs had gone beyond MFN and attempted to 
embody the national treatment standard. The quasi-national treatment standard 
provisions were found in the Sino-Great Britain BIT, Sino-Slovakia BIT, and Sino-
Japan BIT. However, the application of these national treatments was accompanied by 
important conditions precedent, applicable only at the post-entry level and singles out 
the admission of new investments. 379 It is because if not so provided, all contracting 
parties of previous Chinese BITs may claim the same treatment under an MFN 
                                                 
378Art.218 of 公司法 [Company Law] (2005) provides that “The law [company law] applies to limited liability 
companies with foreign investment. Where the laws on Sino-foreign equity joint ventures, Sino-foreign cooperative 
joint ventures and wholly-foreign-owned enterprises otherwise provide, the provisions of such laws apply.” 
379
 For example, under China-Japan BIT, following the national treatment paragraph, there is a list enumerating 
“business activities in connections with the investment” for the purpose of application of national treatment and MFN 
treatment. 
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treatment.380 Therefore, China’s commitment to the national treatment standard to one 
BIT is far more than a promise to one country, but to all countries that have a BIT with 
China, and probably to all WTO member states, if one of the BIT contracting parties 
happens to be a WTO member.  
 
5.1.3.2 Guarantees against Expropriation 
 
An indispensable provision in any investment code is the host country’s guarantees to 
foreign investments against expropriation. This is especially important for a communist 
country like China. Recalling China’s modern history, the industrial bases of the newly 
founded People’s Republic of China was obtained by the confiscation and redemption 
of existing industries owned by foreign and national capitalists. This process, started 
from 1952 and completed in 1957, was historically called “Socialist Transformation”. 
Thus, China with a past history of expropriations is especially keen on giving such 
guarantees so as to correct any fear of expropriation that the investor may have on the 
basis of this history. Such keenness was reflected in a series of national legislations. 
 
The Constitution of PRC was revised in 2004 to make important changes to its 1982 
version on the guarantees against expropriation.381 It was provided that “the state may, 
                                                 
380
 See Jian Zhou, “National Treatment in Foreign Investment Law: A Comparative Study from Chinese Perspective”. 
(2000) 10 Touro Int'l L. Rev. 39 120-122. 
381
 In 中华人民共和国宪法修正案 [Amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (2004), it 
was provided that: “The provisions in Paragraph 3, Article 10 of the Constitution of “The state may, for the public 
interest, take over land for its use in accordance with the law.” shall be modified as “The state may, for the public 
interest, expropriate or take over land for public use, and pay compensation in accordance with the law.” (Art. 20) 
“Article 13 of the Constitution: “The state protects the right of citizens to own lawfully earnings, savings, houses and 
other lawful property.” And “the state protects by law the right of citizens to inherit private property” shall be 
modified as “The lawful private property of citizens may not be encroached upon.” and “The state protects by law the 
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for the public interest, expropriate or take over private property of citizens for public 
use, and pay compensation in accordance with the law” (Art.22)  Although the 
constitution applies to citizens only, to the extent that FIEs are incorporated under 
Chinese law, they are considered Chinese corporate citizens. To make such intentions 
more clear, in China the guarantees against expropriation to foreign investors were 
reiterated under Chinese FIE laws. For example, the EJV, CJV and WFOE laws all have 
the same article reads:  
 
“The Chinese Government protects, in accordance with the law, the investment of foreign joint 
ventures, the profits due to them and their other lawful rights and interest in a joint venture, 
pursuant to the agreement, contract and articles of association approved by the Chinese 
Government. The state does not practice nationalization and expropriation of a joint venture; 
under special circumstances, the state, in accordance with the needs of social public interest, 
expropriates a joint venture pursuant to legal procedures and offers corresponding 
compensations”. (Art. 2) 
 
Despite the in-principle guarantees against nationalization / expropriation of the 
enterprise, a notable fact is that these provisions do not explicitly apply to property of 
that enterprise (though regulations regarding certain special economic zones do so 
provide).382 This limitation in the language arguably places a higher burden on the 
                                                                                                                                               
right of citizens to own private property and the right to inherit private property.” and “The state may, for the public 
interest, expropriate or take over private property of citizens for public use, and pay compensation in accordance with 
the law.” (Art. 22). 
382
 See 国务院关于鼓励投资开发海南岛的规定 [State Council Regulations for Encouragement of  Investment in 
the Development of Hainan Island] (1988) Art. 4; reprinted and translated in two China Laws for Foreign Business: 
Special Zones and Cities 1985-1994 (CCH) P 96-203 (May 4, 1988) (“The State ... will not nationalize or expropriate 
the property [zichan] of investors. However, in special circumstances necessitated by social public interest 
requirements, the property of an investor may be expropriated,” in which case “legal procedures” must be followed 
and “appropriate compensation” must be paid.) (Emphasis added). 
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foreign investor, who may be required to show that the challenged administrative act 
not only effectively denies him a part of his property, but takes the entire enterprise, 
otherwise it is not an “expropriation” under FIE laws, but ordinary bureaucratic 
interference to be regulated under Administration Litigation Law. Such distinction is 
important as China does not submit the latter to international tribunals such as the 
ICSID.383 Indeed, such a delicate difference in wording on expropriation may partially 
evidence the government’s unwillingness to embrace the idea of “indirect takings” as 
developed under other countries’ jurisprudence, notably the U.S.384 
 
Nonetheless, at least theoretically, it might be possible to construct a claim of 
constructive or creeping expropriation that would cover such smaller acts as 
bureaucratic interference or other undue restrictions on FIE’s business and property. In 
particular, the author is interested in the circumstances in China when such 
“expropriation” is a result of environmental regulatory change, and whether controls 
instituted by the host state on environmental grounds can be regarded as takings which 
are compensable. 385  Although Chinese domestic laws are scant on this, partial 
indication may be found in BITs in which China is a party.  
                                                 
383
 In signing the ICSID Convention, China did not require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies 
as a condition of its consent to arbitration under this Convention. However, it has made reservation that “only 
disputes arising out claims against nationalization and expropriation” Thus for disputes arising from nationalization 
and expropriation, there is no need for the foreign investor to exhaust all local remedies before submitting the dispute 
to ICSID.  
384
 See Chen An, “Should an Immunity from Nationalization for Foreign Investment be Enacted in     China's 
Economic Law?” in Ren Jianxin et al (Eds.) Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China 
(Hong Kong: China Trade Translation Co., 1988), at 49 (Arguing that China must “take precautions against the 
theory and practice of the developed western countries in expanding the meaning of “expropriation”; and suggesting 
that, if an immunity is enacted, “then we might eventually end up with the situation in which the taking of such 
reasonable measures as proper increase of tax rates and land prices in the light of new conditions would be construed 
as an act in contravention of municipal law” and therefore give rise to liability).  
385
 For a bundle of literature on takings based on environmental grounds, see J Martin Wagner, “International 
Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection” (1999) 29 Golden Gate ULR 465; Thomas Walde and Abe 
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5.1.3.2.1 Direct and Indirect Takings Based on Environment—A Comparison 
between China and U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 
In order to offset the impact of environmental regulatory change on the interest of 
foreign investment, a traditional strategy of investors has been to negate environmental 
laws through stabilization clauses in the contract which seek to freeze such controls as 
at the time of entry and exclude the application of later improvements to environmental 
standards to the investment.386 Chinese law and practice has permitted such clauses in 
certain limited instances, however the remedial issues on the violation of stabilization 
clause remains unclear. 387  In fact, the inter-state negotiations between the U.S. and 
China over a BIT started in the 1980s, but has been stalled for more than two decades 
largely over the issue of the formula for compensation in the event of expropriation.388 
To illustrate such gap, Table 13 compares the expropriation and compensation 




                                                                                                                                               
Kolko, “Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and Regulatory Taking in Intenational Law” (2001) 50 
ICLQ 811 ; but, for a general survey,  see Gaetan Verhoosel, “Foreign Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on 
Domestic Environmental Policies : Striking a Reasonable Balance Between Stability and Change” (1998) 29 Law 
and Policy in International Business 451; Michael Anderson, “Transnational Corporations and Environmental 
Damage: Is Tort Law the Answer” (2002) 41 Washburn LJ.  
386
 Sornarajah, supra note 282, at 251. 
387
 See Lianlian Lin & John R. Allison, “An Analysis of Expropriation and Nationalization Risk in China”, (1994) 19 
Yale J. Int'l L. 135, 177-78. 
388
 For early literatures on the proposed BIT between US and China, see Timothy A. Steinert, “If the BIT Fits: The 
Proposed Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States and People’s Republic of China” (1988) 2 J. Chinese 
L. 405; Pat K. Chew, “Political Risk and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of Protection and Predictability?”, 
(1994) 34 Va. J. Int'l L. 615, at 661-663. 
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Table 13 A Comparison on the Expropriation and Compensation Articles between 
China Model BIT and U.S. Model BIT 
 
China Model BIT U.S. Model BIT  
Article 4 
  
1. Either Contracting Party may, for its 
public interests, nationalize or take 
similar measures (hereinafter referred to 
as “expropriation”) against investments 
of investors of the other Contracting 
Party in its territory PROVIDED THAT 
such expropriation shall be: 
 
(a) under domestic legal procedure; and 
 
(b) without discrimination; and  
 
(c) against compensation. 
 
2. The compensation mentioned in 
Paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be 
the market value of the expropriated 
investments at the time when 
expropriation is proclaimed, be 
convertible and freely transferable. The 
compensation shall be paid without 
unreasonable delay.  
 
3. Investors of either Contracting Party 
whose investments suffer losses in 
connection with their investments in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party 
owing to war or other armed conflict, 
revolution, a state of general emergency, 
revolt or any similar events, shall be 
accorded treatment not less favorable 
than that accorded by the latter 
Contracting Party to the investors of a 
third state. 
 
Article 6:  Expropriation and 
Compensation389 
 
1.  Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a 
covered investment either directly or indirectly 
through measures equivalent to expropriation or 
nationalization (“expropriation”), except: 
(a)     for a public purpose;  
(b)     in a non-discriminatory manner;  
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation; and  
(d) in accordance with due process of law and 
Article 5 [Minimum Standard of 
Treatment](1), (2), and (3).   
 
2.  The compensation referred to in paragraph 1 
shall: 
(a) be paid without delay;  
(b) be equivalent to the fair market value of 
the expropriated investment immediately before 
the expropriation took place (“the date of 
expropriation”); 
(c) not reflect any change in value occurring 
because the intended expropriation had become 
known earlier; and  
(d) be fully realizable and freely transferable.   
 
3.  If the fair market value is denominated in a 
freely usable currency, the compensation referred 
to in paragraph 1 shall be no less than the fair 
market value on the date of expropriation, plus 
interest at a commercially reasonable rate for that 
currency, accrued from the date of expropriation 
until the date of payment. 
 
4.  If the fair market value is denominated in a 
currency that is not freely usable, the 
compensation referred to in paragraph 1 – 
converted into the currency of payment at the 
market rate of exchange prevailing on the date of 
                                                 
389 Article 6 [Expropriation] is to be interpreted in accordance with Annex A and B.   
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payment – shall be no less than: 
(a) the fair market value on the date of 
expropriation, converted into a freely usable 
currency at the market rate of exchange prevailing 
on that date, plus 
(b) interest, at a commercially reasonable rate 
for that freely usable currency, accrued from the 
date of expropriation until the date of payment. 
 
5.  This Article does not apply to the issuance of 
compulsory licenses granted in relation to 
intellectual property rights in accordance with the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
 
Source: Chinese BIT Abstracted from Agreement between the Governments of the People's Republic of China the 
Government of the State of Bahrain Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment; U.S. 
BIT abstracted from the latest updated U.S. Model BIT by The Department of State and the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR), released on Feb 5, 2004, <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/prsrl/2004/28923.htm> 
Accessed Feb 20, 2007 
 
A preliminary comparison shows several differences. Firstly, the U.S. Model BIT 
provisions are far more sophisticated than that of China. It provides clear guidance on 
what constitutes “expropriation” (in its Annexes A and B), what does the compensation 
include, and how to define market value. All these elements are lacking in China’s 
Model BIT. Second, in defining the right to expropriate, China’s model BIT uses 
positive wording, i.e. “a state may …nationalize…provided that…”, while U.S. applies 
a negative wording, i.e. “neither party may expropriate or nationalize…unless…”, 
although the two expressions come up with largely the same conditions on 
expropriation. This reflects a general attitude among developing countries in keeping 
their sovereign rights of expropriation. Furthermore, in defining the conditions on 
expropriation, the U.S. BIT uses the “minimum standard under international law” as a 
supplementary to “due process of law”. This implies that the expropriation should 
conform to whichever is higher. However, such a reference to the international 
minimum standard is missing in China’s BIT. Fourth, on the compensation criteria for 
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expropriation, China does not use the wording of Hull Formula (i.e. “Prompt, Adequate 
and Effective” 390) as appeared in U.S. BIT, nor does China employ the wording of 
“appropriate” compensation as espoused by many developing countries. Instead, China 
uses a separate article to define compensation as “the market value of the expropriated 
investments at the time when expropriation is proclaimed”, and the compensation does 
not include the interest “accrued from the date of expropriation until the date of 
payment” as provided under the U.S. BIT. Finally and most important, the U.S. Model 
BIT clearly distinguishes “direct expropriation” (which includes the formal transfer of 
title or outright seizure in Annex B Art. 3) and “indirect expropriation” (effect 
equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure in 
Annex B. Art. 4). In particular, it’s Annex B Art. 4(b) provides that:  
 
“Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, 
safety, and the environment, does not constitute indirect expropriations”. 
 
The existence of such article effectively protects the national legislative sovereignty and 
extinguishes the foreign investor’s claim that the raising of environmental standards 
may result in compensable indirect taking. Despite the above clarification, Article 12 of 
the U.S. Model BIT confers the contracting parties the right to challenge each other’s 
domestic laws if such laws inappropriately “encourage investment by weakening or 
                                                 
390
 Cordell Hull, who was Secretary of State during the Mexican expropriations of 1938, stated this to be the standard 
in a letter to his Mexican counterpart. Ever since, the standard has been espoused by the United States and has been 
referred to as the Hull doctrine of compensation. 
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reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental laws.” Given the fact that 
the environmental laws in developing countries are generally lower than that of the U.S, 
such provision in fact entitles the U.S. unilateral rights to interfere with other countries’ 
domestic laws.  
  
With regard to whether regulatory environmental change would constitute an 
expropriation under China’s foreign investment treaties, from the scant language in 
China’s Model BIT, it can only be presumed that China intends to keep adequate 
regulatory space for its new laws and regulations. Thus even if a specific investment 
agreement between a foreign investor and China contains a stabilization clause against 
environmental regulatory change, an expropriation may still be justified when China 
introduces new environmental laws and bases its regulatory actions according to the due 
process of law. In fact, ever since China’s economic reform in 1978 the country has not 
nationalized or expropriated any foreign invested entities. Thus there is no evidence 
showing that China has formally accepted the idea of expropriation (direct or indirect) 
based on regulatory change. Meanwhile, it remains an arguable point whether 
regulatory change or any sort of bureaucratic interference would fall in the definition of 
compensable “expropriation” under China’s BITs.   
 
5.1.3.3 Guarantees on Dispute Settlement 
 
Provision for the resolution of disputes is a key feature of any foreign investment legal 
system. The Chinese guarantees on investment dispute settlement generally involve 
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three types of disputes: i.e. the investor-investor dispute, the state-state dispute and 
state-investor dispute.  
 
5.1.3.3.1 Investor-Investor Dispute 
 
The investor-investor dispute mainly refers to the dispute between the foreign and 
Chinese parties within the same joint venture.391 The subject matter of such dispute 
mainly involves the rights and obligations of each party contained in the joint venture 
agreement. Following the Chinese tradition to amicably resolve the dispute, Chinese 
law strongly encourages the parties to resolve the matter through consultation / 
mediation. In case the consultation / mediation fails, parties can resort to arbitration 
based on either the pre-existing arbitration clause in the joint venture agreement or an 
ad hoc arbitration agreement formed after the dispute. Litigation of a dispute is possible, 
but is usually the last resort. To bring a dispute involving a foreign economic contract to 
the Chinese court, the foreign economic contract must not include an arbitration clause 
and a written agreement to arbitrate must not later be reached. In practice, few 
foreigners or foreign countries have chosen to litigate on their contractual disputes. If 
the parties decide to go to court for the final dispute settlement, it was stipulated that 
disputes arising from an EJV contract, CJV contract, a Sino-foreign joint exploration 
and exploitation of natural resources contract must be tried by a Chinese court.392  
 
                                                 
391
 In the case when a joint venture contract is signed between the foreign investor and a Chinese local government 
on behalf of its state-owned enterprise, such contract is commercial in nature and the state sovereign immunity rule 
does not apply, such dispute belongs to “investor-investor” dispute in the author’s definition.    
392
 Art. 246 民事诉讼法 [Civil Procedural Law] (effective Apr 9, 1991) (PRC). 
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5.1.3.3.2 State-State Dispute 
 
A state-state dispute often involves the interpretation or application of the BIT. China 
Model BIT provides that in case a state-state dispute arises, it should be settled first 
through diplomatic channels. If not successful, then “it shall upon the request of either 
Contracting Party be submitted to an arbitral tribunal”. China is a party to the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,393 thus 
the arbitral award given by an international tribunal can be enforced by the Chinese 
domestic court. 394 
 
5.1.3.3.3 State-Investor Dispute 
 
In the case of a state-investor dispute, i.e. the dispute arises between the Chinese 
government and a foreign investor, the cause of dispute generally involves the violation 
of investment treaties between the parties. Examples of such violation include civil 
strife in the State, alleged nationalization and expropriation, or the denial of justice by a 
state’s political subdivisions, etc. In dealing with state-investor dispute generally, China 
allows the free choice of parties on the forum for dispute settlement. In the absence of 
such agreements, the China Model BIT first requests that the dispute be settled 
amicably through negotiations between the parties. If not successful through 
negotiations within five months of the date of resort to negotiations, China requires the 
                                                 
393
 Note that China made a few reservations to the Convention, which included that China would only enforce the 
Convention on the basis of mutual recognition (thereby refusing to enforce an award in a non-New York Convention 
country), and that the Convention would only apply to disputes recognized under Chinese law. 
394
 For the procedure on enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, see Art. 262 to 269 of Civil Procedural Law, supra 
note 392.  
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foreign investor to submit the dispute to the competent court of the contracting party. 
Although in theory the foreign investor would insist on a court other than in China, in 
practice since the corporation was established and operates in China, the Chinese court 
often proves to be the most appropriate forum for the settlement of dispute.  
 
5.2 Regulation of Dirty Industry Migration through Trade Law 
 
China’s defense against foreign “dirty” products can be traced to the notorious First 
Opium War (1839-1842). The cause of the war was the China’s Qing Empire’s ban on 
the importation of opium from British on the ground of public health. This resulted in 
the British use of force to make China open its market to the western hegemonic powers. 
In the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) after the loss of war, China ceded the island of Hong 
Kong to the British; abolished the licensed monopoly system of trade; opened 5 ports to 
British residence and foreign trade; limited the tariff on trade to 5 percent ad valorem; 
granted British nationals in China extraterritoriality (exemption from Chinese laws); 
and paid a large indemnity. In addition, Britain obtained Most-Favored-Nation 
treatment, which entitled the British to receive whatever trading concessions the Qing 
empire grants to other foreign powers by and later. The Treaty of Nanjing was followed 
by other incursions, wars and treaties that set the scope and character of an unequal 
relationship for the ensuing century of which the Chinese would call “national 
humiliations.”395 If the opium can be viewed as a “dirty” product based on its narcotic 
                                                 
395
 For a history of the China Opium War and its implication on the Chinese subsequent reforms see generally Waley, 
Arthur, The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968). 
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effects on human health), then the Treaty of Nanjing can be seen as the cost of China for 
its first fight against the migration of dirty industry.  
 
Of course no real sense of DIM exists at colonial times when western powers 
themselves were at their early industrialization stage. However, according to Sornarajah 
(2004), the use of overt or covert force in order to coerce settlement of disputes 
continued even after the Second World War into the post-colonial period, and there 
were spectacular instances of such uses of force.396 Moreover, it was suggested that the 
power-based international law could be manipulated by the hegemonic powers to 
express their ideas and secure their key interests.397  When neo-liberal ideas which 
advocate unobstructed flow of trade and investment outweighed other ideologies and 
became the mainstream of current economic globalization, rules that are generally 
favorable to the protection of capital exporting state and MNCs were devised and then 
fixed in international trade and investment legal instruments.398 These rules can then be 
utilized by capital exporting nations and their MNCs to justify their continuous pursuit 
of trade and investment interests in the host states. This is a reality that China and other 
developing countries must live with under the contemporary international trade and 
investment regime. 
 
                                                 
396
 See Sornarajah, supra note 282, at 35-40 (citing the incident involving the Rosemary [1953] 1 WLR   246 , in 
which the overthrowing of the governments of Mosadegh in Iran and Allende in Chile were the obvious instances of 
forcible intervention to assist foreign investment in recent history, Sornarajah also cites the case with the US invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 to suggest that capital-exporting countries, which operated outside the colonial context, were keen to 





 The attempts to set of such rules are apparent in the recent WTO ministerial meetings in Seattle in 1999, Doha in 
2001 and Hong Kong in 2005, as well as the negotiation over a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) by the 
OECD in 1995. Many of these occasions are severely disrupted by the widely reported Anti-WTO demonstrations as 
well as protests from developing countries. 
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5.2.1 International Sources: China’s WTO Commitments Relating to 
Environment 
 
China became a WTO member in 2001. Two agreements among the WTO members, 
the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement, oblige its members to promote clear and 
effective notice of EHS standards, greater public participation in standard setting, as 
well as consistent and transparent enforcement. The SPS Agreement addresses 
measures taken to protect humans, animals, and plants from certain risks to life and 
health, including risks arising from additives, contaminants or toxins in foods. The TBT 
Agreement addresses all voluntary and mandatory standards for products, other than 
any that qualify as sanitary or phytosanitary measures under the SPS Agreement, which 
indirectly impact free trade (i.e., create “technical barriers to trade” without directly 
regulating trade as such). These include product content, packaging, and labeling 
measures, etc. Accordingly, China is required to publish its EHS standards likely to 
affect international trade, including measures to regulate the import, export, and sale of 
goods, in a way that allows other members and entities participating in international 
trade to become acquainted with these requirements. The WTO members also must 
provide a reasonable interval between the publication and entry into force of these 
requirements to give trading partners the time to adjust their products and 
manufacturing methods accordingly.  
 
The two Agreements also encourage members to base domestic requirements upon 
effective and appropriate international standards, and grant a presumption of validity to 
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domestic measures that are based on such standards. These agreements recognize the 
rights of the WTO members to establish national requirements that are more stringent 
than international standards. However, such requirements must conform to the WTO 
rules that protect against “unnecessary, unjustified, arbitrary, and disguised 
discrimination” 399 toward products of other WTO Members.  
 
Currently in China the initiatives to incorporate international / developed-country 
standards are at an early stage, but are growing quickly. In China's Environmental 
Standards Management Measures (1999),400 it was provided, among other things, that 
Chinese regulatory bodies may use existing international standards and standards of 
developed countries when formulating certain new environmental standards. 401  In 
practice, foreign experts are increasingly involved in Chinese legislative process, 
although such practice has not been stressed as a necessary element of the law drafting 
process; it represents a greater realization by the Chinese that the experiences of other 
countries are important for the insurance of WTO-consistency of its domestic 
legislation. 
 
                                                 
399
 GATT Art. 20 Chapeau. 
400
 State Environmental Protection Agency (“SEPA”) promulgated 环境标准管理办法 [Environmental  Standards 
Management Measures] on Jan 5, 1999. These Measures mirror a similar concept included in the 标准化法 
[Standardization Law], (effective Apr 1, 1989). Article 4 of the Law provides that “the State shall actively encourage 
the adoption of international standards.” For implementation of Article 4 of the Law, generally, experts typically 
point to 采用国际标准管理办法 [Several Regulations  Promoting the Adoption of International Standards and 
Advanced Foreign Standards], promulgated by the State Administration of Quality Supervision and Inspection on 
Dec 4, 2002. 
401
 Id, Art. 17(1)(iv). 
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5.2.2 Domestic Trade Laws on the Import of Environmental Sensitive 
Goods 
 
The framework law of China on international trade is the Foreign Trade Law (amended 
in 2004). The law applies to foreign trade and the protection of foreign-trade-related 
intellectual property. 402 It governs the “the import and export of goods, technology, and 
the international trade of services” (Art. 2). In its Chapter III titled “the Import and 
Export of Goods and Technology”, Art.16 provides that: 
 
“The state may restrict or forbid the import or export of relevant goods or technology if: 
2)…it is necessary to restrict or forbid the import or export for the purpose of protecting human 
health or security, protecting the life or health of any animal or plant, or protecting the 
environment; 
4)…it is necessary to restrict or forbid the export of any of the exhaustible natural resources 
that are in short supply or subject to effective protection;” 
 
These two provisions are in fact articles copied from the GATT Art XX (b) and (g). In 
the control over trade in services, China may restrict or prohibit the trade of relevant 
international services if: 
 
“it is necessary to restrict or prohibit it for the purpose of protecting human health or security, 
                                                 
402
 China’s laws concerning the protection of intellectual property are not, strictly speaking, foreign trade or 
investment measures, but rather part of the country’s domestic legislation. The reason for the inclusion of the 
protection of foreign-trade-related intellectual property was principally to encourage the transfer of foreign 
technology to China and only secondarily to provide protection to Chinese citizens. 
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protecting the life or health of any animal or plant, or protecting the environment;” (Art. 26.2) 
 
More concrete trade restrictions relating to environment was scattered in a variety of 
general and special laws, for example, the Environmental Protection Law (1989) 
(“EPL”) provides the administrative liability of the importer for transferring dirty 
technology and equipment to China.403  The Law on the Prevention and Control of 
Atmospheric Pollution (2001) and the Law on Prevention and Control of Water 
Pollution (1996) both prohibit the import and use of obsolete equipments and 
technologies.404  
 
Furthermore, a special law may, for the environment and industrial efficiency purposes, 
preclude certain small enterprises from engaging in certain businesses. The rationale 
being that for prescribed pollution intensive industries which are best for unified 
programming and scaled economy, if individual production capacity cannot reach a 
certain level, their accumulated environmental harm shall outweigh the overall 
economic benefits.405  
 
                                                 
403
 Art. 35 of EPL provides that: “Any violator of this Law shall, according to the circumstances of the case, be 
warned or fined by… for any of the following acts: …(4) Importing technology or a facility that fails to meet the 
requirements specified in the state provisions concerning environmental protection; or …(5) Transferring a 
production facility that causes severe pollution for use by a unit that is unable to prevent and control pollution.” 
404
 Art. 35 of the 大气污染防治法 [Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution] (2001) reads: “If 
any unit, manufactures, sells, imports or uses equipment that is prohibited from being manufactured, sold, imported 
or used or employs production techniques that are prohibited from being employed, the competent department … 
shall order to set it right; if the violation is serious, the competent department …shall submit a proposal to the 
people’s government at the same level that it, within the limits of its power authorized by the State Council, order the 
unit to suspend operation or to close down.” 
405
 For example Art. 23 of the 水污染防治法 [Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution] (1996) provides 
that: “The State shall forbid construction of any small enterprises, devoid of measures for prevention and control of 
water pollution that seriously pollute the water environment, such as chemical pulp mills, printing and dyeing mills, 
dyestuff mills, tanneries, electroplating factories, oil refineries and pesticides manufacturers.” 
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In China FIEs are more export-oriented and have their own import and export rights. 
Therefore it is necessary to screen their trading activities to ensure the post-entry DIM 
does not occur through international trade. In 1998, the MOFTEC (now MOFCOM) 
issued a Circular which requires certain imported materials for processing to obtain in 
advance approval by the MOFTEC.406  According to the Circular, contents enlisted 
under the “restricted category” are mainly those which are “liable to cause pollution, 
with narrow international marketability and liable to effect impact on the export of 
commodities for general trade”.407 Although the Circular is addressed to all Chinese 
enterprises, it has direct impact on many FIEs engaging in the processing industries, as 
they need to import substantive raw materials from overseas for processing.  
 
5.2.3 Domestic Trade Laws on the Export of Environmental Sensitive 
Goods 
 
Besides import, Chinese law also imposes EHS requirement on enterprises which export 
industrial products. This has the effect of preventing DIM from China to other countries. 
In the Decree of General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine (2001), the exporting enterprises are classified into first-, second-, and 
third-class. The first-class enterprise was defined as, inter alia, “whose products have 
passed random safety, health, and environmental protection inspections and are proved 
to have met relevant requirements,” and the “pass rate of the yearly block inspection by 
                                                 
406
 See MOFTEC, 对外贸易经济合作部关于印发来料加工装配项目分类指导目录及有关问题的通知 [Circular 
on Printing and Distributing the Catalogue Guide List for the Projects of Processing and Assembling with Materials 
Provided and Relevant Issues] (1998)  (now abolished). 
407
 Id, Art. 5. 
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the inspection and quarantine authority is no lower than 98%.”408 As a general practice, 
the inspection and quarantine authority will conduct random block inspection, or 
inspection for each batch of industrial products to be manufactured by enterprises 
subject to classified administration according to their different classes. Industrial 
products manufactured by enterprises ranked in the first-class will be subject to minimal 
inspection rate while those manufactured by third-class enterprises will be subject to a 
very high rate of block inspection.409 
 
5.2.4 Domestic Law on the Import of Hazardous Waste 
 
The treatment of waste dumping is addressed separately under Chinese law. Liabilities 
from administrative, civil to criminal may be imposed on the offender according to the 
seriousness of its harmful effect.  
 
The Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste 
(1995) is China’s domestic law enacted pursuant to its international obligations under 
the Basel Convention. The law prohibits the import of solid wastes (Art. 24), the import 
of backward equipment and techniques for its treatment (Art. 25, 26), and the re-transfer 
of such equipment / technique within the China territory (Art. 27). According to this law, 
the competent administrative department of environmental protection under the State 
Council shall, in conjunction with the competent administrative department of foreign 
                                                 
408Art. 6 (5) and (7), 国家品质监督检验检疫总局公告[Decree of General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine] (2001). 
409
 Id, Art. 14 reads: “The first-class enterprises: the yearly block inspection rate shall be 5% to 15%; the second-
class enterprises: the yearly block inspection rate shall be 30% to 40%, the third-class … 60% to 100%” . 
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economic relations and trade under the State Council may, from time to time publish 
both positive and negative list to control solid waste from abroad. An example of such 
list is the Notice on Strengthen the Management of Import of Used Mechanical and 
Electrical Products (1997).  In the most serious case, the Criminal Law (1997) provides 
fixed term imprisonment of more than 10 years for importing solid wastes.410  
 
According to the Annual Statistics Reports of Chinese Customs (“ASRCC”) from 1990 
to 1995, China imported a total of 25 million tons of industrial waste, of which 50 
percent came from member countries of OECD, 16 percent came from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Macau and another 34 percent from other regions, 
mostly Eastern Europe. It is important to note that some FIEs in China have been 
directly involved in waste import, processing and disposal.  
 
In one of the reported cases, in January 1997, the Shanghai First Intermediate People’s 
court sentenced William Ping Chen (a U.S. citizen), chairman of a China-U.S. joint 
venture (“Unity Paper Co. Ltd”), to 10 years in prison for dumping foreign waste in 
China.411  Chen was the first person to be held criminally liable since China’s law 
against waste import went into effect in April 1996.412 Wu and Hang (1998) comment 
                                                 
410
 Art. 339 of 刑法 [Criminal Law] (1997) reads: “Whoever, in violation of the regulations of the State, has solid 
waste from abroad dumped, piled up, or treated within the territory of China shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal detention and shall also be fined; if a major environmental 
pollution accident is caused, which leads to heavy losses of public or private property or serious harm to human 
health, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than 10 years and 
shall also be fined; if the consequences are especially serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of 
not less than 10 years and shall also be fined”.  
411
 On 13 Jan. 1997, the First Intermediate Peoples Court of Shanghai City sentenced William Ping Chen, an 
American citizen, to 10 years in imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 yuan for committing a crime of smuggling into 
China 16 containers of wastes, including 238 tons of household wastes and some hospital wastes, both are prohibited 
by Chinese law. William Ping Chen was ordered by the court to be deported. 
412
 固体废物污染环境防治法[Law of People’s Republic of China on Preventing and Controlling Environmental 
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this case as sending “a clear signal to the outside world that China has finally gotten 
serious about ending foreign waste dumping”.413 It can be expected that more effective 
control of DIM in the form of waste dumping can be achieved through the use of law.   
 
5.2.5 Domestic Law on the Transfer of Dirty Production to Suppliers 
 
A critical issue remains as whether China’s trade law has any measure to regulate the 
passive DIM. In a typical passive DIM, foreign trader (or an FIE in China) does not per 
se engage in the dirty production, but leave such dirty production to its Chinese 
suppliers (or partners). The problem arises as whether there is any legal base for holding 
the foreign traders (or FIEs) responsible for their supplier’s environmental damage. This 
argument sounds difficult but the rationale of such regulation is that without the buyers 
creating the market, the suppliers might not have engaged their production in a manner 
which causes damage to human health and environment.  
 
Under Chinese law, in the case the dirty production occurs solely within an FIE in 
China, there is no doubt that the FIE as a whole shall be held accountable for any 
environmental damage attribute to it. However, where the FIEs contract the dirty 
production out to other corporations, there is virtually no way to hold FIEs accountable 
for their suppliers’ misconducts.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
Pollution Caused by Solid Waste] (effective April 1, 1996). 
413
 Changhua Wu and Simon Huang, “The Emerging Nexus of Environment, Development and Human  Rights in 
China: A Case Study of Foreign Waste Dumping” (1998) The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable 
Development Berkeley, California, <http://www.omced.org/cases/case_Wu.pdf> Accessed Jan 14, 2007,  at 9-10. 
 207 
Unfortunately, evidence has shown that passive DIM is rampant in China as a result of 
most foreign traders and FIEs pursuing the lowest purchasing price without 
differentiating their supplier’s environmental performance. This thesis argues that in 
contracting out the dirty production activities; foreign traders hold not only a moral, but 
also potential legal responsibility to take into consideration the environmental 
performance of their suppliers. To illustrate this point, the author compares three 
scenarios and their respective consequence under Chinese law (see Table 14): 
 
Table 14  Legal Scenarios Comparison under the Chinese Law 
Scenario 
 
Victim Legal Consequences 
Buying a car with knowledge 
that it is stolen 
 
 
Owner of the lost property 
Criminal Liability: Criminal 
Law Art. 312414 
Buying a software with 
knowledge that it is faked 
 
Owner of copyright 
Civil Liability with reference 
to: Regulations for Computer 
Software Protection Art. 30415 
Buying from suppliers with 
knowledge they are violating 
the EHS standards 
 
People’s health, safety and the 
environment 
Administrative, Civil or 
criminal liability with 
reference to Criminal Law 
Art. 345 Para 3416 
Prepared by the author according to the Chinese Law 
 
                                                 
414Art. 312 of Criminal Law (supra note 410) reads as: “Whoever, while clearly knowing that it [property] is booty 
obtained through a crime, conceals, transfers, purchases, or sells it for the criminal shall be sentenced to a fixed-
termed imprisonment for no more than three years, criminal detention or public surveillance, and concurrently or 
independently be sentenced to a fine.” 
415Art. 30 of 计算机软件保护条例 [Regulations on Computer Software Protection] (2002) provides that if the 
possessor of the reproduction is unaware or has no reasonable basis to believe that the software infringes the 
copyright of a software product, there is no obligation of damages on him, the legal responsibility of him is to stop 
using and destroy the infringing reproduction.  But if doing so would cause large loss to the user of the reproduction, 
the user of the reproduction, the user of the reproduction could continue using it after paying reasonable licensing 
fees to the copyright owner of the software concerned. 
416
 Art. 345 Para 3 of Criminal Law (supra note 410) stipulates that: “Whoever, for the purpose of profit, illegally 
purchases forest trees which clearly known by him to be cut down or denuded in forest area shall, if the circumstance 
is serious, be sentenced to a fixed term imprisonment of not more than 3 years, criminal detention or public 
surveillance, and concurrently and independently to be sentenced a fine, if the circumstances are especially serious, 
the offender shall be sentenced to a fixed term imprisonment of not less than 3 years and no more than 7 years and 
concurrently and independently to be sentenced a fine.” 
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As can be seen, there is some similarities in the above three scenarios, in all three 
scenarios the buyers are not in good faith and the purchases per se infringe other 
people’s interests. In the third scenario case, the buyer actually contributes to the 
creation of a market which causes damage to other people’s health, safety and the 
environment. 
 
Although there is no direct legal source which catches these buyers. Some related 
provisions under Chinese law which imposes administrative, civil or criminal liability 
on the buyers.417 In the event FIEs bought products that were made in violation of EHS 
laws, they are caught only in special circumstances such as the purchase of illegally cut 
forest (Art. 345 Criminal Law) or hazardous wastes (Art. 339 Criminal Law). Despite 
that the existence of these provisions casts some light on the possible liabilities for 
purchasing “dirty” products, scholars should be careful in extending the above scenarios 
broadly to the general outsourcing activities of FIEs. Currently for purchasers who 
knowingly bought goods and materials whose production process involves excessive 
untreated pollution or other unethical conducts (for example child labor), their potential 
legal responsibility is still insecure.  
 
5.3 Regulation of DIM through Environmental Law 
 
In the environmental law arena, the key in regulating DIM lies in the effective 
regulation of industrial pollution. In China the government’s efforts to control industrial 
                                                 
417
 Supra note 414 to 416. 
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pollution is by adopting industrial pollution control measures through the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (“SEPA”). Generally, the Chinese 
environmental system tackles pollution through measures that reflect both strategic and 
tactical responses. The former involve large-scale centralized facilities that either reduce 
the overall pollution level (e.g. the implementation of district heating schemes in cities 
in the  north  of  the  country)  or  directly  address potential  sources  of  pollution  (e.g.  
centralized sewage  and  solid  waste  treatment  plants).418 These  are  best  suited  to  
cities  and  larger towns,  where  there  are  more  potential  polluters, and  where  
economy  of  scale  benefits  can  be obtained. However, activities that require special 
pollution control  procedures  or  which  are  dispersed, such as township enterprises in 
rural areas, require  different measures  based  on  the  needs of  individual  factories  or  
enterprises. These measures include the raising of environmental standards for newly- 
constructed industrial projects; the phasing out of  polluting  enterprises; and the  
introduction  of pollution charges, etc. 419  In practice, the environmental protection 
bureaus (“EPBs”) at different levels play an essential role by exercising their 
administrative power in granting permits, issuing licenses, monitoring emissions and 
discharges, and collecting discharge fees. 
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Jinnan,  “Environmental  protection  policy  in  a  market  economy” (1999) 环境观察与评论 Huanjing Guancha Yu 
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According to the latest Chinese government White Paper on Environmental Protection 
promulgated in June 2006,420 since 1996, the State has formulated or revised major laws 
on environmental protection. In addition, the State Council has formulated or revised 
over 50 administrative regulations to strengthen environmental protection and relevant 
departments of the State Council, local people’s congresses and local people’s 
governments have, within the limit of their powers, formulated and promulgated over 
660 central and local rules and regulations in order to implement the national laws and 
administrative regulations on environmental protection. 421 Appendix 1 is the author’s 
selected summary on the key sections under environmental laws which covers different 
aspects of the environmental responsibilities of corporations operating in China. (see 
Appendix 1 “Framework of Laws on the Environmental Responsibilities of 
Corporations in China”) Besides, China is a party to more than 50 international treaties 
on environmental protection. 422  These are also important sources of environmental 
regulations for corporations operating in China. 
 
From the policy perspective, the Chinese government has attached great importance to 
environmental protection by setting it as a basic national policy and stressing the 
sustainable development as an important strategy. It was reported that between 1996 
and 2004, China’s investment into pollution control reached 952.27 billion yuan (119 
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billions U.S. dollars), amounting to 1% of that period’s GDP. In 2006, expenditure on 
environmental protection has been formally itemized in the State’s financial budget.423 
In addition, China has clearly set forth its main goals for environmental protection for 
the year 2006-2010 in its 11th Five-Year Program for Economic and Social 
Development. These goals include, for example, to invest a total of RMB 1.4 trillion 
(US$175 billion), equal to 1.5% of the country’s GDP, in environmental protection from 
2006 to 2010,424 to reduce the energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20%, and to 
reduce the total amount of discharged pollutants by 10% by the end of 2010, compared 
with the end of the 10th Five-Year Plan period.425  
 
5.4 Summary of the Chinese Law Review on DIM 
 
China’s FDI reliant and export-oriented economy has caused these two areas of laws to 
undergo very quick development in recent years. The review of these laws for the 
purpose of DIM regulation is therefore necessary. After examining the relevant articles 
under China’s foreign trade, investment, and environmental laws, it is found that special 
environmental requirements on foreign industries concentrate mainly at the entry level. 
Once foreign industries are allowed entry, Chinese laws generally do not impose higher 
environmental regulations on them. China’s membership of the WTO has forced China 
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to, from time to time, re-examine its laws so as to fulfill its ongoing international 
commitments. The reshuffling of Chinese trade and investment laws has direct 
implication on other areas of law, such as the laws on labour and environment. Contrary 
to the common perception that host developing countries usually lag behind in 
formulating environmental standards. The law review suggests that China so far has 
developed a fairly comprehensive legal framework to screen the incoming dirty industry. 
Putting aside other factors, the author finds no evidence that Chinese environmental 
laws and regulations “on paper” are substantially laxer to that of developed countries.  
 
Despite the above, the author holds the view that apparent regulatory gaps still exist 
between China and major developed countries. Such regulatory gap refers not only to 
the gaps in the environmental standards, but also to the ability to coordinating different 
areas of laws to make the regulation of DIM a coherent and integrated system. The 
author analyzes a number of reasons for that: 
 
Firstly, from the legislative perspective, China’s efforts to build a comprehensive 
environmental legal regime are still at a nascent stage. The environmental regulation on 
enterprises is, to some extent, still administrative rather than legal in nature. In some 
domains, statutory gap exist which results in a lack of national-level standards with 
respect to particular activities that have substantial environmental affects. For example, 
China has yet to enact national statutes specifically to address environmental aspects of 
radioactivity, toxic chemicals, and contaminated site cleanup. Sometimes the authorities 
stress a particular problem as a matter of policy, but because there is no law there is no 
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real continuity of approach. Even if laws are available, many statutes simply state that 
certain activities or behaviors should be encouraged or prohibited, without giving any 
details on the targets of regulation, measures for implementation, and liabilities.  
 
In the meantime, in China the interplay between the Party, its ideology and laws and 
institutions is a crucial factor determining the overall framework for environmental 
policy-making. The principle of supremacy of state law as against “edicts, policy 
documents, exhortations of the CPC and orders, directions and instructions of senior 
officials” has not been firmly established. 426   Although there have been verbal 
statements affirming the principles of socialist legality, these have not been fully 
observed in practice.427  The effect of these, as is suggested, “has been to blur the 
distinction between law and policy”.428 Thus, while environmental policy in China is 
supported by an extensive, formal legal framework, policy initiatives can also be 
launched by the CPC or senior officials which affect the actual effectiveness of law. 
 
Further, from the perspective of political will, it is also unclear whether the Chinese 
government considers the DIM problem serious enough for which legal measures 
should be taken. Although the central government has posited environmental objectives 
at the top priority in its national development agenda, various provincial and local 
governments may not posit the environmental issues within their jurisdiction at the 
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same high priority.429 Governments focus on project approvals but fail to put equal 
efforts in monitoring the projects that they approved. Short-sighted economic 
development at the cost of environment is still rampant in China. The decentralization 
and local protectionism have exacerbated such problems.  
 
Finally, from an international perspective, despite the fact that China is party to most 
international environmental treaties, the capacity of international community to 
influence the environmental regulation in China is still limited. Environmental policy in 
China –as in so many other spheres– will continue to be determined by domestic, not 
international, considerations. The next section will discuss these issues in greater details 
from a practical perspective. 
 
5.5 DIM Regulation in Practice 
 
As an indispensable part of studying Chinese law, in order to answer whether Chinese 
environmental laws provide an incentive for foreign dirty industries to migrate there, 
researchers shall not only look at the laws written “on paper”, but also the regulatory 
and legal institutions that create, monitor, and enforce those regulations.430 Previous 
empirical explorations on DIM have primarily focused on differences in the direct 
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compliance costs of environmental regulation—that is, the capital and operating costs of 
installing the control or abatement technologies mandated by the country’s de jure 
regulations and laws. Total compliance costs to the firm, however, shall also cover 
indirect compliance costs associated with the implementation, monitoring, and 
sanctioning of environmental regulations, i.e., regulatory transactionor process costs. 431  
These costs arise from permit applications, preparing environmental assessments, 
assessing and proving compliance, and resolving disputes. This section is a contribution 
to this study. It goes beyond the statutory provisions and studies the practical issues of 
implementing Chinese laws on both pre- and post-entry regulation of DIM.  
 
5.5.1 Practical Issues on the Pre-entry Regulation of DIM 
 
5.5.1.1 Local Government’s Unlawful Approval of Foreign Investment 
Projects 
 
In China the administrative department under the State Council in charge of investment 
approval is the State Development and Reform Commission (“SDRC”). At local level 
the administrative departments in charge of investment includes the local governments’ 
development and reform commissions (“DRC”) and economic and trade commissions 
(“ETC”) with the functions of investment administration as provided by the local 
governments. As a general rule under Chinese FIE laws, foreign investment projects of 
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a scale over US$ 30 million are subject to approval by the SDRC. However in practice, 
local government and foreign investors may wish to get approval at the local level for 
several reasons. First, foreign investors want to speed up the approval process. The 
central government approval usually takes a longer period of time than local approval.  
Second, many pollution intensive foreign investment projects are subject to restrictions. 
If these projects are submitted to the central government for approval, the approval may 
be delayed or even denied. Finally, as an incentive to attract foreign investment, some 
local governments may provide preferential policies to a certain project. However, if the 
project is submitted to the central government, it is likely that the central government 
may refuse to grant these preferential policies.  
 
The capital intensive nature of foreign dirty industries has determined that very often it 
is beyond the local authorities’ power to approve the project. As a result, the local 
government tends to evade central governmental approval with two methods.  
 
The local government may divide one project into several small projects and each 
divided project is below the US$30 million threshold. Regarding this practice in 1995 
the State Council issued the Urgent Circular on Relevant Questions Regarding 
Examination and Approval of Foreign Investment Enterprises, which prohibits such 
division of projects, and stresses that “such approval by local government on smaller 
projects is invalid, the relevant registration and administration authorities should not 
handle any registration procedures for such projects”.432 And the officials who commit 
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the above offences will be disciplined. In the event that these offences are of a serious 
nature, criminal liability may be imposed.  
 
Although the express prohibition against such approval, in practice, the local approval 
authority has substantial discretion and it is often difficult to distinguish whether a 
project should be one project or is divisible into several projects. If an investor intends 
to manufacture two or more related products, these products each could be counted as 
one project. At present, Chinese law does not contain express principles for ascertaining 
whether or not several projects should belong to one project, which makes monitoring 
very difficult. 
 
Alternatively, the local approval organ simply approves foreign investment projects 
which are beyond its power to approve. Chinese central government makes it very clear 
that all approvals exceeding the approval limit of an approval authority are deemed 
invalid. However in practice, if such case was found, the approval authorities usually 
would not force foreign investment projects to leave China. For example, the State 
Council has handled a case in which the Guangzhou municipality exceeded its approval 
authority in order to approve the establishment of an EJV in pollution intensive industry, 
Guangzhou Yamei Polyurethane Co. Ltd. The State Council held that the Guangzhou 
government was erroneous in granting approval of this project because it was an 
investment over US$30 million. However, since a joint venture contract has been signed, 
the State Council decided to uphold the proposal and ordered that the joint venture 
                                                                                                                                               
Council Urgent Circular on Relevant Questions Regarding Examination and Approval of Foreign Investment 
Enterprises] Nov 22, 1995. 
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contract be re-signed and re-approved pursuant to the relevant appropriate 
procedures.433 Therefore in practice, even though a project which exceeds the power of 
local government to approve is caught by upper level authority, the investment is not 
revoked automatically. Foreign dirty industries being wrongfully admitted would 
continue to operate in China.  
 
These two methods provide examples of the gaps between the DIM regulations on 
paper and in practice. Considering the fact that in China the local governments are 
given the mandate to attract a certain level of FDI each year, They do not, however, 
face much countervailing pressure from environmental regulators to invest in pollution 
control equipment and clean manufacturing processes, or to enforce environmental 
regulations.434 Consequently, in practice local governments tend to compete with each 
other by offering incentives such as quick approval of investment projects, waiver of 
environmental impact assessment, government-assisted application for required licenses, 
etc. If these factors are taken into account, then the actual effectiveness of China’s 
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5.5.2 Practical Issues on the Post-entry Regulation of DIM 
 
Foreign industries enter China with the government’s expectation that they shall bring 
benefit to the local economy. As discussed previously, once foreign industries are 
allowed entry, Chinese law generally does not impose a higher environmental standard 
on them. Thus the recognition and enforcement of Chinese domestic laws becomes the 
principal way of post-entry DIM regulation.  
 
It is to be noted that China’s modern legal system draws heavily from the civil-law 
tradition. In this regard, the nature and format of laws in a civil law system have greatly 
influenced the orientation and development of China’s environmental legal system. As 
the most significant feature of this system, adjudications or decisions of courts do not 
set precedent that must be followed by the courts themselves or by other courts. Rulings 
of courts therefore do not meaningfully influence the law, at least with respect to 
environmental issues. Under these circumstances, law enforcement initiatives and 
regulatory community compliance in the area of environmental protection relies almost 
solely on the edicts in various legal norm-setting documents, as well as the scope and 
specificity of such documents.  
 
5.5.2.1 Regulatory Change and Investment Stability 
 
It is generally believed that most MNCs investing in China are caring more about stable 
return than maximal, but risky, gains. In the environmental sphere, probably what is 
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currently at stake in China might not be the trade-off between high levels of incoming 
investment and high environment standard. Rather, empirical evidence indicates that 
foreign industry seemed to be more concerned about the predictability, transparency and 
equal application of environmental regulation rather than the severity of these 
regulations. Regulatory stability is crucial to foreign investment; however, 
environmental regulation in developing and transitional economies is currently one of 
the most unpredictable factors facing potential investors. Eggert (1993) points out that 
the rapidly changing and unpredictable environmental regulatory framework can be a 
disincentive for investors to explore investment opportunities in developing 
countries. 435  Not only do the environmental legislations in these countries change 
rapidly and frequently, they do also have considerable interpretative margin and are 
enforced with varying degrees of zeal. 436  Environmental measures that were not 
anticipated when the investment decision was made may threaten the profitability or 
even the viability of an investment project. Thus, the problem is not that foreign 
investors would not like to adopt high environmental standards—often they already 
adopted higher standards—rather they do not want to be bothered with economic costs 
flowing from regulatory changes that were unanticipated at the time of the investment 
decision. If the potential foreign investor can reasonably forecast changes in 
environmental measures, the investment decision can incorporate expected 
environmental costs to a greater degree. Therefore, the challenge here is for China to 
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strike a balance between continuing to attract investment and progressively upgrading 
domestic environmental protection.  
 
5.5.2.1.1 Investment Stability and Environmental Regulatory Change—Case 
Study of Kodak 
 
In July 1999 the U.S. MNC Eastman Kodak, the largest film seller in China, closed its 
X-ray film plant in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province. The closure is a result of the tightening of 
waste water disposal laws by local government to preserve the Lake Tai nearby. 
According to the spokeswoman of Kodak, such change of law had inflated the plant 
upgrading cost which made the company no longer profitable. The closure decision was 
agreed between the U.S. Eastman Kodak, its local partner and government authorities. 
The closure has caused over 520 Chinese workers to become unemployed. Soon after 
the closure of Kodak Wuxi plant, the manufacturing was shifted to a factory in Shantou, 
where the environmental standards are less stringent.  
 
The above case is representative of the investment disputes between MNCs and Chinese 
government based on environment. By the time Kodak entered into agreement with 
Wuxi government to acquire a state-owned enterprise for the purpose of its 
manufacturing, it relied solely on the government’s guarantees and existing 
infrastructure. It was not expected that regulatory change would come so fast. Now 
Kodak was not only being forced to stop production, but had an obligation to pay the 
dismissal wage of over 500 workers who became unemployed as a result of 
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government’s regulatory change. 437 Had Kodak known the government’s plan earlier, it 
would re-consider the investment decision. From another perspective, the Kodak’s 
decision to close the plant partially evidences the significant environmental cost 
previously saved by Kodak if not requested to move. Kodak certainly had calculated the 
cost of upgrading the existing infrastructure and feels such cost offset their expected 
gain in the next a few years before it made the decision to relocate. 
 
Based on experience, it is possible to obtain local approval of sub-standard procedures 
or facilities. This, however, is not a reliable strategy. Choosing a location with looser 
standards may just be delaying what will need to be done later. The problem, however, 
can be at least partially avoided through more careful environmental planning, both on 
the side of local government and foreign investors. 
 
The more careful environmental planning can be achieved, for instance, by using the 
following scheme: the authorities, both national and local, draw up environmental 
policy plans that cover a reasonable period such as five years; these environmental 
policy plans outline the options that the authorities intend to pursue and are published; 
the potential foreign investor will start negotiations on the basis of this plan, and make 
its decision accordingly. The environmental policy plan would be incorporated in the 
investment agreement as an annex; and the contracting parties could stipulate that 
within the ambit of the policy plan, such as the five years after the signing of investment 
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agreement, the authorities commit themselves not to substantially deviate, and if so 
deviate only on a non-discriminatory basis, from the policy plan. Such a scheme would 
not only provide legal certainty, but also allow an arbitrator to define a reasonable 
standard with greater ease. Finally, because the lifetime of many investment agreements 
exceeds five years, the investment agreement could include a re-negotiation clause, 
stipulating that the agreement will be opened for re-negotiation in order to adapt it to 
new environmental policy plans. Such a mechanism seems to be a practicable means of 
reconciling investment stability and environmental regulatory change.  
 
5.5.2.2 Dual Standard of Treatment 
 
The other challenge which faces foreign investors is the often differing treatment 
standards that Chinese officials accorded to FIEs as compared to domestic companies. 
Although in principle FIEs face the same environmental laws and regulations that apply 
to domestic enterprises, in practice many foreign companies complain that they face 
more-rigorous enforcement of environmental legislation than do China’s domestic 
companies, especially State-Owned Enterprises (“SOE”). Take the EIA requirement as 
an example, it is not always imposed on those industries that are owned by the local 
government, but it will invariably be imposed on joint ventures and private businesses.  
 
The reasons for this dual standard in practice are multi-faced: First, under the current 
system, the government is, in many situations, both the owner of the principal polluter 
and the environmental regulator. As a result, it is often difficult for regulators to carry 
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out objective reviews on the actions of state entities, or to take opposing positions. 438  
Second, part of the reason behind such due treatment seems to be the government’s 
rationale that those foreign corporations are equipped and have the finance to handle 
environmental issues. As such, they deserve to be scrutinized more closely and are held 
more liable for their activities than locally owned enterprises. SOEs, by contrast, 
generally lagged behind in both financial resources and environmental regulation, thus 
an equally rigorous enforcement of environmental regulations on them is potentially 
devastating to the already-shaky sector. And finally, it is probably undeniable that in 
reality, SOEs are too well connected with local authorities to face strict requirements on 
a level anywhere near the ones placed on FIEs.439  
 
Despite that trends on unifying treatment standards have been progressed slowly, it will 
unlikely to be eliminated until the SOEs have indeed reformed themselves into 
corporate bodies absent of state protectionism. In summary, the dual standard of 
treatment does not incur additional environmental cost of FIEs, as full compliance with 
Chinese law is the obligation of any corporations operating in China, but increases the 
FIE’s sense of unfairness, which in turn “chills” FIE’s initiatives to enhance or even 
sustain their existing environmental standards. 
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5.5.2.3 Regional Variations  
 
Probably what puzzles foreign investors most is the regional variations in the 
environmental requirement on foreign investment. Apart from environmental laws and 
regulations from the central government, there are hundreds of regulations, 
administrative orders, decrees, and policy documents at regional level. It can be 
expected that a total grasp on the scope and nature of local environmental requirements 
could be very difficult. A mere understanding on the regional differences on 
environmental requirements can substantially increase the research cost of investors. 
  
Not only do laws and regulations vary from region to region, they are also implemented 
without uniform strength. Most laws establish broad regulatory goals and then leave 
substantial regulatory discretions to administrative agencies at local level. In China the 
EPBs are dependent upon local governments for their source of funding and 
appointment of personnel. It is not surprising that several  EPBs in wealthy areas with 
such as Hangzhou, Shanghai and Dalian have reputations for keeping a local 
environmental standards that are significantly stricter than the national standards, while 
other sites of China may compromise human health and environmental standards in 
exchange for jobs and investments. Thus the key to understand regional variation in 




It was suggested that the independence of EPBs shall first be achieved before the 
enforcement of environmental law can be anywhere similar to the application of other 
areas of Chinese law. In an effort to address this, a significant campaign by SEPA, 
currently being reviewed by the State Council, is to strengthen the authority of local 
EPBs and bring them to a position in parallel to local government departments. Under 
this proposal, local EPBs will continue be “horizontally” responsible to local 
governments that will fund them and take leadership roles in overall local 
environmental quality and administration. However, greater “vertical” control over 
local EPBs will be given to higher-level EPBs, and ultimately controlled by SEPA. This 
restructuring shall include the integration of all local environmental departments, 
including pollution control, ecological protection, environmental education and 
publicity departments. 
 
5.5.2.4 Conflict of Interest 
 
The enforcement of environmental law is an area that involves substantial conflict of 
interests. To mention just a few, often the local environmental protection authorities 
have a direct interest in the financial health of local enterprises. They do not wish to see 
polluting enterprises bankrupt or moved away as a result of their environmental 
pressure. They are as much concerned with securing an income from the fines as they 
are with protecting the environment.440 Moreover, there is evidence that sometimes the 
income from the fines is filtered off for personal gain. For example, some local 
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environmental officials are associated with private companies to provide environmental 
services. When foreign investors apply to the local EPB for the environmental side 
approval of their projects, they are often instructed to hire designated private companies 
in association with the EPB to conduct the EIA and other environment-related work. If 
foreign investors refuse, then their application may be delayed of approval for several 
months. The existence of such practices discredits the image of the environmental 
protection authorities on foreign investors, and sometimes unduly increases foreign 
investor’s cost of investment in China.  In summary, the environmental regulations in 
China are still very much seen as a matter of policy—which is variable and 
ambiguous—rather than law.  
 
5.6 Remedies and Legal Techniques 
 
The de facto costs of compliance depend also on the probability that noncompliance 
will be detected and sanctioned. The costs for potential EHS lawsuit in the host states 
may serve as an important determinant for the DIM of multinationals. That is the reason 
of this section’s study on the environmental dispute settlement in China. Once dispute 
arises, victims of environmental harm shall learn to utilize available resources under 
Chinese law to protect their legitimate interests and probably, seek remedies. 
Meanwhile, FIEs that engaged in dirty industries in China shall also be aware of the 
stance taken by the Chinese court in order to deal with the environmental related claims 
against them. In China, a comprehensive and effective array of legal sanctions to FIE 
should include three elements: (1) administrative measures, such as fees, fines, licensing 
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requirements and orders to take or refrain from taking specified actions, (2) civil 
liability to compensate for damage or injury to victims; and (3) criminal liability, to be 
applied sparingly as circumstances require.  
 
5.6.1 Administrative Proceedings 
 
Very often foreign companies’ eagerness to invest is dampened by the difficulties of 
doing business in China. One of the most significant of these difficulties has been the 
extensive and ad hoc intervention by the State in foreign investment projects. Various 
national and local departments, and even domestic joint venture partners, are all in 
positions to oversee, interfere with, and sometimes impede FIEs’ activities. FIEs in 
China often complain about getting bound in situations such as a bureaucratic agency 
has changed its position on a particular matter, or another agency with claimed 
jurisdiction has stepped in, etc, which translates into additional costs. Although the 
overreaching regulation is not a problem unique to China, such problem is more acute 
in China as a state undergoing transition from a planned to a market economy. 
 
In the Kodak case previously discussed, 441 Kodak suffered great loss for the closure of 
its plant only after one year of manufacturing. In the end Kodak did not resort to 
litigation, perhaps because it either doubted its chances of winning such a case in a 
Chinese court or wanted to preserve important relationships necessary for the joint 
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venture’s future success. The question remains, however, whether Kodak would have 
had any remedies under PRC law if such claim is brought to the court. 
As a procedural matter, before bringing an administrative case, according to the China’s 
Administrative Review Law (1999), a party (including FIE) that has been fined or 
unduly treated may appeal to an environmental organ at one level higher than the 
decision-maker,442 alternatively it can apply for review of the administrative decision by 
the court. 443  
 
The basic principle of administrative agency liability was first recognized in the 1982 
amendment to the PRC Constitution, which provides that “citizens who have suffered 
losses through infringement of their civic rights by any state organ or functionary have 
the right to compensation in accordance with the law”444. Similarly in the General 
Principles of Civil Law, it was provided that the state can incur liability to citizens or 
entities: “If a state organ or an employee of a state organ in the execution of his duties 
violates the lawful rights or interests of a citizen or legal person and causes damage to 
be sustained.”445  
 
While the general principles have established the right to sue the government, it was the 
passage of the Administrative Procedure Law (“APL”) in 1989 that rendered the right 
more concrete. The APL allows a “citizen, legal person or other entity” (including an 
FIE or foreign entity) to bring suit in a people’s court where such entity believes that its 
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“legal rights or interests” have been violated as a result of a “concrete administrative 
act.”446  
 
The APL is significant in that it provides FIEs with a concrete legal means to resist 
bureaucratic overreaching and challenge intrusive agency actions, especially since 
China does not formally advocate the idea of “indirect takings” based on environmental 
regulatory change. A study on the provisions and cases under the APL therefore 
provides useful guidance on how this law can be employed by FIEs to seek remedies 
from bureaucratic interference by the government.  
 
5.6.1.1 Proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Law 
 
As a general principle, the APL does not permit a plaintiff to challenge the inherent 
validity of so-called “abstract” regulations and rules under which a particular 
administrative act is implemented. More precisely, Article 12 provides that a court shall 
not hear a case if it “involves” or “raises”, inter alia, “administrative regulations or 
rules or decisions and decrees with normal binding force which are formulated and 
issued by administrative organs.” Thus, a general decision by the State Council, for 
example, to empower a local government to construct certain project may not be 
reviewed, even if such decision causes loss to the FIE.447 This position is different from 
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 Art. 2.行政诉讼法 [Administrative Procedure Law] (effective Apr 4, 1989) (PRC). 
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that of the U.S., where a U.S. citizen can not only demand the enforcement of an 
environmental statute even when the government has determined that the statute does 
not apply to the circumstances, but also use environmental statutes to block projects that 
have been proposed or approved by the government.448  Instead, in China only “specific 
decisions” may be reviewed under Article 11 of APL which include: “pollution fines 
imposed by an environmental protection body; refusal by a relevant governmental 
agency to issue emissions licenses; refusal to allow operation of a company on the 
ground that it has failed to install equipment necessary for pollution prevention or 
recycling; harm or losses caused as a result of maladministration, and failure to fulfill 
statutory obligations”.449 
 
Under the APL, for an administrative agency’s concrete act to be upheld as “legal” by 
the court, the agency must not only comply with the letter of the regulation it is 
enforcing or which enables it to act; it must also fulfill the other requirements contained 
in Article 54, namely the “compliance with legal procedure, basic fairness, and proper 
use of authority.”450 Under Article 54, a court must order the “withdrawal” or “partially 
withdrawal” of an administrative act and order reconsideration if there is “violation of 
legal procedure.” Conversely, the APL dictates that a judgment should be upheld if 
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sufficient evidence supports the action, the correct laws were applied, and proper legal 
procedure was satisfied. 
 
5.6.1.2 Procedural Fairness under Chinese Law 
 
A fundamental question raised by these provisions is what constitutes “legal procedure”. 
The concept of procedural fairness is in its infancy in China. Traditionally, the “focus 
[of administrative law in China] was state-centric, emphasizing substantive authority, 
rather than procedural protection for subjects of that authority” 451 , and the courts 
themselves are not known for their procedural niceties. More generally, procedural 
requirements are perhaps (though not necessarily) less likely to be respected when “law 
itself is regarded primarily as a policy tool.”452  
 
Nonetheless, while the APL itself does not specify what the proper procedure is, there 
are three primary sources of law that Chinese courts rely upon for the determination of 
procedural correctness. They are specific procedural requirements contained in the 
relevant operative law, general statutory procedural requirements, and independent non-
statutory principles of fairness. 
 
Courts will look at firstly any specific procedural requirements stated in the particular 
law or regulation under which an administrative agency was acting. For instance, in one 
reported case under the APL, an Intermediate People’s Court in Fujian Province 
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reversed the decision of the lower court on the ground that the statutorily prescribed 
procedure had not been followed. 453  The plaintiff, a traffic engineering team, had 
lawfully procured the three-year right to excavate grit from a specified portion of the 
Nan Pu Xi River. During the term of the license, the new Water Law went into effect.454 
Under this new statute—which replaced the old regime under which the plaintiff had 
obtained its license—the county Water Conservancy and Electric Power Bureau (the 
defendant) granted rights to third parties to excavate in the same area. At the same time, 
the plaintiff had applied to the defendant for supplemental approval under the new 
regime as was contemplated in the Water Law and implementing regulations thereunder. 
The defendant, however, “made neither a decision to grant nor to refuse approval”. 455 
The court read the approval application provisions which require that the relevant 
agency respond to an application in some manner (whether affirmatively or negatively) 
within a prescribed period of time. Furthermore, the court found that the excavation 
rights held by the third parties had not been properly granted, as they had only been 
approved by the defendant Bureau and not by additional departments from which the 
law requires approval. Partially on these procedural bases, the appellate court found that 
the defendant had committed an “administrative infringement” 456 . Accordingly, it 
reversed the lower court’s decision for the defendant Bureau and ordered it to 
compensate the plaintiff’s direct economic losses. 
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This case is only one of several “reported” cases demonstrating the willingness of some 
courts to enforce the specified administrative procedure. The explicit procedural 
requirements of a government agency’s operative regulation thus provide at least some 
protection to affected enterprises. Nonetheless, laws and regulations under which 
administrative agencies act often contain minimal and vague procedural requirements, if 
they include any at all. Thus it makes foreign investors difficult to rely solely on an 
agency’s own operative regulations. 
 
In addition to an agency’s organic or enabling statute, the second source to which courts 
might look for procedural requirements is the Administrative Penalty Law (1996). 
(“Penalty Law”) 457 This law provides fairly detailed, generally applicable procedural 
requirements for the imposition of “administrative penalties,” which are defined as 
“warnings, fines, confiscation of unlawfully acquired or illegal property, orders for 
cessation of production and business operations, suspension or cancellation of permits 
or licenses, administrative detention, or other administrative punishments specified by 
laws and regulations”458.  
 
According to the Penalty Law, before any agency imposes an administrative penalty, it 
must notify the affected party of the facts at issue, as well as the reasons and legal basis 
for the penalty. Where more serious penalties are at issue, the alleged wrongdoer is 
guaranteed a formal hearing. The hearing must be conducted openly (with certain 
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exceptions) and with certain other procedural safeguards.459 Some of these procedural 
requirements have been made more specific by local legislation. 460  The general 
procedural guidelines of the Penalty Law have been paralleled by specification of 
proper procedures for fee or fine collection. To combat the long-standing problem of 
improper requests for fees and widespread corruption among officials, a number of 
localities require that detailed procedures be followed in fee collection. 461  These 
procedures were adopted at the national level in July 1997, when the State Council 
passed the Decision on Controlling the Problem of Arbitrary Collection of Fees, Fines, 
and Various Types of Charges from Enterprises.462  
 
The third source which the court may rely upon is the independent non-statutory 
principles of fairness. Article 54 of the APL allows a court to review administrative 
penalties for “basic unfairness”, even if the penalty imposed is within the discretion 
conferred on the administrative agency. If a penalty is “clearly shown” to “lack 
impartiality,” the court must order an amendment. 463  For instance, if a local 
environmental protection bureau had discretion to impose a penalty ranging from RMB 
1,000 (US$125) to RMB 30,000 (US$3,750) for polluting, imposition of the maximum 
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fine for a minor offense would be actionable under the APL. This protection is an 
important potential check on administrative agencies’ ability either to harass an 
enterprise (whether FIE or domestic) or simply to generate revenue through 
disproportionate fines. 
 
5.6.1.3 Conclusion on the Administrative Actions against Government 
Agencies 
 
Having reviewed the measures available to FIEs to legally resist bureaucratic 
overreaching, in practice few FIEs utilize APL to protect their private interests.464The 
extra-legal barriers that refraining FIEs from bringing such law suits can be grouped in 
two interrelated categories: (1) courts’ inability and unwillingness to accept jurisdiction 
in administrative cases and assert their de jure power against administrative organs; and 
(2) wronged FIEs’ unwillingness to challenge administrative actions in court. At their 
most fundamental level, both of these barriers stem from the same problem—Chinese 
courts’ lack of independence from the government.  
 
Despite of the fact that the Constitution guarantees the independency of judiciary,465 
and the central government had initiated efforts to strengthen judiciary independence, in 
                                                 
464The author is not aware of any government statistics on the number of cases filed by FIEs of foreign entities under 
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465Art. 126 of the Constitution of PRC (2004) reads: “the people’s courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise 
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reality the judiciary continues to serve in part a policy-implementing function.466 Courts 
continue to depend on government and the Party departments for personnel, financial 
resource and material backup. In addition, China’s judiciary has been plagued by poorly 
educated and corrupted judges, though the quality of judges has been improving. The 
lack of institutional power and independence has at least two ramifications for the 
courts’ role in the judicial review of administrative actions:  
 
First, courts are susceptible to pressure from administrative agencies. As a result of this 
pressure, courts in turn frequently pressure plaintiffs to drop a suit or reach a 
compromise settlement with the administrative agency involved. Statistics showed that 
in recent years over fifty percent of administrative cases under the APL have been 
withdrawn by plaintiffs.467 It must at least raise the concern that many of these cases 
were withdrawn because of pressure from political or administrative departments or the 
courts. Even if a court rules against an administrative agency, it does not follow that the 
agency will comply with the judicial order.468  
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The second reason for the rarity of such case is the FIE’s unwillingness to challenge 
administrative actions in court. Firstly, as discussed above, a foreign investor may 
question the ability of Chinese court to render a fair or effectual decision. Second, given 
the extent to which a successful investment will depend on good relations with the local 
and national bureaucracy, a foreign company may be reluctant to pursue litigation 
against them. In fact, despite the substantial number of cases brought each year against 
PRC administrative agencies, no comprehensive statistics are available indicating the 
number of administrative suits filed by foreign investors or their local investment 
entities.  
 
To summarize, the existing laws and regulations on administrative agency liability, 
notably the Administrative Procedure Law and Administrative Penalty Law do provide 
the framework for FIEs to legally resist bureaucratic interferences. These laws, if 
applied properly, have the potential to offer significant protection to foreign investors. 
Despite this, there is currently no substantive administrative law that involves action 
which does not result in formal penalties but may amount to an indirect taking on 
private rights and interests. At the same time, China still lacks sufficient administrative 
procedure law that provides procedural requirements for all agency action, nor is the 
court sufficiently attuned to legal procedure in deciding administrative cases—though 
increasing attention has been paid on procedural requirements. Finally, there are serious 
extra-legal barriers which impede proper use of available legal remedies. On the whole, 
courts lack the institutional power to make a judicial review system truly effectual. 
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Potential litigants, in turn, are often wary of bringing suits to challenge bureaucratic 
interference in their affairs. 
 
5.6.2 Civil Proceedings—Environmental Dispute Resolution between 
Private Parties 
 
This section primarily examines the methods for resolving disputes between the FIE 
polluters and victims of pollution in China with an aim to assessing the effectiveness of 
those methods in resolving disputes and addressing the civil wrongs suffered by victims 




In China when an environmental dispute arises, it is most common for parties to first 
negotiate. Negotiation occurs prior to the more formal administrative or judicial 
proceedings, but remains available to the parties in dispute even after the initiation of 
the judicial process.469 Where a polluting FIE takes the initiative to settle a dispute at an 
early stage, negotiation proves to be both effective and efficient. Although negotiation 
is probably the most speedy, flexible, and inexpensive way of resolving environmental 
dispute if the two parties are willing to reach compromise, it also has its own 
shortcomings. According to Chen and Ma (2000), there is a high moral risk as the 
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unequal bargaining power of the two parties may lead to a negotiation result that is 
lacking in justice and fairness.470 It is not unusual that the stronger party may offer some 
money in exchange for the victims’ acceptance of pollution. Without sufficient 
knowledge of the law or proper legal assistance, the victims tend to settle at an amount 
that is far less than the proper compensation. In practice, negotiation sometimes 




The next dispute resolution method is mediation. It has been a primary method of 
resolving disputes in both traditional and contemporary China. It differs from 
negotiation in that mediation is conducted with a third party serving as a facilitator. The 
mediator normally has no legal authority to impose a decision. The specific role of a 
mediator is determined by the particular needs of the parties and their representatives. 
Depend on who plays the role of a mediator, mediation practiced in China can be 
divided into people’s mediation, administrative mediation and judicial mediation, 
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5.6.2.2.1 People’s Mediation 
 
People’s mediation is carried out with a mediator who has no administrative or judicial 
function. In the context of environmental disputes, people’s mediation is mainly 
restricted to the resolution of disputes arising between township or community 
enterprise and their neighboring residents over the nuisance generated by the 
manufacturing and / or operation process.471 According to the Several Provisions on 
Trying Civil Cases Concerning People’s Mediation Agreements issued by the Supreme 
Court in 2002, the settlement agreement reached with the facilitation of people’s 
mediation committees and bearing the signature or chop of the disputing parties are 
treated as civil contracts. Neither party may modify or repudiate the settlement 
agreement (Art.1). Further, the people’s courts are required to accept the case where one 
party tries to enforce the performance of a settlement agreement in court (Art.2).  
 
5.6.2.2.2 Administrative Mediation 
 
The dispute resolution of environmental administrative mediation is created pursuant to 
Art. 41.2 of the EPL. 472  The administrative mediation, carried out by relevant 
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administrative bodies upon the request of either or both parties to a dispute, helps the 
parties to reach an agreement on the rights and obligations of each party.  
 
In practice, the EPBs at various levels have played a major role in resolving 
environmental disputes. 473  With the technical expertise and familiarity with the 
regulated industry as a result of exercising their administrative power in granting 
permits, issuing licenses, monitoring emissions and discharges, and collecting discharge 
fees, the local EPBs are in the best position to resolve disputes at an early stage, which 
has the additional benefit of minimizing potential loss and achieving harmony in the 
community. In China, victims of environmental pollution tend to place their trust in the 
local EPBs. Often the local EPBs not only resolve disputes by conducting investigation 
and making mediation proposals, but also engage in educating the disputants on the 
relevant environmental laws and regulations. 
 
Despite the obvious advantage of administrative mediation by EPBs in resolving 
environmental disputes, unfortunately very often EPBs do not always make themselves 
readily available to resolve disputes for pollution victims. There is a demonstrated 
reluctance by these administrative bodies to provide assistance in resolving 
environmental disputes between two private parties. There could be a number of 
reasons for such administrative inaction. First, the lack of human or financial resources 
allocated for resolving the environmental disputes within EPBs, which has been 
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discussed above. Second, the outcome of such administrative process lacks binding 
force on parties. The dissatisfying party may simply ignore the mediation agreement, if 
there is one at all. That leads to the perception by many EPBs that administrative 
mediation in many cases is a waste of time and their very limited resources. 
Consequently, many environmental administrative bodies are inclined to view the 
carrying out mediation to resolve civil environmental disputes not as part of their 
statutory duties, but an extra burden. They’d rather focus on the exercise of the 
enforcement powers as regulators, i.e. granting or revoking permits, issuing licenses, 
imposing fines as well as collecting charges.474 This undermines the actual effectiveness 
of administrative mediation available to the parties. 
 
5.6.2.2.3 Judicial Mediation 
 
The difference between judicial mediation and people’s or administrative mediation is 
that judicial mediation is conducted either before or during the trial while people’s or 
administrative mediations are extra-judicial in nature. The Chinese courts may conduct 
mediation not only at first instance, but also in the appellate procedure. In judicial 
mediation, once a settlement agreement is reached between the two parties, the court 
will prepare a mediation report, which is signed by the judges and clerks, chopped with 
the courts’ seal and delivered to the parties.475 It has the same legal force as a judicial 
judgment of the court. Such settlement agreements can then be enforced by the court if 
either party fails to perform its obligations under the agreement.  




 Art. 89 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 392. 
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Although the judicial mediation is proved to be an efficient method for resolving 
disputes even in judicial process, it is also criticized for its inherent difficulties. First, 
despite the “voluntary” nature of judicial mediation, it may become equivalent to “lack 
of coercion” in practice.476 What usually happens is that the judge or the collegial bench 
would propose one or more mediation agreements and persuade, guide or even 
“educate” the parties to accept the contents of the agreement. Many disputants would 
reluctantly give up their rights, and accept the mediation agreement under the pressure. 
In addition, the combination of the role of mediator and adjudicator within one single 
judge raises valid concern over whether justice can be done when the adjudicator, who 
has already expressed his views and position as a mediator, renders a judgment after the 
mediation fails. Further, judicial mediation, as part of the civil procedure conducted by 
court, lacks any formal procedural requirements that bind the judges. In practice, the 
judges enjoy significant discretion in deciding when to conduct mediation and when to 
shift to adjudication. There could be no prior notice to the disputants of the 
commencement of the adjudication procedure, leaving room for some judges to engage 
in misconduct of rendering judgment based on “personal relationships”.477 Last but not 
least, lower court judges are sometimes reluctant to apply the law because of 
insufficient legal knowledge. They prefer to rely on inter-personal skills rather than 
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legal analysis in resolving disputes. Some courts even use mediation as stalling 
tactics.478 
 
5.6.2.3 Environmental Civil Litigation 
 
If negotiation and mediation all fail, then the next only available remedy for the victims 
of environmental harm is environmental litigation. In China, environmental litigation is 
still very much underdeveloped. Although averagely there are more than 200,000 
environment disputes in a year, only a few of them end up in court. Some are settled by 
administrative measures, but most are not settled at all, with pollution victims suffering 
silently. Most victims, who are farmers, fishermen and urban residents, do not have the 
legal, technological or financial resources to go to court. 
 
Although litigation is often cumbersome and costly, it does serve and essential function 
in the environmental dispute resolution process. Litigation can help improve 
environmental law making. According to Dinkins (1984), litigation is an important tool 
to sharpen the language of legal requirements and to define more clearly the respective 
rights and responsibilities of parties under the law.479 Whether the legislative provisions 
are effective or not can only be proved by applying them in practice. When the 
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disputing parties argue in court and debate over the application and interpretation of the 
law, it becomes possible to detect the gaps, loopholes and contradictions in the existing 
law. As a method of settling environmental disputes, litigation produces far more 
significant impact than negotiation or mediation on the society as a whole.480  
 
In addition, litigation creates ripple effects that help raising public awareness. When 
pollution victims are compensated through judicial process and their stories are reported 
by media, other victims become aware of their environmental rights and feel 
encouraged to take legal actions to assert their rights.  
 
Litigation also creates pressure on the polluting industries, whether they are foreign or 
domestically owned. In China, enterprises are, at best, concerned only with the 
compliance with administrative regulations and standards. Most are not serious about 
the consequence of their polluting activities because the current legal mechanisms do 
not seem to hold them fully liable for the pollution caused and the resultant loss 
suffered by the victims, as long as their pollutants discharge does not exceed what is 
prohibited by law. Only when the victims can shift the cost of pollution to the polluters 
through litigation will there be a clear and strong warning to other potential offenders 
that pollution prevention needs to be taken seriously. 
 
                                                 
480
 According to Zhao, legislation at best is often imprecise. Legislators produce laws in a climate of competing 
interests where conflict is ultimately forged into compromise. The resulting legislative documents often contain 
ambiguities, irreconcilable provisions and indefinite standards. The litigation helps not only to test the law, but 
exposes policy makers openly and substantively to the defects or problems of existing environmental law and its 
implementation. Zhao, supra note 5 at 175. 
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In environmental litigations, the victims (plaintiffs) typically seek an injunction, an 
order for the removal of pollutants, or damages in compensation from the polluter 
(including FIEs) who caused harm to human health and environment. Unlike the tort 
based environmental liability regime under common law system, in China the 
environmental damage cases are under national civil liability scheme.481 The General 
Principles of Civil Law provides a number of environmentally related provisions. In the 
section of the law dealing with personal rights, it is provided that civil liability will arise 
if damage is caused by hazardous operations—such as those involving the use of high 
pressure, high voltage, combustibles, explosives, highly toxic or radioactive 
substances,482 or where damaging pollution occurs in violation of the state provisions on 
environmental protection and pollution prevention. 483  Besides, provisions on civil 
liability for environmental damage are included in the major environmental statutes as 
well as hundreds of EHS regulations. 
 
5.6.2.3.1 Fault-based Liability and Strict Liability for Environmental Damage 
 
Most modern environmental liability regimes include liability not only for unlawful 
activities but also for activities which, although carried out lawfully, nevertheless cause 
damage to the environment (and/or to persons or property). This is particularly 
                                                 
481
 As China is not a common law country, past judicial decisions do not have precedential value for either FIEs or 
domestic entities. But see Nanping Liu, “Legal Precedents with Chinese Characteristics: Published Cases in the 
Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court” (1991) 5 J. Chinese L. 107, at 107-08  (noting that, despite common 
scholarly opinion that published Chinese decisions do not carry precedential weight, “decisions reported in the 
[Supreme People's Court] Gazette may shape the development of the law by providing “guidance” to lower courts in 
adjudicating cases with similar factual situations or with similar issues of law”). 
482
 Art. 123, General Principles of Civil Law, supra note 366. 
483
 Id, Art. 124. 
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important in the case of hazardous activities or operations using hazardous substances. 
For FIEs involved in such productions in China, it is important to understand whether 
their liability for environmental damage is a strict (“no fault”) or fault-based liability. 
 
Fault-based liability is more commonly accepted common law jurisdictions (e.g. the 
U.K. and U.S.), but is also used in combination with strict liability in many other 
countries. Even in those countries where fault-based environmental liability used to be 
common, there is a tendency to introduce strict liability for dangerous activities and 
substances. For example civil law countries such as EU member states have all 
subscribed to regional treaties which set environmental liability regimes that are based 
on strict liability for damage.484  
 
Chinese law seems to adopt a hybrid of the two. The types of damage covered in its 
environmental liability regimes include: personal injury; damage to private property; 
economic loss; and damage to the “un-owned” environment. Among all these 
environmental damage, strict liability is generally limited to those operations or sectors 
governed by specific rules. In the strict liability regime, there is no need to prove fault 
on the part of the person who caused the damage. The victim only needs to show the 
damage and prove the causal link between the act and the damage. By contrast, the 
                                                 
484
 For a trend of EU on environmental civil liability, see The Maastricht Treaty (1992) 31 I.L.M. 247  (requiring EU 
to have a policy to protect the environment), the “Fifth Environmental Action Program” (committing the EU to 
introducing civil liability at the EU level for the year 2000), the resolution of the EU council in February 1993 
(committing the EU to the rapid implementation of the measures agreed at Rio in June 1992, including Principle 13 
of the Rio Declaration which requires the development of environmental liability.) and the Lugano Convention on 
Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment under the auspices of the 
Council of Europe and adopted in March 1993. 
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successful establishment of a fault-based liability must fulfill three essential elements, 
i.e. the proof of fault (negligent act or omission); damage; and causation. 
 
In a fault-based regime of liability arising out of FIE’s dirty production, the proof of 
fault (intention or negligence) can be difficult for plaintiffs to establish. It is because the 
victim is not often in a position to prove the fault of polluter, and he does not have 
specific knowledge of the relevant technological processes or the effects of the 
substances involved. It is the operator who is in the best position to carry out the 
appropriate risk assessment and management activities related to his operations. To 
address this difficulty, the courts often apply a combination of “reasonable man’s 
test”485 and “foreseeability test”486 for the determination of fault. In practice, there is a 
strong link between fault-based liability and environmental regulations. The standards 
and procedures laid down in environmental statutes provide guidance for a reasonable 
person’s behavior under the circumstances. Compliance with the then prevailing laws 
thus indicates that an enterprise’s behavior was reasonable; non-compliance thus 
provides prima facie evidence of fault.  
 
Other than fault, the proof of causation is also difficult for plaintiffs. The plaintiff must 
prove that the alleged fault by the defendant (either an unreasonable conduct, or lack of 
due care) is the direct cause for his damage. Often the establishment of causation 
                                                 
485
 “The reasonable man test” generally means the court will ask what a reasonable operator would act in the like 
circumstances. 
486
 “Foreseeability” generally refers to the duty of operator to act with reasonable prudence under the circumstances 
and anticipate the consequences of one’s acts and missions. In taking the foreseaability test the court will take into 
account customary industry practices at the time. In general, something is foreseeable if it is something that other 
persons / operators involved in similar activities would have foreseen under similar circumstance. 
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requires not only factual but also scientific evidence, which is beyond an ordinary 
person’s ability to collect. In view of this reality, China has adopted the principle to 
reverse the burden of proof in environmental litigation. The 1992 Supreme People’s 
Court’s Opinion on Certain Issues on the Application of Civil Procedure Law mandates: 
“in action for compensation as a result of environmental pollution, if the defendant 
objects to the tortuous allegations of the plaintiff, the defendant bears the burden of 
proof”487. Thus, a party undertaking environmentally hazardous activities will be first 
presumed to be liable for damage caused by such activities, unless it can prove that its 
activities are not the cause of damage, or all proper measures have been taken at the 
appropriate time to prevent damage.488 
 
Civil actions leading to environmental problems are processed under the Civil 
Procedure Law (1991) and are handled by the civil chambers of the people’s courts. 
The General Principles of Civil law (1986) provides in its Art. 124 and 134 the right for 
any enterprise or individual to apply to the courts for an order requiring the polluter to 
remove the source of pollution and pay damages. Given that an environmental related 
accident often involves large number of victims, Article 55 of the Civil Procedure Law 
apparently encourages victims to bring “class actions” against polluters.489 In other parts 
                                                 
487
 Art. 74, 最高人民法院关于适用民事诉讼法若干问题的意见 [Supreme People’s Court’s Opinion on Certain 
Issues on the Application of Civil Procedure Law] (effective July 14, 1992) (PRC). 
488
 Palmer, Michael, “Environmental Regulation in the People’s Republic of China: the Face of Domestic Law” in 
Richard Louis Edmonds (ed.) Managing the Chinese Environment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
489
 Art. 55 of Civil Procedure Law (1991) provides that:  “When one party or both parties consist of two or more 
persons, the object of action is the same or of the same category and the people’s court considers that, subject to the 
consent of the parties, the lawsuit can be tried together, a joint lawsuit shall be constituted” (Art. 53), and “With 
respect to a case in which the object of action is of the same category and one party is numerous and of an uncertain 
number upon institution of the lawsuit, the people’s court may issue a public notice, stating the particulars and claims 
of the case and informing claimants to file at the people’s court within a fixed period of time. The judgments or 
orders rendered by the people's court shall be effective for all the claimants who have filed at the court. The same 
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of the world, particularly the U.S., this form of proceeding has proven to be an 
important mechanism in promoting environmental welfare.490 The class actions against 
the polluter appear to be gaining some ground in China too, although they are still 
relatively experimental.491 
 
5.6.3 Criminal Proceedings  
 
The most serious cases of environmental pollution are dealt with as criminal offences. 
Criminal cases are prosecuted by the procuracy in accordance with the provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Law (2005). 492 The principal substantive law applied in 
environmental cases involving criminal liability is the Criminal Law (1997 revised.), 
together with a variety of supplementary provisions typically found in specific 
environmental protection laws. Part II Section 4 of the Criminal Law provides for 
“crimes committed by a corporation”, and includes criminal liability not only for the 
enterprise but also for persons directly in charge.493 
 
In practice, pollution intensive production in FIE’s ordinary course of business rarely 
incur criminal liability, unless it incurs “very serious consequences either on public or 
                                                                                                                                               
judgments or orders shall be binding on the claimants who have not filed at the court but instituted legal proceedings 
during the limitation of action (Art. 55). 
490
 See generally David Robinson & John Dunkey (eds.), Public Interest Perspectives in Environmental Law (London: 
Wiley Chancery, 1995). 
491
 For a excellent review on the development of class action litigation in China, see Benjamin L.Liebman,  Class 
Action Litigation in China (1998) Harvard Law Review, Vol. 111, No. 6, pp. 1523-1541. 
492
 刑事诉讼法 [Criminal Procedure Law] (effective Jan , 1997) (PRC). 
493
 Art. 31 of Criminal Law (1997) reads: “A unit which commits a crime shall be punished with a fine and the 
person(s) directly in charge and other person(s) directly involved in the crime shall be given a punishment, where 
specific provisions of this law or other laws stipulate otherwise, such stipulation shall apply.” 
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private property or bodily injury or death or another person”.494 However, in the event 
that FIEs in China are directly involved in waste import, processing and disposal, 
Art.339 of Criminal Law provides for the criminal offence of importing solid waste for 
both corporations and the persons in charge.495  
 
The Pinggu incident in the suburb of Beijing is one of the a few “reported” foreign 
waste dumping cases. In 1997 Zhiqiang Caoxian Co. Ltd—a China-Australia joint 
venture—was discovered to have dumped 639 tons of what is labeled as “waste paper” 
which actually was hazardous hospital wastes 496  from Long Beach, California to 
China’s port of Qingdao. Considered the serious consequences it has on China’s human 
health and environment, China decided to not only criminalize the FIE, but also to seek 
international cooperation. On May 13, 1997 China’s SEPA filed a complaint to the 
Secretariat of Basel Convention, alleging that it violated China’s national interest.497 




In this chapter, the author’s review of both legal and extra-legal issues indicates the 
sharp divergence between the de jure and de facto regulations on foreign DIM. In China 
where no aggregate quantitative data on costs arising from the de facto compliance is 
                                                 
494
 Id, Art. 338. 
495
 Id, Art. 339. 
496
 The medical waste is on the top of 47 kinds of wastes prohibited from exporting by the Basel Convention, thus a 
serious violation of international convention and China’s domestic laws. 
497
 See Changhua Wu & Simon Wang, “Environment, Development and Human Right: A Case Study of Foreign 
Waste Dumping, in Lyuba Zarsky (ed.), Human Rights and the Environment: Conflicts and Norms in a Globalizing 
World (London ; Sterling, VA : Earthscan, 2002). 
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available, the influence of de facto compliance cost on foreign investor’s investment 
decision can be salient. On one hand, the environmental regulatory change, dual 
standards on domestic and foreign corporations, regional variations in environmental 
laws and wide spread corruption increase the transaction costs by increasing the amount 
that FIEs must spend delineating their legal obligations and enforcing their rights.498 On 
the other hand, the non- or low enforcement on environmental laws significantly 
undermined both the pre- and post-entry regulation of DIM, which has the same effect 
of lax environmental standard. It has been suggested that a possible key to understand 
the “implementation gaps” in China is to be found in the wide discretionary powers 
exercised by environmental regulators.499 It is therefore not surprising that enterprises in 
China are likely to seek alliances with officials in the bureaucracy. Usually a company 
that was able to negotiate good relationship with government would end up with 
significant savings on environmental cost.  
 
Based on these findings, it is difficult to draw a general conclusion on whether or not 
Chinese laws as a whole have created incentives for the migration of dirty industries. 
Each migration shall be studied on a case by case basis.  Regarding the second common 
understanding that the increase of Chinese environmental standards would deter foreign 
corporations and thus decreases China’s FDI inflow, the author did not find an apparent 
                                                 
498
 For a discussion on transaction costs of industrial flight, see C. Leigh Anderson & Robert A. Kagan,  “Adversarial 
Legalism and Transaction Costs: The Industrial-flight Hypothesis Revisited” (2000) 20 International Review of Law 
and Economics 1, at 6. 
499 As Clarke (1994) observes, “enforcement activity at an industrial facility may be a sign that the EPB considers it 
an important and viable local industry. In contrast, particularly stringent  enforcement, especially  where  the  
punishment  does  not seem to match the offence, may be a sign of poor  relations between facility management and 
the EPB. On the whole, the relationship between the facility management and the EPB officials is perhaps the most 
important factor in influencing the degree of environmental regulation”. See Clarke, S. (1994) Pollution Control in 
the PRC:  Regulations and Reality (ERM, Hong Kong), at 80. 
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connection between the two, but rather, the environmental regulatory change as well as 
bureaucratic interferences may serve as real challenges for China’s sustainable FDI.  
 
There are many aspects that Chinese law can be strengthened to improve its control 
over DIM. The regulation of DIM is an area Chinese foreign trade and investment laws 
are intertwined with environmental considerations. To fully utilize the benefit of trade 
and investment liberalization and inhibit their negative effect on China’s environment, 
improvements shall be made in the following aspects:  
 
In the investment area, the promotion of investment stability and incrementally 
strengthen the environmental standards probably has the greatest potential, although the 
goals of investment stability and environmental regulatory change inevitably clash. The 
resolution lies in the better environmental planning as well as enforcement. In the 
enforcement of existing trade, investment and environmental laws, special attention 
shall be given to the application of national treatment standards that are often evaded or 
ignored at the local level.  
 
In the foreign trade area, the environmental cost internalization is the ultimate way to 
extinguish incentives for the passive DIM. This implies that not only environmental 
sensitive industrial products shall be controlled from import / export, but also out-dated 
technologies, subsidies, price distortions, and other adverse incentives that encourage 
pollution need to be eliminated. It must be stressed that, to achieve all these goals, trade 
measures per se are not sufficient. China requires more in-depth reform in other areas of 
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law, for example, to the ownership reform including that of environmental assets, to 
protect the intellectual property rights for transferred environmentally sound 
technologies, to safeguard people’s health and their right to a healthy environment, etc.   
 
Other than effective law making, the implementation of laws are crucial in the 
regulation of DIM. At present, the policy and organizational reform to strengthen the 
power of environmental authorities at national and sub-national level (especially the 
SEPA and local EPBs) to monitor and implement environmental laws and regulations 
probably has much potential. In the meantime, the judiciary—as the important propeller 
of this process—must be kept independent of government interference. The power of 
courts to interpret environmental laws and to adjudicate disputes based on legal and 
regulatory provisions needs to be strengthened. Otherwise the laws would remain 
remote to the victims and have little deterrence on polluters. 
 
It has been suggested that except in a handful of countries, the “top-down planning 
approach” did not bring about real change. National governments acting alone simply 
could not generate the political will and financial and human resources needed for 
action. The problem was that national-level plans were too extensive, too general, and 
sometimes too complicated, and thus they were not effectively translated into action.500 
The author acknowledges the difficulty of eliminating China’s huge bureaucratic 
administration and judiciary over-nightly. Instead, other values and initiatives “from the 
                                                 
500
 See Jacob Scherr & David Barnhizer, “Showdown at Implementation Gap: The Failure of Agenda 21” (1997) 
ECODECISION, at 34-35. 
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bottom” are particularly important to evade the top-down bureaucracy for the regulation 
of DIM. Such values and initiatives are discussed in the rest of the work. 
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CHAPTER VI CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZENSHIP IN CHINA 
 
In previous chapters the author discusses both the international and Chinese legal 
framework on the regulation of DIM. It is found that despite the formal institutions 
imposed on foreign corporations, there is no single way that comprehensively assures 
full compliance with all legal requirements on a continuous and uninterrupted basis. 
Empirical evidence does show a large variance in the conduct of foreign corporations in 
the host countries. Some MNCs stick to a uniform code of conduct despite the various 
legal context in which they operate, while others are found being engaged in social and 
environmental abuses in countries with lax environmental standards. This implies that 
there exists other regulatory force in addition to domestic and international laws which 
shapes the conduct of MNCs. The self-regulation of corporations, and in particular the 
Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”), is what the author envisages as a third force 
in the global regulation of DIM. Such force has the potential to overcome the systemic 
deficiencies underlying both international and domestic institutions in the regulation of 
DIM, which deserves intensive study.  
 
This chapter does not intend to address full issues of CSR in China. Previous public 
concerns over the social performance of foreign corporations in China focus on the 
labour aspect of CSR, i.e. to take China as a haven for cheap labour and study the 
labour rights of Chinese workers. However, few researchers have ever taken a serious 
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look on the environmental aspect, i.e. to take China as a potential “pollution haven” and 
studies the environmental performance of various forms of corporate entities operating 
in China. This chapter seeks to fill this gap. It takes into account the Chinese 
institutional environment for the examination of CSR. Furthermore, the environmental 
aspect of CSR is studied as one of the resolutions for the regulation of dirty industry 
migration in China. 
 
6.1 The Development of Corporate Social Responsibility—Theories and 
Practice  
 
While there is no single, commonly accepted definition of CSR,501 CSR is generally 
accepted as operating businesses in a manner that meets or exceeds the ethical, legal, 
commercial and public expectations that society has of business.502 While the labour 
and environmental issues have traditionally formed the core of most CSR approaches, 
CSR encompasses human rights, employee rights, community involvement, supplier 
relations, and environmental protection, and exhort MNCs to make decisions that fairly 
balance the claims of all key “stakeholders”.503   
                                                 
501
 The sources of CSR comprise of public international instruments, domestic legislations relating to CSR, 
individual business codes of conduct, as well as NGO guidelines, See Ilias Bantekas, “Corporate Social 
Responsibility in International Law” (2004) 22 B.U.Int’l L.J. 309, at 317, see also Kathryn Gordon, “The OECD 
Guidelines and Other Corporate Responsibility Instruments: A Comparison”, in OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: Annual Report 2001 (OECD, Working Paper No. 2001/15, 2001) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/36/2075173.pdf> Accessed Dec 18, 2006. 
502
 For a brief overview and discussion of CSR’s origins, see Daniel T. Ostas & Stephen E. Loeb, “Teaching 
Corporate Social Responsibility in Business Law and Business Ethics Classrooms” (2002) 20 J. Legal Stud. Educ. 61 
503
  While the traditional definition of stakeholders offer descriptions akin to the definition of shareholder, the use of 
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The modern debate on CSR can be traced to the 1930s on an exchange of views 
between Professor Merrick Dodd and Adolf Berle on the extent to which the 
corporation should be regarded primarily as an economic entity, or as a social entity. 504 
Such debate on the nature of corporation not only had a significant impact on 
subsequent researchers in shaping theories of CSR, but also formed the basis of 
contemporary debate on models of corporate governance, especially after the large 
corporate scandals in major developed economies.505 
 
6.1.1 Shareholder View vs. Stakeholder View of Corporation 
 
The traditional western view about CSR is directly derived from the shareholder-oriented 
theory of corporation.506 This view suggested that corporations have no specific social 
responsibilities beyond profit-maximization for the benefit of shareholders, but that such 
                                                                                                                                               
“stakeholder” in the environmental, social responsibility, and sustainability contexts usually connotes a broader 
group of interests or affected constituencies. From the public, NGO, and government perspective this broadening 
often encompasses those individuals and groups impacted by the enterprise's activities. For the corporation, the 
connotation of “stakeholder” might be best defined as those individuals or groups whose opinion or interests bear on 
a corporation's reputation, and hence it's brand value. Monsma, supra note 37, at 174. 
504
 Dodd and Berle developed different implications about the fiduciary duties of boards of directors from their 
differing concepts of the nature of the corporation. Thus, Dodd viewed the modern corporation as a quasi-public 
entity, and so argued that the board of directors had quasi-public responsibilities to multiple constituencies, while 
Berle thought that until the problems created by potential accountability to multiple constituencies could be solved, it 
was necessary for boards to exercise their fiduciary duties in the interests of shareholders only See E. Merrick Dodd, 
Jr., “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1162; Adolph A. Berle, Jr., “For 
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees: A Note” (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365, 1368. 
505
 See Shleifer & Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance” (1997) Journal of Finance, 737-83; Also see OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf> Accessed 
Feb 20, 2007. 
506
 See Jenry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89 Geo. L. J. 439  
(Suggesting that there is convergence trend on the structures of corporate governance in the world and such 
convergence is towards the Anglo-American model, which they term as “standard shareholder-oriented model”. 
Under this model, as Hansmann and Kraakman describes it, ultimate control over the corporation is in the hands of 
shareholders, corporate managers are charged with managing the corporation exclusively in the interest of 
shareholder’s economic interests; and the interests of other corporate stakeholders, such as creditors, suppliers, 
employees and customers, ought the be protected by explicit contracts or by other bodies of law, rather than through 
participation in corporate governance.). 
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profit-maximizing must occur within the confines of the law, without deception or 
collusion. 507  In other words, the constraints of law, supplemented in some specific 
instances by contractual obligations, will be sufficient to address any and all concerns 
about the exercise of corporate power and in particular will be sufficient to ensure that 
companies fully internalize all of the social and environmental costs of their productive 
processes and labour relationships. 508  The notions of such view were probably best 
expressed by the Nobel Prize winner Prof. Milton Friedman, who once launched an 
ardent attack on advocates of CSR: “In fact, they [advocates of CSR] are – or would be 
if they or anyone else took them seriously – preaching pure and unadulterated 
socialism. Businessmen who talk this way are unwitting puppets of the intellectual 
forces that have been undermining the basis of a free society these past decades”.509   
Friedman  remarked   that a   corporate   executive,   who “imposes  taxes  and  spends  
proceeds  for  ‘social’  purposes”,  is  not  responding  to ‘market mechanisms’ and is 
not mandated through ‘democratic procedures’. Hence, “the  doctrine  of  ‘social 
responsibility’ involves the acceptance of the  socialist  view that  political  mechanisms,  
not  market  mechanisms,  are  the  appropriate  way  to determine  the  allocation  of  
                                                 
507
 Under this view, corporations meet their proper social responsibilities by excelling in their economic activities, 
which then contributes to a well-functioning economy by employing people, by providing needed goods and services, 
and by contributing the social welfare through paying taxes. The most widely quoted exemplar of this view is 
Professor Milton Friedman, who has stated that in a free economy “there is one and only one social responsibility of 
business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays with the rules 
of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.” See Milton 
Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), at 133.  
508
 This point of view, in the eye of the author, has its merit in that some categories of participants in the corporate 
governance are well positioned to protect themselves by contract. However, it must be noted that there are other 
groups of people or entities-employees, consumers, communities, and “the environment” who typically have not 
negotiated explicit contracts with the business entities of interest, who are not protected by contracts, or whose 
contracts are not very protective. Often these people are not in a position to negotiate a contract to protect their 
interests, either because of a lack of bargaining power or perhaps because they don't know they're about to be affected 
by an exercise of corporate power. 
509
 Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits?”, N. Y. Times Magazine., Sept. 
13, 1970, at 32. 
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scarce  resources  to  alternative  uses”.510 Such strong libertarian notion of CSR probably 
still represents the predominant academic view in the U.S.511  
 
In competition with the shareholder view of CSR are the views that derive from the 
stakeholder oriented theory of corporation. 512  In 1984, Edward Freeman published 
Strategic Management—A Stakeholder Approach, which has become the backbone 
classic of the subsequent and very extensive elaborations of the stakeholder model.513 
Proponents of the stakeholder view of CSR contend that corporate managers’ 
underlying duties are by no means confines to the maximization of shareholder interests, 
and they ought to consider the impact of their decisions on a wider range of constituents 
than shareholders.514 As the interests of shareholders may sometimes clash with that of 
other stakeholders, academics have sought to evaluate the conditions under which 
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  Friedman, ibid, inverted commas in the original. 
511
 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press 1991), at 12 (stating that shareholders, as residual claimants, have implicitly contracted for promise 
that firm will maximize profits in long run); Henry G. Manne & Henry C. Wallich, The Modern Corporation and 
Social Responsibility (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972) (noting that social responsibility of 
corporations is shareholder wealth maximizing); Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, “A Self-Enforcing Model of 
Corporate Law” (1996) 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (arguing that principal goal of corporate law is to maximize 
shareholder wealth); see also Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram and James P. Walsh, “The 
Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads” 
(1999) 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 9 ; Roberta Romano, “The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes” (1987) 73 Va. 
L. Rev. 111, 113 (asserting that core goal of corporate law is to maximize equity share prices). 
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 See for example, Clarkson, M. B. E. “A Stakeholder Framework for Analysing and Evaluating Corporate Social 
Performance” (1995) Academy of Management Review 20: 92-117; Wood, D. J., Jones, R. E. “Stakeholder 
Mismatching: A Theoretical Problem in Empirical Research in Corporate Social Performance” (1995) International 
Journal of Organizational Analysis 3: 229-267; Maignan, I., Ferrell, O. C., Hult, G. T. M. “Corporate Citizenship: 
Cultural Antecedents and Business Benefits” (1999) Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 27: 455-459. 
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 Freeman, R. Edward, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Boston: Pitman 1984). (Freeman defines 
stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement  of  a  corporation’s  
purpose”,  and  offers  the  following  list  of  possible stakeholders “employees, customers, suppliers, stockholders, 
banks, environmentalists [and] government” at 25.) Also see Freeman, Edward R., “The Politics of Stakeholder 
Theory: Some Future Directions”. (1994) Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 4, issue 4, pp. 409-421; Freeman, R. 
Edward & Robert Phillips, “Stakeholder Theory: A Libertarian Defense”, (2002) Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol.12, 
No. 3, 331-350. 
514
 See Steven M.H. Wallman, “The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of 
Director Duties” (1991) 21 Stetson L. Rev. 163; Peter Nobel, “Social Responsibility of Corporations” (1999) 84 
Cornell L. Rev. 1255, 1259.  
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decisions presumed to be shareholder wealth-maximizing have had negative effects on, 
for example employees, consumers, suppliers, the community, and the environment.515  
 
The stakeholder view of CSR is not simply an academic construct but is evident in the 
structure of corporate governance and in the social democratic underpinnings of most 
European and other civil law countries.516   A substantial study comparing business 
ethics in North America and Continental Europe finds a significant difference between 
the two continents: “Europeans are predominantly concerned with systemic macro-
issues while North Americans mainly deal with personal micro-issues”.517As suggested, 
CSR in the American context seems to have evolved in society with a minimal state on 
the sideline, while CSR in Europe evolves in interactions between state and society on 
a fairly equal footing.518 In effect, the European conceptualization of business ethics 
predominantly refers to “legal regulations and negotiations between social partners 
(management, labour, professional associations, etc.) at the national and European 
levels”.519 As to the legal regulations in question, Enderle (1996) specifies European 
labour laws and provisions by governments for education, health care, and 
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environment.520 In other words, nation states and the EU seem to play decisive roles in 
the systemic organization of social welfare responsibilities of businesses.  
 
In practice, developing countries compete for American and European MNCs’ 
investments and MNCs can choose to make their investment only in the country that is 
able to offer them the most corporate-friendly business environment. In light of this 
reality, MNCs are in a position to influence a country’s social and environmental 
practices, forcing the change of a country’s practices or policies by refusing to invest in 
a country if its policies are adverse to the goals of the company. 521 It is therefore 
important that MNCs maintain a high ethical standard in choosing the countries they 
wish to invest and bear a social responsibility throughout its operation. 
 
6.1.2 Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Citizenship 
 
The non-unified definition of CSR is not necessarily a detriment to the CSR movement. 
As companies look inward to develop their own approaches to diverse stakeholders, and 
governments and NGOs seek to promote an ethos of corporate citizenship, the 
amorphous nature of CSR allows a great deal of flexibility in its approach and 
application. Until the late 1980s, the social responsibilities of corporations towards the 
environment were not treated differently, but as a part of the term “social responsibility”. 




 Since the 1970’s, the investment pressure on companies was used to persuade the government of South Africa to 
change its apartheid policies. See Monsma, supra note 37, at 190. 
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However, the content and the significance of environmental responsibilities of 
corporations widened in the course of time and it became necessary to distinguish the 
studies concerning environmental responsibilities. The concept of corporate 
environmental citizenship (“CEC”), 522  which has been developed parallel to the 
development of “social responsibility”, has started to be used by researchers in order to 
indicate corporate responsibilities for the environment.523 Thus in this thesis the author 
defines the concept of CEC as all of the precautions and policies corporations need in 
order to reduce the hazards they give to the environment.  
 
In the environmental arena, the high visibility of environmental issues drives customers, 
investors and employees to pressure companies to go well beyond regulatory and legal 
compliance. Media scrutiny and market-based environmental activist campaigns are 
raising the importance of proactive environmental management to protect and enhance 
brand image and corporate reputation. As a result leadership companies around the 
globe are adopting more sophisticated environmental practices and policies. They are 
increasingly expected to address environmental impacts of their facilities throughout the 
entire product lifecycle, from sourcing, production and transportation to marketing, use 
and disposal. 
 
                                                 
522
 For the development of the concept of corporate environmental citizenship, see Carroll AB, “The four faces of 
corporate citizenship” (1998) Business and Society Review 100/101; Maignan I,  Ferrell  OC.,    “Measuring  
Corporate  Citizenship  In  Two  Countries:  the  Case  of  the  United  States  and  France” (2000) Journal of 
Business Ethics 3(3): 283–297; Küskü F, Zarkada-Fraser A. “An empirical investigation of corporate citizenship in 
Australia and Turkey” (2004) Journal of Management 15: 57–72. 
523 Rondinelli DA, Berry MA.“Environmental Citizenship in Multinational Corporations: Social Responsibility and 
Sustainable Development” (2000) European Management Journal 18(1): 70–84. 
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6.2 Synthesizing the Principle of Sustainable Development, Environmental 
Justice, and Corporate Social Responsibility for the Regulation of DIM 
 
MNCs have an important role to play in the promotion of global sustainable 
development. Although international treaties have not endowed MNCs with legal 
personality, the whole structure of sustainable development is necessarily dependent 
upon MNC’s direct participation. Principles 5 and 27 of the 1992 Rio Declaration have 
made it clear that the obligations arising from sustainable development are addressed to 
“all States and people”. 524  Agenda 21, the implementing blueprint of the Rio 
Declaration, in its Chapter 30 spells out the role of industry and MNCs in sustainable 
development, particularly by increasing the efficiency of resource utilization, reduction 
of waste, promoting of cleaner production, environmental reporting, and other 
concerns.525 These practices thus become social responsibilities of MNCs, regardless of 
the place they operate.  
 
The principles of environmental justice, on the other hand, seek to address the 
disproportionate impact of environmental pollution caused by MNCs operating around 
the world and the lack of equal environmental protection experienced by the 
disadvantaged people.526 To apply the environmental justice principle to the MNCs thus 
require MNCs to bear a responsibility that they do not exacerbate the environmental 
                                                 
524Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Annex I, 
Agenda Item 21, at 8-11, U.N. Doc. A/ CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992). 
525
 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21: The United Nations Programme of Action from 
Rio (1992) § 30 U.N. Doc. DPI/1344, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.11 (1993). 
526
 See Ke Jian, “Environmental Justice: Can An American Discourse Make Sense in Chinese Environmental Law?” 
(2005) 24 Temple Journal of Science, Technology & Environmental Law 253, at 254. 
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injustice by transfer pollution to the host state or cause any environmental harm to the 
local people and environment.  
 
As Monsma (2006) observes, environmental justice could serve as the “conceptual link 
between human rights and the environment that is missing in the dialogue on corporate 
social responsibility and sustainable development.”527   Insofar as CSR is explicitly 
aligned with global standards for corporate conduct, which define human rights as an 
ethic (if not a right) to a healthy environment, it would seem logical for proponents of 
CSR to also reference environmental justice principles as conferring a duty on 
corporations to evaluate and report on their activities in terms of their potential for 
discriminatory disparate impacts”.528 
 
Monsma’s argument was supported by the relevant principles under Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI). 529  The GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines had called on 
                                                 
527
 It was suggested that the principles of sustainable development and CSR “both share a potential for addressing 
environmental justice principles through a framework of transparent reporting commitments linked to social 
investment and stakeholder responsibility”, and “both receive the criticism that neither system is sufficiently 
developed, accountable, or “legal” enough to become as effective as, for instance, financial accountability.” See 
David Monsma, “Equal Rights, Governance, and the Environment: Integrating Environmental Justice Principles in 
Corporate Social Responsibility” (2006) 33 Ecology L.Q. 443, at 492 and 497; also see Benjamin J. Richardson, 
“Enlisting Institutional Investors in Environmental Regulation: Some Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives”, 
(2002) 28 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 247, at 247 (noting “the role of private financial organizations in 
environmental policy and argu[ing] that the effectiveness of environmental regulation may be enhanced when it can 
encourage institutional investors to take account of the environmental effects of their decisions”). Gerald F. Tietz, 
“Strict Product Liability, Design Defects and Corporate Decision-Making: Greater Deterrence Through Stricter 
Process” (1993) 38 Vill. L. Rev. 1361, at 1403 (analogizing to the duty of care in manufacturing, Tietz observes: 
“Corporate resistance to safety is substantially due to the absence of a sense of social accountability. As Blackstone 
observed, corporations have no souls. If this is true, then perhaps it is unreasonable to expect corporations to act as 
responsibly—and be held as socially accountable—as individual persons.”). 
528
 Monsma, ibid, at 492 (Comparing the nature and history of the principle of environmental justice and CSR, 
Monsma suggests that “fundamentally, environmental justice, as a set of ethical principles, is as much an issue of 
corporate social responsibility and sustainable development as it is a matter of equal protection of laws.” same, at 469) 
529
 Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) <http://www.globalreporting.org> (Accessed Dec. 18, 2006) is one of the most 
widely known corporate self-performance standard that focuses on the economic, environmental, and social 
dimensions of corporate activity, products, and services. The GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines were first 
issued in 1999 and are renewed regularly, laying out a coherent format upon which corporations are to structure their 
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corporations to “intend, among other things, to assist organizations in reporting 
information clearly demonstrating the impact of their operations, products, and services 
on air, water, land, biodiversity, and human health”, 530  and further encouraged 
companies to “describe global policy and procedures for preventing all forms of 
discrimination in their operations”.531 It was suggested that the above GRI provisions 
are clear reporting indicator for environmental justice on corporate social responsibility 
which is essential to sustainable development. 
 
6.2.1 Codes of Conduct 
 
Starting from 1991 when the U.S. jeans producer Levi-Strauss developed the first 
“Code of Conduct” at the pressure of its being accused of labour abuses in developing 
countries, a large array of social responsibility movement was initiated by consumers, 
environmental groups, trade unions, human rights groups as well as other non-
governmental organizations towards MNCs. As a result, MNCs and other industrial 
leaders vied with each other to set up their own code of conduct enlisting the ethical 
standards that they claim to uphold.532 In addition to the code of conduct designed by 
                                                                                                                                               
social reports. The importance of the GRI Guidelines is stressed by the fact that the UN Global Compact has entered 
into an agreement of collaboration with it, whereby corporate submissions that meet the GRI Guidelines will be 
accepted under the relevant Compact reporting procedures. See Ananymous, “Guide to the Global Compact: A 
Practical Understanding of the Vision and Nine Principles, U.N. Global Compact” (2002) 
<http://www.uneptie.org/outreach/compact/docs/gcguide.pdf> Accessed Dec 18, 2006, at 9. 
530 Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, Part C (2002), <http:// 




 Benjamin J. Richardson, supra note 527, at 247, who investigates the role of private financial          organizations 
in environmental policy and argues that the effectiveness of environmental regulation may be enhanced when it can 
encourage institutional investors to take account of the environmental effects of their decisions. Through a 
combination of incentive, informational, and regulatory mechanisms, governments can mobilize institutional 
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corporations, there are a great number of industry codes,533 union sponsored codes,534 as 
well as codes of conduct that come from international organizations.535 These codes of 
conduct stress the absence of pollution, the non-abuse of human rights, the eradication 
of corruption and similar aims,536 and they all serve to facilitate the self-regulation and 
social responsibilities of MNCs. 
 
6.2.2 Socially Responsible Investment 
 
Another significant change in the movement of CSR is that investors in developed 
countries have increasingly taken into consideration the social performance of 
corporations while making their investment decisions. Investors have begun to realize 
that investment shall contribute to sustainable development, and that a sustainable 
investment must consider its economic, social and environmental impacts in a 
multidisciplinary context. The term “Socially Responsible Investment” (“SRI”) refers to 
investing funds based on ethical, environmental or social conditions. Although currently 
                                                                                                                                               
investors to support environmental policy by providing a means of transmitting and amplifying primary regulatory 
controls through the market. 
533
 See for example, Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) Workplace Code of Conduct (Prepared by the AIP, an 
affiliation of apparel manufacturers, contractors, retailers and the U.S. Department of Labour developed to address 
domestic and international sweatshop labour, 
 <http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/guide/apparell.htm> Accessed Jan 18, 2007; World Federation 
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 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf>; United Nations Global Compact (2000), 
 <http://unglobalcompact.org/> Accessed Jan 18, 2007. 
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  For a useful resource of company based, industry based as well as other-based codes of conduct see 
<http://www.codesofconduct.org> Accessed April, 4, 2005. 
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accounting for a small percentage of all funds invested worldwide, SRI has seen a 
significant growth in recent years. Commentators point out that in 2003, the total 
amount invested in SRI-type screened portfolios exceeded $2.15 trillion.537 Most SRI 
funds operate under specific social or environmental criteria. Some funds use negative 
criteria, excluding industries such as tobacco and alcohol, while others seek out 
investment in companies that act proactively to address social or environmental issues. 
Some investors participate in SRI funds based on purely ethical or moral motives; while 
many other proponents believe that socially and environmentally responsible corporate 
policies are indicative of sound internal and external management.  
 
For corporations, they can benefit financially by listing their stock with an ethical stock 
market index.538 Such a listing enhances the appeal of a company to investors and acts 
to protect a corporation’s core assets of brand and image. In fact, the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index has outperformed the Dow Jones Global Index by more than 140% 
over an eight-year period, and the Domini 400 Social Index (“DSI”) has outperformed 
the S&P 500 over the eleven years since DSI’s inception in 1990. 539  Generally, 
corporations in these funds are considered best-practices performers in managing the 
myriad factors that affect financial performance, most importantly social and 
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environmental factors. 540 Conversely, if the corporation disregards its social 
responsibility, the disclosure of such negative information would cause the price of its 
shares to drop and even causes the collapse of the corporation. 
 
In addition, CSR-related sustainable development is reinforced through the lending or 
insurance mechanisms of inter-governmental institutions. For example, Art.12(d)(i) of 
the MIGA Convention provides that MIGA would agree to guarantee only those 
investments that are “economically sound” and which contribute to the development of 
the host country. This has been interpreted by MIGA to include environmental 
performance and sustainability with regard to natural resource management. 541 
Similarly, the World Bank as well as other lending institutions would make it 
impossible to secure a loan without proper environmental assessment and sustainable 
operations.542 
 
6.3 Corporate Social Responsibility in China 
 
6.3.1 Values of the Chinese on Business Ethics 
 
CSR is part of the field of business ethics. The discussions on business ethics had been  
initiated in North America  in the 1960s and that research on business ethics issues had  
                                                 
540 Simon Zadek, “Comment, Materiality in Reporting” (7 August 2003) Ethical Corp. Online, 
<http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=928> Accessed Apr 4, 2005 
541 World Bank Group, “MIGA’s Environmental and Social Review Procedures” (1999), <http:// 
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begun  in  Europe  and  Britain  in  the 1980s.543  Although some western scholars might 
think that business ethics has never come about in China, Chinese scholars have 
explained that the basic norms of business ethics emerged as early as 2,500 years ago in 
the eras of The Spring and Autumn and the Warring States.544  
 
6.3.1.1  Business Ethics under the Confucius Doctrine 
 
Chinese business ethics scholars go a long way to substantiate the Chinese tradition of 
business ethics. A tentative survey of their explications  indicates  general  agreement  
that  the  Confucian  virtue  of “Yi” (义) is  the pivot around which the Chinese tradition 
of business ethics evolves. “Yi” is commonly translated as “righteousness”. Under the 
Confucian doctrines, it refers to the virtue of knowing and acting according   to what is 
right.545  Scepticism towards profit (li-利) is a defining characteristic of Confucianism, 
and righteousness (“yi”) is elevated as the opposing virtue. Shi (1995) has pointed out 
that,“Throughout history, numerous business people have encountered the problematic 
opposition of “righteousness” and “profit”. If they could not help focusing on short term 
profit, they would go for the petty gain. But if they appreciated the large, long term gain 
of the nation; they would bring about national common prosperity, even if that entailed 
sacrificing their own personal revenue.” 546  So far, the Chinese explications of the 
opposition between “righteousness” and “profit”  appear  to  be almost identical to the 
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explications of the opposition between ethics and profit  offered by the Western CSR 
literature.  
 
Furthermore, as Chinese scholars elaborate further on the connotations of 
“righteousness”, it is found that “righteousness” is ingrained upon the Chinese 
traditional emphasis on hierarchal ordering of human relations. It is the key norm of the 
superior interacting with the inferior. 547  According to Liu (1995), “righteousness” 
includes the approval, protection and favor bestowed by the superior upon the 
inferior”.548  Such a view is consistent with the Confucius saying that “The mind of  the  
Superior man is conversant with righteousness, the mind of the mean man is conversant 
with profit.”549  
 
6.3.1.2  “Serving the People” 
 
For thousands of years, leadership in China has been intensively influenced by the 
Confucius doctrines. Such influence is reflected by the way that leadership at different 
times educates its people by performing role models for righteousness. For example, 
Mao Zedong has created the doctrine of “serving the people” (“wei renmin fuwu”) and 
performs the role model of righteousness by educating the Chinese Communist Party 
(“CCP”) that “We [the CCP] should be modest and prudent, guard against arrogance 
                                                 
547
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and rashness, and serve the Chinese people heart and soul....”550  Mao also legitimized 
the authority of CCP by aligning the interest of CCP with that of a multiplicity of 
stakeholders. “Our point of departure is to serve the people whole-heartedly and never 
for a moment divorce ourselves from the masses, to proceed in all cases from the 
interests of the people and not from one’s self-interest or from the interests of a small 
group, and to identify our responsibility to the people with our responsibility to the 
leading organs of the Party.”551 
 
6.3.1.3 “Socialist Spiritual Civilization” 
 
Since the start of the reform era, Deng Xiaoping, the successor of Mao, proposed an 
outstanding theoretical creation to “allow some regions and people to get rich first, so they 
can help others for common prosperity”,552 Such an idea greatly stimulated entrepreneurial 
spirit that has energized China’s rapid economic development over the past decades. 
However, things turned out that those who “get rich first” did not promote “common 
prosperity” as Deng envisaged, and the opposition between profit and ethics had quickly 
become severe problem which arouse civil unrest. During the economic reform era the 
traditional inequalities  have  been  unfolding  between  the  urban  and  rural  sectors, 
between  the  new  entrepreneurs  and  the  traditionally  privileged  working class, and 
between the rich coastal provinces and the backward inner provinces. As a result, the 
leadership had to re-emphasize on ethics by creating the idea of “Socialist Spiritual 
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Civilization” (“she hui zhu yi jing shen wen ming”). The heading “Socialist Spiritual  
Civilization” aimed at establishing a consistent ideological foundation for the economic  
development, referred to as “Socialist Material Civilization”.  
 
In educating the people (including the businesses) on ethics the leadership again adopted 
the approach of first performing the role model from the above.  For instance, Jiang Zemin 
remarked in his  speech  on  the  80th  anniversary  of  the  CPC  in  2001  that  “the  
comrades of the whole Party must have a comprehensive mastery of the dialectical 
relations between the  two  civilizations  and  while  promoting  material  civilization,  it  is  
necessary  to promote socialist spiritual civilization. In contemporary China, to develop 
advanced culture is to develop culture with distinct Chinese characteristics and to build 
socialist spiritual civilization”. 553 Similar to Mao, Jiang Zemin re-enforced the authority 
of CCP by aligning its interest with the general public when he created the theory of 
“Three Represents” in 2000.554  
 
6.3.1.4  “Harmonious Society” 
 
Probably what best incorporates the Chinese values of business ethics is the recent 
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policy slogan of “Harmonious Society” (“he xie she hui”) propagated by the CCP and 
president Hu Jintao.555 Hu  Jintao  offered explications  of  this  vision  of  the  political  
leadership in a speech on 19 February 2005 at a seminar, which was sponsored by the 
CPC Central Committee Party School and attended by major provincial- and  
ministerial-level leaders. “A  Harmonious  Society  should  feature  democracy, the  rule  
of  law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and  vitality”, said Hu and “honesty, unity, 
fraternity, professional ethics should be advocated to the whole society”. 556  
Furthermore, he stressed that “without a common ideological aspiration or high moral  
standard, a Harmonious Society will be a mansion built on sand”.557  
 
President Hu’s this speech has been so far the clearest interpretation of what the 
political leaders demand for business ethics in contemporary China. It was suggested 
that the fact that Hu Jintao mentions “vitality” as one of the features of the vision   
indicates that the harmonization is not intended to hamper the entrepreneurial spirit that 
has energized China’s rapid economic development over the past decades. The vision 
rather signals the wish that part of the entrepreneurial energy should contribute to the 
common good.558 Here the Chinese political leaders seem to draw on the insights of the 
concept of “Stakeholder Society” as promoted by Western  European social  democratic 
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parties, 559  which supports the idea that the government should facilitate the active 
participation of all stakeholders and provide  the  organization  and  norms  for  the  
social  responsibility  of  companies, individuals and other social groups.560 
 
6.3.2 Corporate Social Responsibility—Does East Meet West? 
 
A review on the western and eastern values of CSR gives rise to the question whether 
western values of CSR can be adapted to a Chinese context. In recent years, CSR has 
become very topical in China especially as the country becomes increasingly integrated 
into the global production chain. However, the reality of the transitional economy has 
determined that on the one hand, the Chinese leadership maintains the principle of 
absolute Party-State control and China is still characterized by heavy bureaucracy and 
remnants of the centrally planned economy. On the other hand, decentralization and the 
current mode of economic development imply at times unlimited permissiveness to 
representatives of the entrepreneurial spirit. This is the context where the western values 
of CSR try to fit in. 
                                                 
559
 The idea of “Stakeholder Society” was first introduced by Tony Blair in his speech to the Singapore Business 
Community in January 1996, in which Blair proposed abolishment of universal welfare; instead certain duties and 
conditions should be required from welfare beneficiaries. Each having a stake in society, all citizens and groups should 
have equal opportunities. Business should play an  active  role  in  the  Stakeholder  Society  and  the  government  
should  serve  as  the facilitator. See Tony Blair, “The Singapore Speech” 
<http://www.psa.org.nz/library/psa/02%20partnership%20for%20quality%20materials/tony%20blair%20-
%20the%20singapore%20speech%201996.doc> Accessed Jan 19, 2007. 
560
 In February 2006, the journal 学习时报 [Study Times], an organ of the CPC Central Committee Party School, 
published an article. The article notes that Western European social democratic parties have come to acknowledge 
that the state should not be regarded as the only agent responsible for social welfare. In stead, “companies, 
individuals  and  other  social  groups  must  undertake  responsibility  together  with  the government.” As to the role 
of government in this new setup, the article quotes British Labour Party representatives stating that “It is not 
automatically the role of govern- ment to provide all social welfare, but rather to provide the organization and norms 
for it” See Wang Yu, 国外政党如何处理效率与公平的关系 [“How Do Foreign Political Parties Handle the 
Relationship between Efficienty and Fairness?”] (2006) 学习时报 Study Times, February 23, 2006. On-line edition 
<http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_Text_xx?info_id=1060904> Accessed Jan 19, 2007. 
 277 
 
As discussed above, the American conceptualization of CSR is characterized by strong 
libertarian notions which stress freedom and individualism. As a result, CSR in an 
American context is  based  on  a  dynamic  interplay  of  descriptive  and  instrumental  
aspects  of business, set in a self-regulated normative framework in which  governments  
and intergovernmental organizations may take part as facilitators rather than regulators. 
By contrast, in a European context the American libertarian notions seemed somewhat 
downplayed and the nation states and the EU seem to play more decisive roles in the 
systemic organization of social welfare responsibilities of businesses. However there 
seems to be a convergence trend towards the American model as we have seen 
governments of EU states began to publicly advocate a “stakeholder society” to change 
government’s role from the regulator to facilitator and to encourage more active 
participation by private sector (most importantly businesses).561 
 
In China, the leadership seems to conceptualize CSR  by  reference  to  a  blend  of  an 
eclectic  interpretation  of  Western  European  welfare  models  and  CSR  conceptions 
of Chinese tradition and political culture.562 On the one hand, the government wants to 
energize the private sector and gradually engage them in the welfare program so that 
“common prosperity” can be achieved. On the other hand, the Party-State retains tight 
control over various national stakeholders and the system is still in the nature of rule of 
man rather than the rule of law”. As a result, CSR  in  China  lacks  the element  of  
multi-stakeholder  dialogue,  which  is  commonly recognized as the core element of 
                                                 
561
 See the idea of “Stakeholder Society” introduced by Tony Blair, supra note 559. 
562
 See Jensen, supra note 518, at 31. 
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CSR in Western countries.  
 
Furthermore, when the stakeholder conflict becomes severe which threatens the 
authority of leadership, the leadership tends to adopt the traditional Chinese approach of 
government educating its people by performing role model for righteousness, as 
illustrated above. From this perspective, the “Harmonious Society” as envisaged by the 
Chinese leadership is still harmonious society under the regulation of CCP. It is quite 
diverge from  the Western  European social  democratic  welfare  models,  because  it  
leaves  out  the  latter’s  ideals  of  a representative  democracy. It is, to the author, the 
reason why the western concept of CSR finds it hard to fit in the Chinese context. 
 
6.3.3 China’s Recent Initiatives on CSR 
 
In China, the issues of development and stability are always among the most important 
tasks for the leadership, as they have served as the basis for the legitimacy of the 
political leaders in the reform era.563 Based on this, the Chinese government is receptive 
to foreign ideas such as CEC or CSR. For example, the Global Compact was introduced 
by Kofi Annan in 1999 as an international initiative to advance CSR. Since its 
introduction into China, the Global compact has enjoyed official support from the 
political leadership and by the end of 2006 a total of 72 Chinese companies are now 
                                                 
563
 See Deng Xiaoping’s saying “To China’s problems, the overwhelming priority is stability. Without a stable 
environment, nothing can be achieved, and what has been achieved will be lost... Democracy is our goal, but the 
country must remain stable.” cited from Deng’s meeting with George H. W. Bush on Feb, 26, 1989. Also see Deng 
Xiaoping’s saying “Development Is the Absolute Principle” , Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 
(1993) the People’s Press. 
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Global Compact members.564  
 
In recent years, the Chinese government has made continuous progress in fostering a 
social base that embraces CSR values. In 2001 China ratified the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). 565.This includes the 
state’s commitment in protecting people’s rights to environment, health and safety (Art. 
12). Although the commitment under the covenant is only going to be realized 
“progressively” according to “available resources” (Art. 2), it is nevertheless a good 
starting point. Without states formally advocating these rights of people, there is no way 
these rights can be exerted at the corporate level.  
 
Labour and environment are among the two most important issues of CSR. In the labour 
area, in addition to the Labour Law (1994), China has passed the Trade Union Law 
(2001), 566  the Law on Work Safety (2002), 567  and the Law on Industrial Injuries 
Insurance (2003).568 These legislations proscribe labour standards that meet or even 
surpass international standards and they are addressed specifically to corporations. In 
the environmental area, the Chinese government promulgated the Law on Promoting 
                                                 
564Figure cited from Global Compact website:  
<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/search_participant.html> Accessed Jan 20, 2007. In 
late November 2005, a Global Compact Summit was held in Shanghai and it was launched by UN representatives as 
the largest event ever held in China on the topic of responsible business. See Ho, Brian, “The UN Global Compact 
Summit” (2006) CSR Asia Weekly, vol.1, week 49. <http://www.csr-asia.com/index.php?p=5377> Accessed Jan 29, 
2007. 
565
 However, China entered a reservation on a crucial article. Article 8, which guarantee the right to form and join 
trade unions of one's choice, will not apply to China. Currently, Chinese law only permits one official, government-
sponsored trade union. 
566
 中华人民共和国工会法 [Trade Union Law] (effective Oct 27, 2001) (PRC). 
567
 中华人民共和国安全生产法 [The Law on Work Safety] (effective Nov 1, 2002) (PRC). 
568
 国务院工伤保险条例 [State Council，Procedures for Industrial Injury Insurance] (effective Apr 1, 2003) (PRC). 
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Clean Production.569 To the author’s knowledge, it is the first law of this kind in the 
world which directly aimed at promoting clean production. The law has imposed 
liabilities on companies which fail to, for example, notify the material composition of 
the products (Art. 37), reclaim the used products or packages (Art. 39), or publicize the 
emission of pollutants (Art. 41).   
 
More recently in 2005, China amended its 1982 Constitution to incorporate two 
important articles: Art.13 “private property obtained legally shall not be violated” and 
Art.33 “the state respects and safeguards human rights”. The constitutional protection of 
private property is very much needed for the furtherance of Chinese reform to transform 
a semi-market economy to a market based one. While through formally upholding 
human rights in the Constitution, the concept of “human rights” has, for the first time 
been elevated from a political concept to a legal norm.  
 
Probably the most interesting legal change took place in 2005 when China incorporated 
the open demand for social responsibility in its new Company Law. Article 5 of the 
amended Company Law reads: 
 
“In conducting business operations, a company shall comply with the laws and administrative 
regulations, social ethics, and business ethics. It shall act in good faith, accept the supervision 
of the government and general public, and bear social responsibilities.” 570 
 
                                                 
569
 Law on Promoting Clean Production, supra note 371. 
570
 Art. 5 of Company Law, supra note 378. 
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Although nowhere in the Company Law defines the scope of CSR, other laws, such as 
labour laws, environmental laws and consumer laws, complement the Company Law in 
forming a framework of mandatory and voluntary social responsibilities on corporations. 
This article has made it clear that complying with laws and regulations is no longer 
sufficient for companies. Instead, companies shall be prepared to be supervised by a 
broader range of stakeholders. It was the first time the term CSR was used in Chinese 
law and it implied the policy trend that corporations are gradually being integrated to 
the Chinese welfare system.    
 
6.3.4 Legislation on CSR—International Trend and Initiatives 
 
Despite the argument that the whole rationale behind CSR is premised on de-regulation 
thus any reference to CSR legislation raises questions of paradox.571 Evidence have 
shown that followed by a series of corporate scandals,572 a growing number of countries 
have begun to legislate on CSR to impose legally enforceable public disclosure 
requirements upon corporations.573  For example, the 2002 U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
requires companies to disclose and observe their codes of ethics.574 In France, the newly 
amended Nouvelles Regulations Economiques is a law that imposes reporting 
obligations on all nationally listed companies, pertaining among others to the 
                                                 
571
 See Ilias Bantekas, supra note 501, at 324-326 (discussing the regulation of CSR through domestic legislation). 
572
 For example in the case of Enron and WorldCom,the corporation not only defraud in its financials, but their 
collapse also caused substantial loss of jobs and pensions because pension funds were invested in these deflated 
corporations. 
573
 It has been suggested that a merge of voluntary reporting and national mandatory reporting on social and 
environmental issues has become a reality in many countries with which the corporations must live. See generally 
KPMG, “International Survey on Corporate Sustainability Reporting” (2002) 
<http://www.wimm.nl/publicaties/KPMG2002.pdf> Accessed Dec.18, 2006. 
574
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act  (Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745) §§ 7241-7266. 
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environment, domestic and international labour relations, local community, and 
others.575  
 
In U.K., the 2002 Corporate Responsibility Act has imposed a duty on corporations to 
publish an annual report on all major CSR areas of concern.576 Other than Articles 7 and 
8 which provide for the environmental and social duties of directors, Article 6 
establishes further the liability of the parent company with regard to its subsidiaries: “A 
parent company of a corporate group shall be liable to pay compensation in respect of 
damages where … the group’s activities are managed and undertaken in a manner 
which fails to ensure… the health and safety of persons working in or affected by the 
activities and the protection of environment” and “such failure may be regarded as a 
cause of serious physical or mental injuries to persons working in or affected by the 
activities, or serious harm to the environment, or both”.577 Therefore the Corporate 
Responsibility Act not only imposes a CSR reporting obligation on corporations, but 
also creates an effective cause of action for victims of the subsidiary to sue the parent 




As an indispensable part of this research, during the period April to August 2004, the 
author has conducted a five-month fieldwork in mainland China. The fieldwork is 
                                                 
575
 S. Nahal, “Mandatory CSR Reporting: France’s Bold Plan” (2002) in International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
UK, Guide to Global Corporate Social Responsibility, at 182. 
576
 Art. 3, United Kingdom, Corporate Responsibility Act 2002  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmbills/129/2003129.pdf> Accessed Dec 18, 2006.  
577
 Id, Art. 6 
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designed to achieve three primary objectives. First to collect China sourced industrial 
and environmental data for the testing of the author’s hypothesis on DIM to China; 
second to obtain a true and fair picture of problems arising from DIM in China and its 
regulation by interview experts in related areas and conduct factory site visits; finally to 
examine the level of the corporate environmental citizenship and social responsibilities 
in China by interview selected corporations and their stakeholders. 
 
6.4.1 Fieldwork Methodology 
 
This thesis is the first comprehensive research on DIM in China. Considering the 
complexity of this issue and the multiplicity of stakeholders that are involved, together 
with the sensitivity of this topic not only to the investigated corporations, but also to the 
interviewed governmental bodies in China, the author decided to adopt the social 
science research method of snowball sampling to access a larger sample for the 
fieldwork.578  While this approach has its limitations, the process of the fieldwork has 
later proven that it is the most suitable method for the author to obtain a true and fair 
picture of DIM and CSR in China. 
 
                                                 
578  Snowball sampling is a special non-probability method used when the desired sample characteristic is rare. 
Snowball sampling relies on referrals from initial subjects to generate additional subjects. This sampling technique is 
often used in hidden populations which are difficult for researchers to access. While this technique can dramatically 
lower search costs, it comes at the expense of introducing bias because the technique itself reduces the likelihood that 
the sample will represent a good cross section from the population. See Salganik, M.J. & D.D. Heckathorn, 
“Sampling and Estimation in Hidden Populations Using Respondent-Driven Sampling” (2004) Sociological 
Methodology 34 at 193-239. 
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6.4.1.1 Designing the fieldwork 
 
In designing the populations for the research, the author first identified three broad 
groups of population. They are corporations, government, and other stakeholders. In the 
author’s opinion, these three groups represent the three major institutional forces for the 
regulation of DIM, i.e. the formal regulation of law (mainly driven by the government), 
the “invisible” regulation by the market (mainly driven by the stakeholders),579 and the 
self-regulation (mainly driven by the corporations). For corporations, based on their 
nature and ownership, the author further divides them into large multinational 
corporations, state-owned enterprises, 580 small and medium foreign invested companies, 
581
 and small and medium domestic companies. For governmental bodies, based on 
areas of regulation, the author has divided them into government bodies that are related 
to foreign investment  foreign trade, and environment. For other stakeholders, based 
their roles in the society the author has divided them into international organizations, 
academia, media, business professionals, and NGOs. An illustration on the categories of 
samples is shown in Chart 4: 
                                                 
579
 Some researchers suggested that a more effective solution to resolve apparent conflicts between business interests 
and environmental protection is to use market-oriented adjustments rather than political or regulatory mechanisms. 
See Hull,   B. and   St-Pierre, A., “The   Market   and  the   Environment:   Using   Market-Based   Approaches   to 
Achieve  Environmental  Goals” (1990) The  Conference  Board  of Canada; Also see  Cooper,  P.J.  “Toward the 
Hybrid  State:  the  Case  of Environmental Management in A Deregulated and Re-engineered State” (1995) 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 61, 185–200. 
580
 State owned enterprises traditionally refer to non-corporation economic units where the entire assets are owned by 
the state and which have registered in accordance with the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Management of Registration of Corporate Enterprises. Now with the SOE reform, state owned enterprise includes 
sole state-funded corporations in the limited liability corporations, a corporation pursuant to an investment where 
state-owned capital accounts for more than 50%, in some circumstances where the largest shareholder in a 
corporation is the state, this corporation can be called state-owned corporation. 
581
 The standard for “Small and Medium Enterprises” was defined in 中小企业标准暂行规定[Provisional Rules on 
the Standardization of Small and Medium Enterprises] (2003), which takes into account indexes such as the number 
of employees, the sales value and the total assets of the enterprises and in light of the characteristics of the industries. 
Also note that not all foreign invested enterprises are foreign invested corporations. For example, Sino-foreign 
contractual joint venture and Wholly foreign-owned enterprise can choose whether to register as a corporation, a 




Chart 4  Categories of Interviewees (Fieldwork) 
 
The initial short listed interviewees under each category are from the author’s contacts 
and referrals from the contacts. For categories under which no contacts of the author are 
available, the initial targets are selected from open sources.582 
 
After identifying the initial targets, a customized covering letter, stating the purpose and 
                                                 
582
 These open sources are mainly from internet. For example, the information of previous authors on DIM and 
related topics from University websites, the contact information of governmental departments from governmental 
websites, the contact information of Chinese environmental NGOs from <http://www.greengo.cn/>.  
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significance of the study, and promising confidentiality of responses, was emailed or 
faxed to each targeted interviewees. During the period from January to April, around 
250 such letters were sent which ensured that under each category there are at least 10 
candidates being approached. Based on their response status, 583  interested parties were 
subsequently contacted by telephone to arrange a convenient meeting time for interview. 
This process initially secured at least two interviewees under each category for a face-
to-face interview.  
 
6.4.1.2 Face-To-Face Interview 
 
The author adopts the face-to-face interview rather than traditional survey method as the 
primary research method for several reasons:  
 
First, considering the large variance between the professional and educational level of 
different interviewees, although the questions were framed in practitioner jargon, the 
author is concerned that the respondent’s apprehension about research of this nature 
may require further reassurance and clarification which could not be achieved through a 
mailed questionnaire.  
 
Second, given the complexity and sensitivity of this topic, many useful information and 
innovative ideas the author wishes to get from interviewees are hard to be designed in a 
                                                 
583
 According to the responses, excluding those who did not respond or were uncontactable (58), corporations that are 
inactive (14),  and those who are unwilling to participate in the study (35), a total number of 89 feedbacks were 
received, representing a response rate of 45.4%. The author considers the initial response rate encouraging in view of 
the difficulty of conducting survey research of this kind in China given the general tradition of secrecy. 
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questionnaire manner. Some generic “yes” or “no” questions or multiple choices 
questions have been utilized in many surveys and they are less likely to be serious 
questions for this research. Face-to-face interviews were expected to help in this respect 
and in the event respondents had no problems comprehending the questions.  
 
Finally, the nature of the snowball sampling methodology requires the author to use the 
referral of initial subjects to generate additional subjects. Therefore it is important that 
the author first win the trust of the interviewees so that larger subjects can be accessed.  
This approach is also in consistent with the Chinese culture which stresses guanxi and 
such personal relationship can not be obtained by questionnaires.    
 
Throughout the research period of this thesis (from 2003 to 2007) and most intensively 
during the period from April to August of 2004, a total number of 70 face-to-face 
interviews and 28 telephone interviews were successfully conducted in China and 
elsewhere.584 A list of interviewees is attached in Appendix 2 for reader’s reference. 
(see Appendix 2 “List of Interviewees”) 
 
The final interviewees comprised of 13 from the government, 18 from corporations, and 
67 from other stakeholders. Among the 13 interviewees from the government, 4 are 
                                                 
584
 In addition to interviews conducted in mainland China, some interviews were conducted in the United States 
during the author’s  conference attendance at the 6th Annual Association of Pacific Rim Universities Doctoral 
Student Conference held by University of Oregon in July 2005; Harvard East Asia Society (HEAS) Graduate 
Students Conference held by Harvard University in March 2005; International Conference on “Corporate Social 
Responsibility in China” held by Columbia University, New York, in April 2004; Some interviews were conducted in 
Singapore during the author’s attendance at the International Conference on “Fair Trading and Business Ethics”, held 
by Center for Commercial Law Studies of NUS in Singapore November 2003. Some interviews were conducted in 
Hong Kong and Macau during the author’s conference attendance at the World Business Ethics Forum, held by Hong 
Kong Baptism University and University of Macau on November 1-3, 2006. 
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governmental officials from the central or ministerial level, and 9 are local level 
governmental officials. Among the interviewees from corporations, 6 are from MNCs, 2 
are from SOEs, 10 are from foreign or domestic invested SMEs. The interviewees are 
primarily at management level. Among interviewees that are characterized as “other 
stakeholders”, 24 are academia. These scholars are mostly professors from law or 
management schools of esteemed Chinese Universities and most of them have 
published literatures in relation to the author’s research interest. 7 are from international 
organizations such as the World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR), Social Accountability 
International (SAI), etc. 5 are from foreign and domestic consultancy firms which 
provide business solutions to corporations, and help Chinese factories to obtain the 
international accreditations such as ISO9000, ISO14000, and SA8000. 17 are 
professionals comprising of lawyers, accountants and auditors. 4 are from the media. 
Among the interviewees, 62 are Chinese and 26 are of other nationalities. 
 
In order to create an interview environment conducive to ideas sharing, a customized 
and original questionnaire consisting of both informational and open-ended questions 
was used. For example, questions were structured to deal with the interviewee’s attitude 
towards not only DIM, but also the relationship between society and the environment, 
the future development of Chinese society, the law, government and other institutions 
relating to environment, etc. During the interviews, extensive notes were taken by the 
author. An interview summary form was prepared after each interview within 24 hours 
to highlight emergent themes and other issues of interest. In the process of filling the 
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summary form, when it was realized that the data collected was not satisfactory, follow-
up interviews were arranged and conducted through meetings or telephone. Each 
interview lasted an hour on average. 
 
6.4.1.3  Factory Site Visits  
 
Besides face-to-face interview, another essential part of the author’s fieldwork is the 
site-visit on corporations. The on-site visit of corporations not only facilitates the 
author’s understanding on the most pollusive production processes of different 
industries, but also enables the author to compare the extent of pollution control 
employed by corporations in the same industry but under different ownership.  
 
Throughout the research and most intensively during the period from April to August of 
2004, the author has successfully conducted site visits to 14 corporations. A list of 
visited corporations classified by industry, ownership structure, location, and with brief 
introduction is provided in Appendix 3 (See Appendix 3 “List of Site-visited Factories”). 
Some general criteria of selecting corporations for site-visit is summarized as follows:  
 
(1) The company, no matter foreign or domestically owned, is incorporated in China 
with an annual turnover of at least US$1 million; and 
(2) The company’s primary business must fall under the author’s definition of pollution 
intensive industry;585 and 
                                                 
585
 For the list of pollution intensive industries identified by the author see infra Table 2. 
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(3) If a company is not an FIE, then at least half of the company’s revenue must be 
achieved through exportation.586 
 
Companies that meet the above criteria generally fall under the author’s description of 
either active DIM or passive DIM in Chapter 2.2.3. The initial pool of candidate 
corporations is sourced from the author’s contacts and their referral. Subsequently, 
snowball sampling was used to access a larger sample. Sometimes the interviewees 
would recommend and direct the author to the corporations that they have visited 
before.587 In other occasions the author was arranged to follow the staff of EPB to 
investigate on the polluters, or to follow the local environmental consulting firms to 
provide on-site technical assistance to corporations. In both processes the author 
primarily took the form of participant-observer, documenting exchanges between the 
parties. When specific points required clarification, they were raised subsequently with 
the EPB staff or the environmental consultant, but not to the corporate managers 
directly. Through this approach the author was able to access larger samples of 
polluting enterprises. Finally, when the author’s interviewees are themselves 
entrepreneurs, they were often willing to guide the author for a visit at their factories 
immediately after the interview.  
 
                                                 
586
 This category of companies, although domestic, falls under the author’s definition of “passive DIM” as described 
in chapter 2.2.3. 
587
 The author would like to thank those interviewees who were very generous in sharing with the author their 
business contacts and referring the author to the targeted corporations for site-visit, especially Mr. Li Xiang, director 
of Chengdu Miracle Consulting Co., Mr.  Miao Xiaoxing, vice chief editor of the Xinhua Daily Newspaper, Ms. 
Chen Rong, officer of the IFC China Project Development Facility, and Ms. Annie Y. Ma, CEO of Beijing Alliance 
Investment Co., and Professor S. Prakash Sethi, president of International Center for Corporate Accountability, 
Baruch College, CUNY, etc. Without their support and referral the site-visit could not have been carried out 
successfully. 
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In addition, the author had the opportunity to visit three provincial and municipal-level 
industrial parks where foreign and domestic manufacturers concentrate and share the 
same infrastructure. The three industrial parks are Zhengzhou Hi-tech Industry 
Development Zone, Henan Zhengzhou Export Processing Zone in Zhengzhou city and 
the Chemical Industry Park of Jiangsu Funing Economic Development Zone in Funing 
city.588  
 
Throughout the factory site visits, observations and interviews with managers on site 
were carried out. For example, questions were asked on environmental improvements 
and how they were related to cost savings, waste reduction, customer satisfaction, new 
business markets and improved products, etc.  In addition, opportunities were given for 
entrepreneurs to comment freely on any environmental laws and regulations which 
affect them directly or indirectly. In most industrial factories, photographs were taken 
under the permission of entrepreneur.  
 
6.4.2 Fieldwork Results and Analysis 
 
6.4.2.1 General Findings from Interviews and Factory Site Visits 
 
Most interviewees were asked about their opinion about the phenomenon of DIM 
globally and its implications on China. To summarize, over 85% (84) of the 
                                                 
588
 For the information on three industrial parks, see Zhengzhou Hi-tech Industry Development Zone 
<http://www.zzgx.gov.cn/>, Zhengzhou Export Processing Zone < http://www.zzepz.gov.cn/>, Jiangsu Funing 
Economic Development Zone <http://www.jsfnkfq.com/>. 
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interviewees support the hypothesis that free trade and investment would drive pollution 
intensive industries to migrate from one country to the other, of whom over 70% (69) 
support the hypothesis that China has the potential to become a pollution haven.  
 
When the interviewees were asked to name a few representations of DIM, the most 
cited ones are: (1) the transfer of hazardous waste to China (55%); (2) FDI in pollution 
intensive industries in China (37%); (3) purchase from China the pollution intensive 
industrial products (32%); (4) MNCs to apply double standard / obsolete technology in 
its operation in China (24%); (5) export to China products that have potential harmful 
effect on people’s health and environment (15%).  
 
Interviewees were asked about which factors are driving the above representations of 
DIM, the most cited causes are: (1) low labour and environmental cost which provide 
incentives to foreign traders and investors (65%); (2) A pro-growth political and social 
environment which favors foreign trade and investment (52%); (3) the legislative 
shortcomings (including the inadequacy of environmental and other related laws, as 
well as poorly designed policy instruments) (46%); (4) the non- or low-enforcement of 
existing laws and policies (42.5%); etc. 
 
Interviewees were asked about their understanding on the connotation of CEC in the 
context of China, most interviewees consider the compliance with relevant laws and 
regulations to be the non-negotiable starting point (82%). This includes to install the 
pollution control equipment, conduct the EIA, and pay for pollution discharge in 
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accordance with law, etc. Other environmental responsibilities raised by the 
interviewees include to apply the energy saving / environmental friendly technologies, 
to publicize the potential human health and environmental effect of its production 
processes, to be responsible for the recycling of products, to adopt accounting policies 
that taking into account the environmental factors, to make donation or sponsor 
environmental programs, etc.  
 
During the factory site visits, the author observed that all the corporations visited have 
installed biological treatment, wastewater treatment, or chemical treatment units. More 
than half of the corporations stated that they have provided EHS training to their 
employees. Four of the visited corporations had shown the author their EHS policies in 
written form. The reasons for the installation of these units and provide EHS training 
were given as the obligation to meet the legal and governmental regulations (85%), the 
common trends in the sector / industrial practice (61%), and to meet the requirement of 
environmental management systems (18%).  
 
In the author’s interview with corporate managers in selected pollution intensive 
industries, most of the interviewees believed environmental issues to be issues that 
affect their business. Despite that most corporate managers expressed a positive attitude 
in supporting and directing the environmental activities, they generally perceive the 
meeting of environmental requirements as a cost which was not transferable to 
customers in terms of added benefits, and few could show that environmental activities 
led to a competitive advantage. Among all factories visited, only one stated that it has 
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informed its customers about the possible hazards their products and / or production 
processes may pose to the environment. The majority of companies do not tend to use 
environmental activities as a marketing tool. Only a few of them perceive environment-
friendly activities as a means of marketing. This implies that neither do the customers 
have any pressure to put on corporations obliging them to adopt environmental 
activities, nor do the corporations try to improve their environmental performance to 
gain more customer satisfaction. Such a finding is consistent with several previous 
studies which hold the view that in developing economies corporations’ environmental 
activities tend to be more affected by obligatory regulations coming from institutional 
forces than by voluntary regulations coming from their own social awareness.589 
 
In addition, it was found that different types of firms have different perceptions about 
CEC. Such perceptions are driving the corporations to engage in different types of 
environmental activities, with varying degree of zeal. Such a finding gives rise to the 
necessity of analyzing the CEC of corporations based on their different nature and 
ownership.  
 
                                                 
589 For example, see Banerjee SB., “Managerial Perceptions of Corporate Environmentalism: Interpretations from 
Industry and Strategic Implications for Organizations” (2001) Journal of Management Studies 38(4): 389–513; 
Küskü F, Aydın I. “Corporate Motivations and Pressures for Environmental Citizenship Behavior: the Case of 
Turkish Medicine Industry” (2002) paper presented in Eleventh World Business Congress–the Impact of 
Globalization on World Business in the New Millennium: Competition, Cooperation, Environment, and 
Development, Antalya, Turkey, 2002; 111–117. 
 295 
6.4.2.2 Corporate Environmental Citizenship of MNCs in China 
 
For various reasons, existing research on CSR in China tend to focuse on the social 
performance of MNCs that operate in China. MNCs, because of their transnational 
character, have always been the focus of public attention. Countries are competing for 
the investment by MNCs and MNCs are capable of negotiating with host countries 
about taxes, subsidies, rule of law issues, wages, environment and other parameters 
prior to investing.590  In practice, most MNCs operating in China are located in more 
developed coastal areas that have more stringent environmental standards and 
enforcement. They are careful in selecting their local partners and many of them formed 
joint venture with monopolistic SOEs. These joint ventures are industrial leaders in a 
wide range of productions and responsible for a broad spectrum of hazardous and 
pollution intensive activities. On one hand, a sizeable investment from MNCs benefits 
the local economy and represents investor’s confidence in the government’s ability to 
maintain a thriving business environment. On the other hand, it would be irresponsible 
for policy makers to assume that MNCs will voluntarily contribute to the government’s 
environmental protection effort. MNCs are neither charitable organizations nor 
philanthropists. They seek real profit and policy makers should develop realistic long-
term and short-term goals which integrate MNCs into their overall strategic planning. 
The keen suspicion by the host country governments manifested by the closer scrutiny 
                                                 
590
 See United Nations ESCOR, Division for Social Policy and Development, Report on the World Social Situation: 
1997 (1999), <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss97c0.htm> Accessed Feb 20, 2007, (stating that “Transnational 
forces that propel global changes, in particular mobile investment and finance, are weakening the ability of national 
governments to influence economic and social outcomes, often putting fulfillment of even the national political 
commitments, not to mention the ability to influence global trends, beyond the reach of elected national 
representatives.”) 
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directed towards compliance with environmental standards than towards their local 
counterparts is an example of such a paradoxical relationship.591   
 
6.4.2.2.1 Case Study: BASF Nanjing Site 
 
6.4.2.2.1.1 Background of BASF-YPC Company Ltd. 
 
The company BASF-YPC Co. Ltd. (“the Company”), which the author selected for site 
visit, is a joint venture project between the German MNC BASF and Chinese SOE 
Sinopec Yangzi Petrochemical Co. Ltd (“SYP”) with an overall investment US$2.9 
billion.592  BASF is the largest chemical producer in the world, specializing in the 
production of a wide range of chemicals, plastics, performance products, agricultural 
products & nutrition, and oil & gas. The BASF Group comprises more than 160 
subsidiaries and joint ventures and operates production sites in 41 countries. In recent 
years, BASF is active in expanding its international activities with a particular focus in 
Asia. The local partner SYP is a subsidiary of China’s chemical giant Sinopec. It is a 
super large SOE with shares listed in Shenzhen stock exchange. BASF and SYP each 
holds fifty percent stake in the Company.  
 
                                                 
591
 Warhurst, supra note 90 
592
 For an introduction on the joint venture Company, see BASF-YPC Company website: <http://www.basf-
ypc.com.cn/en/about_us/company.htm> Accessed Feb 9, 2007. 
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The Company produces a wide range of petrochemical products, which can be widely 
used in fields of light industry, textile, electronics, foodstuff processing, automobile, 
aviation, modern agriculture and etc. The Company’s 2.2 km2 integrated petrochemical 
site (IPS) comprises of 9 world scale petrochemical plants. It was built in a chemical 
industrial park located in the Luhe District of Nanjing, Jiangsu province. (See Photo 1) 
 
Photo 1    BASF Nanjing site—BASF-YPC Co. Ltd. 
Source: BASF 
 
6.4.2.2.1.2 Social and Economic Impacts of the Company 
 
The existence of the Company has large social-economic impact on the local 
community. The construction of the site caused the relocation of over 2000 farmers. At 
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the same time, the existence of the Company had a strong influence on the 
implementation of local public infrastructure projects such as roads and pipelines. The 
Company helps increasing the attraction of the Nanjing chemical industrial park for new 
businesses to settle down in the park and neighbouring areas. The Company facilitates 
local welfare by guaranteeing safe jobs for more than 1,000 employees, who mostly 
used to work with SYP. The local economy benefits from the growing expenses spent 
there by workers in the Company and the local government profit from increasing tax 
incomes.  
 
6.4.2.2.1.3 Environmental Impacts and Control 
 
As a chemical company, perhaps what is most concerned is its potential impact on the 
environment. Indeed, the existence of a world-scale chemical production site inevitably 
increases emission in the region. However, as will be shown, the Company has taken 
environmental protection seriously and embraced the principle of sustainable 
development throughout its production processes. According to the director of the 
Company’s EHS department, during the application phase of the project the Company 
conducted several mandatory EIA in accordance with law. Due to the size of the 
investment volume the SEPA instead of sub-national EPB was responsible for the 
approval of the EIA report, which translates into stricter examination and approval. 
Ever since the production phase, the Company has introduced the worldwide BASF 
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monitoring standard Responsible Care®593  to ensure satisfactory compliance with local 
laws and regulations. 
 
The Company has its own management system to deal with all sources of pollution. For 
example, on waste water, the major environmental risk is the pollution of the adjacent 
Yangzi River by waste water from the petrochemical plants in the Chemical Industrial  
Park. It was found that all waste water by the Company is treated by the waste water 
treatment plant of the joint venture partner SYP. Over ten years the quality of waste 
water treated by SYP was monitored by Nanjing EPB (which has monitoring stations 
within and around the Nanjing Chemical Industrial Park) and 98.8% of its waste water 
was below the necessary level. In addition, the Company demands regularly waste 
water analyses from SYP and in case of irregularity the Company will send its people 
on site to find out the problem.   
 
On the air emission, substances like NH3, SOX, NOX  as well as CO are measured  and  
controlled  by  the Company  on  a regular basis. The Company set up an air monitoring 
spot within the site which reports to the Nanjing EPB.  Notably, the Company uses a 
gas power plant instead of a coal based power plant in order to reduce the emission of 
CO2. Notably, according to the corporate manager, the Company has to meet not only 
the emission standard set by the Chinese law, but also that required by its foreign lender. 
                                                 
593
 The term Responsible Care® is copyrighted by the ICCA, the International Council of Chemical Associations. 
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It is a demand by the lenders that World Bank standards594 have to be followed. If a 
Chinese standard is higher than the World Bank standard then the Chinese standard will 
be chosen as the benchmark. As a result the current power plant emissions level is much 
lower than any applicable standard, reaching only 5% of the World Bank’s limit.  
 
On the treatment of residuals, it was reported that most residuals are treated by 
registered third party service providers. For example the heavy residuals of the Acrylic 
Acid / Acrylic Esters plant are either burnt or sold to a local purchaser. The light 
residuals are generally burnt while the heat is recovered and used for high pressure 
steam which again is used on the site. Toxic waste is also bought by a third party and 
buried in the ground. For solid waste incineration a contract with the Jiangsu Fuchang 
Chemical Waste Treatment Company Ltd. was signed. 
 
On the relationship between the Company and local environmental authorities, it was 
suggested that the Company is working closely with the Nanjing EPB in monitoring the 
plant’s environmental performance. Every month the Company sends report to the EPB 
about all emissions by the waste water pre-treatment facilities, boiler and furnace, the 
process of waste gas and flare. Every  year  the  emission  plan  from  the  past  year  is  
discussed  with the EPB and a new plan is negotiated.  
                                                 
594
 For a serious of World Bank standards, see for example, Environmental Assessment, Safeguard Policy OP 4.01, 
IFC, October 1998; World Bank Guidelines for Petrochemical Plant (1998); Environmental Assessment Process 
(Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook, World Bank Group, July 1998); Water Resources Management OP 
4.07, World Bank, February 2000. 
 301 
 
Finally, on the aspect of public awareness and participation, it was reported that during 
the period from 2002 to 2006, the Company has held four environmental impact 
dialogues with representatives from the nearby community, enterprises and the 
government. During the dialogue the Company introduced its EHS protection measures 
and listened to feedback from the community on the social and environmental impact 
from their operation.595 In addition, the Company sponsored public programs especially 
in the field of education. 
 
According to the Nanjing EPB, the Company had a positive impact in terms of setting 
high standards for environment, health and safety standard  which  can  be  used  as  a  
“best  practice”  for  the  whole  industry. Although the operation of the Company 
definitely increases the environmental risks to the nearby environment and community, 
the Company has demonstrated a good sense for environmental protection and has taken 
all possible environmental effects seriously. It can be considered as a model for 
environmental management for other nearby SMEs which traditionally have problems 
with environmental protection.  
 
In summary, despite the suspicion that the lack of effective state standards as well as 
regulatory capacity might draw the worst performing firms and dirtiest industries to the 
                                                 
595
 For the Company’s Environmental Impact Dialogues on its Integrated Petrochemical Site (IPS) Project see 
<http://www.basf-ypc.com.cn/en/hse/environment.htm> Accessed Feb 9, 2007. 
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least regulated countries, thereby creating “pollution havens”,596 the author’s site visit 
of the Company shows that super large MNCs like BASF operating in China tend to 
rely on their own interrelated array of policies and procedures to assure satisfactory 
compliance with applicable laws. They generally did better in environmental citizenship 
than domestic enterprises. Interview with corporate managers revealed that there are 
several reasons for that: First, MNCs like BASF usually have ambitious plans in 
entering China and these plans are often a part of their global business strategies. Most 
of them targets China’s market and economic outlook rather than solely cost advantages. 
Second, MNCs generally have access to superior technological and financial resources. 
They are also leaders in technological innovation, institutions of technological change 
and agents of commercialization for new technology.597 Thus their capacity to comply 
with the local regulations is beyond doubt. Due to an unfamiliarity and incompatibility 
with institutions nurtured within the socialist traditions, and probably also because of 
the ambiguity of Chinese local regulations, MNCs in China seem to be more cautious in 
their behavior and subject themselves more to the standards of their headquarters in the 
home country, and such standards are generally higher than China’s domestic standards. 
Finally, for their presumed “superiority” and reputation considerations, MNCs are 
obliged to pay attention to their social performances. This was reflected in their annual 
CSR or Sustainability Reports.598 
                                                 
596
 Zarsky, supra note 29. 
597
 See generally, Choucri, N. Global Accord, Environmental Challenges and International Responses (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993). 
598
 For an example of annual environmental sustainability report of MNC operating in China, see Ricoh Group 
Sustainability Report (Environment) (2005), <http://www.ricoh.com/environment/report/pdf2005/china/all.pdf>; 
Ricoh Group was ranked the 3rd of “the most socially responsible Fortune 500 MNCs in China 2006”. The ranking 
was prepared by the Chinese influential newspaper Nanfang Daily, the ranking is available in Chinese at: 
<http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2006-11/23/content_7399647.htm> Accessed Feb 5, 2007. 
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6.4.2.2.2 Problem with MNC’s CEC—“Green” the Supply Chain 
 
Despite the general superiority of MNCs’ CEC over other forms of corporations, a 
critical issue remains as how do MNCs respond to the accusation of “passive DIM” 
whereby some MNCs appear “green” themselves but in fact they have contracted out 
their dirty production process to local suppliers. For example, it was reported that 70% 
of the MNC Wal-Mart’s world-wide suppliers come from China. With Wal-Mart’s 
massive purchasing power, it is capable of keeping the procuring price as low as 
possible while still attracting numerous suppliers. When the supply orders from MNCs 
come, the Chinese suppliers produce and sub-contract their orders at an even lower 
margin. Among these contractors and sub-contractors there are numerous heavy 
polluters. Under these circumstances, although Wal-Mart itself is not involved in any 
“dirty” production, it simply transferred such responsibilities to its suppliers who are 
less able than Wal-Mart to deal with environmental problems.  
 
The literature on the supply chain environmental management suggests that purchasing 
can be viewed not only as way of greening the procurement function of an organization 
but  also  as  a  way  of  influencing  others  in  a supply  chain.599 To green the supply 
chain may require the corporation to undertake a range of activities such as to seek 
information on environmental aspects of policies, processes and systems from 
                                                 
599
 Lamming  R,  Hampson  J.  “The  Environment  As  A Supply Chain Management Issue” (1996) British Journal 
of Management 7 (Special Issue): S45–S62.; Morton B. “The Role of Purchasing and Supply Management in 
Environmental Improvement” (1996) Business Strategy and Environment Conference Proceedings 136–141. 
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suppliers, 600  to impose specific environmental requirements upon suppliers, 601  to 
address the company’s accreditation to an environmental management standard by 
assessing a supplier’s environmental performance,602 to cease purchasing from suppliers 
who fail to meet the company’s environmental criteria,603 and to share experiences and 
best practice with suppliers,604 etc. 
 
Despite these principles, in practice MNCs seldom make efforts to influence their 
suppliers. Bowen et al. (2001) point out that many large firms with strategic purchasing 
have not undertaken green supply, as it is not commercially important enough to their 
business.605  Holt (2004) examines the supply management activities undertaken by a 
sample of 149 large UK based organizations. It was found that larger, higher risk 
organizations are beginning to reach out to their suppliers, although still at a fairly low 
level. The method of supply chain management is primarily through assessment and 
evaluation, and to a much lesser extent through supplier education, mentoring or 
coaching. 606 According to his survey, only 21 of the 149 organizations stated that they 
felt their own environmental stance had influenced their suppliers. 18 organizations 
stated that they would not reject a supplier even if they failed to meet their own 
                                                 
600
 Hill KE.  “Supply Chain Dynamics, Environmental Issues and Manufacturing Firms” (1997) Environment and 
Planning 29: 1257–1274; Green K, Morton B, New S. “Case study in the UK – Green Purchasing and Supply 
Policies: Do They Improve Companies’ Environmental Performance?” (1998) Supply Chain Management 3(2): 
89–95. 
601
 Business in the Environment (BiE), Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS). (1997)  Buying Into A 
Green Future. BiE: London. 
602
 Clayton J, Rotheroe  C.  “An Analysis of Supplier Environmental Assessment in the UK” (1997) Eco-
Management and   Auditing   Conference   3–4   July,   The   Manchester Conference Centre: Conference 
Proceedings. ERP Environment: Shipley; 19–24. 
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 Baylis R, Connell L, Flynn A. “Small and Medium Enterprises: the Implications of Greener Purchasing” in 
Russel T (ed.) Greener Purchasing Opportunities and Innovations,(Greenleaf: Sheffield 1998), at 135–150. 
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 Business in the Environment (BiE). (1993). supra note 601.  
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 Bowen  FE,  Cousins  PD,  Lamming  RC,  Faruk AC.  “The Role  of  Supply  Management Capabilities in 
Green Supply.  (2001) Production  and  Operations  Management  10(2): 174–189. 
606
 Daniel Holt, “Managing the Interface between Suppliers and Organizations for Environmental Responsibility—
An Exploration of Current Practices in UK”, (2004) Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Management 11, 71-84. 
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environmental criteria. Interestingly, the most popular supplier assessment criterion as 
identified by respondents is that “the supplier must not have been identified publicly as 
having poor environmental or ethical performance”. Only the largest companies have 
identified their suppliers’ accredit to ISO14001, EMAS or similar standards to be 
essential. 607  According to Holt, this lack of assistance for suppliers is especially 
disturbing for the SME sector, which traditionally need more “hand-on” guide, and may 
eventually be rejected as suppliers for failing to confirm to environmental standards 
they do not understand or require assistance to achieve.608   
 
6.4.2.2.3 Supply Chain Environmental Management in China 
 
An examination on the commodity’s chain and foreign investment vehicle in China may 
cast some light on the problem. In the case of China, (as shown in Chart 5) there is a 
hierarchy among various corporations within the same commodity’s chain. At the top 
level are the external markets (mainly U.S., Europe and Japan) served by MNCs. These 
MNCs, like Wal-mart, Nike, and IBM, no longer hold their own manufacturing 
workshops since 1990s instead, they have suppliers all around the world, and their 
headquarters mainly function as a business and R&D center.  
 
At the middle level are corporations from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. 
These corporations play an intermediary role in that on one hand, they receive orders 
from top tier MNCs and are their direct suppliers; on the other hand, they also invest in 
                                                 
607
 Id, at 80. 
608
 Id, at 81. 
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manufacturing plants in the mainland China. Although mostly small and medium in size, 
these investors comprise of the largest source of FDI in China.  
 
At the bottom of this hierarchy are the Chinese domestic enterprises, be they state-
owned, collective-owned, or private-owned. These Chinese enterprises are fortunate in 
the sense that they are privileged to supply the foreign customers, which often translates 
to better pay compared with their domestic peers. However, these Chinese enterprises 
are also unfortunate in the sense that they are positioned at the bottom of the supplier’s 
chain. They are the group with the least CEC awareness but meet the real environmental 
challenges.  
 
For a long time since economic reform, China has adopted a foreign trade operator 
approval policy. It implied that most domestic enterprises do not have their own foreign 
trade rights.609 In order for these enterprises to receive orders and export products, they 
rely on the complex licensing arrangements with “Trading Houses” and agents who 
arrange their production. In other words, supply and demand are matched by the third 
party and buyers and sellers do not know each other (though this situation has recently 
been improved).610  
                                                 
609
 According to this policy, import / export rights may only be granted to the following operators: (1) Specialized 
foreign trade houses affiliated to MOFTEC, provincial, and municipal governments; (2) Foreign invested enterprises, 
and confined to its own products and production facilitates; (3) other productive enterprises upon approval; (4) 
Certain scientific institutions and academies engaged in technological products; and (5) approved large commerce 
and materials enterprises  中华人民共和国对外贸易法[Foreign Trade Law] (1994, now abolished). 
610
 Note that the situation has changed since the promulgation of the Foreign Trade Law of 1994. On 1 January 1999 
and 1 January 2000, MOFTEC had twice relaxed controls on approving import and export rights, some 1,000 
enterprises had been granted rights to do import and export business. In 2001 the MOFTEC has issued a Circular 
which provides that private enterprises each with registered capital not less than RMB 5 million (not less than RMB 3 
million in central and western regions) can apply for the right to handle foreign trade business. Enterprises with 
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Chart 5  Illustration on the Hierarchy of the Supplier’s Chain in China 
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Under the above hierarchy, the serious problem of information asymmetry arises. As 
trading houses and agents do not necessarily share the stated values and business 
practices of the brand name company, it is often difficult for MNCs to supervise what is 
going on at the bottom Chinese domestic suppliers. In fact, this lack of information has, 
in some cases, even become a calculated risk management strategy of MNCs to assist in 
ensuring minimal damage to their reputation as a result of potential liabilities. For 
example, in a recent product quality survey conducted in March 2005, cancer-causing 
Sudan-I was found in Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) food; hazardous contents were 
found in P & G’s well known cosmetic brand SK-II, and in Johnson & Johnson’s baby-
                                                                                                                                               
minority regions), research institutes, high-tech firms and electromechanical enterprises not less than a registered 
capital of RMB 1 million) can apply for import and export right. Such rights may even be granted to individuals, 
subject to certain conditions. 
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care products. When the scandal was released to the public, the first thing that these 
MNCs do was to stand out and claim innocence themselves, and attribute the 
responsibilities to their Chinese suppliers.611  
 
It was suggested that to manage the suppliers is an integral part of CSR for MNCs.612  
Positioned at the top of the “buyer-driven commodity’s chain”, 613  and receive the 
highest margin from the production, MNCs are both capable and under a duty to 
influence their suppliers on environmental citizenship.  
 
Understanding that customers and other stakeholders do not always differentiate 
between a company and its suppliers, and may hold companies accountable for their 
suppliers’ environmental and labour practices, it was reported that some MNCs have 
started to look beyond their own facilities and involve their suppliers in environmental 
initiatives. In practice, some MNCs have initiated routines of monitoring or auditing, 
in which personnel or specific sections within the corporation perform so called “social 
audits” of their suppliers. It is the aim of these social audits to assess whether the 
suppliers comply with the Codes of Conduct of the corporations. The fact that some 
MNCs, such as Reebok, Nike and Disney, have set up specific CSR offices in mainland 
                                                 
611 Anonymous, “Johnson & Johnson: Baby Products Are Safe” Xin hua Daily March 24, 2005, 
<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/24/eng20050324_178038.html> Accessed Feb 5, 2007. 
612
 Bantekas, supra note 501, at 311 (commenting that “essentially, CSR recognizes that corporations are not only 
responsible to their shareholders, but owe, or should owe, particular duties to persons or communities directly or 
indirectly affected by their operations;” and “[t]he human rights and environmental conformity of the supply chain 
can be guaranteed by entering into binding contracts whereby such agents and suppliers are obliged to adhere to the 
corporation’s Business Principles”). 
613
 Gereffi, Gary, “The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How US Retailers Shape Overseas 
Production Networks” in Gary Gereffi & Miguel Korzeniewicz (eds.) Commodity Chains and Capitalism (Praeger: 
West Port CT, 1994), at pp. 95-122.  
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China and Hong Kong indicates the high priority given to these efforts.614  
 
As a global trend, the Supplier Environmental Management (“SEM”) focuses on 
streamlining company’s supply base and to develop more cooperative, long-term 
relationships with key suppliers and service providers.615 Many companies that have 
undertaken SEM programs have found that working with suppliers on environmental 
issues not only generates significant environmental benefits, but also offers 
opportunities for cost containment and competitive advantage. For example, in the 
BASF Nanjing site that the author visited, it was reported that due to the Company’s 
large quantity of waste residuals, the Company has always been careful in selecting 
service providers which implement up-to-date standards in terms of EHS protection. 
Given the situation that there is few qualified purchasers in Nanjing which can meet 
BASF’s standard for waste treatment, the Company stated that if a local purchaser 
doesn’t have fully compliant standards yet, the Company would sell the waste for less 
than the market price on the condition the local purchaser can invest in building up the 
standards. The Company also offers trainings for third parties and audits the quality of 
their services. All these measures have already created several positive results with the 
service providers. For example, it was reported that new equipped trucks were 
purchased by a transportation company that provides logistics service for BASF and a 
new furnace being built at a waste treatment plant. Additionally there is evidence that 
                                                 
614 See Tan Shen & Liu Kaiming, Social Responsibilities of Multinational Corporations and the Chinese Society 
(Social Science Press, Beijing, 2003), at 20. 
615
 Examples of SEM include screening suppliers for environmental performance, setting purchasing standards to bar 
the purchase of products made through prohibited production processes, working collaboratively with suppliers on 
green design initiatives, and providing training and information to build suppliers’ environmental management 
capacity For a general briefing on the issues of supplier environmental management and initiatives of paradigm 
MNCs, see <http://www.bsr.org/AdvisoryServices/Environment.cfm> Accessed Apr 20, 2005. 
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some solid waste subcontractors expanded their capacities because of the Company. 
These are all excellent examples on how MNCs can have a positive impact on the CEC 
of their suppliers in China. 
 
6.4.2.3 CEC of Foreign Invested Small and Medium Size Enterprises in China 
 
Small and Medium Size Foreign Invested Corporations (“foreign invested SMEs”) is a 
group that should be treated differently from MNCs in many aspects. Their instinct to 
maximize profits, coupled with the absence of keen international observers and 
relatively low risk of world-wide boycott on their production activities, have rendered 
the foreign invested SMEs reluctant to take CEC seriously. Some of them were 
involved in the direct transfer of dirty production into China. In regard to corporate 
vehicles, foreign invested SMEs usually take the form of Equity Joint Venture (EJV), or 
Contractual Joint Venture (CJV) with local partner(s). According to EJV laws, there is a 
requirement for joint subscription of registered capital, joint management and joint 
sharing of profits and risks. Such arrangement serves as a channel for the Chinese party 
to learn advanced technology and management from the foreign party. While in CJV, 
the Chinese and foreign parties cooperate in joint projects or activities according to the 
terms and conditions stipulated in their joint venture agreements. This has the main 
advantage of flexibility, as the proportion of sharing is not necessarily the same as their 
respective proportion of investment.  
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The author’s fieldwork showed that the social performance of foreign invested SME 
varies drastically. Generally, compliance with local EHS standards is not problems for 
most of these FIEs as they have both the financial and technological capacity to meet 
such standards. However, given that such corporations are invested in by small and 
medium investors, to whom the main objective is to achieve high yield with minimum 
inputs, these corporations are found more likely to speculate in those pollution intensive 
industries and their chance of being caught in violation of environmental standards is 
potentially high. There is evidence that a selected number of foreign investors 
(including Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan investors) routinely chose to neglect 
environmental regulations in pursuit of high economic returns on investment, and then 
relocate, bribe or declare bankruptcy when caught red-handed. In the phosphate 
industry, for example, the author has found rampant dirty production in western China, 
especially Sichuan and Shanxi province, where phosphate resources are abundant. The 
Township and Village Enterprises (“TVEs”) there are the major polluters. 616  The 
author’s incomplete estimation on the TVEs in phosphate industry in Mian Zhu city of 
Sichuan province shows that over 80% are either foreign invested or suppliers to 
foreign clients.617  
 
Youfou (1995) notes that many foreign investors in dirty industries enter into joint 
ventures with China’s township factories that are beyond the reach of enforcement 
                                                 
616
 According to Vermeer (1998), seriously polluting township and village enterprises (TVEs) have accounted for 
about half of China’s industrial output in recent years. See Vermeer EB, supra note 419, at 960. 
617
 Source from the author’s interview with Mr. Li Xiang, director of Chengdu Miracle Consulting Co. Ltd in May, 
2004. 
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efforts by national government officials.618 TVEs are, in many respects, a “soft target” 
for regulators because of their size, dispersed nature, small workforce and lack of 
administrative protection from controlling ministries.619 The author’s site visit on these 
enterprises revealed that most of them do not have a separate department on 
environmental issues. They usually conduct environmental activities through a quality 
coordination department, or a quality security directorship. The few firms that do have 
separate department on environment generally demonstrate a higher willingness to 
introduce to the author on their environmental measures and initiatives. Such a finding 
is consistent with the empirical findings of Zhu and Sarkis (2004) that there is a 
relationship between whether organizations have quality-based programs and their 
support or adoption of environmental management practices, and that the strength of 
this relationship depends on the size of the organization.620  
 
Another notable finding is that in China a few paradigm FIEs have begun to hold the 
belief that if local contractors want to establish and continue business with them, they 
will let themselves be audited and comply with relevant EHS requirements. Interview 
with a CEO of a pharmaceutical Co. which had recently received private investment 
from Singapore revealed that an increasing number of foreign parties are requesting ISO 
and GMP standards over its Chinese partners and suppliers. Such initiative stimulates 
                                                 
618
 See Xia Youfou, Study on China’s Control Measures to the Transfer of Foreign Wastes and Pollution Intensive 
Industries Through Trade and Investment (Winnipeg, Canada 1995). 
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 See Peter Hills and C.S. Chan, supra note 18, at 54. 
620
 See Qinghua Zhu and Joseph Sarkis, “the Link between Quality Management and Environmental Management in 
Firms of Differing Size: An Analysis of Organizations in China” (2004) Environmental Quality Management Spring 
2004, 53-64, at 54. 
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local suppliers to self-discipline on its environmental management which also benefits 
them through access to broader market.621 
 
In conclusion, being positioned in the middle of the global hierarchy of supplier’s chain, 
and pressured their closer exposure to global market as well as their deemed superiority 
to domestic SMEs, the foreign invested SMEs in China is a group which has just started 
to derive some sense of CEC. An opportunity is growing for these companies to 
demonstrate their credentials to rapidly growing international markets which 
increasingly favors sustainable production and socially responsible investments. Despite 
these good initiatives, there is still large room for improvement which requires foreign 
invested SMEs to take the lead in not only engaging in clean production but also 
supporting their suppliers to meet their set requirements. Such support shall include not 
only supplier assessment and evaluation, but also supplier education, mentoring or 
coaching.622  These improvements shall not only save the FIE’s own environmental cost, 
but also help the FIEs to establish long-term business relationship with trustful suppliers.  
 
6.4.2.4 CEC for Domestic Small and Medium Enterprises in China 
 
The standard for “Small and Medium Size Enterprises” was defined in the 2003 Interim 
Provisions on the Standards for Medium and Small Enterprises,623 which takes into 
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 Sourced from the author’s interview with Mr. Zhang Yinhua, CEO and director of Yancheng Huaye 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 
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 See Holt, supra note 606. 
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 Interim Provisions on the Standards for Medium and Small Enterprises (2003)  issued jointly by the National 
Economic and Trade Commission, National Planning Commission, Department of Finance and National Statistics 
Bureau. 
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account such criteria as the number of employees, the sales value and the total assets of 
the enterprises and in light of the characteristics of the industries.624 Ever since China’s 
economic reform in 1978, the SME is undoubtedly the fastest growing sector. Statistics 
show that as of October 2004, the number of SMEs exceeds 8 million in China, 
accounting for 99% of the nation’s total enterprises in number. Their industrial output 
accounts for 60% of the national total, and provides over 80% of the new 
employment. 625  The development of SME is a priority in the country’s economic 
reforms.  
 
SME has its unique advantage in implementing social responsibility. They are generally 
well connected with their respective communities and in many ways understand the 
local needs better. Often their interest is hand-in-hand with that of the local government. 
In addition, as China is gradually transforming from a semi-market economy to a 
market one, the SMEs play a key role in accommodating the redundant labour that were 
cut down by state-owned enterprises.626 According to the data provided by China NBS, 
between 1996 and 2001, the number of employees in private enterprises increased by 
nearly 300%, and 31.7 million jobs were created. This emphasized the role of SME in 
                                                 
624According to Art. 4 of Interim Provisions on the Standards for Medium and Small Enterprises, supra note 581, the 
standards for industrial medium and small enterprises are: “less than 2000 employees, or sales amount of less than 
300 million yuan, or total amount of assets of less than 400 million. Among which, medium enterprises must 
concurrently meet these conditions: 300 employees or more, sales amount of 30 milliona yuan or more, and total 
amount of assets of 40 million yuan or more; and the rest are small enterprises.”  
625
 Data from China Industry News, <http://my.tdctrade.com/airnewse/index.asp?id=1113> Accessed Nov 19, 2004. 
626
 Statistics shows that from 1997 to 1999, the reform of State-owned enterprises and the cut of governmental organs 
had resulted in a “lay-off” up to 47 million. During the same period the new employment opportunities was 22 
million, and these opportunities are almost exclusively created by private owned economies. China Securities 
Newspaper, 10 Dec 2002. 
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reducing poverty and providing supplementary employment opportunities for the 
society. In the author’s view, these are SME’s two most important social responsibilities.  
 
To find out the status among domestic SMEs on CEC, the author did his fieldwork in 
Sichuan Province of western China. During the fieldwork, the author received a great 
deal of assistance from the China Project Development Facilities (“CPDF”) of the 
International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) based in Chengdu.  
  
6.4.2.4.1 IFC-CPDF: Missions and Approaches in China 
 
CPDF is a multi-donor SME facility managed by the IFC, the private sector arm of 
World Bank Group. It was planned and implemented in close collaboration with the 
Chinese government. The facility was established in 2002 to support the development 
of a vibrant private sector, and to foster the societal base of CSR in the interior of 
China.627  One of the core programs of CPDF is to strengthen the local enterprises 
through technical support projects; design and support management education on 
corporate governance and environmental management programs.  
 
According to the author’s interview with Dr. Xiaofang Shen, the director of CPDF, the 
local companies need assistance in getting started in the process towards becoming an 
environmentally sustainable business. However, based on CPDF experience, it is 
                                                 
627 For an introduction of the organizational goals of CPDF and its work see <http://www.cpdf.org/en/index-
new.htm> Accessed Feb 10, 2007. 
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difficult to offer a pure environmental or CSR program, simply because there is no 
appreciable market demand for such programs in the interior China. Therefore, CPDF 
decided to change its strategy. Understanding that Chinese SMEs generally show a 
preference for advice that is company specific, face-to-face and preferably delivered on 
site,628  and that such advices need to be delivered at an affordable cost with measurable 
benefits,629 the CPDF turned to promote its business enabling programs which embrace 
environmental performance as an intrinsic part of business development.630 Over the 
years the CPDF has developed a fairly large pool of corporate clients.631 It was through 
CPDF that the author was able to access one of their clients—the Chengdu Miracle 
Environmental Consultancy Ltd., and through which to further access the SMEs for site 
visit. 
 
6.4.2.4.2 Environment Consultancy Firms and International Accreditations 
 
Chengdu Miracle Environmental Consultancy Ltd (“Miracle”) is a private company 
                                                 
628
 Groundwork, “Small Firms and the  Environment:  A Groundwork Status Report” (1998) Groundwork: 
Birmingham. 
629
 See Rowe J, Hollingsworth D., “Improving the Environmental Performance of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises: A Study in Avon” (1996) Eco-Management and Auditing 3: 97–107, at 104. 
630
 Accordingly, the services they provide cover the issues that are most popular among SMEs, such as marketing, 
internal cost reduction, and financial management, etc. A special feature, which distinguishes these CSR facilitation 
organs from general business consulting firms, is that the role of CSR is highlighted as a business strategy which is 
integrated in their training. Source: the author’s interview with Chen Rong, officer of CPDF.  
631
 Throughout the interview, it is interesting to find that the marketing of CSR programs in China is an art. At the 
beginning, in order to create incentives for these potential clients to join the program, CPDF organized a series of 
seminars and business activities to promote their tenets and services. Many local entrepreneurs have seen it as an 
opportunity to meet people and seek advice from IFC experts. While the World Bank does not guarantee it would 
provide financial assistance to local SMEs, many enterprises enter their CSR program with the hope that they would 
obtain sources of financing from the World Bank. In view of this reality, facilitation organs like the CPDF did 
substantial research to target a group of people / corporations who may become their long-term partners. According 
to their officer, University lecturers, educated entrepreneurs as well as local business consultancy firms are their most 
favorable client bases. The distinct characters shared by these people are: Firstly they are relatively open to modern 
concepts of management, including those integrate the values of CSR; secondly they are innovative and have 
potentials for growth; finally these people have the widest social contacts thus could disseminate the CSR values to 
people they communicate with. Empirical evidence indicates that this approach is a fast and effective way to market 
the CSR programs. Source: the author’s interview with Ms. Shen Xiaofang, director of CPDF. 
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specializes in providing environment-related consultation services to corporations. An 
essential part of the company’s business is to provide technical assistance to SMEs that 
wish to obtain international accreditation such as ISO9000, ISO14000, and Social 
Accountability 8000 (“SA 8000”), etc. According to Mr. Li Xiang, director of Miracle, 
currently in Chengdu alone there are more than 50 companies which provide similar 
services. The emergence of such professional business consultancy firms, which 
specialize in the promotion and training of international environmental accreditations in 
China, is in itself an indication of the growing market demand for such services.632  
 
Consider the fact that most SMEs are sensitive to open questions on their EHS 
performances but prefer on-site advices, the author adopted the suggestion of Miracle to 
acts as the director’s assistant and follows the director in his on-site training of a series 
of Miracle’s client firms in Sichuan Province. During the on-site training the author 
mainly acted as an observer and documented the process as well as exchanges between 
the parties. The author’s questions to SMEs were raised in advance to the director and 
were asked through him to the corporate managers. If some points required clarification, 
they were raised subsequently with the director, but not to the corporate managers 
directly. By this means, the author was able to capture a true picture of environmental 
activities among SMEs.  
 
                                                 
632
 For instance, the SA 8000 certification program was initiated in 1996 by the New York based NGO Social 
Accountability International (SAI). By the end of 2006, the  number  of SA8000  certified  facilities  around  the  
world  totals 968, of which 127  are  located  in China. <http://www.sa-intl.org/_data/global/includes/worldmap.htm> 
Accessed Jan 18, 2007. 
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6.4.2.4.3 Case Study: SMEs in Phosphate Industry in Sichuan Province 
 
The pollutive nature of phosphate industry has been recognized extensively in 
literature.633 The fieldwork covers four domestic SMEs in the phosphate industry. They 
all locate in the city of Mianzhu, which is about 50 miles from Chengdu. The Mianzhu 
city is famous for its phosphate mines and as a result, there are more than 50 SMEs 
which engage in the production and sale of phosphate and phosphate-related chemical 
products. For confidentiality reasons in this thesis the author would not disclose their 
names.  
 
The author’s fieldwork first reveals that before the training there is a general lack of 
CEC awareness among SMEs. Interviews with corporate managers reveal that many 
SMEs consider their impact on the environment to be minimal and therefore are 
insensitive to the regulatory changes on environment. Most SMEs had a generally poor 
perception of the need for environmental improvements and were ill equipped to take 
advantage of such improvements. For example, when the corporate managers were 
asked about whether their enterprise in the past has ever benefited from environmental 
improvement, almost all held the opinion that environmental responsibility and 
improvements were a cost and that cost were not possible to pass on to customers in the 
                                                 
633
 See for example, Demandt, I, “The World Phosphate Fertilizer Industry, A Research Project for the EU on 
Environmental Regulation, Globalization of Production and Technological Change” (1999) United Nations 
University, Institute for New Technologies, Brussels; Scott H. Dewey, “The Fickle Finger of Phosphate: Central 
Florida Air Pollution and the Failure of Environmental Policy 1957-1970 (1999) Journal of Southern History, Vol. 
65, No. 3, pp. 565-603; Michael Connett, “The Phosphate Fertilizer Industry: An Environmental Overview” (2003) 
Fluoride Action Network, <http://www.fluoridealert.org/phosphate/overview.htm> Accessed Feb 10, 2007; 
Constantine Yapijakis and Lawrence K. Wang,“Treatment of Phosphate Industry Wastes”, in Lawrence K. Wang, 
Yung-Tse Hung, Howard H. Lo, Constantine Yapijakis, Kathleen Hung Li (Eds.) Handbook of Industrial and 
Hazardous Wastes Treatment (2nd Edition, Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York-Basel). 
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form of higher prices since the competitive forces in the marketplace were keeping 
prices down. A manager of a small scale factory even told the author they cannot afford 
to comply with local environmental laws in the absence of guarantee that their 
competitors will do.  
 
Regarding the motives of these SMEs to employ experts to improve their environmental 
mental performance, the “request from customers” and “access to broader market” are 
their two most cited reasons. According to the corporate managers, it is now a common 
practice in China for potential customers, before placing an order, to send representative 
or contract third party to inspect the production plants, and customers from U.S., 
Europe and Japan are especially interested in checking and inquiring into their 
environmental performances.634 Sometimes local suppliers do not know how to satisfy 
these queries yet they do not want to lose any potential customer. Consequently, an ISO 
accreditation becomes a proof to satisfy most standards that customers demand of them. 
An ISO accredited enterprise often distinguishes itself from those without accreditation 
in showing the potential customers that it is more capable of meeting the required 
specifications. Such an observation is in line with a series of literature which find that 
international economic competition and greater economic openness can influence the 
rate of strengthening environmental regulations.635  For example, Lee (1993) finds that 
Korea upgraded its regulatory standards (pollution abatement for cars) to match what 
                                                 
634
 Sometimes consultancy firms like Miracle itself is mandated by the buyers to conduct routine checks on their 
suppliers, which makes these firms in many aspect understand the buyer’s needs better. That is probably also one of 
the reasons why SMEs are willing to employ consultancy firms to improve their social and environmental 
performance.  
635
 See Vogel, D., “Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and Environmental Protection” 
(1997) 4:4 Journal of European Public Policy 556-571. (finding that obtaining access to greener industrialized 
country markets can motivate higher environmental standards.) 
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was in effect for the United States, EU and Japan.636 Ruishu et al. (1993) finds that in 
China, there is evidence that large state owned factories have endured higher production 
costs as a result of stronger environmental policies and regulations in industrialized 
countries.637  In Chile, the pulp and paper industry has decreased chlorine bleaching 
largely in response to export market pressures, 638  and Israel was reported to have 
adopted EU pesticide standards in order to get market access to the European Union.639  
 
Regarding the main obstacles for these SMEs to implement environmental activities, 
one of the most cited ones is the short of finance. To allocate resources on 
environmental protection would mean that less resource will be spent in the production 
and sale, and further make SMEs uncompetitive on the market. As a result, it is not 
surprising to find that many SMEs are engaged in reckless production at the cost of 
environment. More profoundly, the deficiency in working capital has caused these 
SMEs to pursue short-term goals without an overall scientific planning, which 
conversely makes them unsustainable in the first place. Suppose the corporate finance 
environment for SMEs in China can be improved so that SMEs have wider access to 
bank loans and other sources of capital,640 they would consider long-term goals and 
                                                 
636
 See Lee, D., “The Effect of Environmental Regulations on Trade: Cases of Korea’s New Environmental Laws”, 
(1993) 5 Georgetown International Law Review 659. 
637
 See Ruishu, L., Xia, Y., Zhang, J., & Lu, Y. (1993) A Study on Environmental Protection and Foreign Trade 
Development in China (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development/United Nations Development 
Program (UNCTAD/UNDP) Project on Reconciliation of Environment and Trade Policies: Geneva). 
638
 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1999: Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Development, 
(UNCTAD: Geneva 1999). 
639 Vogel, D., “Environmental Regulation and Economic Integration” (2000) 3:2 Journal of International Economic 
Law 265-280. 
640
 In regard to the external environment for SME fund raising, in China the capital market is far from fledging. To 
most SMEs the sources of financing are limited to bank loans. However the Chinese banking system has inherent 
problems. Generally banks and other investors are reluctant to provide small loans to SMEs because the interest gain 
for such loans are minimal and the risks of non-repayment are high, but overlooking the fact that today’s SME may 
become tomorrow’s magnate if they obtain funds to carry out their expansion plans. It therefore created a vicious 
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more wisely manage their production. This is crucial as the return for the investment on 
environmental improvement usually become appreciable over a long period of time. 
 
The other obstacle for SMEs to take environmental activities is perhaps their inability to 
take the advantage of environmental improvements. Past literature has shown the 
potential for SMEs to benefit from engaging in environmentally sustainable ways of 
production.641 However, according to the fieldwork, many SMEs did not realize that 
environmental improvements are associated with cost reduction and more efficient 
energy use. Furthermore, it was found that none of the visited phosphate factories had 
ever used their environmental activities as a marketing tool.642  
 
All the above problems highlight the importance of capacity building among domestic 
SMEs. In this regard local consultancy firms like Miracle have an important role to play 
in guiding them to scientifically manage their limited resources in achieving socially 
desirable production without undermining profit maximization. Throughout the process 
                                                                                                                                               
cycle that on one hand, Chinese banks overstock trillions of loanable capital but fail to lend; on the other hand, large 
numbers of SMEs thirsty for finance are unable to borrow due to their small size. Although other sources of financing 
such as Venture Capital, Private Equity, or Overseas Fundraising etc are developing quickly in China, the investors 
seemed to be interested only in those SMEs that either possess unique technology or already establishes an economy 
of scale. In other words, for most SMEs that engaged in the traditional pollution or labor intensive industry, the over-
narrow sources of financing is their obstacle for development and further to implement their environmental activities. 
641See generally Smith, A., Kemp, R. and Duff, C. “Small Firms and the Environment: Factors that Influence Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises’ Environmental Behaviour” in Hillary, R. (Ed.) Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
and the Environment: Business Imperatives (Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, UK, 2000) See also Tilley F. “The Gap 
between the Environmental Attitudes and the Environmental Behaviour of Small Firms” (1999) Business Strategy 
and the Environment 8 (4): 238–248; Huang X, Brown A. “An Analysis and Classification of Problems in Small 
Business” (1999) International Small Business Journal 18 (1): 73–85; Rutherfoord R, Blackburn RA, Spence LJ. 
“Environmental M anagement and the Small Firm–An International Comparison” (2000) International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Behavior and Research 6(6): 310–325. 
642  The primary reason for this is perhaps that their product (mainly phosphate raw materials and intermediary 
phosphate chemicals) do not face consumers directly. This implies that neither do the consumers have any pressure to 
put on corporations to oblige them to adopt environmental activities, nor do the corporations try to improve their 
strategies to inform their consumers. 
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of Miracle’s on-site technical assistance, it was found that in many cases the 
improvement of environmental performance is not as complicated or costly as 
entrepreneurs often contemplate. The training process is more like a timely review of 
these SMEs’ former bad habits, and it is often surprising to find that one small change 
would lead to big difference in cost reduction, higher efficiency, or environmental 
improvement.  
 
For example, coal is the most widely used fuel in China, for most SMEs, they are 
accustomed to purchase the high sulphur coal which generates great amount of Sulphur 
Dioxide (“SO2”) into the atmosphere. In fact on the market there is low sulphur coal 
available, which is only RMB20 (about US$2.5) per ton higher than high sulphur coal. 
These coals have undergone the desulphurization process, which makes them more 
efficient and generate much less SO2. In fact after the training many SMEs turn to 
purchase low sulphur coal because they realize it is more cost-efficient for them to do 
so.  
 
In one visited phosphate factory (see Photo 1), the manager let the factory’s wasted 
water to discharge directly to nearby river without any treatment. In fact these waters 
can be reserved and circulated to cool the boilers and machines. In small scaled 
factories, to construct a waste water reserve pool together with circulation system (see 
Photo 2) only costs around RMB 2000 (US$250). One small such effort would result in 
not only substantial water saving but also improvement in safe production as well as 
environment protection.  
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Photo 1 Phosphate workshop of a small scaled factory 
 
Photo 2  Sample of A Circulation Pool of a Small Scaled Phosphate Factory  
 
Photos taken by the author at Mian Zhu, Si Chuan Province, June 2004 
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6.4.2.4.4 Conclusion on the CEC of Domestic SMEs 
 
In summary, the domestic SMEs are a group that currently has the least CEC awareness 
but has the broadest market potential for improvement. The author’s fieldwork indicated 
that although laws play a fundamental role in setting the minimum environmental 
standards that SMEs are obliged to comply, domestic SME’s interest to implement 
environmental activities seemed to be driven by both external pressures such as the 
demand from customers and internal demand such as the access to broader market. 
Unlike MNCs, SMEs in dirty industries often do not face end users directly, but they 
also face pressures from other stakeholders such as buyers, potential investors, and 
competitors. Consequently, the key in improving domestic SME’s CEC lies in the joint 
effort from multi-stakeholders.  
 
In order for SMEs to integrate CEC values into their daily operation, they need both 
financial and technical assistance. In 2002, the promulgation of the long awaited Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises643 has marked a new stage of official promotion of SME development. The 
law provides guidelines on all levels of governments in directing their policies in favor 
of SMEs. These policies are divided into five portions, namely capital support, support 
                                                 
643
 中华人民共和国中小企业促进法 [Law on the Promotion of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises] (effective Jan 
1, 2003) (PRC). 
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on the start of business, support on technology innovations, support on market 
development, and support on social services.644  
 
To provide financial assistance, it is essential to expand the direct financing channels 
for SMEs. In this regard banks shall take a lead in strengthening the direction of credit 
policies and give more credit support to improve the financing environment for SMEs. 
Considering that the main difficulty of SMEs in applying for bank loans is that they are 
often unable to offer adequate security, a new trend in China is the emergence of credit 
guarantee institutions. These institutions not only act as guarantors of SME in respect of 
their applications for bank loans, but also act as the company’s business advisor. Being 
the guarantors, credit guarantee institutions have a direct interest in ensuring the 
sustainable growth of these SMEs. Being the company’s business advisor, these 
institutions are better in a position to influence the SMEs by incorporating CEC into the 
SMEs’ long term business strategies.  
 
To provide technical assistance, a multi-stakeholder approach is generally desired. 
Investors have an important role to play in giving preference to SMEs through making 
socially responsible investment. The buyers, who are sometimes also investors of SMEs, 
have a responsibility to ensure that their suppliers conform to prescribed environmental 
standards. Evidence has shown that there is market for professional bodies to engage in 
the marketing and training of environmental best practice to facilitate SME’s 
sustainable development. Finally, SMEs themselves shall be educated to understand 




CSR as a long term investment rather than cost. After all, there is no uniform way of 
implementing CEC, each company understands the local needs best and has its own best 
practice for CEC. It is to be noted that often the improvement of CEC can be achieved 
at a cost efficient manner.   
 
6.4.2.5 CEC of State-owned Enterprise in China 
 
China’s SOE has historical link with its central planning system. Formerly they were 
the vehicles through which the government carried out economic plans, collected taxes 
and profits, provided social welfare support, and exercised its overall control over the 
society. Since the 1990s the SOE reform had been on the top agenda of the China’s 
economic reform. Unlike those Eastern European countries which simply closed down 
or sold off loss-making state enterprises, China’s strategy has been to let the private 
sector gradually reduce the state’s share of the economy.645 This is to avoid the shock 
caused by drastic reforms, maintain social stability, and in the meantime facilitate the 
SOE’s transformation from the traditional government’s economic arm into profitable 
state-owned corporations. As a result, over the years SOEs have witnessed a declining 
share in industrial output from 64.9% in 1985 to less than 38.04% in 2004.646  
 
Despite this, there should be no underestimation of SOE’s role in China’s national 
economy. So far large and medium SOEs remain the backbone of the industrial sector. 
                                                 
645
 The Economist, Sept 13, 1997, p.22. 
646
 Grace O. M. Lee et al, “The Decline of State Owned Enterprise in China: Extent and Causes”, (1999) City 
University of Hong Kong, <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/sa/working_paper/csop9902.pdf> at 1 Accessed July 15, 2006. 
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Currently there are more than 220,000 industrial SOEs in China. They account for about 
52% of the country’s total assets, 60% of the net fixed assets, and 33.6% of country-
wide employment. 647  In addition, SOEs play a dominant role in the nation’s key 
industries such as oil and gas, mining, machinery, etc. Consider the capital and 
pollution intensive nature of these industries, it is fair to say that SOEs are among the 
nation’s largest sources of industrial pollution. 
 
6.4.2.5.1 Case Study: Tuo River Pollution by the SOE 
 
In March 2004, a serious pollution disaster occurred in the Tuo River of Sichuan 
Province. The cause of the pollution was the continuing release of untreated industrial 
wastewater from Sichuan Chemical Limited Company (“the Company”), a large state-
owned fertilizer factory. The disaster has caused the contamination of water supplies for 
about 1,000,000 people living in the Tuo River region for three months from late 
February to March 2004, and over 1,000 businesses were forced to shut down 
operations during the period. It was anticipated that the total damages caused by the 
pollution were above RMB 300 million (US$37.5 million) and it will take at least five 
years for the Tuo River to recover to its former state.648 
 
In February 2005, two separate criminal trials initiated in the Sichuan Chengdu Jinjiang 
District People’s Court. The first is the prosecution of the three managers of the 
                                                 
647
 Source from: National Statistics Bureau, China Statistics Yearbook 2005 (2005). Percentage calculated by the 
author. 
648 See Xinhua Net, “An Investigation on the Large Scale Tuo River Pollution Accident in Sichuan” 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-04/05/content_1401893.htm> Accessed Feb 9, 2007. 
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Company (the former general manager, deputy general manager and the head in charge 
of environmental safety). They were each charged with causing large-scale pollution to 
the Tuo River region.649 The second trial was the prosecution of three former officials at 
the local EPB, including the former deputy head, who were charged with criminal 
negligence in the monitoring and supervision of environmental protection.650  
 
Compared with the relatively tough stance on the individuals who are responsible for 
the pollution, the administrative liability towards the polluting SOE is much softer. The 
EPB of Sichuan Province ruled the maximum administrative penalty within its power 
against the Company which is only RMB 1 million (US$125, 000). Such penalty was 
significantly less than the estimated costs of RMB 300 million (US$37.5 million) for 
damage actually caused. 
 
More importantly, so far there appears to be an absence of private claims against the 
Company for compensation. The reason is that the Company’s parent corporation, 
which is another SOE, has threatened to liquidate the Company if the Company is sued 
and being ordered to pay full compensation. According to news reports, the local 
government has persuaded the affected peoples and businesses to “have patience and try 
to avoid litigation in order to maintain social stability” because if the Company goes 
into liquidation then thousands of local workers would lose their jobs.651 
                                                 
649
 Under the Criminal Law, if convicted, such crimes could carry a maximum sentence of three years’  imprisonment, 
or if the circumstances are deemed to be particularly serious, the sentence could be up to seven years. Art. 338 of 
Criminal Law (1997), supra note 410. 
650
 Under the PRC Criminal Law, if convicted, such crimes could carry a maximum sentence of three years. See Art. 
397, id. 
651
 Lucille Barale and Lily Wei Zhou, “The Tuo River Pollution Case”  Business Law Bulletins, Disputes and Cases - 
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The “Tuo River Pollution Accident” reflected several important realities on the 
environmental performance of SOEs in China. First, in China most SOEs have 
historically very weak concept of environmental protection. The Company in question 
is a listed SOE with over 40 years’ history but it did not install the pollution treatment 
monitoring facilities as required by law. 652  Evidence shows that the Company’s 
management was aware of the problem as early as February but covered the truth and 
continued to release waste chemicals into the river without reporting to the local EPB. 
Furthermore, it was later found out that the Company had two set of books on its 
environmental performance, the true one is for internal reference and a “cooked” one 
for submitting to the local EPB. When the reporter interviewed the former EHS director 
of the Company, it was admitted that keeping two set of environmental books has been 
the traditional practice for the Company and also the common practice for other SOEs 
within this industry.653 
 
Second, the local EPB has a duty to identify the disaster at an early stage and take 
immediate actions to prevent the accident from escalating. However, the fact that the 
accident was only publicized after more than 20 days of occurrence indicated that the 
local EPBs have been extremely negligent in monitoring the pollution SOEs within the 
region. Furthermore, given that the Company is the top 5 large chemical enterprise in 
Sichuan, it would be unacceptable for the EPB to claim that it did not know the 
                                                                                                                                               
(2005), <http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/default.asp?Page=5&F=F&SID=4375&M=2&Y=2005> Accessed 
Feb 9, 2007. 
652




Company hadn’t installed the pollution treatment monitoring facilities, as it is clearly in 
violation of the “Three Synchronous” principle as required by law.654 
 
Finally, the role of the government as the mediator to avoid private actions against the 
Company after the disaster attracts the author’s interest. As owner of the SOE, the 
government has a direct interest in the Company and also suffers as a result of any 
penalties or compensation being paid by the Company. Ironically, the RMB 1 million 
administrative penalties paid by the Company to the government amounts to the money 
being transferred from the government’s left to the right hand. As the regulator, the 
government has to balance the interest of peoples and businesses affected by the 
pollution with that of thousands of workers who are employed by the Company. As a 
result, the government has been active in dealing with the aftermath of the disaster, such 
as ordering the Company to install the necessary environmental protection equipment; 
using significant amounts of government funding to clean up of the Tuo River; 
coordinating various businesses and parties to share the burden of the damages caused; 
and trying to minimize the loss of jobs in the local economy by not forcing the 
Company to liquidate. 
 
The Tuo River Pollution Accident reveals a general lack of CEC among SOEs. Despite 
this, the author’s site visit and interviews with SOE managers revealed that it would be 
irresponsible to draw an easy conclusion that Chinese SOEs do not take their social 
                                                 
654
 Art. 26 of EPL stipulates that: Installations for the prevention and control of pollution at a construction project 
must be “designed, built and commissioned” together with the principal part of the project. No permission shall be 
given for a construction project to be commissioned or used, until its installations for the prevention and control of 
pollution are examined and considered up to the standard by the competent department of environmental protection 
administration that examined and approved the environmental impact statement”. 
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responsibilities seriously. On the contrary, the reason that environmental issues are 
often overlooked by SOEs may be partially explained by the fact that many SOEs have 
traditionally carried excessive social burdens. Living with these social burdens occupies 
large resources of SOE, which causes SOEs to place the environmental issues in a low 
priority compared with other issues. 
 
6.4.2.5.2 Social Burdens of SOE—A Case Study on “Enterprise Society” 
 
Traditionally, as the government’s economic arm, SOEs in China perform many social 
functions that otherwise should be provided by the government. This phenomenon is 
collectively called the “enterprises taking care of society” (qiye ban shehui). In other 
words, rather than being businesses, SOEs were “small societies” (xiaoshehui) and 
undertook all aspects of social welfare functions of within the community.  
 
To give an example of unnecessary social burdens that is borne by SOEs, the author 
visited a typical large-scale SOE group in the mining industry with total assets over 
RMB 5 billion (US$625 million) and employing a workforce of over 10 thousand.655 It 
was found that this SOE provides almost “from cradle to grave” social services to its 
workers and staffs. Apart from providing daily life facilities such as dining, residency, 
groceries, entertainment and hospitals, this enterprise has its own kindergarten, primary 
and middle school which accommodate 4,200 children and supporting staff of over 500. 
Such educational scale and expense amounts to 54% of its municipal government and 
                                                 
655
 For confidentiality reasons, at the request of the SOE group, its name is not disclosed in the thesis. 
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this translate into an annual educational expense of RMB 80 million (US$ 10 million). 
In addition, the SOE also undertakes to keep 20 police stations of the local public 
security bureaus, which employs another 500 people. Moreover, the enterprise was 
asked to “sponsor” different local governmental departments under various items which 
eat up an annual expense of 30 million. Such heavy social burden is not the end of the 
story, the enterprise has to follow the government’s order to donate like “inexhaustible 
charity organizations”,656 to “lend” money often without being told when and in which 
form the money would be repaid; and to absorb the lay-offs in the society despite its 
existing high ratio of redundant labour.  
 
The above example reveals that the SOEs have traditionally shouldered excessive social 
burdens in a sense far beyond or quite divergent from what the modern concept of CSR. 
During the old times when the state controlled most of the society’s assets, SOEs 
provided social welfares to their own “communities” with support from the state by 
ways of land-use, raw materials, bank loans and subsidies. However with the conditions 
of China’s economic reform and the country’s fast transition from a central-planned to a 
market economy, these privileges are gradually being eliminated. As a result, Chinese 
SOEs are facing both intra- and supra- market pressures while still undertaking social 
responsibilities in-proportion to their power. These changes have also influenced the 
way in which SOEs respond to environmental concerns. In the past, any pollution 
charges they paid did not affect their material interests, or the welfare of their 
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 Zhou, M. S. & Sang, X. C, “Diagnosis on the Loss of State-owned Enterprises” (1997) China Reform 5, at 26; 
Also see Kang, Y. F. & Li, S. D., Going to the Market – Problems of Large and Medium-Sized State-owned 
Enterprises and Their Ways Out (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1994). 
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workers.657  However, these charges are now more directly reflected in increases in the 
costs of production and a reduction in profits, thus affecting the interests of SOEs and 
the benefits of their staff. Findings from a survey indicated that on average about 81.6% 
of the net income of SOEs has been submitted to various levels of government through 
profits, taxes and fees, and another 10.2% has been used to repay loans, leaving only 
8.2% to be retained by the enterprises.658   If SOEs spend too much financial and 
management resource on providing public welfare (which is generally regarded as the 
responsibility of the government), then the resource left for environmental protection 
will be minimal. Not surprisingly, many SOEs have tended to downplay their 
responsibility for environmental protection to reduce the costs of production, and to 
protect their profits.  
 
In fact, a comparison between the modern western concept of CSR and the old Chinese 
SOE practice of “enterprise taking care of society” indicates that the two concepts differ 
fundamentally (see Table 15) . 
 
Table 15  Comparison between CSR and “Enterprise Taking Care of Society” 
Content / Gauges Corporate Social Responsibility Enterprise Taking Care of Society 
Societal Base Market Economy Planned Economy 
Beneficiary Stakeholders of Corporation Enterprise Employees and Their Family 
Core Principles Provide Safeguard to Stakeholders’ Interest Provide Social Welfare 
Conduct Authority Laws, Regulations, Private Codes 
of Conduct, etc Policy 
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 Luo, D.R. and Deng, J.X., “Industrial Effluent Fees and Preventing the Industrial ‘Three  Wastes’”  in  L.  Ross  
and M.A. Silk (eds) Environmental Law and Policy in the People’s Republic of China (Quorum 1987), pp. 211–213. 
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 Zhou, supra note 656, at 26. 
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Content / Gauges Corporate Social Responsibility Enterprise Taking Care of Society 
Conduct Mode Economic Behavior Political Behavior 
Conduct Objective Corporate Sustainable Development 
To Comply with the State 
Order 
Bodies of Action Corporation(s) Upper-level Management 
Substance of Conduct To Safeguard and Develop Business Opportunities Unlimited “Lump Work” 
Source of Financing Corporate Operation Capital State Contribution 
Code of Conduct Inner-Corporation Rules and Guidelines Upper Administrative Orders 
Other Participants Corporate and Employees Enterprise Alone 
Consequence of 
Implementation 
Benefiting corporate and the 
society Excessive Social Burden 
Summarized by the author 
 
China’s SOE reform comprises a series of laws and policies which on one hand aim at 
separating the enterprise from the government, on the other hand to maintain a social 
and economic environment that are generally favorable to SOEs. For example, sectors 
in which SOEs have a monopoly are often protected by policies, subsidies in various 
forms are given to SOEs to facilitate their production, marketing and sale, large SOEs 
are given the priority of fund raising through listing on the domestic and foreign stock 
exchange, etc. Despite all these efforts to transform the SOEs from the former 
government’s economic arm into profitable separate legal entities under competitive 
market condition, the historical social burden of SOEs, especially their redundant labour, 
continues to consume SOE’s revenues and restrain SOEs from scientifically allocate 
resources, which makes them uncompetitive in the first place. Western economists even 
consider that as many as 30% to 40% of SOEs working force might be released if the 
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enterprises were to operate on strictly commercial lines.659 The government’s dilemma 
and inability in dealing with redundant labour is illustrated in the following issue study 
of Xiagang.  
 
6.4.2.5.3 Xiagang—A Chinese Way of Lifting Social Responsibility of SOEs 
 
Xiagang (lay-offs) may be described as the Chinese way of reducing labour redundancy 
thereby alleviating SOE’s social burdens during their transitional period. It is a process 
whereby redundant workers are gradually exposed to market conditions rather than 
abruptly becoming openly unemployed. This helps to maintain social stability in the 
course of SOE reform. The problem of Xiagang in China first surfaced in 1993 when 
China’s SOEs attempted to reduce the number of redundant workers and to reassign 
these workers to other jobs within the society. The number of lay-off workers in 1995 is 
only 5.6 million but the figure rose to 16 million in 1998. 
 
The concept of Xiagang workers is in fact very ambiguous. Usually it means that the 
worker has left his post and is not working for the enterprise anymore, but is still related 
to it and is paid allowances by it. However, these workers are free to look for other jobs 
in the market. Usually the central government lays down mandates for local 
governments to deal with the problems of Xiagang workers. In the event of social unrest, 
the central government would blame and even sack local officials in order to placate the 
Xiagang workers. Hence, the social consequences of a sharp increase in Xiagang 
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workers have been regionally contained as their grievances are directed only at their 
employers and local governments, not at the central government which is sometimes 
even viewed as a savior. 
 
Usually lowly educated and middle-aged workers and apprentices are the largest group 
of Xiagang workers. Female workers are also more likely to be laid off. The situation 
then becomes that if SOEs reform quickly, the cut of labour force is inevitable thus 
more workers will join the ranks of Xiagang. However if SOEs do not reform 
themselves quickly, they are likely to be bankrupt. Should that happens; even more 
workers will be laid off, thus creating a vicious cycle of endless massive unemployment.  
 
The Xiagang not only reflects the government’s dilemma in apportioning the lifted 
social responsibilities from SOEs, but also touches upon the core of China’s SOE 
reform, i.e. the government cannot stop propping up the SOEs because of its reliance on 
the role of the SOEs as employers and treasuries, but as long as it keeps propping them 
up the SOEs have little incentive to change. Despite the achievements of China in 
extending exports, attracting foreign investment, and promoting domestic consumption, 
these measures rarely address the root of SOE problem. The government has formerly 
relied too much on SOEs in performing social functions and it comes the difficult time 
for the government to address these historical social burdens.  
 
As a general principle, the government bears principal responsibility to provide public 
welfare which highlights the address of unemployment. In this regard the government is 
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relying on a vibrant growing private sector to share such responsibility. This 
emphasizes the role of the private sector in job creation and absorbing the labour from 
SOEs. In 1999 the Central Committee of the CCP promulgated the Major Issues 
Concerning the Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises.660 This guideline 
instructed the governments at different levels to take measures in facilitating the re-
employment of lay-off workers at other forms of enterprises. In practice, the 
government plays an important role in providing training to lay-off workers to equip 
them with skills for re-employment. Besides, the government apportions the lay-off 
workers to non-public sectors by providing incentives to private businesses such as 
easier incorporation and registration, tax holidays, easier access to bank loans, etc. A 
vibrant private sector is able to create more job opportunities and attract more lay-off 
workers to start their businesses thus become self-employed. 
 
To summarize, Xiagang as a supply-side response can only provide temporary relief to 
the Chinese government in relation to the apportioning of social responsibilities. While 
it attempted to reinvigorate ailing SOEs by reducing their social burden, it did not solve 
the fundamental weakness and problems of SOEs, which had made SOEs uncompetitive 
in the first place. So far all solutions seemed to be stressing on the importance of 
maintaining China’s GDP growth at a satisfactory level. Only at this level can the SOEs 
continue to shoulder excessive social responsibilities, and only at this level can the 
society, especially the private sectors, continue to digest the redundant labour gradually 
released from SOEs.  
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 中共中央关于国有企业改革和发展若干重大问题的决定 [Central Committee of the Communist Party Major 
Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises] (effective Sept 22, 1999) (PRC). 
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6.4.2.5.4 Prescription on the CEC of Chinese SOE 
 
Chinese SOEs are a group which is deeply influenced by the central planned system and 
bureaucracy. As a result, the CEC of Chinese SOEs is to a large extent determined by 
two factors. One is the extent of willingness of SOE management (who are often 
government officials) to make environmental improvements, the other is the availability 
of resources allowed to make such improvements. In the author’s opinion, Chinese 
SOEs, even if they have been transformed from the former government economic arm 
into a separate legal entity under Chinese law, the government’s influence as both the 
owner and upper-level authority may not easily fade away. Under such influences, 
SOEs will continue immingling the social responsibilities that attributed to the 
government and those attributed to the corporations.661 As discussed previously, one of 
the key difference between the Chinese and western concept of CSR is that CSR in 
China lacks the element of multi-stakeholder dialogue, which is commonly recognized 
as the core element of CSR in Western countries. Following this logic, it can be 
expected that only after SOEs become truly independent from the government will they 
be able to initiate meaningful stakeholder dialogue and perform their pertinent social 
responsibilities.  
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and Sinkule, B, “Implementation   of   industrial   water pollution control policies in the Pearl River Delta Region of 
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6.5 Concluding Remarks on the CSR and CEC in China 
 
This chapter is based on the assumption that government and market failure to protect 
the environment might be ameliorated by the self-regulation of enterprises through 
corporate social responsibility, especially the corporate environmental citizenship. In 
business, CSR / CEC is a potentially useful framework for developing and guiding a 
better corporate response to the questions raised by environmental justice, one that 
reflects and respects the competing material claims for all stakeholder groups. As has 
been shown in this Chapter, there exist natural synergies between the principle of 
environmental justice, sustainable development and other existing principles and 
standards in the area of corporate social responsibility.  
 
The author’s fieldwork in China reveals a generally low level of CEC among Chinese 
corporations, although there is evidence of improvement. It was found that different 
companies have different incentives and difficulties to engage in environment activities. 
As a result, MNCs, foreign invested SMEs, domestic SMEs, and SOEs have 
demonstrated different levels of corporate environmental citizenship. Despite this, this 
study also identified some distinguished companies in China that were able to integrate 
the environment protection into their production and further gain a competitive 
advantage via improved energy efficiency, reduced waste, increased recycling, better 
environmental credentials, greater customer satisfaction, new business opportunities, 
and gaining local community support. These companies will make excellent case 
examples for future research in this area. 
 340 
 
The Chapter also discusses possible measures to promote the environmental citizenship 
among Chinese corporations. Generally given the low level of stakeholder activism in 
China, most corporations do not feel as much environmental pressure as in developed 
countries. As a result, few enterprises have the incentive to go beyond the law in 
environmental activities. In this regard, the author suggests a “bottom-up” approach 
which emphasizes on multi-stakeholder dialogue as well as sector-specific initiatives.  
 
In environmental sensitive industries, there is a need for binding sectoral regulation to 
supplement generic guidelines for good corporate environmental management.662 These 
detailed regulatory guidelines would go well beyond procedural issues and set 
minimum sectoral standards for products and processes. MNCs, leading companies in 
the industry and industrial associations in this regard play an important role. They are 
the ones who have the power to shape and negotiate the industrial best practice in the 
context of a changing market. They are also able to influence the environmental 
practices of SMEs through green purchase and education. Once these standards and 
practices become the prevailing industry standard practice, they are reaching the 
maturity of being adopted as sectoral regulations. 
 
In the long run, in order to effect the change there is need for public-private partnership 
(PPP). Over the last decade, the international community has begun to recognize that 
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making a grand promise is easy but is of little value when not followed by effective 
performance. As a result, there is an emergence of large numbers of “partnerships” at 
the Johannesburg Summit as a means to fill the growing “implementation gap” between 
governmental commitments and action.663 According to Scherr and Gregg (2006), the 
“partnership” approach has real promise in providing the often missing “transmission 
belt” between standards and institutions at the international level and political and 
economic decision-making at the national, provincial, state, and local levels. It 
recognizes that governments cannot make change without active engagement with civil 
society in all of its diverse forms. It has been suggested that traditional approaches to 
funding sustainable development were becoming increasingly intermingled with new 
approaches and that the public sector should be a facilitator in incorporating and 
strengthening local capacity, increasing transparency, and encouraging private sector 
participation.664  
 
In the case of China, the partnership framework can take the form of the government 
(and in many cases the EPB) negotiating pollution reduction plans and agreements with 
corporations. This process requires the government to first be open for dialogue and 
seek common interest with private sectors. The dialogue helps the government to 
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identify environmental opportunities, set practical environmental objectives, and fill the 
implementation gaps. In facilitating more corporations to adopt the reduction plans, the 
government shall support technical innovation and promote information sharing. Once 
such agreements are made, the government should send clear signals to industry 
suppliers, policy makers and consumers so that corporations that made environmental 
improvements will receive the understanding and support from the society. Finally, the 
government shall perform its due diligence in monitoring the progress and reward 
achievements through administrative measures. Through the partnership approach the 
author believes the concept of corporate environmental citizenship will be better 





CHAPTER VII  CONCLUSION 
     
This thesis has value in at least three important aspects. First, it is the first systematic 
and interdisciplinary study on the DIM that focuses on the People’s Republic of China. 
The selection of China as the major case for study therefore has not only law and policy 
implications for the country itself, but also for other developing countries that wish to 
emulate China’s development strategies.  
 
Second, this thesis is the first work of this kind that clearly makes the distinction 
between active DIM through foreign investment and passive DIM through international 
trade, and studies their aggregate environmental impact on China. It synthesizes the 
academic theories derived from the debates over trade and environment, investment and 
environment, environment and competitiveness for the construction of a conceptual 
framework to evaluate the environmental impact of DIM on a specific country. It 
broadens the perspective of previous research which generally regard that DIM involves 
only plant relocation of dirty industries from one country to the other.  
 
Third, despite the fact that the academic debate over DIM started as early as 1970s, this 
thesis is the first work of this kind that goes beyond the mere testing of DIM hypothesis 
and further to depict a multi-stakeholder, international and domestic regulatory 
framework on DIM. It not only highlights the necessity for DIM regulation through the 
use of law, but also examines the actual effectiveness of relevant laws, policies and 
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other institutions through the author’s fieldwork in China. The findings and insights of 
this work are therefore of value to policymakers who wish to moderate the adverse 
environmental effects of DIM without sacrificing the state’s continued economic 
growth and international competitiveness. 
 
In the introduction of this thesis the author has listed four major questions that shall be 
addressed by the work. (1) Have dirty industries migrated to China, if yes, which 
industries? (2) Did they migrate because of lax environmental standard in China? (3) If 
the existence of DIM is confirmed, why it requires regulation? (4) How to regulate DIM? 
 
The first question is a question of fact. Chapter III empirically tests the DIM hypothesis 
in the context of China. Based on the data analysis covering a 12-year period from 1995 
to 2006, the author finds that a general trend of DIM from other countries to China has 
not occurred. However, there is strong evidence of both active and passive DIM in 
specific industries, notably the paper manufacturing and fabricated metal products 
manufacturing industries.  
 
The second question in fact contains two sub-questions. Namely, (i) whether China’s 
environmental standards are “lax” compared with that of the home countries of 
migrated industries, (ii) whether China’s environmental laxity is the foreign industries’ 
primary incentive to migrate to China. In chapter five the author examines the domestic 
trade, investment and environmental laws of China. It is found that the “environmental 
gap” between China and other developed countries does exist. However, such gap is not 
 345 
as much reflected in the legislative discrepancies, but in the large institutions which fail 
to effectively monitor violations, enforce the existing laws and regulations, and protect 
the people and environment against damages. All these factors constitute and affect the 
actual environmental compliance cost of foreign enterprises operating in China. With 
regard to the second sub-question, chapter III empirically tests the correlation between 
the active & passive DIM respectively with the stringency in environmental regulation 
in China. The results indicate that certain industries are particularly sensitive to the 
changes in the stringency of environmental regulation. Although the primary incentives 
for these industries’ migraton decision may differ, the empirical result nevertheless 
shows that the environmental stringency is an important influencing factors on their 
migration.  
 
The third question highlights the significance of DIM regulation globally and in China. 
To argue this point the author synthesizes the principle of sustainable development, 
environmental justice, as well as corporate social responsibility. To summarize, it is not 
an ethical manner to achieve one country’s sustainable development through displacing 
the burdens of environmental pollution to other countries. MNCs, being the principal 
carriers of DIM around the world, bear social responsibilities and environmental 
citizenship in the host state and the community in which they operate. 
 
The final question is a complex one. In chapter four the author focuses on the 
international laws and institutions that bear implication on the regulation of DIM. 
Chapter five focuses on the national law of China and conducts a “green” examination 
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on its existing laws and institutions which might provide incentive for DIM. Chapter six 
shifts the perspective from the public to the private sector and studies the regulations by 
multi-stakeholders, in particular the self-regulation by corporations. To summarize, it is 
found that under globalization no single power is capable of effectively regulating DIM. 
What presented here are a multiple sources of power and institutions with regulatory 
authority competing with each other. Furthermore, it is found that in the national 
context of China, different industries, or even different types of enterprises within the 
same industry have demonstrated divergent responses to environmental regulatory 
initiatives. Accordingly, customized solutions to these industries and corporations are 
required. The idea regulatory model of DIM, according to the author, lies in the public-
private partnership. Chapter six has begun to evaluate several of such initiatives 
 
Finally, this work gives rise to some directions of future research in the area of DIM. 
For example, although this thesis focuses on the DIM between countries, there is also 
compelling evidence to show that DIM occurs not only at the inter-state, but also at the 
intra-state level. A representative case is China’s “go west” policy which drives 
substantial PIIs to relocate from the east coastal China to the rural and interior China. 
Such a trend deserves intensive study. Furthermore, with China’s growing global 
purchasing power and outward foreign direct investment, there emerges reasonable 
concern whether there is DIM from China to countries with even less stringent 
environmental standards. If yes, how the global regulation of DIM would accommodate 
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Appendix 1 Framework of Laws on the Environmental Responsibility of 
Corporation in China 
 







 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promoting Clean Production 
(2002) Art. 18,19 
 Environmental Protection Law (1989) Art. 25 
 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste (1995) Art. 17, 30 






 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Conserving Energy (1997) Art. 
11, 22,37 
 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promoting Clean Production 
(2002) Art. 20 
 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 





 Environmental Protection Law (1989) Art. 13, 26 
 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Appraising of Environment 
Impacts (2002) Art. 16, 24, 26 
 Regulation Decree on Chemical Hazardous Products (1987) Art. 8 
 Regulation on the Report and Registration of Pollutants Discharge (1992) 
Art. 4,5,6,11,12 
 Notice of the State Environmental Protection Administration of China on 
Promulgating the Regulation Measures of the Environmental Standards 
(1999) Art. 17 
 Notice of the State Environmental Protection Administration of China on 
Promulgating the Measures for monitoring the Source of Pollution (1999) 
Art. 19 
 Measures for the Completion and Verification of Environmental 






 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of 
Water Pollution (1996) Art. 13,14,23,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,41 
 Provisional Measures on the Management of License on the Discharge of 
Water Pollutants (1988) Art. 12, 13, 18 
 Management Measures on the Environmental Protection and Supervision 
of Waste Water Disposal Facilities (1988) Art. 4,5 
 Marine Environment Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China 




 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Atmospheric Pollution (2000) Art. 12, 20, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39 
 Management Measures on the City Soot Control Zones (1987) Art. 
 388 
Category Laws and Regulations 
 
Control 8,10,11,12 




 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 




 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of 





 Measures for the Administration of the Charging Rates for Pollutant 
Discharge Fees (2003) Art. 2-20, 26 
 Circular of the State Environmental Protection Administration on the 








 Environmental Protection Law (1989) Art. 35,36,37,38,39 
 Decree on the Environmental Protection of Construction Projects (1998) 
Art. 24,25,26,27,28 
 Measures for the Completion and Check of Environmental Protection 
Facilities of Construction Projects (1994) Art. 13 
 Amendment to the Measures for the Administrative Penalties for 
Environmental Protection (2003) Art. 2,6,12,41,42,43 
 Management Measures on the Report and Registration of Pollutant 
Discharge (1992) Art. 12 
 Measures on the Movement of Hazardous Wastes (1999) Art. 13 
 Management Measures on the Environmental Protection and Supervision 
of Waste Water Disposal Facilities (1988) Art. 9 
 Measures for the Administration of the Charging Rates for Pollutant 
Discharge Fees (2003) Art. 21-25 
 Measures for the Completion and Verification of Environmental 
Protection Facilities of Construction Projects (1994) Art. 14 
 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Atmospheric Pollution (2000) Art. 46-63 
 Provisional Regulations on Environmental Protection In Cases of Wastes 
Importation (1996) Art.27-30 
 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste (1995) Art. 59-72 
 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of 
Water Pollution (1996) Art.37-43 
 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Conserving Energy (1997) Art. 
42-48 
 Implementation Rules on Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (2000) Art. 38-48 
Source: the author’s law review, Institution of Environment and Development, Corporate Social 
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Li Zhijian Guangzhou BizDao 
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One of China’s largest 
international non-ferrous 
mining company, engaged 
in all aspects of geological 
survey, design and 
research, engineering and 
construction for N/M 


































The Company was 
originally a SOE and was 
acquired by a Hong Kong 
company in 2003. The 
Company’s main business 
is to process coal extracted 
from the Huaibei Coal 
Mining area into coke. The 
Company’s coke is 























The Company engaged in 
the development, 





















The company is a joint 
venture between German 
MNC Philips, Korean 
MNC LG, and Chinese 
Ancai Group. The joint 
venture supplies LCD 
























The Company applies its 
patented product—XGK 
roller to process raw steel 
into rolled products as per 
specification and need 




























Industry Nature Location Company Infomation Contact 
Ltd. SME manufacturer in China. 
The company supply 




































manufactures wheels for 
motorcycles, ATVs and 
cars. The company is a key 
supplier to two major 
MNCs namely, Honda (the 
largest motorcycle 
manufacturer in the world) 
and Carlisle (the No.1 
manufacturer of ATV 
wheels in the USA). 
Exports to MNCs account 
for 50% of the Company’s 
































The Company engages in 
the manufacture of 
thermoelectric cooling 
systems to tailor different 
cooling needs. The 
Company received private 
investment from an 
unknown Singapore 
































The Company is one of the 
largest producer of O-
phenyl phenol (a chemical 
intermediate) and organic 
silicon in China. The 
Company is key supplier 
to more than 10 MNCs 
including German Bayer, 





























The Company specialized 
in producing Digital Video 
Network Displayer 
(DVnD) and other 
telecommunications 





































cotton fabrics, textile 
dying, weaving, design and 
cloth-making. The 
Company’s clothing 
products are exported to 
more than 20 countries 
through its distribution 































The Company is a super-
large chemical enterprise 
group founded in 1993 
upon the approval of the 
State Council. It engages 
in a wide range of 
research, production, 
trading and investment in 
the chemical industry in 




































The Company is the joint 
venture between German 
MNC BASF and Chinese 
MNC Sinopec. Founded in 
2000, the Company 
engages in a wide range of 
petrochemical products & 
services and is the key 




























The Company specializes 
in producing phosphate-
related chemical products. 
Half of the Company’s 
products is exported to 
countries including EU, 
Japan and Korea. 
Li Xiang, 
the 
Company’s 
environmen
tal adviser 
 
 
